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ABSTRACT 
Making extensive use of British official sources, this thesis traces the origins, 
development, and eventual dereliction of the idea of a restored Arab caliphate amongst 
British imperialists in the Middle East during the Great War. The thesis describes how 
Britain, as the European imperial power with the greatest number of Muslim subjects, 
became especially sensitive to the Ottoman Empire's attempts to compensate for European 
encroachment by extending the religious authority of the sultan-caliph into territories 
outside the Empire. There is emphasis on the fact that, with the weakening of the Ottoman 
Empire towards the end of the nineteenth century, and moves towards autonomy in the 
Arab provinces, the return of the caliphate to Arabia appeared to the British as more or less 
inevitable. 
The thesis demonstrates how British Islamophobia intensified with the prospect of war and 
more so once Turkey joined the Central Powers, since what Britain feared most was the 
manipulation of the caliphate by an imperial adversary. The thesis goes on to show how 
British imperialists based in Cairo and Khartoum sought to extend their empire through the 
endorsement of an Arab caliphate, which, they hoped, would prevent the forces of pan- 
Islam being turned against them while providing a faqade behind which Britain could 
obtain exclusive control of the region. Of key significance to the account is the coincidence 
of this predisposition with Turkish moves to undermine the tenure of the current Sharif of 
Mecca, since this provided the principal elements of a collaborative alliance in which the 
latter's supposed standing within Islam made him an ideal candidate for future Arab caliph. 
Upon this supposition an Arab rebellion against the Turks with British support was 
planned. 
The currency of the idea during the months prior to the Arab Revolt of 1916-18 is 
explained in terms of the abstract logic of a scheme of British rule 'behind the veil of 
Islam. ' This is followed by an explanation of how, in practice, the Revolt proved to be the 
undoing of the idea, in part because the Islamic religious credentials which had attracted 
the British to Sharif Husayn actually precluded them from aiding him openly and directly. 
Finally, it is shown how the limitations inherent in the Sharif's position within the Arabian 
social-economic system rendered him completely unsuited to the collaborative project to 
which he had been assigned. 
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The fearful ghost which, if the bravest man in 
Europe saw it even in his sleep, would cause 
him to rise in fear and panic. 
Shaykh Muhammad Bakhit on the caliphate, 1926. 
Most people have heard of the pan-Islamic 
movement, especially during the War. Some of 
us have called it a political bogey and some a 
world-menace, but these are extremist views- 
it is really the practical protest of Moslems 
against the exploitation of their spiritual and 
material resources by outsiders. 
G. Wyman Bury, 1919. 
Note on Transliteration 
The transliteration systems used have been applied to the main text, excluding quoted 
material. That part of the footnotes relating to primary source references is presented as per 
the original; however, comments and further information which have been added by the 
candidate are consistent with the systems applied to the main text. 
The MESA (Middle Eastern Studies Association of North America) system has been used 
for the spelling of Arabic technical terms, personal names and most place names, except 
that no distinction has been made between the two forms of d, h, s, t or z, and long vowels 
have not been distinguished from their short variants. 'Ayns ['] and harnzas ['] are, 
therefore, the only diacritical marks employed. Commonly accepted English forms are 
used for some place names, for example, Cairo, Mecca, Medina. Only technical terms 
which do not appear in the second edition of the Oxford English Dictionary are italicised. 
A similarly modified MESA system has been applied to Ottoman Turkish technical terms, 
personal and place names, a cedilla [q] in place of the letter tchin being the only diacritical 
mark used. The designation 'Constantinople' rather than 'Istanbul' is used throughout. 
Except for consistency, no system has been applied to the few names and terms which 
derive from the languages of Afghanistan and the Indian sub-continent. 
CHAPTER 1: The 'Idea of an Arab Caliphate': 
Determininp, the Nature of the Subiect Matter 
1.0 Introduction 
This thesis is about the part played by the idea of an Arab caliphate in the formation and 
execution of British Middle Eastern policy during the First World War. Except for its 
treatment as a subsidiary issue in relation to the 'Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, ' 
there is little existing literature devoted to the issue of the British scheme for the transfer of 
the caliphate from Turkey to Arabia which emerged in response to the exigencies of the 
Great War. This thesis aims to redress this default, first, by demonstrating the centrality of 
the idea, and, secondly, by explaining its trajectory, that is, the origins, development and 
ultimate decline of the idea in British imperial thinking. The remainder of this chapter is 
devoted to establishing a mode of explanation appropriate to the subject matter in relation 
to the objectives of the thesis set out below. 
1.01 The Obiective of the Thesis 
The thesis being propounded here may be stated as follows: 
Firstly, that the idea of an Arab caliphate during the First World War was neither 
incidental, peripheral nor an aberration in relation to British policy making in the Middle 
East. Rather, the idea was a crucial factor at the very foundation of British policy during 
the first half of the war with consequences thereafter, being based on a coherent, if abstract 
and ultimately unrealisable, vision of 'Oriental'/Islamic society. 
Secondly, that the idea of a revived Arab caliphate was neither imposed on 'the Arabs' 
unilaterally, nor did it arise primarily due to a fundamental misapprehension concerning 
the nature of the institution on the part of the British. Rather, the idea was worked out 
conjointly between British imperialists serving in the region and certain individuals 
representing (or purporting to represent) the nascent pan-Arab and Arab nationalist 
tendencies. The respective parties were in need of a 'principle of unity' which would 
facilitate either, a nominal Arab independence and sovereignty in combination with 
effective British control, or a degree of British involvement in support of something 
closely resembling Arab independence. The inherent possibilities for the convergence of 
these two positions are self-evident. The idea of a revived Arab caliphate was, therefore, an 
instrument of collaboration between the British imperial ruling class and certain elements 
of the Arab 61ite. 
The idea of a revived Arab caliphate originated in response to the pan-Islamic propaganda 
which emerged in the context of the relative decline of the Ottoman Empire in the I 91h 
century, and was sustained by a more general paranoia amongst imperial powers 
concerning trans-national and extra-territorial political forces. However, the idea retained 
currency since it served the intentions and interests of both British expansionism and of 
certain tendencies within the Arab movement, and was facilitated by its adaptability and 
reinforced on account of its internal coherence, noted above. 
Thirdly, that in spite of its coherence at the ideological level the British project of a revived 
Arab caliphate was not ultimately realised - primarily because it was incompatible with the 
underlying social-structural capacities which both British imperialists and certain pan- 
Arabists wished to exploit. Besides which, the British idea contained a central 
contradiction. This being that the precise reasons underlying Britain's initial preference for 
Sharif Husayn amongst Arab leaders as a collaborative partner (specifically, his presumed 
pre-eminence within Islam based on his supposed eligibility for the caliphate) were the 
very reasons for which Britain later felt unable to intervene directly on his behalf. 
1.02 Some Anti-theses 
The first of the above sub-theses stands in direct opposition to what may be inferred from 
Elie Kedourie's monumental work, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, ' regarding the issue of 
1 Kedouric, 1976. 
2 
the caliphate in British thinking. It should be emphasised, however, that it has not been the 
primary objective of this study to take issue with Kedourie's treatment of Britain's 
caliphate policy. Any criticism of him here is as incidental to the main aims of this thesis 
as the matter of the caliphate was to his own exposition. Nevertheless, it is precisely this 
effective marginalisation (to the point of dismissal) of British deliberations concerning the 
caliphate during the Great War which is distinctly at odds with the conclusions of this 
thesis. Consequently, some criticism of Kedourie's argumentation on a number of specific 
points has been unavoidable. 
The second and third sub-theses are a challenge to the implicit essentialism of Edward 
Said's Orientalism, and to the anti-foundationalism and epistemological relativism 
engendered by Michel Foucault's power/knowledge approach 
2, respectively. The former 
has tended to view European imperialism in the Middle East as the effect of the particular 
set of preconceptions which constitute 'orientalism. ' The second tendency treats power as 
an irreducible category not explicable in any other terms and considers that 'knowledge' 
may not be evaluated according to its 'ability more or less accurately to characterize 
independently existing states of affairs. 93 The possible relevance of Said to any study of the 
relationship between a European imperial power and the Middle East is immediately 
obvious and requires no further elaboration here. Regarding Foucault, besides his being 
one of Said's two declared theoretical sources (the other being Gramsci) any theory 
dealing with the articulation of power and knowledge is, at least, ostensibly applicable to 
any consideration of an imperial power's representations of the Middle East. However, 
neither Said's predominantly 'intertextual' method, nor the Foucauldian approach upon 
which he purports to rely, are conducive to explaining the rise and fall of the idea of a 
revived Arab caliphate in British Middle Eastern policy. While the first does not permit 
reference to factors extraneous to the self-contained history of British representations of 
Islam and the caliphate, the second restricts one to describing the juxtaposition of elements 
interior to the all-encompassing domain of power/knowledge. 
Broadly, the postmodern and post-colonial are rejected for their dogmatic abjuration of 
class analysis. While it would be quite uncontroversial to assert that it was not, for 
2 Works on Foucault are legion; however, Nick J. Fox has produced a brief critical assessment of the 
usefulness of the various Foucauldian approaches for the social sciences which is sympathetic to the aims of 
this thesis. Fox, 1998. 
3 
example, the Yorkshire miner who set out to subjugate the Syrian fallah, such an obvious 
fact has serious implications for any analysis such as Said's which, except in terms of 
culture and ethniCity, 4 takes no account of the internal differentiation of the societies 
concerned. There is an alternative: in a more recent context Said Aburish opined that 'the 
common enemy' of 'the West and the Arab elite' is 'the Arab people. 5 There is not, 
however, even the faintest acknowledgment of such a possibility in Edward Said's 
Orientalism. 6 Like the object of his critique, Said relies entirely on the unstated metaphor 
of an al I -encompassing binary opposition 
7 according to which one discrete object, either 
'the West' or one of its representative powers, imposes itself upon the other, 'the East. ' 8 In 
this way, rather than negating them, Said abstracts from orientalism its major tropes. In 
fact, Orientalism's assimilation of the essentialism found in orientalism itself has long 
been recognised9. 
Following from Said, post-colonialists in general have not only placed great 'emphasis on 
an epistemological break between colonizer and colonized, ' but tend towards the view that 
'the discontinuities between [their] interests ... make a coherent 
history of their exchanges 
virtually impossible. "o Thus the implications of collaborative arrangements based on a 
coincidence of ruling class or 61ite interests across cultures are simply excluded from 
analysis a priori. " Collaborative arrangements with fractions of subject societies, it will be 
argued later, constitute the very modus operandi of imperialism, and a generality in 
relation to which Britain's involvement in the issue of the caliphate is only one instance. 
3 Callinicos, 1989b, pp. 81-2. 
4 Thomas, 1994, p. 24. Interestingly, the only occasion on which Said treats class exploitation is when the 
difference between exploiter and exploited is also an ethnic one, and the exploitation occurs overseas. Said, 
1993, p. 69. 
5 Aburish, 1997, p. 3 1. Unfortunately, this assertion too treats 'the West' as undifferentiated. 
6 MacKenzie, 1995, p. 35. While the terms 'Britain' and 'the British' will be used regularly throughout this 
thesis, it should be clear from the context that what is being referred to is some section of, or function within, 
the imperial ruling class and not to British subjects in their entirety. The term 'imperialist' is used to refer to 
any person purposefully engaged in the running of an empire. 
7 MacKenzie, 1995, p. 20. 
8 Ahmad, 1994, P. 183. 
9 al-'Azm, 1981, p. 6; John M. MacKenzie cited in, Macfie, 2002, p. 135; Ahmad, 1994, pp. 182 & 183. 10 Hamilton, 1996, pp. 176-7. Notwithstanding the misuse of the original Bachelardian/Althusserian term 
pertaining to discontinuities within a single development (Majumdar, 1995, pp. 30-37), the sense here of a 
lateral discontinuity between distinct developments is adequately conveyed. See Note 65, below. 
Furthermore, this quotation illustrates the difference between a relativist and a relational approach. See Note 
82, below. 
11 Such lacunae are legion amongst the subaltern studies and post-colonialist schools of thought, for example 
in: Homi Bhabha cited in, Moore-Gilbert, 1997, pp. 121 & 168; Spivak, 1990, p. 27; Bhabha again, quoted 
in, Ahmad, 1995, p8. 
4 
Regarding Edward Said's fetishisation of 'the text, ' exemplified by his belief in the 
autonomous transmission of 'knowledge' between texts which is assumed to take place 
independently of the authors' conscious intentions, it need only be said that the 
historiographical chapters of this thesis are replete with examples of individuals 
consciously selecting from alternative texts according to their current interests and 
objectives. In addition, the findings of this thesis run counter to Said's failure to 
acknowledge 'the contribution made by the intelligentsia of the colonized countries 
concerned to the formation of western textuality. ' 12 
It has already been said that, on theface of it, Foucault's concept of power/k-nowledge is 
eminently suited to the analysis of imperialism. It is impossible to imagine an instance of it 
(imperialism) where power is not exercised and knowledge not applied, simultaneously. 
Since the vague, though undoubtedly correct, idea that 'wherever there is knowledge there 
is power' is at least as old as Francis Bacon' 3 and in the present era something of a 
philosophical banality, it must be assumed that Foucault meant something more. The first 
thing to be said about the idea of power/knowledge, is that there is some ambiguity and 
indeterminacy in his own, not to mention his adherents, ' demonstrations of it. The problem 
revolves around whether we should be thinking about 'power/knowledge' or 'power- 
knowledge. ' The distinction is not merely typographical. Since, on the one hand, Foucault 
talks about a correlation 14 between 'power relations' and 'fields of knowledge, ' and yet 
elsewhere we are told that knowledge/power is 'a phenomenon that cannot be reduced 
simply to either component, ' 15 and that 'knowledge ... presuppose[s] and constititte[s] at 
the same time power relations. ' 16 
The first version cited, being an internally differentiated construct, at least admits of a 
relationship and, at first sight, looks more promising. However, by assuming a priori some 
kind of correspondence between power and knowledge the nature of the relationship in a 
given instance is determined in advance of any inquiry. The second variant, which 
postulates an identity between the two terms, precludes all theorising of any relationship 
between power and knowledge since knowledge is power and vice versa, and is therefore 
12 Macrie, 2002, p. 126. 13 Francis Bacon, 'De Haeresibus', Meditationes Sacrae, 1597, quoted in, Tripp, 1976, p. 337. 14 Foucault, 1979, pp. 27-28. 15 Fox, 1998, p. 416. 16 Foucault, 1979, p. 32. 
5 
unlikely to prove helpful in analysing or explaining actual instances of either. If applied to 
the subject matter in hand, either formulation would seem to rule out questions about the 
precise nature of the relationship between, firstly, British imperialism as a source of power 
and generator of interests in the Middle East, and secondly, British vision and knowledge 
concerning Middle Eastern society. According to one commentator Foucault 'is not 
interested in explaining why things change, only in identifying points of discontinuity and 
describing various systems of power/knowledge. ' 17 More importantly, as the conclusion of 
this thesis will indicate, power and knowledge are not necessarily equipollent. 18 
1.03 The Approach Adopted 
It should be pointed out that it has not been the main purpose of this thesis to undertake a 
philosophical engagement with postmodernism or post-colonialism. Rather the aim is to 
contribute some evidence, in relation to a specific historical instance, towards a more 
empirically grounded theory of 'imperial knowledge' in its relationship with imperial 
practice. The aim, in other words, is to reassert the notion that for the historian as well as 
the imperialist 'empirical evidence ... imposes 
inescapable limits on all theorising. " 9 
Having outlined what are thought to be the deficiencies in a Saidian-Foucauldian approach 
to the task of explaining the trajectory of Britain's relationship with the idea of a revived 
Arab caliphate, this chapter will proceed, in the first instance, by way of a brief discussion 
of the nature of the subject matter. A more grounded and dialectical approach will be 
developed in the remainder of his chapter by reference to two social-historical theories 
which, it is hoped, will facilitate an explanation of the origins, currency, and ultimate 
failure of Britain's caliphate adventure. The first of these is Ronald Robinson's theory of 
collaborative imperialism which is predicated on the fundamental and far-reaching 
observation that extensions of empire are invariably achieved by obtaining mutually 
beneficial arrangements with local agents. Although treated here as a theory of 'imperial 
modalities' - specifically, the political techniques which constitute the ubiquitous practice 
of imperial collaboration - rather than a theory of imperialism as such, Robinson's theory 
17 Best, 1995, p. 219. 
18 'Equipollent' combines 'co-extensive' with 'co-efficient. ' This terms is preferred to 'equivalent' which 
carries connotations of interchangeability, and correspondence of essence, rather than a correspondence of 
general effect and seems to accord with Foucault's own understanding. 
19 Callinicos, 1995, p. 94. 
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is considered to contain a number of acutely useful insights. It will be suggested that, shorn 
of its more extravagant claims, his theory may be refined to take account of the distinct 
functions of collaborator and informant 20 in such a way that introduces the factors of 
knowledge and interests to the collaborative framework. It will be argued that this more 
modest version of Robinson's theory requires augmentation by a true theory of imperialism 
in a manner which relates the somewhat common practice of collaboration to the 
possibilities for action - political, economic and military - inherent in the particular social 
structures under examination. This will be achieved by a brief exposition of Alex 
Callinicos' theory of structural capacities which reconciles a conventional theory of agency 
with the constraining and enabling factor of social structure. The theoretical section will be 
completed by a cursory reference to Lenin's theory of imperialism with particular regard to 
its implications for explanations based on an over-estimation of the self- actuali sing 
capacity of imperial romanticism. 
1.04 Conceptual i si n-g the Caliphate of Islam 
The caliphate of Islam per se is the subject of this thesis only to the extent that it was 
treated by British imperialists in the development and implementation of their Middle 
Eastern policy during the Great War. Nevertheless, some elementary appreciation of the 
historical phenomenon of the caliphate is necessary. The brief survey of its origins and 
development, which follows, is undertaken in order to apprehend its nature for the 
purposes of pursuing the objectives of this thesis as set out in the introductory section of 
this chapter. However, as the summary overview will illustrate, there are many possible 
ways of conceiving the caliphate: as a dynamic tradition, an enduring institution, an 
evolving ideology, a discourse, an unfolding religious doctrine, or the effect of 
transformations in secular power (political and economic). There would seem to be no 
good reason for settling exclusively on any one of these as long as it is understood that 
there is no essential caliphate, no single model by which any actual or proposed instance of 
it may be judged authentic or counterfeit. This point is of paramount importance when it 
comes to explaining the failure of the British caliphate project, one possibility being that 
the British misunderstood its 'true' nature. This is not to descend into radical relativism but 
20 It is important to note that these terms are, in no way, meant to carry the connotations of either 'quisling' 
or 'grass, ' respectively. 
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to acknowledge the variable and indeterminate nature of the phenomenon under 
examination. It will be argued that none of the aspects of the caliphate enumerated below 
should be treated in isolation but only within their full range of concatenations. The 
importance of a 'totalising' approach will be reiterated in a later section. 
The opening sentence of Wilfred Madelung's authoritative study of the foundation of the 
caliphate is remarkable only in its restraint: 'No event in history has divided Islam more 
profoundly and durably than the succession to Muhammad. 92 1 Except for the fact that in 
Arabic the term khalifah means 'successor' (in this case, of God's messenger) 22 there is 
little about the caliphate that is agreed upon even by Muslims. The term appears several 
times in the Qur'an in connection with the inheritance and succession of past prophets 
(Adam, -David, etc. ) but nowhere in relation to future provision. 23 The only consensus 
which existed at the time of the Prophet's death, therefore, was over the need for a 
successor to Muhammad, there being immediate and, on occasions, violent24 disagreement 
over who should be the first caliph. During the period of the first four 'rightly-guided' 
caliphs there were divisions between those who insisted that the caliph be a member of the 
Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh, and those who would have preferred a candidate from the 
wider community of Islam. Others favoured a caliph from Muhammad's clan, the Banu 
Hashim. Whereas the latter based their arguments on the traditions of inheritance and 
succession cited in the Qur'an in relation to former prophets, the opposing party believed 
that Muhammad's designation as 'the seal of the prophets' meant that strictures of 
customary practice no longer applied, 25 so leaving the field wide open. 
It may be said that the dispute over the succession was neither purely, nor even primarily, 
doctrinal (in the sense of theological-exegetical) since the interpretation of the scriptures 
preferred by the concerned parties depended on their relationship to Muhammad and their 
place in his prophetic career. The underlying issue, in the first instance, was over who 
should rule the cities of Mecca and Medina and was soon followed by deliberations over 
the fitness of the Quraysh to lead the Arabs. 
21 Madelung, 1997, p. 1. 
22 Enayat, 1982, p. 6. 
23 Madelung, 1997, p. 6. 
24 Ibid., P. 144. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
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From its inception, then, the principal considerations surrounding the caliphate were 
political rather than rel igi ous- ideological, acceptance or rejection of traditions of 
inheritance being subordinated to political expediency. The result of such disputes over the 
succession was such that within a quarter of a century of the Prophet's death Islam was 
irrevocably divided by civil war. Subsequently, the majority who accepted Qurayshite 
supremacy came to be known as Sunnis (meaning followers of tradition); those preferring 
a Hashimite caliph and the succession of the fourth caliph, 'Ali, were known as the Shi'a 
(etymologically, 'followers') of 'Ali. An earlier faction, the Khawarij (seceders) supported 
the right of all Muslims to elect the most suitable successor. 26 Thereafter, doctrinal 
differences emerged between these traditions with the result that the caliphate became a 
predominantly Sunni institution 27 and remained so until its abolition in 1924. 
The period of the Rashidun ended with the assassination of 'Ali, though, after the first civil 
war the majority of Muslims were united in AD 661 under the caliphate of Mu'awiya, the 
founder of the Umayyad dynasty. 28 Under the Umayyads, now based in Damascus, Islam 
continued to expand especially in the West 29 until, in AD 750, the caliphate passed to the 
Abbasid dynasty. The precise reasons for this are not apposite here, though it is pertinent to 
what follows that, once established, the dynasty legitimised its rule by reference to its Banu 
Hashim lineage. 30 The Abbasid caliphs resided in Baghdad for about 500 years until the 
city was sacked by the Mongols in AD 1258, however the period of their reign 
encompasses what is conventionally considered to have been the apex of Islamic 
civilisation only to be followed by its decadent disintegration. By the early 10 'h century, 
besides the autonomous Turkish and Persian states which existed outside the empire, a new 
non-Sunni, Fatimid caliphate had emerged in Cairo and it became evident that the 
Abbasids could no longer guarantee the unity of the Sunni Islam. 31 Consequently the 
Umayyad Amir of Cordoba declared a rival caliphate in AD 928.32 
26 Enayat, 1982, pp. 6-7. 
27 The most notable exception being the Shi'i Fatimid caliphate (AD 910-117 1) which established its rule in 
Egypt. 
28 Hawting, 1986, p. 1. 
29 It was under the Umayyads that Muslim campaigns reached the Frankish Merovingian towns of Sens and 
Poitiers in AD 721 and AD 732, respectively. 
30 Hawting, 1986, pp. 109-11. 
31 Enayat, 1982, p. 10. 
32 Arnold, 1924, p. 58. 
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Hitherto, there had been little by way of an Islamic theory of the caliphate since the unity 
and dynamism of Sunni Islam had obviated the need for sustained self-examination. 
Whereas the first four (Rashidun) caliphs had been elected, the Umayyads and Abbasids 
were dynasties in the conventional sense. It was Mu'awiya's passing of the caliphate to his 
son which established the contrast with the Rashidun caliphs. 33 This gave rise to the 
distinction between 'caliphate' (khilafa) and 'kingship' (mulk) based on the notion that a 
caliph should be chosen after consultation with the representatives of Islam, however 
defined, whereas kingship was an arbitrary office based on force. 
It was during the Abbasid decline that the first theories of the caliphate were expounded. 
Mawardi and Ghazzali, writing in the I 11h and 12'h centuries AD respectively, 
acknowledged political power as a criterion for office equal to piety and adherence to the 
norms of religion, and accepted that the caliph's right to rule ended whenever and 
wherever power had passed to a local amir. Although Mawardi reaffirmed, in theory, the 
caliph's 'authority over the entire range of Muslim public life 34 he also indicated how 
'accepted Sunni theory ... could be reinterpreted and 
developed so as to take account of 
existing power relationships. 05 Ghazzali went further by conceding that the caliphate no 
longer conferred authority but merely gave legitimacy to rights already obtained by force. 
Sometime after the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, during its nominal tenure 
in Cairo under the Mamelukes, another theorist, lbn Jama'ah, declared that military power 
was the sole criteria of possession. 36 In each instance these theorists were merely recasting 
theory in the light of changing circumstances thereby legitimising each new status quo as it 
emerged. Remarkably it was such theorists upon whom those debating the future of the 
caliphate after its abolition in 1924 relied, 37 there being little new thinking on the subject to 
have gained acceptance amongst the overwhelming majority of learned Muslims during the 
intervening period. 38 
33 Hawting, 1986, pp. 12-14. 
34 Black, 2001, p. 87. 
35 Ibid., p. 89. 
36 Enayat, 1982, pp. 10- 11. 
37 Ibid., p. 14. 
38 Rashid Rida was undoubtedly an exception, though he too began with the theories of Mawardi and 
Ghazzali. Enayat, 1982, Ch. 3. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Raziq's view, on the other hand, that politics was no business of 
Islam, was rejected as heresy. Enayat, 1982, pp. 62-66. Although 'Abd-al-Raziq was attacked on doctrinal 
grounds it seems likely that his views were found unacceptable because they were thought to serve the 
interests of European imperialism. Hourani, 1983, p. 189. 
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In due course the caliphate was appropriated by the Ottoman Sultans, though the occasion 
and manner of the original transfer from the last, nominal, Abbasid caliph in AD 1517 is 
the subject of conjecture, claim and counter-claim. The legitimacy of the Ottoman 
caliphate was vulnerable from the outset it being the first dynasty to attain the office which 
could not reasonably claim Qurayshite descent. This factor would not prove critical until 
the late I 9th and early 201h century when certain Arabs, aided and abetted by a European 
imperial power, began to propose an alternative. 
As Hamid Enayat concludes: 'So far as the Sunni thinking on the Caliphate enjoyed any 
continuity and sequence, one can detect in it a pronounced sense of realism, an eagerness 
to adjust theory to practice. '39 Notwithstanding the endless tailing of practice by theory, a 
number of customs and validating procedures have come to be associated with the 
legitimate possession of the caliphate. Apart from the criteria of Qurayshite descent and 
political effectiveness which have already been mentioned there has been also a degree of 
consensus concerning consultation of the community of Islam and the election of caliphs, 
though invariably these have been somewhat ritual and perfunctory processes in practice. 
Other criteria insisted upon by some commentators have included possession of certain 
relics associated with the person of the Prophet, and effective rule over the Holy Places. 
The latter came to prominence with the emergence of the Arab movement and again when 
Turkey lost effective control of the Hijaz during the Great War. 
Finally, even though, as Fred Halliday has pointed out, 'The fact that proponents of the 
religion claim something is no reason whatsoever to accept it, 00 the evidence of the 
Islamic theorists cited above amounts to an acceptance that, notwithstanding the supposed 
duties of the caliph, the caliphate is what anyone powerful enough to lay more or less 
exclusive claim to it says it is. 41 It follows from this that the caliphate would endure as long 
as there was a single ruler who could effectively lay such a claim. The historical record 
suggests that later theorists have invariably favoured past doctrines which best serve a 
particular regime or candidacy - an observation which will be of particular significance 
39 Enayat, 1982, p. 10. 
40 Halliday, 1995, p. 208. 
41 The issue of the relationship between the secular and the religious in Islam has not been taken up here. 
Suffice it to say that according to Enayat politics was rarely theorised separately from religion by Muslims 
before European encroachment at the end of the I 81h century. Enayat, 1992, p. 3. This is not to say, however, 
that the distinction between religion and politics had no place in the actual, historical 'Muslim world. ' Black, 
200 1, pp. 38,82 & 87. 
when it comes to analysing the relationship between British imperialists and the local 
informants upon whom they relied in the course of developing their Islamic policy. 
1.05 Issues Arising from the Sources Used 
Although the thesis outlined makes reference to the indigenous social-structural constraints 
imposed on the realisation of imperial will and vision, except for a very brief recourse to 
secondary theoretical material dealing specifically with such issues, the evidence presented 
is derived almost entirely from official British sources. Consequently, British archives 
recording British perceptions of Middle Eastern societies are relied upon to show that the 
impracticability of a certain British vision was determined by more objective factors 
extrinsic to those archives. Nevertheless, it is possible to compare the circumstances, 
discernible from these and other independently produced texts, under which the vision was 
constructed, with those under which it fell apart. That is, by comparing the exercise of 
imagination and wishful thinking in the first instance with the less mediated experience of 
the Arab Revolt in the second, a process in which the producers of texts became 
increasingly acquainted with the object of their speculation. 
In the context of a more extended programme of research in relation to which this thesis 
constitutes a partial implementation the evidence regarding social structural constraints 
upon the implementation of British policy would ideally be derived from alternative 
primary sources. Notwithstanding the limitation associated with an overwhelming reliance 
on official British sources which is accepted as necessary though unproblematic, it will be 
argued in the main section of the thesis that numerous British perceptions constitute, at 
least, pritna facie evidence in support of the view that their intentions were ultimately 
thwarted by external, objective factors. More importantly, the change in British perceptions 
exposes their earlier theorising as a less adequate reflection of the reality with which they 
were about to engage. The failure of the British caliphate policy and the precise manner in 
which this failure was apprehended will support the conclusion that the world does not 
automatically re-constitute itself in conformity with the misapprehensions of the powerful. 
Power may produce both representations and misrepresentations (or alternatively, varying 
degrees of misrepresentation), but in the longer run the latter, although necessary, are 
likely to prove detrimental to the interests of the powerful. This issue, which is essentially 
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one of epistemology, will be addressed cursorily in the Conclusion as a matter lying 
beyond the scope of the thesis. 
The alternative is rather stark. As Aijaz Ahmad points out, the problem with the 
'postmodernist emphasis on "representations as representations... is that without reference 
to ... historical and social circumstances... there can be no grounds for discriminating 
between representations and misrepresentation S. 42 Alex Callinicos has illustrated the dire 
consequences of adopting a view according to which there would be no basis for preferring 
6conventional' to 'revisionist' histories of the Ho loCaUSt. 43 Of lesser moment, though of 
more immediate concern, is the fact that it would not be possible to pursue the second 
objective of this thesis, outlined at the head of this chapter. Although this thesis is 
concerned primarily with British ideas about the caliphate it also aims to explain the 
failure of a policy, i. e. an intended intervention in concrete reality, based upon those ideas. 
Such an endeavour could not be contemplated if one were to adopt the view, for example, 
that texts may only be apprehended in relation to other texts, or a concomitant position 
which regards historiography as merely another genre of literature none of which may be 
evaluated according to its factual accurac Y. 44 The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will 
be devoted to assembling the theoretical underpinnings of a more grounded approach. 
1.06 Towards a Dialectical Approach 
The problems identified with some of the more obvious approaches to the question of 
Britain's involvement in the issue of the caliphate may be reduced to two essential 
features. Firstly, that the relationship between East and West is characterised as being one 
between discrete and internally undifferentiated objects. Secondly, the superficially 
attractive notion of power/knowledge reinforces the idea of unilateral imposition at the 
expense of more subtle and ambiguous processes. What is required is an antidote to the 
force of the Orwellian metaphor45 which underlies such approaches to the subject matter: 
that of the imperial boot stamping forever on the imperialised face. 
42 Ahmad, 1994, p. 185. 
43 Callinicos, 1995, pp. 66-7. 
44 The latter is the position of Hayden V. White. White, 1973. 
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Even some post-colonialists have recognised that in general the 'colonial cultural 
experience had mutually modifying effects 946 which goes some way towards the view that 
the relationships which constitute imperialism and engender orientalism are sustained 
dialectically. In a remarkably pertinent passage, written, coincidentally, during the first 
weeks of Sharif Husayn's Arab Revolt, though, it should be emphasised, not with that 
particular event in mind, Lenin provides a clear application of the dialectical approach to 
the circumstances under investigation here. The idea, 'that all dividing lines - both in 
nature and society - are conventional and dynamic, and that every phenomenon might, 
under certain conditions, be transformed into its opposite, 47 does not force one to 
characterise a phenomenon as essentially Eastern or Western, as necessarily either 
endogenous or exogenous, nor, as simply either imposed or voluntarily produced. Above 
all, such observations emphasise the inherently unstable nature of imperialism. For 
example, whereas Homi Bhabha believes that mimicry on the part of the undifferentiated 
colonial subject remains unilateral and occurs solely to the advantage of the 
undifferentiated coloniser, 48 Samir Amin reminds us that frequently imitation of Europe is 
undertaken 'in order to offer a better resistance to it, 49. One might go further and point out 
that imitation, at least in the form of the modular adoption of techniques and institutions 
theorised by Benedict Anderson, 50 was a two-way process - Britain's engagement with the 
subject of the caliphate of Islam being one such instance. 
In contrast to the broad theoretical framework characterised earlier as anti-foundationalist, 
a dialectical outlook prefers a 'relational' approach to a relativist one, 51 where the elements 
of a relationship are viewed as being mutually constituting within an encompassing 
totality, rather than simply irresolvably different. In terms of the central question of this 
thesis, this allows for the possibility that British and Arab views of the caliphate may be 
intimately connected in some way rather than irreducibly different. Hence the invocation 
of the need to 'totalise' as an essential part of a dialectical approach to any subject. 
Accordingly, the notion of an authentic caliphate by which subsequent 'alien' idealisations 
45 Orwell, 1989, p. 280. 
46 MacKenzie, 1995, p. 11, referring to Bhabha and Spivak. 
47 Lenin, 1969, pp. 178-80. 
48 Moore-Gilbert, 1997, p. 120. 
49 Amin, 1976, p. 300. This 'mimicry' need not be seen simply as the imposition of ideas by colonisers upon 
the colonised, nor as slavish emulation, rather the adoption of the techniques of a more dynamic and 
ýroductive society may be construed as a rational response to imperial encroachment. 
0 Anderson, 199 1, p. 4. 
51 See Note 10, above. 
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might be measured is rendered meaningless. In more concrete terms a dialectical approach 
encourages the historian to consider in advance, for example, that the idea of a revived 
Arab caliphate may have arisen under a particular conjuncture which blurs the integral and 
pristine identities of the 'traditions' so engaged. It allows for the possibility that Sharif 
Husayn was simultaneously a pan-Arabist and an agent of imperialism, and that his politics 
need not be characterised as, necessarily either traditional-Islamic or modern-nationalist. 
Specifically, a dialectical approach is capable of producing an explanation in which the 
British idea of the caliphate is not viewed simply as a misapprehension, but one in which 
conceptions of it are understood to be under constant transformation according to the 
exigencies of the imperial relationship. It is precisely such possibilities which will be 
considered in the following chapters of this thesis. However, it is first necessary to 
elaborate the adopted approach in terms of theories which are appropriate to the specific 
combination of internal transformation and external articulation of societies found within 
the particular conjuncture under examination. 52 With this need in mind, the sections which 
follow deal, in turn, with, a theory of imperial collaboration and a theory of structural 
capacities. 
1.1 Theories of Imperialism and their Relevance to Historical 
Explanation 
Although Ronald Robinson's theory of collaborative imperialism will be put to great use in 
this thesis, it will be argued in the following section his theory of collaboration is not a 
theory of imperialism as such. Specifically, the ubiquity of the phenomenon theorised 
prevents it from explaining the particular global changes that occurred around 1880.53 
More importantly, as will be indicated in this section, theories of imperialism which give 
explanatory priority to certain underlying mechanisms can impact on the range of 
52 Indeed, it may be argued that a dialectical approach brings into question conventional notions of interiority 
and exteriority along with the presumption of a universe consisting of discrete objects. 
53 A cursory survey of even the most disparate theories of imperialism will indicate that, with very few 
exceptions, they agree on one thing: that momentous structural changes occurred during the last quarter of 
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explanations deemed valid in respect of any particular instance of imperial policy. It has 
been the view of several authors that the problems encountered with Robinson's theory 
arise largely on account of his exclusive reliance on 'official' sources. 54 In relation to such 
methods in general, and to Robinson's views concerning the explanatory primacy of 
official sources in particular, one author writes: 'All that the documents disclose is that the 
, 55 initiative came from [politicians]. Tom Kemp adds that, 'that is bound to be the banal 
conclusion of any historiography which confines itself to "the documents" and interprets 
them in terms of the politicians and not in the entire social context of productive relations 
and class structures. ' 56 The implication of these remarks is that the kind of archival sources 
which form the basis of this thesis need to be augmented by some more generally 
applicable social theory - hence the deliberations undertaken in the remainder of this 
section. 
Lenin's theory has been selected, not because its original elaboration coincided with the 
onset of the Arab Revolt in June 1916 (though, undoubtedly, it was the same global 
context which engendered both), but on account of the relevance of some of its 
implications and assumptions. Significantly, this theory has been chosen in spite of the 
claim that Robinson and Gallagher, had, once and for all, invalidated 'Marxist 
interpretations of colonial history. ' The latter, according to one commentator, support the 
notion that 'Victorian statesmen [extended] British influence in [for example] Africa in the 
hope of immediate economic gain. ' 57 The absurdity and ignorance of this assertion should 
be evident from Lenin's characterisation of 'the extreme extension of annexationist 
(colonial) policy ... from 1880 onwards' when 
he wrote that, 
the fact that the world is already divided up obliges those contemplating a new division to 
reach out for any kind of territory and ... because an essential feature of imperialism is the 
rivalry between a number of great powers in the striving for hegemony, ie, for the conquest 
of territory, not so much directly for themselves as to weaken the adversary and undermine 
his hegemony. [emphases per originalI58 
the I 9th century. See, for example: Addo, 1986; Baumgart, 1982; Brewer, 1990; Kemp, 1967; and Mommsen, 
1981. 
5' Kiernan, 1964, p. 265; and, Owen, 1976, p. 215. Owen concludes that, 'the Robinson and Gallagher 
a 
5pproach ... 
severely limits the possibility of establishing any general theory of imperialism. ' 5 Aron, Raymond, 'The Century of Total War', 1954, p. 60, quoted in Kemp, 1967 p. 144. 
56 Kemp continues: 'Naturally nothing can he learned about the inner compulsions of the capitalist mode of 
ý roduction by even the most meticulous examination of cabinet papers. ' Kemp, 1967, p. 144. 
71 Fyfe, 1962, pp. 93-4. 
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While it may be conceded that Lenin's theory is, in a certain sense, reductionist in so far as 
a dialectical approach 'calls for a many-sided investigation of a given social phenomenon 
in its development, that we reduce the exterior, the apparent, to the fundamental driving 
forces, to the development of productive forces and to the class struggle, ' [emphasis 
added]59 his approach does in fact allow for the influence of a multiplicity of factors while 
insisting that some factors are more fundamental than others. It does not, however, as 
Robinson and Gallagher imply, mean 'drawing a straight line between finance capital and 
every colonial expedition. ' 60 
Of more direct relevance to the explication of Britain's interest in the caliphate of Islam is 
the single most abiding feature of Lenin's conceptualisation of modern imperialism. 61 This 
is the close identification of the state with capital which was an essential characteristic of 
the period under examination. This emphasis emerges as a result of Lenin's (and 
Bukharin's) observations concerning the acute intensification of inter-state rivalry and 
competition in the late I 9th century which culminated in the Great War. The underlying 
logic here is that, in order to prevail economically and militarily vis-b-vis other states, a 
state must favour the most dynamic class under its dominion by maintaining the conditions 
of its successful reproduction and aggrandisement, necessarily at the expense of other 
contending classes. 62 For the leading European powers of the time the class in question 
was, undoubtedly, the financial-industrial bourgeoisie. 63 Conversely, the reliance which the 
state necessarily places upon this class is reciprocated, in as much as the bourgeoisie is 
incapable, in the long run, of acquiring and retaining territory on its own behalf for the 
purposes of capital investment. This is especially the case under the conditions of intense 
competition between the capitalist powers which prevailed after 1870. Alternatively, it 
may be said that, 'the limiting case for the state is that, even if it overrides the interests of 
particular capitalists, it cannot forget that its own revenues and its own ability to defend 
58 Lenin, 1996, p. 92. Although Lenin does not use the term himself the notion of the prophylactic acquisition 
of territory may be inferred from his work. 
59 Kemp, 1967, p. 143. 
60 Ibid., p. 144. 
61 This had been advanced by Bukharin and was subsequently elaborated by Paul M. Sweezy. Bukharin, 
1973; and, Sweezy, 1968, especially Chapter XIII. 
62 Bob Jessop's qualification that 'the "capital logic" approach can only indicate the probable forms of the 
state, and specify the broad limits within which variations can occur without fundamentally threatening the 
process of capital accumulation' seems a reasonable one and does not detract from the usefulness of the 
conclusions drawn here. Jessop, 1990, pp. 37-8. 
63 This is so even where another class is incumbent in the state apparatus as was the case in Germany after 
187 1. This is the conclusion of David Blackbourn and Geoff Sey. Blackbourn and Eley, 1984. 
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itself against other states depend, at the end of the day, on the continuation of capital 
accumulation. ' 64 
The upshot of these deliberations is that although Lenin's theory conceives of an 
underlying mechanism which sustains the phenomenon of imperialism as a whole, this is 
not at odds with the assertion that, 'finance capital is not only interested in the already 
known sources of raw materials; it is also interested in potential sources of raw materials, 
because present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and because land which is 
useless today may be made fertile tomorrow if new methods applied and large amounts of 
capital are invested. 965 Moreover, the fact that a state has different immediate priorities in 
different areas of the world emerges as a consequence of Lenin's theory and not, as some 
would have it, as a fatal challenge to it. What is important in limiting the kind of 
explanations deemed permissible with regard to specific instances of imperial conduct is 
that, while collaboration of one sort or another may be necessary in all cases, the precise 
arrangement sought in a given instance is determined by the factors pertaining to that 
particular locale in view of its specific connections to the totality of the empire in question 
set within the context of inter-imperial rivalry. For example, whether a given territory is, at 
the outset, required for direct investment, future potential, strategic locatiofi, or for purely 
prophylactic reasons (i. e. to prevent another power's acquisition) will determine the kind 
of collaborative arrangements preferred by the imperial power. Furthermore, the notion of 
'prophylactic acquisition' may be extended to include instances where the objective is to 
preclude another power from gaining control of an institution which is the source of some 
extra-territorial ideology considered potentially threatening to ones own empire. This, it 
will be argued later, was the case when Britain first became interested in the future of the 
caliphate of Islam. While this may have been, in many obvious respects, a unique 
occurrence, it is nevertheless explicable within the general framework adumbrated above. 
The significance of the limiting factors which emerge from Lenin's theory for this thesis is 
that they invalidate the explanatory primacy frequently given to imperial romanticism, 66 
and counter any tendency to overestimate its capacity for self-realisation. If one accepts the 
basic tenets of Lenin's and Bukharin's theories these romantic inclinations are more likely 
64 Harman, 199 1, P. 15. 
65 Lenin, 1996, p. 84. 
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to be explained in terms of the specific collaborative arrangements necessitated by a given 
imperial context. There is, admittedly, an unmistakable correspondence between the 
contradictorily destructive and preserving effects of imperialism, on the one hand, and 
certain romantic dispositions towards subject peoples typical of imperialists, on the other. 
In Arabia, for example, the British made the distinction between the 'pure, ' and politically 
less threatening, Arabs of the desert who they sought to preserve by 'ring-fencing, ' and the 
hybrid 'levantines' rendered dangerous through their being 'contaminated' by 
'progressive' European political ideas. 67 Moreover, imperial notions involving the revival 
of ancient traditions or the artificial preservation of indigenous institutions of long standing 
(such as the Arab caliphate) are certainly romantic in form and specific content. 
Nevertheless, it is argued here that such romanticism arises as a consequence of 
collaborative preference, and, furthermore, that the capacity for the self-realisation of such 
ideological dispositions is ultimately curtailed by the realities of the subject society. In 
other words, 'incessant belief, ' despite its labours, does not inevitably 'create its object. P68 
1.2 Ronald Robinson's Theorv of Collaboration: An Assessment in, 
Terms of the Aims of this Thesis 
1.21 Tntroduction 
Ronald Robinson sought to develop an 'Excentric Idea of Imperialism' 69 applicable to 
formal colonies and informal empire alike, and wished to oppose those theories which 'for 
the most part were restricted to explaining the genesis of new colonial empires in terms of 
circumstances in Europe' 70 [emphasis added]. This idea is immediately attractive since it 
aims to remedy the Eurocentrism of other theories and to dispense with the metaphor of 
66 Such is the effect of the popular overestimation, and mistaken reading, of the part played by T. E. 
Lawrence in British Middle Eastern affairs. 
67 it is interesting to note that this distinction correlates with Aziz al-Azmeh's sublation of xenophilia and 
xenophobia to a common principle. al-Azmeh, 1993, pp. 7,9,10,19 & 28. See also, Chapter 2, Note 136, 
and Chapter 5, Note 53, of this thesis. The notion of 'ring-fencing' is referred to in sections 4.2 & 4.3. 
68 William Empson, quoted on, Cooke, 2001. 
69 Taken from the title of Ronald Robinson's contribution to Mommsen and Osterhammel (eds. ), 1986. 
70 Robinson, 1972, p. 120. 
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'metropolitan drives projecting on passive peripheries' 7 1. Robinson's central premis is that 
'imperialism was as much afunction of its victims' collaboration or non-collaboration-of 
their indigenous politics, as it was of European expansion, ' and the unquestionable fact 
that '[tlhe expansive forces generated in industrial Europe had to combine with elements 
within the agrarian societies of the outer world to make empire at all practicable' 72 
[emphasis added]. 
The first thing to note, however, is a certain ambiguity concerning Robinson's application 
of the concepts of 'genesis' and 'function, ' which, like his theory as a whole, conflates 
origins, in terms of an underlying mechanism and impetus, with development, in terms of 
modes of performance and realisation. That is, Robinson obliterates the distinction 
between the form and content of imperialism with the consequence that the continuities in 
its superficial appearance obscure his appreciation of the momentous transformations in 
the hidden workings of imperialism in a way which corresponds with Said's construction 
of the phenomenon of orientalism. This allows Robinson to posit his theory of 
collaboration as an alternative, rather than an adjunct, to other theories of imperialism. 
Nevertheless, if recast in a more modest form, that is as a complement to certain other 
theories, many features of Robinson's theory are eminently applicable to the set of 
circumstances under examination here. Furthermore, they offer a way out of the constraints 
already identified in the methodologies of Said and the post-colonialists whose approaches 
preclude any theorisation of the concrete mode of articulation occurring between dominant 
and subordinate societies under imperialism. 
Robinson's theory rests on the observation that European effort alone could not have 
accounted for the massive extension of empire which occurred from the late 19th century 
onwards. This concurs with the idea, expressed earlier, that certain sections of 'the 
colonised' actively participated in their own colonisation, and, indeed, had an interest in so 
doing. The are obvious affinities between Robinson's theory and the situation in the 
Middle East around the time of the Great War - particularly regarding Britain and the 
caliphate. For example, Robinson emphasised how 'imperialism ... proceed[s] 
by 
combining with local interests and affiliating with local institutions. ' 
7' Robinson in, Mommsen and Osterhammel (eds. ), 1986, p. 269. 
72 Robinson, 1972, p. 120. 
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Of further relevance to Britain's disposition towards the issue of the caliphate is 
Robinson's view that 'metropolitan power [was] deployed ... to manipulate, but not to 
abolish, the indigenous politics of other countries. ' 73 This followed from the fact that, in 
any given instance, empire had to be run as cheaply as possible and was, therefore, 
'founded ... on indigenous organizations and built out of local resources in the countries 
imperialized. ' Of greater moment for the investigation being undertaken here is the 
observation that 'enough [local] leaders had to be attracted or conscripted into transferring 
the necessary resources and allegiances' in order that imperial business could be conducted 
safely and local resistance contained. Success therefore depended, in the first instance, on 
identifying local intermediaries who would be 'pliable without being ineffective. ' In 
practice this meant maintaining local collaborators in a state of dependence which would 
give them an advantage vis-a-vis competing dlites, and some protection against the 
demands of their own subordinates. More will be made of the tension and potential 
contradiction between the need for dependence and capacity to perform on the part of the 
local collaborator in the historical chapters of this thesis. As Robinson himself puts it: 
From the standpoint of the collaborators or mediators the invaders imported an alternative 
source of wealth and power which, if it could not be excluded, had to be exploited in order 
to preserve or improve the standing of indigenous elites in the traditional order. 74 
The full implications of this statement for any particular society, it will be argued later, 
require amplification in terms of its internal relational social capacities. 
Of further relevance to Britain's engagement with the Middle East in the late I 9th and early 
201h centuries is Robinson's awareness that there is a 'balance of terms struck between the 
imperialists and their local contractors' which may be equalised by the subordinate party 
through the implied or actual threat of national resistance. Although expressed in abstract 
terms, the notion that, 'the relativity of imperialism to proto- and modem nationalism can 
... be measured in the changing balance of collaborative equations, ' 
75 has obvious 
application to Britain's relationship with the Arab movement and underlines the 
precariousness of any imperial collaborative enterprise. This formulation supports Lenin's 
more dialectical assertion that '[a] national war might be transformed into an imperialist 
73 Robinson in, Mommsen and Osterharnmel (eds. ), 1986, p. 270-1. 
74 Robinson, 1972, pp. 120-1. 
75 Robinson in, Mommsen and Osterharnmel (eds. ), 1986, p. 27 1. 
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war and vice versa. 76 Such an outcome might be precipitated, for example, when a 
collaborating elite is forced by the internal balance of political and social forces to answer 
to the needs of its own people to the detriment of the interests of their imperial sponsors. 
There is a further dimension of imperial collaboration, which remains implicit in 
Robinson's exposition. Apart from the more obvious competition between imperial powers 
over potential collaborators, is the less conspicuous contest among the latter to secure 
mutually beneficial arrangements with one or other of the imperial powers. This 
corresponds precisely to the situation pertaining between the European powers and pan- 
Islam during the Great War. Similarly, although as Mommsen and Osterhammel put it 'the 
choice of collaborators determine[s] the organization and depth of colonial administration, 
which institutional ize[s] the indigenous political and economic affiliations upholding its 
authority, ' 77 it must be stressed that 'choice' operates in both directions, albeit unequally. 
With regard to the Sharif of Mecca and the institution of the caliphate this must remain an 
open question at least at the outset of the investigation. 
1.22 The UbiQuity of the Collaborative Paradigm 
An outstanding feature of Robinson's exposition of collaborative imperialism is the 
ubiquity of the phenomena he describes and the wide applicability of his paradigm. The 
theory of collaboration may be applied equally to practically any instance of empire from 
classical antiqu itY78 to the relationship between Israel and the PLO during the seven years 
'peace' which followed the Oslo accords of 1993. So universal are the features described 
by Robinson, that collaborative techniques are necessarily employed even where the 
dominant power's ultimate objective is the total annihilation of the subject polity - as they 
were, to cite one of the starkest instances, in the case of the Judeflrdte in the Lodz and 
Warsaw ghettos . 
79 In a certain sense this is the sign of a good theory, however, its near 
universal applicability betrays an inherent ahistoricity which renders Robinson's theory 
unsuited to the purpose to which he puts it: namely explaining the changes in 'modem 
76 Lenin, 1969, pp. 178-90. 
77 Robinson in, Mommsen and Ostcrhammel (eds. ), 1986, p. 272. 
78 For example, 'The Romans did not seek to destroy annexed societies; on the contrary, they sou, --ht to 
maintain order and harness their resources with minimum disruption. ' James, 1999, p. 102. 
79 Mayer, 1990, pp. 392 & 403-4. 
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imperialism' which occurred around 1880. Explaining the 'Scramble for Africa' (including 
the British occupation of Egypt), the transition from the 'old' to the 'new' Eastern 
Question, ' and the partition of China into spheres of influence, in a piece-meal fashion in 
terms of the breakdown of existing systems of collaboration8o is bound to obscure more 
fundamental changes in the imperial system as a whole. Robinson's approach results in a 
smoothing over of the momentous transformation of the world during the last quarter of the 
191h century and of its bloody repartition subsequently known as the 'Great War. ' 
A related problem with Robinson's collaborative theory of imperialism is that he deftly 
exchanges one kind of chauvinism for another by replacing supposed 'Eurocentric' 
explanations with the presumption that European concern over instability in, say, southern 
Sudan, is not, itself, in need of explanation. Ironically, for a theory which purports to 
challenge Eurocentrism, it has been said that Robinson's inability to adequately explain the 
4new imperialism' results in part from his approaching the subject solely through the 
perspective of Great Britain. 81 It is for these reasons that Robinson's 'excentric' theory, 
originally advanced as an alternative theory of itnperialism, has been adapted, for the 
purposes of this thesis, and redeployed as a theory of the modalities of empire, that is of 
the techniques employed by a particular empire given the nature if imperialism itself. 
1.23 The Need for a Theorv of Structural CaDacities 
The case for some reference to the issue of class and social differentiation when dealing 
with the area of societal conjuncture under conditions of imperialism has already been 
made. What is now required is an extension of Robinson's theory in terms of a theory of 
structural capacity, partly for the reasons given above and partly in order to counter the 
relativist and anti-foundationalist approaches referred to earlier. It is hoped that a version 
of Robinson's theory extended in this way may be able to explain an imperialist power's 
failure to make its vision 'stick, ' by reference to the inability of the collaborating party to 
prevail within its own milieu. This, in turn, might be explained in terms of the structural 
capacity of the collaborating elite or class fraction within the subordinate society. 
Furthermore, in the context of this thesis, it is intended that the evidence provided 
80 Robinson, 1972, pp. 126-132. 
81 Louis in, Louis (ed. ), 1976, p. 7. 
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concerning Britain's and Sharif Husayn's aspirations for a revived Arab caliphate with the 
Sharif as incumbent, will dispel the notion of an absolute epistemological hiatus between 
the discrete and undifferentiated categories of colonizer and colonized. 82 
Finally, in a way which is especially relevant to the case at hand, it is only by reference to 
the notion of structural capacities that Ronald Robinson's theory of collaboration may 
usefully be refined to take account of the temporally phased division of labour which takes 
place within the collaborative process. Specifically, this involves making the distinction 
between the function of informant in the speculative phase of a given collaborative 
engagement, and the collaborating dlite proper. In both instances account must be taken of 
their interests determined by their respective positions within their local social structures 
and the effect this has on their performance as informants and collaborators. In addition, 
the elaboration of a speculative phase - of central importance to the subject of this thesis - 
gives rise to the notion of a dialectical learning process involving a bilateral accumulation 
of knowledge subject to discontinuities in terms of reference, certain leaps of faith and the 
occasional redirection of effort. In practice, as will be shown later, in spite of the economic 
and military advantage possessed by the colonisers, they are frequently less well informed 
about their subordinates than their subordinates are about them. This should not be 
surprising once it is understood that external collaboration was an essential and customary 
feature of the tribal substructure upon which the British vision for the Arab Middle East 
was founded 83 . Imperialists may be omnipresent but it does not 
follow that they are 
omniscient. It may be pointed out that even where political intelligence is exceptionally 
thorough, the internal drive towards imperial incursion and expansion is unlikely to be 
diminished by the paucity of collaborative options in a given instance: a lesson that may 
never be learnt by imperialists for reasons that will become apparent. This constitutes 
further evidence against the supposed 'equipollence' of power and knowledge. 
82 See Note 10, above. 
83 Ayubi, 1995, pp. 46 & 53-4. 
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1.3 Alex Callinicos' Theorv of Structural CaDacit 
1.31 Introduction 
As will become evident in later chapters of this thesis, some of the British imperialists 
implicated in the Anglo-Sharifian accords eventually came to understand the failure of 
their collaborative enterprise in terms of the shortcomings inherent in their correspondent's 
location within the Arabian social structure. In other words, although less systematically 
articulated, and frequently tinged with prejudice, British imperialism proceeded on the 
basis of an implicit theory of structural capacity. It is suggested that the central question to 
be answered here - concerning the rise and fall of the idea of an Arab caliphate in British 
Middle Eastern policy - may be answered explicitly in terms of such a theory in a way 
which avoids the deficiencies associated with either the textualism of Said or the interiority 
of Foucault's power/knowledge formulation. 
In general terms, Alex Callinicos is opposed to both structural determinism and the kind of 
'metaphysical individualism' 84 which assumes that individuals are ontologically prior to 
structures. In developing a theory of structural capacities he endeavours to show, against 
the usual treatment of the social context of an actor's performance as part of a ceteris 
paribus clause, that the failure to realise one's desires may be explained by one's class 
position. However, in order to avoid 'bouncing back' into structuralism, Callinicos 
demonstrates that the idea that social structures have explanatory autonomy is not 
inconsistent with an orthodox conception of agency since the latter, he maintains, includes 
a hidden premis concerning an individual's capacity to act. In other words the powers 
agents have to act 'depend on and are determined in part by social structures, ' 85 hence the 
term 'structural capacities. ' 86 
The starting point of Callinicos' exposition is a treatment of Anthony Giddens' concept of 
social structures 87 which are regarded as 'the unacknowledged conditions and 
84 Callinicos, 1989, p. 91. 
85 Ibid., p. 38. 
86 This expression is derived from the earlier work of Erik Olin Wright, specifically, Wright, 1979, p. 99. 
87 As advanced by Anthony Giddens in, Giddens, 1979. 
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unanticipated consequences of human action, '88 in conjunction with Giddens' basic insight 
that structures are enabling as well as constraining. The dual nature of structure, so 
conceived, is attractive since it permits a resolution of the conventional 'dualism' of 
structure and action in so far as structures are not simply a 'barrier to action, but ... 
essentially involved in its production. '89 Not only do structures make possible the exercise 
of power but determine the manner in which such power is exercised. Accordingly, 
Callinicos' claim that 'structures have explanatory autonomy' is upheld and amounts to his 
assertion 'that agents' powers are partly dependent on their position in the production 
relations. ' 
The flexibility of this basic formulation is evident, since, as Callinicos is happy to point 
out, his thesis may be expressed in other than Marxist terms 'so long as one accepts that 
agents' ability to realize their goals is determined to a significant degree by their place in 
social relations, whether one thinks of these relations as structures, institutions, or 
whatever. '9() Such latitude seems likely to be beneficial when it comes to applying the 
theory to a situation comprising the articulation of social formations involving semi-tribal 
societies where the applicability of the paradigm of classes based on relations of 
production is less than straightforward. Furthermore, Callinicos' theory is unaffected by 
the fact that individuals may have beliefs about, or shaped by, structures since the mere 
possession of powers does not depend on the nature or extent of knowledge about them. 91 
However, as will be shown in later chapters of this thesis, their successful exploitation may 
depend on the quality of knowledge acquired. 
1.32 Structural Capacities and Callinicos' Notion of 'Interests' 
According to Callinicos a suitable definition of interests is crucial to a complete 
enunciation of the theory of structural capacities since it is 'the hinge connecting structure 
88 Callinicos, 1989, p. 94. This corresponds closely to Roy Bhaskar's conception. Ibid., p. 90. One might add 
that this 'unacknowledgement' is not merely a feature of lay perceptions since Foucault's treatment of power 
as diffuse and unstructured deals only with its most immediate appearance and effects. 
89 Ibid., p. 84. It is pertinent that, according to Nick J. Fox: 'The structure/agency dichotomy is not resolved 
by Foucault, rather it is seen as incapable of resolution: and ceases to be a problem. ' Fox, 1998, p. 429. 
90 Callinicos, 1989, p. 89. 
91 A capacity is, by definition, inherent, and, therefore, not necessarily utilised. 
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and action. ' 92 This is of importance here if it is understood from a modified version of 
Robinson's theory of collaborative imperialism proposed earlier that imperialism involves, 
among other things, a conjoint pursuit of interests between imperialist and collaborator. 
Furthermore, in relation to the objectives of this thesis, it is precisely these interests and 
capacities which, it is hoped, will provide the 'objective context' of events, and thereby 
form the basis of historical explanation. Callinicos' makes use of Antony Giddens' 
definition of interests which encompasses the view that, 'To be aware of one's interests ... 
is more than to be aware of a want or wants; it is to know how to go about trying to realize 
them. ' The 'bracketing' of wants in this way is of theoretical importance since, by not 
reducing them to the factor of social structure, it leaves space for the notion of agency 
albeit within an objectivist framework. However, the importance of this conceptualisation 
for historical practice is that, rather than assuming wants, it is concerned with 'the possible 
modes of their realization in given sets of circumstances' which 'can be determined as 
46 objectively" as anything in social analysis. 93 
If one accepts Callinicos' argument, it becomes apparent that the possible ways of realising 
wants will depend on an individual's structural capacities. This is as important for the 
historian as it is for any imperialist seeking out mutually beneficial collaborative 
arrangements since a determination of interests will depend on a rational assessment of a 
potential collaborator's structural capacities which will depend, in turn, upon knowledge of 
the local social structure. This insight is of crucial importance when it comes to explaining 
both the course of action chosen by British imperialists in the Middle East at the beginning 
of the Great War as well as the later re-orientation undertaken as their knowledge became 
more sophisticated. Of equal consequence to this enquiry is the fact that the local 
informants who are necessarily employed during the early stages of an imperial 
advancement have interests of their own. These too will depend upon their structural 
capacities within the very social structure they are relied upon to convey faithfully to their 
imperial masters. Naturally they would seek to enhance their own standing within the 
subject society and would tend to provide information that suggests that such an outcome 
is either desirable or inevitable. 
92 Callinicos, 1989, p. 6. 
93 Callinicos, 1989, p. 129. 
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1.33 The Congruence of Callinicos' Theory of Structural Capacity with Robinson's Theory 
of Collaborative Imperialism 
According to Callinicos it is largely through the experience and conduct of class struggle 
that agents discover their interests and the extent of their powers9,1. This could usefully be 
generalised to situations of imperial collaboration where an imperial power may gain 
knowledge of its interests through imperial conflict. In a given situation it will soon be 
ascertained who is most likely to make a reliable partner. In the light of comments already 
made concerning the delicate balance between capacity and dependence required of a 
collaborator the importance of local knowledge cannot be overestimated. Secondly, 
Callinicos names social mobility within a given class structure as an alternative method of 
realising one's desires, that is, through an exchange of class capacities. 95 Alternatively this 
may be achieved by acquiring a position within a state apparatus. Such considerations are 
of more immediate significance to potential collaborators (who may effect such an 
exchange through the act of collaborating) than they are to imperialists; nevertheless, these 
possibilities extend the range of strategies available to imperialists and their local agents. 
The congruence of Callinicos' theory of structural capacities with what has been retained 
of Robinson's theory of collaboration is readily apparent. Between them these theories will 
form the backbone of the theoretical approach to be applied in pursuit of the aims of this 
thesis. 
1.4 A Brief ChaDter Outline 
Although, as the title of the thesis indicates, the Great War of 1914-18 forms the main 
historical context of this investigation, the main arguments of the thesis are developed 
through, and, indeed, derived from, an historical narrative spanning a period from the late 
18 th century down to 1926. Chapter 2, in this respect, is more than preambulatory since it 
gives prominence to what are considered to be the preconditions of Britain's later 
94 Callinicos, 1989, p. 132. 
95 Ibid., p. 133. 
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involvement in the issue of the caliphate which only occurred as a result of the crisis which 
faced the British empire in October-November 1914. This chapter deals with British 
perceptions of the caliphate of Islam in so far they impinged on imperial policy, and 
therefore begins with the treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci in 1774 which marked a fundamental 
transformation in the Ottoman Sultan's role as caliph in his relations with the encroaching 
European powers. The effects of the 'Indian Mutiny' of 1857, in particular the manner in 
which it induced British orientalists to regard Islam as an anti-imperial and potentially 
trans-national political force, are also examined. Of central importance to this chapter is 
the 'Meccan Crisis' of 1879-80 which established the historical paradigm of a 
collaborative venture involving the Sharif of Mecca with far-reaching consequences for 
Britain's relations with the caliphate. 
Chapter 3 covers approximately the period of Kitchener's tenure as British Agent and 
Consul-General in Egypt from 1911 up to the end of 1914 when Britain came into conflict 
with the Ottoman Empire and ipsofacto the caliphate and official guardian of the holy 
places of Islarn. It was under Kitchener's influence that the vague notion of a collaborative 
enterprise involving an Arab, as opposed to a Turkish, caliphate, re-emerged. The 'Hijaz 
Crisis' of 1914 is used to show how certain British imperialists hoped to realise their vision 
of a British-dominated Middle East through the manipulation of the central institution of 
Islam. This chapter will explore how the idea of Arab 'independence' from the Turks came 
to be conflated, in the British imperial mind, with the project of a restored Arab caliphate 
functioning as a cover for British predominance in the region. 
Chapters 4&5 deal with the coalescence of a definitive caliphate policy during the first 
nine months of 1915. Chapter 4 provides ample evidence for the centrality of the issue of 
the caliphate in the context of Britain's overall Middle Eastern policy in the early months 
of the war, exemplified by the attention accorded it in the deliberations and final report of 
the de Bunsen Committee. Evidence is provided at this early stage for the emergence of a 
constructive caliphate policy designed to facilitate imperial expansion, rather than a purely 
defensive one designed to forestall an anti-British jihad. Chapter 5 examines the 
relationship between the Governor General of the Sudan and two of his local informants, 
both Islamic dignitaries and loyal servants of the British administration. Of particular 
interest here is the use made of what turned out to be rival sources of information regarding 
Islamic politics in promoting the idea of a British sponsored Arab caliphate. 
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Chapter 6 will look at the relationship between the idea of an Arab caliphate and the broad 
thrust of Britain's Middle Eastern/Islamic policy during the period of the Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence up to the end of 1915, and the final decision to support an Arab 
revolt. This chapter goes on to demonstrate the reinforcing and modifying influence of a 
self-styled leader of the secular Arab movement on the British idea of a Sharifian Arab 
caliphate. 
The Arab Revolt of 1916 is the subject of Chapter 7 to the extent that it affected Britain's 
support for Sharif Husayn as the future caliph of Islam. Above all this chapter serves to 
illustrate the argument which lies at the heart of this thesis, namely that Britain's caliphate 
policy (and ultimately Britain's Middle Eastern policy) was thwarted by its internal 
contradictions. Chapter 7 then shows how these emerged as a result of the limitations 
inherent in the social-structural location of the party whom Britain had selected for 
collaboration. 
Chapter 8 analyses Britain's attitude towards the caliphate during the last two years of the 
war and up to its abolition in 1924. Of particular interest here is the first use made by 
British orientalists of more sophisticated continental academic sources in forming a 
coherent position vis-6-vis the institution of the caliphate during the post-war peace 
process. This will involve a brief examination of the effect of such 'expert' opinion on the 
British response to the political and social reorientation which took place in Turkey during 
the same period. The Conclusion to the thesis draws on the sub-conclusions attached to 
each of the chapters described above and will make a number of more general points in 
relation to the objectives and theoretical approach established in this chapter. Finally, a 
number of theoretical issues will be introduced, which, although emerging from the subject 
matter of the thesis, lie beyond its scope as set out in this Introduction. 
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CHAPTER 2: Precedents, Precursors, and Preconditions 
2.0 Introduction 
It should be evident from the brief history of the Islamic caliphate provided in Chapterl that 
there is no such thing as a pristine caliphate. For historians if not for Islamic theorists, there 
can be no single instance of the institution which may stand as a paradigm against which all 
other instances could be judged as either authentic or in some sense degenerate. It follows that 
any historical example of the institution must be taken in context rather than in comparison 
with some supposed ideal. It also emerged from that brief survey that since the death of 
Muhammad religious theory has tended to justify changes in the status quo ex post facto. I In 
attempting to explain Britain's semi-official support for an Arab caliphate during the Great 
War it will be necessary, therefore, to provide some account of how the institution of the 
Ottoman caliphate itself, as well as certain theories of it, developed as part of the totality of 
changing relations between the Ottoman Empire and the dominant European powers between 
the late l8th century and the eve of the First World War. 
The history of the relationship between modem Europe and Islam is usually recounted within 
the context of 'The Eastern Question. ' The question itself generally takes this purely nominal 
form; though once made explicit it becomes clear that the question was a European one, asked 
by Europeans to other Europeans. The corresponding question formulated from the Ottoman 
point of view is rarely, if ever, articulated by Western historians, though it may safely be 
assumed that for Ottoman statesmen the matter of resisting, or even reversing European 
incursions into imperial territory, would have been an overriding one. It is in the context of 
such resistance that the ancient institution of the Islamic caliphate first re-emerged as a 
political force in the modem era. As will be shown later, this idea, once established as an 
1 Mustafa Kemal argued precisely this point in 1923 when he wished to abolish the Caliphate. Enayat, 1982, pp. 
53-4. 
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instruinent of politics and diplomacy, becomes available, at least in theory, for the use of other 
parties in the furtherance of their interests being distinct from, and even opposed to, those of 
the Ottoman ruling order. It is this process of instrumental i sation which will be examined in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
The era of 'The Eastern Question' corresponded precisely with the period during which Islam 
first appeared as a threat to the modern empires of Christian Europe, and to which Islam, in 
turn, was bound to respond. This, of course, is no coincidence. Presented thus the issue of the 
caliphate in modern times may be viewed as developing within a context of mutual awareness 
and understanding (and, as will be shown, occasional misunderstanding, deliberate deception 
and malicious misapprehension) between European imperial powers on the one hand, and 
various Islamic countries on the other. A further aspect of this dynamic is the part played by 
the instrumental i sation of Islam and the institution of the caliphate both in the relations 
between the Ottomans and other Islamic and national parties, and in the rivalry between 
European imperial powers themselves. It is the unfolding of this process throughout the 
century or so leading up to the Great War which is the central concern of this chapter. 
2.1 The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarci and the Origins of Pan-Islam 
The emergence of 'The Eastern Question' as an object of historical enquiry is conventionally 
denoted by the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci, being that concluded between Russia and Turkey 
on the conclusion of the war of 1768-1774, in which the former obtained strategically 
significant territory from the latter. More importantly, in relation to the issue of the caliphate, 
the territory in question was the first such area ceded by the Ottoman Empire to a Christian 
power, which was inhabited predominantly by Muslims. 2 It is the precise legal form of this 
cession, as recorded in the Treaty, which marks a new departure in relations between the 
2 Hourani, 1983, p. 38. 
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Ottoman Empire and Europe by positing Islam as a political force capable of transcending 
state boundaries and subverting European imperial expansion. 
The precise novelty of the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci was that for the first time it effectively 
established the assumption of the title of Caliph by the Sultan. 3 One has to say effectively, 
since a perusal of a faithful copy of the TreatY4 will reveal that the word 'Caliph' appears 
nowhere, and yet the implications are unmistakable. The precise manner in which this 
assumption occurred is an object lesson in the internalising effects of an imperial conjuncture 
between unequal contenders. The Russians having taken parts of the Khanate of Crimea in the 
war of 1768-1774, territories inhabited predominantly by Muslim Tartars, had the stipulation 
written into the Treaty that the Empress of Russia become the official patroness of Orthodox 
Christians living in the Ottoman Empire. This they effected by establishing the right to build 
an Orthodox church in the Ottoman capital and, more importantly, by the insertion of what has 
been referred to as 'a vague and potentially dangerous phrase, ' allowing them 'to make 
representations on behalf of it "and those who serve it. "'5 In return for this extra-territorial 
extension of sovereignty, and in order to save face, 6 Ottoman plenipotentiaries began to refer 
to the Sultan as 'the sovereign caliph of the Mahometan religion [sic] . 97 Furthermore, 
for the 
sake of Muslim unity in the face of European 'Christian' expansion, religious theorists tended 
to support this innovation after the fact, thereby internalising a European political 'technique'8 
via a subtle, though far-reaching, modification of Islamic doctrine. In fact the then serving 
Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam, the true religious authority within the Empire, resisted the Treaty 
and had to be replaced. It was not until some years later, according to Jacob M. Landau, that 
the legend was put about that Sultan Selim I had inherited the caliphate in 1517 from the last 
Abbasid incumbent, and much later still before this was generally accepted. 9 
3 Enayat, 1982, p. 52. 
4 Hurewitz, 1956, Vol 1. pp. 54-61. 
5 Anderson, 1966, p. xi. 
6 Landau, 1990, p. 10. 
7 Enayat, 1982, p. 53. 
8 It seems fair to refer to this as a 'European' technique since this had been the state or affairs with regard to the 
Papacy for centuries. Whereas the Roman Catholic Pope had traditionally claimed an extra-territorial spiritual 
authority over Catholics regardless of which sovereign state they lived under, within Islam the territorial authority 
of the caliph of Islam had been coterminous either with that of the Islamic state of which he was head, or 
alternatively of the emirates affording him allegiance. 
9 Landau, 1990, p. 10. 
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It should not be assumed, however, that the interaction here was purely bilateral, since the 
clause inserted into the Treaty asserting the Sultan's jurisdiction over Muslims everywhere, 
regardless of domicile, was supposedly introduced on the advice of the French Ambassador at 
the Porte, a Francois Emmanuel Guignard, Comte de Saint-Priest. According to Landau the 
insertion of this 'pontifical concept' into the Treaty enabled 'each side to interpret [it] 
differently, either as an Ottoman renunciation of temporal authority or as a recognition of its 
spiritual one. '10 Here we see that the factor of inter-European rivalry becomes crucial" once 
the Ottoman Empire is perceived as being weak enough to concede on issues which potentially 
confer advantages to one power at the expense of others. 
Moreover, the unpopularity of the Treaty was the reason that the Sultan delayed ratification 
until January 1775, that is, five months after ratification by Catherine 11, since it was obvious 
that the supposed independence of the Crimea from Russia was a sham. Finally, in March 
1179, on the advice of Saint-Priest, Turkey agreed to the Convention of Aunili-Kavak' 
2 
according to which Turkey agreed to recognise the new ruler of the Crimea but subsequent 
rulers would have to obtain the formal approval of the Sultan on their assumption of the 
throne. Although Russia recognised the religious authority of the Sultan over the Muslim 
inhabitants of the Crimea the contrivance of those rights as a pretext for political intervention 
was now specifically precluded. 
It is significant that it was only after the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci, beginning with the 
accession of Mahmud 11 to the throne in 1808, that the Ottomans introduced such symbolic 
acts as the girding of each new Sultan with Caliph 'Umar's sword. 
13 Similarly, according to 
Bassam Tibi, it was around this time that court historians first declared the Sultans to be the 
legitimate heirs to the caliphate and later confirmed this new-found authority by inventing 
genealogies tracing the House of 'Uthman back to the Prophet himself. This was undertaken in 
order to comply with the orthodox Islamic stipulation that the Caliph be a member of the 
10 Ibid., p. 10. 
11 This factor defines the 'Eastern Question. ' 
12 Anderson, 1966, pp. 1-8. 
13 Landau, 1990, p. 11. 
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Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh. 14 It should not be supposed, however, that all changes in 
Ottoman Islam were either consciously formulated, or introduced solely as 'window-dressing' 
for external effect. Already, by the late 18 th century, tax farming had been introduced in order 
to ameliorate the effects of the territorial contraction of the Empire. However, the attendant 
growth in absentee landlordism and fief-holding by state officials meant that no party had an 
interest in improving productive capacity but merely in extracting, or avoiding the extraction 
of, surplus value by whatever means were available. 15 Quite naturally such an increase in 
despotism and militarism produced resentment and resistance at the periphery, especially 
among the non-Turkish elements of the Empire. This, in turn, necessitated a renewed 
legitimacy which likewise meant 'a recourse to Islam and the shari'a, ' whereby 'Islamic 
universalism gave ideological sanction to the supra-national character of the Empire. ' 
16 
For obvious reasons the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci is seen by some 
17 as marking the origins of 
pan-Islam. There is less agreement, however, concerning the broader relationship between the 
spiritual-religious and temporal-secular functions within historical Islam. Regardless of what 
was assumed to be 'authentic' Islam, it was the functional separation of religious authority 
from political sovereignty as applied to Eurolman Christian states which constituted the 
innovation to be found within the provisions of the 1774 Treaty. Regardless of whether these 
changes constituted a novelty within Islamic doctrine the novelty lay in their new emphasis 
being the work of a Christian diplomatist. The point, however, is that the Ottomans adopted 
them freely and in fact incorporated similar terms into subsequent treaties confirming the loss 
of territory to European powers. 18 One author is more clamorous on the issue when he asserts 
that the original claim to an extra-territorial extension of religious authority was fraudulent to 
the extent that Europeans were intentionally deceived. If so this would not be the last time that 
the Ottomans, or indeed Muslims, took advantage of, or even encouraged, the misconceptions 
of Europeans in order to gain political advantage in a world where the general drift of history 
14 Tibi, 198 1, p. 52. 
15 Tibi, 198 1, p. 52. 
6 Ibid., p. 52. 
7 Landau, 1990, p. 10. 'The origins of Pan-Islam can be traced, perhaps, to the Ottoman-Russian treaty of KUqUk 
Kaynarca, in 1774, in which a clause was inserted, asserting the Sultan's jurisdiction over Muslims (ehl-i Islam) 
outside the Ottoman Empire. ' 
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was not in their favour. The full significance of this assertion, being made as it was towards 
the end of'the First World War by an Italian academic serving his government, will be dealt 
with in a later chapter. His claim to the effect that, from a European point of view, the 
presumption by the Ottoman Sultan of extra-territorial jurisdiction on the lines of the Christian 
Papacy was subsequently reified into an incontrovertible fact about Islam, should not be 
doubted. According to Professor Nallino, writing in 1917, it was an Armenian of 
Constantinople by the name of D'Ohsson who turned this 'error' into a doctrine of European 
diplomacy through the publication of his Tableau general de VEmpire Ottoman in Paris in 
1788. It seems highly probable that this was the first occasion on which anyone in Europe 
referred to the Sultan, in his capacity as Caliph, as the 'Pontiff of the Moslems' 19 and as such 
marks the beginning of a process whereby an historical claim might be mistaken for an 
essential attribute. However, as the later chapters of this thesis indicate, it was a situation 
which an imperial power could also see advantage in exploiting. 
2.2 The Indian Mutinv and the Emereence of British Islamophobi 
Before the mid-nineteenth century, British statesmen were little concerned with Islam as such. 
Strictly speaking, the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci implicated no state other than Russia, and in 
even in her case, the effects had been largely reversed by the Convention of Aunali-Kavak. 
Neither were the practical legal effects extended by Turkey, nor the theoretical implications, 
generalised by European observers, in the aftermath of the Treaty. All of this was to change, 
for Britain at least, with the Indian revolt of 1857, better known, no doubt in order to justify 
punitive action taken at the time, as the 'Indian Mutiny. ' In simple objective terms, Britain's 
18 Over several decades various European powers reluctantly granted extra-territorial powers to the Sultan as 
caliph regarding certain Islamic offices within acquired territories - for example Algeria, Tunis, the Balkans and 
Tripolitania. See section 8.22. 
19 FO 882 Vol. 27, Arab Bulletin No. 102,3 September 1918. More specifically D'Ohsson refers to the 'priestly 
authority of the Sovereign. ' Note also that Nallino merely implies that D'Ohsson was a propagandist, though, of 
course, as a Christian he may simply have mistaken the novelty of the Sultan's claim for a long-standing 
tradition. See Section 8.22 for references to Nallino as a contemporary source after the First World War. 
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relation to Islam was no different after the Mutiny from what it had been before. As an 
imperial power Britain was unique in merely having more than seventy million Muslims under 
her rule. Nevertheless, as P. Hardy points out: 'Before 1857 British policies were generally 
speaking 'community-blind'; Muslims were considered harmless being members of a 'fallen 
race' or in George Campbell's words, "the most gentlemanly and well-mannered" of those 
seeking employment under the [East India] Company. ' 20 By contrast, however, the British 
would later blame Muslim intrigue for the conversion of a Sepoy mutiny into a conspiracy to 
21 subvert the Raj. It was upon such experiences that British writers such as Sir William Muir 
based their assessments of Islam and 'helped to foster the myth of the Muslim as always 
armed with the sword in one hand and the Qur'an in the other. ' 22 
According to P. Hardy the specific Muslim character of the Mutiny was merely apparent and 
that it was really a Hindustani affair, described as 'a rebellion of previously dominant classes, 
both Hindu and Muslim, in the North-Western Provinces "who have been rejected by US. it, 23 If 
Hardy is correct, it is pertinent to ask why Muslims were perceived as so threatening and 
conspiratorial in a way which Hindus were not. The answer must lie partly in the transnational 
nature of Islam according to which loyalty and allegiance is presumed to be to some 
transcendent, though singular, source of authority discharged nebulously across state frontiers. 
This was not the case with Hinduism 24 which was local and unorganised in character. 
This factor is alluded to in correspondence later cited in Government of India records on the 
subject of 'mujahidin' operating beyond the jurisdiction of British forces: 
The avowed object of the fanatics is the restoration of the Muhammadan role in India by the 
sword ... They unite the sympathies of Muharnmedans all over India and on its fronticr. They 
are supplied with funds from Hindustan. It was ascertained that the Nawab of Tonk supplied 
persons with money to enable them to reach their settlements. They are believed to carry on 
correspondence with Bombay, Pa(na, Bareilly and other Muhammadan cities. In short their 
20 Hardy, 1972, p. 60, quoting George Campbell, Modern India, (London 1852), p. 291. 
21 Ibid., p. 62. 
22 Ibid., p. 62. 
23 Ibid., pp. 67-8. One might add that such a view suited British rule in so far as hostility to it was explained by 
the inherent attitude of those subjected to it. 
24 The argument that the notion of 'Hinduistn' was a British invention is compelling. What is now conventionally 
referred to as Hinduism was in fact a set of local ritual social and religious practices and traditions found 
throughout the sub-continent which, having no common source of authority, did not constitute a religion as such. 
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hostile position on our frontier is a rallying point for all those who long for the renewal of 
Muhammadan rule, an encouragement to the disaffected intrigues of that sect, and a stimulus of 
the worst sort to the unruly passions of the warlike and inflammable population on our frontier. 
In a time of difficulty their posture of defiance might not improbably serve as a beacon to the 
Muhammadans generally. 25 
As Hardy concludes: 'Most Britons emerged from the events of 1857 with the conviction that 
Muslims were required by their religion to be antipathetic if not actively hostile to British rule, 
despite the active military assistance of Muslims from the Panjab and the loyal service of 
Muslim officials. 26 Firstly, the rule of India was revolutionised in a manner which, it has been 
argued, created a sectional Muslim interest in India. 
27 This resulted in a special fear of 
Muslims by the British and a corresponding awareness among leaders of the Muslim 
community, whether appointed autonomously or by the British authorities, of the potential for 
exploiting that fear. Secondly, India, being the primary source of colonial experience for 
imperial administrators and British Army staff, became a paradigm by which all other non- 
settler colonies were both conceptualised and organised. More importantly, in relation to the 
Middle East after 1882, what imperial administrators based in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden or the 
Gulf, knew or thought they already knew about Islam, they had learnt in, or from, India. It 
was precisely through such a process, according to Hardy, that, 'the "Indian Muhammadan" 
bugaboo in British foreign policy had been borne. ' 28 
Whereas the revolt which confronted the British in India was not truly Islamic, the same can 
not be said for other rebellions faced by Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia during the 
1850's and 60's which used Islam as a rallying cry. However, like the Indian Mutiny, each 
. 
29 Although the Indian was a response to foreign domination construed as a form of crusade tn 
Mutiny may have been misconstrued by the British, this was the era in which Islam emerged 
as a vehicle for opposition to the non-Islamic Empires, as did the possibility, in the minds of 
imperialists and Muslims alike, that such disparate revolts might somehow be co-ordinated in 
25 Quoted in Hardy, 1972, p. 83. Secretary, Panjab Govt., to Govt. of India, 16 August 1862, Selections from 
Government of Punjab Records, Confidential Series no. A xiii (Lahore, 1884), p. 23. 
26 Hardy, 1972, pp. 81 -2. 27 This process resulted in the Morley-Minto reforms of 1906-9 which introduced separate Muslim electorates. 
These were later acknowledged as being responsible for strengthening, if not creating, a distinct Muslim political 
identity. See Chapter 7, Note 93. 
28 Hardy, 1972, p. 119. 
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order to effect such resistance on a global scale. Whether this was ever a feasible project is a 
moot point; what is important in the context of this thesis, however, is the part played by the 
possibility in the minds of those British imperialists engaged in various attempts to extend 
their empire during the First World War. 
It would be wrong to assume from the foregoing that the Indian experience and the 'Eastern 
Question' did not interact before 1882. During the Crimean War (1854-56), in which Britain 
supported the Ottoman Empire against Russia, 'the British themselves had magnified Turkey 
in the Indian eyes. ' 30 Besides which, during the Indian Mutiny, in spite of a nascent 
Islamophobia among members of the administration, the British had already enhanced the 
Sultan's standing as the leader of world Islam by obtaining a proclamation from him urging 
Indian Muslims to remain loyal to Britain. 31 The apparent soundness of this policy could only 
have been based on the assumption that Britain's best response to the 'Eastern Question' was 
to continue to support the Ottoman Empire at all costs, and that this would be the case for the 
indefinite future. As will be shown later, this would remain a well-founded assumption for 
another two decades at most, at which point, according to one French statesman, 'the Islamic 
world [would come to resemble] a gigantic drum, the reverberations from one end being felt at 
the other. ' 32 
Elsewhere, within months of the Indian Mutiny but with no apparent connection to it, ideas 
were being aired in certain Arab speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which would 
only seem significant with hindsight. In July 1858, in relation to recent local disturbances 
resulting from an increase in taxes by the Ottoman authorities, the British Consul in Aleppo 
submitted a report to his superior in Constantinople in which he stated: 
The recent incidents ... have given rise to much talking on these subjects, 
from which it would 
also appear that the Mussulman population of Northern Syria harbours hopes of a separation 
29 Landau, 1990, pp. 11-12. This has remarkable similarities to the reaction of certain Muslims to the (neo-) 
imperialism of the 21" century who characterise Western globalisation as a crusade against Islam. 30 Enayat, 1982, p. 58. 31 Ibid., p. 57. 
32 Hardy, 1972, p. 176. A quotation of Marshal Lyautey's (1854-1934, Marshal of France). 
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from the Ottoman Empire and the formation of a new Arabian State under the sovereignty of 
the Shereefs of Mecca. 33 
Although the Consul reported that the local Arab population hated the troops of the Turkish 
garrison 'whom they regard as degenerate Mahometans, ' he viewed this local conflict as 
inherently national in character. 34 The overriding British concern at the time, however, was the 
maintenance of law and order within the Ottoman Empire. 35 Moreover, no opportunities were 
perceived, never mind seized, as they would be twenty years later in relation to the office of 
the Sharif of Mecca and his supposed position within Islam. Such manoeuvres could only be 
contemplated within the context of a revised approach to the 'Eastern Question' in which 
British support for the Ottoman Empire could no longer be taken for granted. 
Regardless of Consul Skene's gloss, his scant report suggests that as early as the 1850's Arab 
disgruntlement with certain aspects of Turkish rule manifested itself in the form of a desire for 
Islamic purity under an Arab ruler whose source of authority was religious and whose 
legitimacy was genealogical. 36 It would be tempting to argue that the inherent logic here 
anticipates an Arab caliph in the person of the Sharif of Mecca. As far as such logic goes, 
Albert Hourani is correct when he asserts that, 'to return to the original purity of Islam meant 
in fact to move the centre of gravity back from Turks to Arabs; if there was to be a caliph at 
all, he could only be an Arab caliph. 07 
Apart from the account of an alien observer, who wrote of certain Arabs living in Jerusalem in 
the 1850's and 60's that they were 'unable to comprehend how a Sultan of Turks, an alien race 
coming from Tartary, can rightly be regarded as Caliph (successor) of Mohammed the Koreish 
33 FO 78/1389 d: 20, pp. 237- 242. Letter from J. H. Skene, Consul at Aleppo to Charles Alison Esq. at Istanbul, 
31 July 1858. This report is referred to obliquely in, Landau, 1990, p. 38, and is cited specifically in, Tauber, 
1993, plO. 
34 Albert Hourani refers to a lecture by Bustani in 1859 which he indicates an awareness of an entity called 'the 
Arabs' and 'Arab culture, ' however this would seem to fall short of national consciousness per se. Hourani, 1983, 
277. 
FO 78/1389. See Note 33, above. 
36 These two are closely linked of course, it being a variant of Islamic doctrine which privileges the Qurayshi line 
of descent. The Wahhabi-Sa'udi alliance of the 18 th century was along these lines but lacked the genealogical 
qualification which would have posed a more direct challenge to Ottoman authority everywhere. 37 Hourani, 1983, p. 268. 
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Arab, or exercise the power of appointing or displacing the Shereef of Mecca, ' 38 there is no 
direct evidence that such reasoning was made explicit at that time. To discern, without 
qualification, the inherent logic of a situation retrospectively solely on the basis of subsequent 
development, is to disregard what is possible in terms of thought and action at tile molnent in 
question. The same observer seems to have assimilated this intuitively when he added that 
'loyalty to Islam is a powerful and pervading principle which keeps in check every other 
feeling. The Sultan is de facto Caliph to the learned Arabs; he is also Caliph de jure. As a 
matter of religious obedience they acknowledge and obey him. ' 39 Certainly there is no 
suggestion that the Sharif himself claimed anything along these lines on his own behalf, nor 
that he was acting in collusion with the disgruntled elements of northern Syria or other 
enemies of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the following section, this 
would soon change as a result of a shift in relations between the Ottoman Empire and certain 
European powers. 
2.3 The Eastern Crisis of 1875-80: Pan-Islam and the 'New Imperialism' 
While there may be a good deal of consensus regarding the fundamental changes occurring in 
the relationship between certain European powers and the rest of the world in the period 1875- 
85, there is less concurrence amongst theorists in respect of the underlying mechanisms giving 
rise to them. In Chapter I certain aspects of Lenin's theory were singled out for their relevance 
to the issues at hand. It may be inferred from Lenin's exposition of the relationship between 
the state and capital in certain countries that there is an alternative to the 'autonomy of 
diplomacy' approach which underpins the conventional 'Eastern Question' framework. 
Rather, the changes which occurred then may be seen more usefully as an aspect of the 
development of capitalism operating on a global scale. The conflicts of 1875-80, including 
38 Ibid., pp. 266-7, quoting, Finn, Stirring Times, (London, 1878), (2 vols. ) i. 215. Note that these comments were 
not recorded until 1870-2. 
39 Ibid. 
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those involving the Ottoman Empire, may be viewed in this light since it was during this 
period that a fundamental change of attitude occurred among certain European powers giving 
rise to what has been called the 'New Eastern Question. ' It matters little that some of the 
powers involved may not be designated 'advanced capitalist. ' It is sufficient to grasp that it 
was the structural changes occurring in the most advanced economies, principally Britain, 
France and Germany, which characterised the dynamics of the new era. In addition, due to the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1868, a gradual shift of focus on the part of the British, away 
from Constantinople in favour of Egypt and the Levant, was already under way. 
Moreover, even before the events of 1879-80, described below, and further reports of dissent 
within the Arab speaking provinces of Turkey in Asia, Lord Salisbury, as Secretary for India, 
had already observed: 'In the course of my travels I have not succeeded in finding a friend of 
the Turk. He does not exist. Most believe his hour is come. Some few that it may be 
postponed. No one has even suggested the idea that he can be upheld for any length of time, 
AO 
though as yet he did not advocate dismemberment. 
The 'Eastern Crisis' of 1877-8 began, as crises frequently do, over matters of apparently local 
significance: a peasant revolt in 1876 in Hercegovina and a rebellion against taxation in 
Bosnia. However, these local conflicts also had a Christian-European versus Muslim-Turkish 
dimension and the inhabitants of the surrounding provinces were soon embroiled. Inevitably 
the various powers became interested in the outcome. Eventually a Russian advance on 
Constantinople led, in March 1878, to the imposition on Turkey of the harsh terms of the 
Treaty of San Stefano. This proved unacceptable to the other powers. Britain threatened war, 
and along with Austria secured a new settlement at the Congress of Berlin in which they both 
obtained former Ottoman territories, ostensibly in return for maintaining the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire. The obvious contrariety of this result reflected the fact that although the 
rules of the 'old game' were still applied in principle, there was in evidence a new, 
countervailing tendency towards the partition of the whole world, including Turkey, amongst a 
small number of powers. 
40 Yapp, 1987, p. 8, quoting Salisbury in 1876. 
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The new dispensation, like the old, had both an intemal and an external effect on the Ottoman 
Empire. Consequent to the initial crisis in the Balkans the Constantinople conference of 
powerS41 of December 1876 put pressure on the Ottomans to instigate constitutional reforms. 
No doubt some, like the high-ranking Ottoman official, Midhat Pasha, wishing to avoid Great 
Power interference, saw the opportunity to shift power away from the Sultan's Palace towards 
the Sublime Porte. Consequently, a new constitution was promulgated based on those of 
Prussia, France and Belgium. Given the unevenness of consciousness found within the 
Ottoman Empire, the secularisation of authority inherent in the Tanzimat reforms was 
unacceptable to many Muslims who felt that their privileged status under the Shari'a 42 had 
been undermined. Accordingly, the Sultan was persuaded by certain divines to shun friendship 
with European Christian governments in favour of a policy of uniting Islam against them. 43 A 
central contradiction emerged which might almost be the leitmotif of this thesis, namely that 
the supposed 'foreign' nature of the constitutional changes, deemed necessary as a 
consequence of the failure of Turkey to compete with European powers, were politically 
unworkable, precisely as a rcsult of that 'foreignness. '44 Then as now, resistance to what is, at 
bottom, military and economic domination, frequently took the form of a cultural struggle 
against supposedly 'inauthentic' influences. 
Following the war with Russia which he used as a pretext, 
45 the new Sultan, 'Abdulhamid 11 
abandoned the more democratic reforms while retaining those which enhanced the central 
46 
authority of the state and his own position as the its head . Again, the internal and external 
components of these changes were intimately connected. One may discern, on the one hand an 
internalisation of certain external effects due to the relative weakness of the state vis-el-vis 
other states, and, on the other, an outward projection of an ostensibly traditional form of 
4' Anderson, 1966, pp. 190-92. 
42 Macfie, 1998, pp. 14-16. 
43 Zeine, 1966, p. 55. 
44 The issue of the supposed foreignness of these reforms, like that of the supposed foreignness of capitalism 
itself, is one that only arises because certain sectional interests embodied in extant social structures are 
threatened. Where ruling classes are sufficiently united, provisionally or otherwise, and able to reap the benefit, 
such technological, social and political innovations are not threatening except perhaps to the subordinate classes 
and the issue of their supposed foreignness is suppressed. The foreignness is therefore of an extrinsic ideological 
nature. Compare Malaysia to Iran post 1979. 
45 Kayali, 1997, p. 30. 
46 Hourani, 1983, p. 104. 
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Islamic authority revived in order to mitigate that weakness. The policy of 'Abdulhamid II 
may be characterised as reform from above coupled with Islamic revival. 
Evidently the claim of the Sultan to be the caliph of Islam, sustained since the Treaty of Kuquk 
47 Kaynarci , had already gained considerable acceptance, since, as Albert Hourani points out, it 
was given written form in the constitution of 1876.48 Hourani aptly describes the continuation 
of this process under 'Abdulhamid II in a way which encompasses both the domestic and 
global aspects of this Islamic revival: 
Under Abdulhamid the claim was pushed even farther. It was a policy aimed partly at the 
European Powers: they had Muslim subjects, the Russians in the Caucasus and Turkestan, the 
French in North Africa, the British in India, and might fear trouble among them if their policy 
pressed too heavily on the sultan. But it also aimed at reinforcing the loyalty of the Muslim 
peoples of the empire, a loyalty which might be shaken by the secularisation of law, the sprcad 
of liberal ideas, or the contagion of nationalism. 49 
This period saw also the advent of differential ideologies of legitimation within the Ottoman 
Empire since the Sultan was both a national symbol for the Turks and the source of imperial 
authority based on Islam for other ethnic groups including the Arabs. 50 As a response to the 
reaction against reform, Islamisation was not without its inherent contradictions. The attendant 
dangers soon became acute. Due to the importance of the Arabs as native speakers of the 
language of the Qu'ran they were deemed the most suitable vehicle for propaganda in support 
of the Sultan as caliph. At the same time those policies accentuated their difference from, and, 
in Islamic terms, inherent superiority to, the Turks. Meanwhile, 'Arab intellectuals grew 
increasingly more conscious of their ancestors' role in the origin of Islam and in early Islamic 
civilization, '51 consequently Islam became an essential attribute of the nascent Arab identity. 
The Islamic policies simultaneously alienated certain internal constituencies whose prestige 
was magnified by them as well as the 'traditional' upholders of Ottoman territorial integrity. 
Already by 1875, a 'secret society ... spoke ... of the "Arab pride" of the people of Syria and 
47 It will be recalled that the Ottoman recourse to the authority of the Caliphate in 1774 was primarily for external 
consumption. 48 Hourani, 1983, p. 106. Landau, 1990, p. 10. 49Hourani, 1983, p. 106. 50 Ibid. 
51 Kayali, 1997, p. 36. 
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rejected the sultan's claim to be caliph as a usurpation of Arab rights. 
52 Midhat Pasha, as Vali 
53 
of Syria, later reported to the Sultan that some Syrians were plotting to establish an Arab 
54 
caliphate, however, the possibility may well have been exaggerated in order to enhance his 
own powers within the province. Both the Sultan and those wishing to oppose him had to 
reckon with the relative potency of the external European threat to Islam and the caliphate, on 
the one hand, and the internal fear and loathing of deSpotiC55 rule, on the other. 
Furthermore, because of such contradictions these Islamic policies entailed a closer control of 
the Holy Places, particularly Mecca and its local guardian and ruler, the Sharif of Mecca. The 
potential coincidence of interests between a querulous and insecure Sharif and an imperial 
power contemplating the possible threat of an Islamic revolt encouraged by another, albeit 
minor, power would not remain theoretical for long. It would, however, take the effective 
extension of Ottoman propaganda to the borders of the British Empire to induce a keener 
interest in her internal Islamic affairs 
Whereas the internal effects of 'Abdulhamid's Islamic policies are clear, the question of 
whether Ottoman foreign policy may be characterised as distinctly and intentionally pan- 
Islamic 56 remains contentious. Jacob Landau refers to two orientalists writing at the turn of the 
20th century one of whom thought that pan-Islam was a force to be reckoned with and another 
who denied its existence. 57 A similar divergence of views is to be found among modern 
52 Hourani, 1983, p. 277. 
53 In spite of 'Abdulhamid's policies, the Empire continued to be integrated into the world economic and political 
system. The effect was uneven however. It was the social-structural changes which occurred in Syria, at least 
ýartly as a result of this process, which made Syria the site of such acute discontent. 
.4 Zeine, 1966, p. 54 
-55 Macfic, 1998, p. 16. 
56 Landau, 1990, pp. 2-3, provides an interesting discussion of the etymology of the term 'pan-Islam' which 
although not consistently used in Europe until the 1880's appeared simultaneously in English and German in 
1877. However the Young Ottomans used the term 'Ittihad-i Islam' from the 1860's and in the early 1870's 
advocated pan-Islam as an antidote to pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism, suggesting the kind of modular adoption 
described by Benedict Anderson. Anderson, 1983. The earliest recorded use of the term in Arabic is by Afghani 
and 'Abduh in 1884 in their publication, al-'Unva al-wittliqa, when writing in Paris at a time when the term was 
already being used by French commentators. 
57 E. G. Browne who believed pan-Islam did not exist and C. A. Nallino who believed that it did. Landau, 1990, 
p. I Note that the writings of Nallino were not discovered by British political intelligence officers operating in the 
Middle East until 1918. He was later quoted as an authority in a series of Foreign Office handbooks on the 
caliphate and pan-Islarn published in 1919 in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. See Section 8.22. 
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Turkish authors. 58 At the root of this issue is the view that 'the idea of political unity is 
inherent in Islam, whose character is a priori international, no less than a complete moral, 
cultural, legal, social, and political system. 59 Underlying this notion is the idea of an 
autonomous and essential Islam existing, as it were, outside history, a notion which ignores 
the distinction between Islam's ideal view of itself as a universal total system, and actual 
historical practice which has varied over time. As Landau points out, both the champions of 
such unity and Western observers of Islam, have often failed to acknowledge the divisive 
factors in 'actually existing' Islam - such as nationalism. It is suggested here that if this 
Western view of Islam is to be characterised as 'orientalist' then so is Islam's view of itself 
under the impact of European centred imperialism. Thus regarded, Orientalism emerges not 
simply as a set of prejudices imposed externally on the 'other' but as an ideological effect 
emerging conjucturally. Questions concerning the inherent unity of Islam cannot be resolved 
here, except to say that conscious efforts to unify Islam, for whatever reason, imply that the 
supposed unity of Islam's is not pre-given. Regardless of how the question is answered, the 
presumption and of an ideal unity, that is the elevation of unity as the norm, and the Islamic 
response to imperialism, may be seen as aspects of the same phenomenon. 
In pursuit of a new Islamic unity under conditions of European encroachment 'Abdulhamid 
developed an emissarial programme. According to Martin Kramer: 
In the doctrine associated with Abdulhamid, authority was personified in the radiant ottoman 
sultan-caliph, and amplified by his possession of Mecca and Medina; around his person and his 
sacred possessions revolved all Muslims. But not all were in close orbit. Most simply faced the 
sultan-caliph's territories in prayer; few cited him in their prayers; still fewer visited or resided 
in his domains; yet fewer bore arms in his cause. It was the task of Abdulhamid's emissaries to 
make Muslims aware of sultan-caliph's prerogatives, and to ask more of those Muslims who 
already acknowledged Ottoman primacy. Those emissaries gifted in speech travelled widely in 
the Ottoman Empire and abroad, while those prolific in the written word were maintained in 
Istanbul at the expense of the treasury. Together they formed a chain of transmission for the 
message of Ottoman primacy which, by spoken or printed word, was intended to reach the most 
distant Muslim enclaves. 60 
58 1. S. Sirma who believed pan-Islam to be a cornerstone of Hamidian policy and 0. Koluglu who thought it 
entirely absent. Landau, 1990, p. 1. 
59 Ibid., p. 4, referring to, A. Dawisha, (ed. ), Islant in Foreign Policy, esp. pp. 2 ff. 60 Kramer, 1986, p. 6. Kramer also lists various emissaries posted after 1876 including Afghani in 1892 following 
his expulsion from Iran, Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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Of particular concern to the British, no doubt, was the Ottoman consular service in India 
through whom Indian Muslims 61 delivered expressions of allegiance. It was in this vein that 
the 'kazasker Ahmed Hulusi Efendi' was sent to Kabul in 1877 to establish a Muslim alliance 
against Russia 'by persuading Amir Saghir Ali of his obligations to the Sultan. ' 62 British 
concerns did not go unarticulated. Following Russia's declaration of war on Turkey, the 
Viceroy, Lord Lytton, wrote in May 1877 to Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India, 
of his concern that Indian Muslims might suspect Britain of colluding with Russia against 
Turkey. He advised that, 'did they see us openly sharing the plunder, we should probably be at 
once confronted by an internal embarrassment sufficiently serious to paralyse all external 
action on our part; we should not only have to reckon on a real. jehad all around our frontier, 63 
and later that: 
It is my strong impression, at the present moment, the lives of all your officers and European 
subjects in India mainly depend on the course of your Eastern policy and its freedom from all 
appearance of subserviency to Russia. .. There is no getting over the 
fact that the British 
Empire is a Mahommedan power, and that it entirely depends upon the policy of Her Majesty's 
government, whether the sentiment of our Mahomedan subjects is to be an immense security or 
an immense danger, to us. 64 
Regardless of whether such fears were the intended effect of the Sultan's policies, or whether 
the possibility of exploiting such fears was fully realised by his government at the time, the 
policy was, understandably, characterised by European imperialists as pan-Islamic. Pan-Islam, 
however, presupposed, above all else, a strong central authority vested in a caliph to whom 
universal obedience would be pledged by Muslims regardless of domicile. 65 Consequently, the 
British, as the power with the greatest number of Islamic subjects, quickly sought to avoid the 
potential consequences. 
61 The effects of the emissarial policy in India were manifold but generally inconsequential. They included the 
celebration of Turkish successes in the 1877-8 war with Russia, the popularisation of the fez, and the addressing 
of the Sultan as Amir al-mu'ininin and Khalifa by Muslim dignitaries, all of which, however, emphasised the 
trans-national power of Islam. Hardy, 1972, p. 119. 
62 Kramer, 1996, p. 8. 
63 Hardy, 1972, p. 1 18, referring to, Lytton to Salisbury, 21 May 1877, Lytton Papers, Letters Despatched 1877, 
vol. 11, pp. 405 & 519-20. 
64 Hardy, 1972, p. 119. 
65 Landau, 1990, p. . 5. 
47 
Just as European empires had become global, so had the capacity for resistance in the name of 
Islam. This is evidenced in the example of the Second Afghan War of 1878_80,66 which may 
be regarded as an outgrowth of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-8.67 The war resulted in part from 
the exploits of the Russian General, Kaufman, who had been turned back at the gates of 
Constantinople in February 1878. In spite of an ostensible agreement between Britain and 
Russia at the Congress of Berlin, Kaufman hoped to strike at India via Afghanistan with the 
assistance of a popular anti-British revolt. Amir Sher Ali of Afghanistan failed to have 
Kaufman's mission to Kabul turned back, which, to the annoyance of the Viceroy, Lord 
Lytton, whose own missions had been refused, was then met cordially. Unaware that the 
Russians had already threatened to support the Emir's nephew and rival, Abdur Rahman, 
Lytton decided, late in the year after writing to the Emir and receiving no reply, to despatch 
his own mission. The Emir died in February 1879 and was replaced by his son Yakub Khan 
who, being uncertain of his support in the country, accepted a British offer of protection 
against the Russians. In spite of a treaty signed at Gandamak in the May of 1879, due to a 
series of misunderstandings the British mission was massacred at the compound of Bala Hisar 
in September. The British reprisals (considered atrocities by the British press and public) 
induced a jihad in December 1879 which concentrated its force on the city of Kabul. Although 
the British succeeded in putting down the uprising, partly as a result of their fear of instability 
in the sub-continent and the contagion of a religious war, and partly as a result of their belated 
realisation that Abdur Rahman was neither pro-British nor pro-Russian, they decided to 
forestall Russian attempts at collaboration by welcoming Abdur Rahman's re-installation as 
Amir. 68 Ultimately, the British agreed to withdraw leaving a Muslim agent behind, on the 
condition that Afghanistan foreswore all relations with foreign powers other than Britain. 
In spite of an apparently satisfactory resolution of this conflict, the British in India continued 
to suffer from a chronic sense of insecurity. This, coupled with the discontent felt by the Sharif 
of Mecca, resulting from unwelcome interference by the Ottomans in relation to their own 
endeavours to control Islam, produced an ephemeral alliance between him and Britain. In an 
66 The summary of this conflict which follows relies heavily on, Hopkirk, 1990, pp. 380-397. 67 Yapp, 1987, p. 82. 
68 The British even went so far as to arrange a durbar proclaiming Abdur Rahman as Amir. Hopkirk, 1990, p. 
397. 
48 
audacious bid, based on a sound knowledge of global politics, the Sharif of Mecca offered his 
services in order to mitigate his own, as well as British, insecurities in respect of a threat 
construed as common to both parties. Although not directly connected with the alliance sought 
during the First World War, the formal similarities are outstanding, both in terms of the 
diplomatic and political context and in terms of the mutual manipulation of anxieties. This 
abortive attempt at collaboration would appear, on the face of it, to have been the source of 
certain misapprehensions concerning the position of the Sharif of Mecca in relation to Islam, 
and as such deserves closer examination. 
2.4 The Mecean Crisis of 1879-80 and the Second Afighan War: A Paradigm 
for Imperial Collaboration 
In early March 1879, before news of Amir Sher Ali's death had reached the Hijaz, the British 
Consul at Jiddah, James Zohrab, wrote to the Secretary for India, the Marquis of Salisbury, 
informing him of what he considered to be an unprecedented opportunity. The Consul had 
heard, via his dragoman, that, prior to the war in Afghanistan, the Sharif of Mecca had 
received a letter from the Amir in which: 
His Highness [the Sharif] was earnestly requested to state in reply whether, seeing the 
Government of India ill-used and oppress[ing] the Indian Mussulmans, the Mussulmans would 
not be justified in taking up arms against the Government in aid of Afghanistan. His highness 
saw the object Shere Ali had in view in seeking for such a document, and well knowing that a 
declaration of this kind, emanating from the highest Mussulman ecclesiastical authority, would 
prove most mischievous, he refused to give the opinion-, he replied that, being on the most 
friendly terms with England, and feeling that England was humane and just in her rule over 
Hindostan, he could not credit assertions to the contrary, and would not give an opinion 
prejudicial to her interests. The Sultan having also sent a Mission to him (the Anfleer) to convey 
the disa P roval of his Majesty at the policy of the Ameer, he was bound to bow to that 
opinion. 6 
69 CAB 37/1 1880 No. 8, a series of 19 letters from March 1879 to February 1880, printed for use of Cabinet II 
February 1880. No. I Consul Zohrab to Salisbury - Jeddah, March 12,1879. 
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Assuming that the consul's dragoman had conveyed the Sharif's intentions faithfully, it would 
appear that that the latter wished to impress upon the British, (a) the possibility of a properly 
declared jihad among Indian Muslims against British rule, (b) his own pre-eminence in 
relation to the Muslim religion generally, and (c) that the Sharif's inability to respond 
positively to the Amir's request was contingent upon the inclination of the Sultan. Item (b) 
would seem to be novel, however, this pre-eminence could be of no consequence to the British 
in the absence of the already familiar Islamic 'bogey' which the Sharif clearly wished to 
exploit to his own advantage. The letter went on: 
His Highness requested me to inform your Lordship, always under the strictest secrecy, that the 
state of Mussulman feeling in India, throughout Asia, and in Egypt, is such that a slight event 
might create wars and raise revolt in all Mahommedan countries. Suspicion, mistrust, doubt, 
and irritation have taken deep root in the hearts of Mussulmans, and these sentiments, his 
Highness states, can only gradually be eradicated and confidence restored by the exercise of 
great prudence and delicacy, and by avoiding any and every measure which may excite 
fanaticism. The various Mussulamn nationalities are now in close correspondence with each 
other, and political events are reported to the Chiefs of all; the organization seems complete and 
the union perfect, and restless spirits are ever moving in search of pretexts to raise 
complications. Russia is aware of all of this, and she is, through her agents, fanning the flame. 
His Highness states that he will be happy to give his aid to her majesty's Government in any 
question in which his sacred position may be of any use, so long as such aid will not prejudice 
the Sultan. All communication must, however, be made to him secretly, and must not be 
communicated to any one; by this I know he includes the Turkish Government. 70 
This is not, however, simply the aggravation of British Islamophobia but the linking of this 
fear with the designs of another Great Power set against the possibility of an alliance between 
Britain and a power within Islam as an antidote. In other words, the Sharif presented a 
problem to Britain in order to promote himself as the solution. The Sharif took the step of 
offering to act as an intermediary in communicating with Yakub Khan and the other chief's of 
Afghanistan on behalf of Britain in order to counteract the supposed plans of Sher Ali. 
In the same letter, Consul Zohrab, went on to explain, albeit ambiguously, the relationship 
between the 'Sheriffate' and the Sultanate, specifically that the Sultan could not dispose of the 
appointment at will since it was hereditary. However, since there were two families, the 'Devi 
Aun' (line of 'Aun) and the 'Devi Zed' (line of Zayd) both descendants of the Prophet, from 
whom the Sharif could be chosen, the Sultan could, exceptionally, exercise his discretion. In a 
70 Ibid. 
50 
manner which could only have enhanced the Sharif's standing even further in the eyes of 
British statesmen, Zohrab added that, 'the Sultan is acknowledged as the elected leader of the 
Mahommedan religion; the Sheriff is recognised as the direct descendant of the Prophet and 
head of the Faith. 71 Precisely what was supposed to be the difference between 'leader of the 
religion' and 'head of the Faith' cannot be ascertained, but there can be no doubt that the 
juxtaposition of these formulations implies a potential cleavage within Islam, an alternative 
source of authority which ultimately no imperialist threatened by Islam could fail to 
contemplate exploiting. 
Following discussions between the Foreign Office, the Government of India, and the British 
Ambassador in Constantinople 72 shortly after the Treaty of Gandamak, Salisbury wrote to 
Zohrab 73 in August 1879 declining the offer of moral assistance while asking him to convey 
their appreciation to the Sharif. Evidently unsatisfied with the results of his initial approaches, 
74 the Sharif contacted Consul Zohrab again later in the year , as he also did a Mr. Hassan Jehur, 
a British subject resident in Mecca, in order to report an alleged rapprochement between 
Turkey and Russia. He also claimed to have received many letters from Arabia and Syria 
opposing a compact between the Sultan and Russia against Britain for fear that Asiatic Turkey 
would be absorbed into Russia. Furthermore, 
the Sultan no longer possessed that unbounded allegiance and veneration which his exalted 
position and his sacred character as Kalif demanded. People asked why they should respect and 
obey a man who could be dethroned by the fetva (decree) of an inferior (the Sheikh-ul-Islam), 
and why should they venerate him as the representative of the Prophet when the same Decree 
could deprive him of that sacred power and character? The forced abdications of the Sultans 
Abdul Aziz and Murad [in 18761 had, he added, given rise to these pernicious opinions. The 
people now say if a Sheikh-ul-Islam can dethrone a sultan, he cannot be the indisputable 
Sovereign, and his right to represent the Prophet is not Divine, therefore opposition to him is 
not wrong. 75 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. No. 2, Mr Lister, FO to Sir L. Mallet, April 14,1879; No. 3, Mr. Stanhope, India Office, to Lord 
Tenterden, April 18,1879; No. 4, Mr. Stanhope, India Office, to Lord Tenterden, July 25,1879, enclosing a letter 
from the Governor General of India in Council, Simla, to Viscount Cranbrook, June 23,1879. 
73 Ibid. No. 5, Salisbury, FO to Zohrab, August 7,1879. 
74 Ibid. No. 6 Consul Zohrab, Jeddah, to Salisbury, FO, December 8,1879. 
75 Ibid. 
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'Mysteriously, ' according to Zohrab, the Sharif requested that HMS Philoinel remain at 
Jeddah. 76 One might presume that whatever insecurities the Sharif was feeling at the time were 
connected with his next proposition. He now offered to send a representative to Afghanistan in 
order to communicate a message to the effect that, 'Mussulman religion requires England's 
aid, Mussulmans opposing England oppose interests of their own religion; their duty, 
therefore, is to submit to England, and follow her wishes. 77 Similar messages, if approved by 
the Indian Government, would be distributed by the Sharif's agents, if necessary accompanied 
by Indian Government officials. Significantly, the Sharif now asserted, more positively than 
before, that a secret treaty had been reached between Turkey and Russia. 
Aware of the ongoing chaos in Afghanistan the Sharif continued to make offers of mediation 
on Britain's behalf and to assert that Turkey had signed a treaty with Russia. 78 Such offers 
Zohrab duly passed on to London while taking the opportunity to explain 'the importance of 
establishing British influence in the Hedjaz on solid bases. ' 79 Additionally, and in contrast to 
the conventional European wisdom of the day, Zohrab describes the power of the Sultan as 
caliph as distinctly temporal while the spiritual component of power in Islam is vested in the 
'Grand Sheriff. ' Consequently, 
[Given] the position, as regards Mussulmans, of the two heads being thus defined, it will not be 
difficult to understand how their influence acts on the followers of Mahomet, and whose word 
will be listened to most. Any kind of advice or counsel offered by the Sultan will and inust be 
regarded, by those for whom it is intended, as biased by political leanings and views, and must 
lose much of its power and value, while whatever is said by the Grand Sheriff, being regarded 
as emanating from the true Spiritual Head of Islam, will, I am persuaded, carry conviction with 
it. 80 
Although only a consul and obviously not a maker of imperial policy, Zohrab made many 
comments which reflected, if they did not actually influence, the political changes occurring at 
the time. He recommended that England cease to temporize with Turkey, albeit on the basis of 
an imaginary treaty between the latter and Russia, and opined that, 'The Eastern question (if 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. No. 7, Malet, Cairo, to Salisbury, FO January 8,1880, reporting that Zohrab has arrived in Cairo and 
requested that a message from the Sharif be passed on to London. 
78 Ibid. No. 8, Consul Zohrab, Jeddah, to Salisbury, FO, December 22,1879. No. 9, Consul Zohrab, Cairo, to 
Salisbury, FO, January 9,1880. 
79 Ibid. No. 9, Consul Zohrab, Cairo, to Salisbury, FO, January 9,1880. 
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we can still so term Asiatic questions) no longer embraces merely Turkey, it includes the 
whole of Mussulman Asia. ' 81 He therefore advocated a protective policy which would 
'establish our authority over Mussulmans in a manner which will permit of no wavering or 
falling away. ' The weapon which would be used against a Sultan in alliance with a Great 
Power opponent, an alliance which, moreover, constituted a unique threat in view of the 
Islamic factor, he asserted, 'we now have to our hand in the Hedjaz and the Grand Sheriff. 982 
In a way which would not be taken up until such circumstances were replicated thirty-five 
years later, Zohrab argued that, 'if we establish an influence by a kind of protectorate in the 
Hedjaz, we shall be able to guide the whole Mussulman world. 83 Uniquely, Zohrab ascribed 
certain characteristics to the Sharif of Mecca which were more usually attributed by 
Europeans to the Sultan as caliph: 'Were the Grand Sheriff a mere servant of the sultan, like 
the Sheikh-ul-Islam, his authority with Mussulmans would be nil, but being a direct 
descendant of the Prophet, he is for Mussulmans pretty well what the Pope is for the Roman 
Catholic Church. 84 The appeal of this assumed separation of functions, however, becomes 
evident when he reasons that, 'were he, therefore, placed beyond the power of being 
controlled by the Sultan, through his ability of removing him and appointing in his stead the 
head of the family of the Beni Zed, he would be in a position to influence every Mussulman, 
and of materially aiding our cause in Asia. ' 85 
Following discussions between Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, the British 
Ambassador in Constantinople, and the Viceroy of India, the latter approved the use of the 
Sharif's agents in Afghanistan and India. 86 However, Salisbury emphasised the necessity of 
maintaining the semblance of non-involvement and the appearance that the proposed mission 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. No. 10,7, ohrab, Cairo, to Mr Alston, January 12,1880. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. No. 11, Sir J. Pauncefote, FO to Sir L. Mallet, January 27,1880; No. 12 (under cover of No. 13, 
Salisbury, FO to Mallet, January 29,1880), Stanhope, India Office to Lord Tenterden, Januray 28,1880 with 
inclosures (all telegraphic): Cranbrook, India Office to Viceroy, January, 12,1880, Viceroy, Simla, to Cranbrook, 
January 17,1890, Cranbrook, India Office to Viceroy, January 17,1880, Viceroy to Cranbrook, January 27, 
1880. 
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was the spontaneous act of the Sharif. 87 Meanwhile, Salisbury sought confirmation from the 
8 Ambassador in Constantinople that Turkey had entered into a secret treaty with Russia 8. 
Layard was unable to obtain corroboration of the Sharif's story and in any case thought it 
highly improbable. 89 As will become evident later, the issue of secrecy over Britain's use of 
Islamic authority and the potential pitfalls associated with such a venture would be identical to 
those concerns attending a similar collaborative project during the First World War. 
Ambassador Layard then submitted a report based on what he had been told by an informant, 
though supposedly originating with the Sharif, stating that, 
discontent with Turkish rule prevailed amongst the Arab populations in all parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. They were ready, he declared, to emancipate themselves from it if they could depend 
upon the support of England. The Sultan, he maintained, had lost the greater part of his 
influence and authority over the Mahommedan world as caliph, and all true Mussulmans now 
looked to the Sherif of Mecca as their real religious head. 90 
Nevertheless, such views were not uncorroborated, since Layard professed to be in receipt of 
information from a variety of sources confirming the view that the Arabs of the Fertile 
Crescent were willing to free themselves from Turkish rule with the aid of a power such as 
Britain. He was convinced that 'there is a secret conspiracy or movement amongst the Arabs 
against the Sultan and his Government, the head-quarters of which is in the Hedjas. ' 91 
Regardless of any conclusions drawn concerning the precise origin, in modern times, of the 
idea of a specifically Arab caliphate, Layard's communication to Salisbury of 9 February 1880 
must have been the first occasion on which that notion was connected so explicitly with the 
institution of the Sharifate of Mecca by an official of the British Empire. Layard wrote: 
The idea prevails among certain Mussulmans, and no doubt extends to the Arabs, that the 
present Ottoman dynasty is effete, and that it would be greatly to the advantage of Islam to 
replace the Sultan by the Sheriff of Mecca, who would then be universally accepted as the head 
of the Mahornmedan world and as the true Caliph. 92 
87 Ibid. No. 19, Salisbury, FO to Mallet, February 5,1880. 
813 Ibid. No. 14, Salisbury, FO to Earl Dufferin, January 29,1880. 
89 Ibid. No. 10. Printed for use of Cabinet, February 27,1880. Sir A. H. Layard, Constantinople, to Salisbury, No. 
182 Secret, February 9,1880. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. It should be noted that the idea of an Arab caliphate is not identical to the notion of the Sharif of Mccca 
becoming caliph. Whereas the latter is not necessarily nationalistic (since it may depend on religious arguments 
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Of more immediate concern was that the Sultan had intimated to the Ambassador that he was 
aware not only of Arab discontent but also of the suggestion that Britain might annex the Hijaz 
'in order that the Queen, who has many millions of Mussulmans under her sway, might 
possess the Holy Cities. 193 Reasonably, Layard speculated that such suspicions might cause 
the Sultan to depose the current Sharif unless Britain took steps to support the latter. Any steps 
the British might have taken were, in fact, pre-empted, since, five weeks later consul Zohrab 
reported that when the Sharif was on the point of sending his two emissaries to Afghanistan he 
was assassinated. 94 The assassin, who, it transpired, was an Afghan, which Zohrab thought 'a 
strange coincidence, ' was executed within a week without confessing who had instigated the 
act. 95 Regardless, the consul made the obvious connection when he referred to 'the sacrifice of 
his life by the late Sherif while on a self-imposed duty in favour of our interests. ' 96 That there 
really was such a connection was further supported by the fact that the Sultan took the 
opportunity of replacing 'Abd al-Ilah, the brother and designated successor of the deceased 
Sharif, by 'Abd al-Muttalib, a member of the opposing Zayd family. 97 
It will be recalled that the events of 1879-80, described above, were also part of a more 
fundamental change occurring on a global scale, namely the advent of 'classical' imperialism. 
However explained, this period witnessed a significant qualitative transformation of the 
underlying nature of the competition between the European Powers and a concomitant 
development in the political uses of Islam according to which Sultan 'Abdulhamid II, 
unable to defend his own territories effectively, and even less able or prepared to liberate 
fragments of other Muslim empires already under Western rule, ... was drawn to claim a 
spiritual authority no longer dependent upon possession of the sinews of power. His was a 
policy designed to conceal weakness, to create an illusion of strength. " 
alone), the former implies, at least, that it is issues of race and nation which are paramount even though they 
might be rationalised and lcgitimised in terms of the redemption of Islam. 93 Ibid. 
94 FO 78/3131 Turkey (Political) Consuls at Jeddah, Jerusalem. - Zohrab. Burrell. Johur. Moore. January to 
December 1880. Political No. 1, Zohrab, HBM's Consulate, Jeddah, to Salisbury, March 16,1880, reporting that 1h the Sharif had been assassinated on the 14 95 Ibid. Political No. 3, Zohrab, HBM's Consulate, Jeddah to Salisbury, March 22,1880. 
96 Ibid. Political No. 2, Zohrab, HBM's Consulate, Jeddah to Salisbury, March 17,1880. 
97 Ibid. Zohrab to J. B. Malet Esq. Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, Cairo, March 16,1880; Political No 7 
Zohrab, HBM's Consulate, Jeddah, to Salisbury, April 7,1880. 
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The link between these global changes and the internal ramifications for the Ottoman Empire 
is made most succinctly by Hasan Kayali when he writes that, 
what makes Islamism politically important was that it gained ascendancy in opposition to the 
political interests of the European powers that traditionally had abetted Ottoman territorial 
integrity. Indeed, Islamism was the child of changing international and economic relations in 
Europe and the position that the Ottoman Empire acquired in the neoirnperialist status quo. It 
had wide domestic implications which were strongly felt in the Arab provinces of the empire. 99 
It was this unfamiliar situation which facilitated inter-imperial meddling through the medium 
of Islam and produced, in equal measure, opportunities for collaboration with Islamic parties 
based on, as yet, unanticipated coincidences of interests. Although not fully realised, the 
arrangements negotiated by Consul Zohrab were probably the first attempt to effectuate such 
possibilities. 
The formal similarities between the situation which gave rise to the arrangements proposed, 
and considered, fleetingly, by Great Britain in 1879-80, and the alliance which emerged 
between the British in Cairo and the Sharif of Mecca in 1912-14 will become apparent later in 
this thesis. The details of these earlier proposals and the conclusions drawn from them by 
British imperial officials are worthy of close inspection if only to emphasise the synchronic 
and contextual conditions of their emergence over what might otherwise appear to be a linear 
causal chain linking the two instances. 
2.5 The Ouestion of Continuity 1881-1913: From Meccan Crisis to Meccan 
Crisis 
As the title of this section is intended to suggest, as far as British views on the question of the 
caliphate are concerned there are two ways if viewing the connections between the Eastern 
98 Kramer, 1986, p. 6. 
99 Kayali, 1997, pp. 31-2. 
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Crisis of 1875-80 (broadly conceived) and the eve of the Great War: either as continuous 
development, or as the reproduction of contexts which evoke correspondingly similar 
responses. It is maintained here that it is important to avoid a pernicious form of 
anthropomorphism, namely the fallacy of treating such categories as 'The British, ' or even the 
aggregate of 'British imperialists, ' as coherent subjects whose careers span the centuries. Such 
an approach is frequently supplemented by what might be called a 'viral' theory of ideology 
which seemingly obviates the need for identifying the real connections in modes of thought. 100 
As regards such direct biographical links between these two sets of events there are two prime 
contenders. The first is Herbert Horatio Kitchener who gained fame as the avenger of General 
Gordon in the Sudan and whose career evolved predominantly in the Middle East. His role 
was pivotal at the outset of the 1914-1918 war in establishing an alliance between Britain and 
the Arabs centred on the Sharif of Mecca as a candidate for the caliphate. Significantly, 
Kitchener's Middle Eastern career began under Layard during the crisis of the late 1870's. 
However, his position was a relatively minor one and there is no evidence, direct or indirect, 
that he was aware of Consul Zohrab's advocacy of a British backed caliph vested in the 
institution of the Sharifate of Mecca. 101 
The second is Wilfred Scawen Blunt who was certainly associated in some way with the 
events of 1879-80. Although Blunt lived through the war and was well connected with the 
statesmen of the late Victorian era he was very much an outsider, an anti-imperialist even, 102 
and in no way instrumental in the politics and diplomacy of the later period. It has been 
100 Contrary to the notion of 'intertextuality' espoused by Edward Said, the view taken here is that determinant 
'textual' connections are ultimately human connections since it is only people, and not books, which are capable 
of intentional action. See further references in Section 1.02 and in the Conclusion to this thesis. 
101 Having been assigned to the Palestine Exploration Fund from 1874 to 1878 and after undertaking similar work 
in Cyprus for one year Kitchener was transferred to the post of military Vice-Consul at Kastamonu in Northern 
Anatolia in the summer of 1879 where he remained until March 1880. There he reported to Sir Henry Layard, 
ambassador to Constantinople, and was originally supposed to aid the implementation of reforms designed to 
enhance Turkey's defence against Russia, pursuant to the Congress of Berlin. He returned to the Survey for 
Cyprus for two years before continuing his career in Egypt and the Sudan. Magnus, 1961, p. 40, and, Pollock, 
2001, Ch. V. The Consular files for the period include no correspondence between Kitchener and Layard, except 
on the most mundane matters and in any case Kitchener was not involved in political intelligence at that time. It 
is possible that Kitchener learned of the intrigue at Mecca at a later date but even his private archive, PRO 30/57, 
gives no indication of this. However, considerations such as these cannot be conclusive since Kitchener was 
notably circumspect on such matters throughout his life. 
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suggested, nevertheless, that through his numerous contacts with various Muslim and Arab 
theorists, Blunt was responsible for the genesis of the idea of an Arab caliphate among Arabs 
themselves. It is this claim which will now be examined 
Sylvia Haim, writing in 1955, identifies a number of similarities between what Blunt 
advocates as a remedy for the supposed ills of Islam, in his book The Future of Islam, 
published in 1881, and those ideas espoused later by the influential Arab Islamist, 'Abd al- 
Rahman al-Kawakibi, in his own book Umm al-qura. Certainly, Kawakibi, like Blunt, 
anticipated the fall of Constantinople and held that Islam would become a better religion for 
being relieved of its secular responsibilities. On a more practical level, both men advocated an 
Arab caliphate in Mecca as the centre of a new religious system, due to its remoteness and 
poverty which would 'protect it from the ambitions of competitive neighbours, ' 103 including, 
presumably, imperial powers. Notions of the purity of the bedouins as the essential Muslims 
and bearers of the language of the Qur'an betray a romanticism whose content is identical to 
that of many imperialists, and illustrates how identical ideological content may be assimilated 
by proto-nationalists and their imperial detractors for quite different, though related, reasons. 
While the similarity between al-Kawakibi's ideas, as summarised by Haim, and those 
expressed in Blunt's The Future of Islant may not be doubted, that is insufficient reason for 
agreeing with Haim's assertion that, 
a pious Muslim as [Kawakibil no doubt was, he unconsciously adopted all Western fallacies 
about the temporal and spiritual powers of he caliph, and carried the distinction so far that he 
justified through it the setting up of an Arabian caliphate. 104 
Regardless of the suggestion that al-Kawakibi's adoption was unconscious, an argument for 
which Haim provides no support whatsoever, one might question the implication that the 
separation of the spiritual from the temporal powers of the caliph was, at least on Blunt's part, 
102 Edward Said refers to Blunt as unusual since, although he was an orientalist imbued with classically orientalist 
ideas, he was neither afraid of, nor hostile to, the Middle East. Said, 1985, p. 237. 103 Haim, 1955, p. 133. 
104 Ibid., p. 136. 
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based on a misapprehension about Islam. 105 As Haim seems to acknowledge later, al- 
Kawakibi, like Blunt, consciously and positively advocated a 'revolutionary change in the 
nature of the caliphate from being both a spiritual and temporal power, to being a kind of 
papacy"06 in order that Islam might redeem its position in the world in the face of changing 
circumstances. While the actual 'spiritual' role of the Ottoman caliph may have been 
negligible in comparison to that of the earliest caliphs, a fact recognised by al-Kawak-ibi, it 
should be recalled that from the late I Sth century, Ottoman caliphs had officially assumed such 
a role at least in their dealings with Muslim populations falling under European domination. 
This development, both Blunt and al-Kawakibi believed, ought to have been eagerly embraced 
by Islam. What they each advocated was in fact a logical progression of the changes which 
had already occurred in the caliphate: that is a displacement of political sovereignty by 
spiritual 'reach' in the face of European encroachment. 
As we shall see later similar ideas to those expressed by al-Kawakibi and Blunt were 
eventually expounded by leaders of the Arab movement and by other parties wishing to 
collaborate with them. This is not to argue, however, that there was necessarily an actual 
transfer of such ideologies from one such party to another. It may be argued that their general 
currency is a function of their usefulness to anyone who had both an interest and a capacity for 
an effective intervention in history on the basis of them. In other words the apparent 
possibilities for change embodied in these idea were real in so far as they emerged immanently 
from the new circumstances. There is, then, a certain Eurocentrism in the contention that such 
thoughts were the invention of a particular individual such as Blunt, upon whom all other 
apologists were ultimately dependent. 
The question of Blunt's role in the emergence of the idea of a revived Arab caliphate has 
already been examined in some detail by Marten Kramer. A critical review of the latter's 
account, therefore, is a prerequisite to answering the questions raised here concerning the 
105 This is in distinct contrast to Consul Zohrab's advocacy of a caliphate in Mecca under British protection, 
which was quite definitely based on a misapprehension concerning the historical nature of the caliphate in Islam. 
'()6 There is, admittedly, a certain ambiguity in the writings of Haim over the use of the word 'Islarn, ' which is 
used to refer both to the religion as espoused by its adherents, as well as the geographical domain of that part of 
the world in which Islam has predominated. Consequently, such writings lack the distinction provided by, for 
example, the terms 'Christianity' and 'Christendom. ' 
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currency of the idea. According to Kramer, Blunt and his wife had travelled extensively in 
Arabia and the Middle East returning to England in 1879, apparently convinced that the Turks 
were responsible for the decline of Islam which, they believed, could only be reformed under 
Arab guidance. Two possible sources of the idea, both acquaintances of the Blunts, are 
rejected as unlikely by Kramer: one being the Iranian minister to London whose writings 
indicate no interest in Arabs or the idea of an Arab caliphate, and the other, a former Syrian- 
Catholic priest from Diyarbekir who resided in London from 1874. The latter, John Louis 
Sabunji, however, was not critical of the Ottoman claim to the caliphate until January 1881 by 
which time, Kramer asserts, Blunt had already suggested the possibility of an Arab caliphate 
under British protection to both Prime Minister Gladstone and certain members of the Foreign 
Office, with whom he had personal contact. ' 07 
However, Blunt's own account records that on 8 July 1880 he conveyed to Gladstone the idea 
'that the Caliphate was not necessarily vested in the House of Othman, ' 108 which does not 
amount to the advocacy of an Arab caliphate. What Blunt does say, however, is that when he 
met Sir Charles Dilke, Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Off ice, on 17 July, the latter's 
questions were plain and to the point, and, once understood, he wrote the draft of a despatch to 
Goschen at Constantinople [Ambassador Layard's replacement], referring me for furthcr details 
to Tenterden (the permanent Head of the Foreign Office), and I ain now full of the notion of 
going to Arabia and heading a movement for the restoration of the Arabian Caliphate. 
[emphasis added] 
It is important to note the ambiguity here and the distinct possibility that, although no doubt 
already moving in that direction, he may only have arrived at the solution of an Arab 
caliphate, as a result of this meeting. 109 Kramer offers two further alternatives sources of the 
notion: one a publicist active before July 1880 and the other a contact made some months 
later. The first was an Indian Government administrator by the name of G. C. M. Birdwood, 
also an acquaintance of Sabunji, who had expressed a preference for a caliphate vested in the 
Sharifate of Mecca rather than the Sultans of Constantinople. These views were articulated in 
107 Kramer, 1986, p. 12, referring to Blunt's, Secret History, 1907, p. 67. 
108 Blunt, 1907, p. 88-9, quoting extracts from his own diary for that day. 
109 Hitherto, according to Blunt's own account, he had only argued for the independence of certain parts of 
Turkey in Asia, questioned the Sultan's entitlement to the caliphate and at most hinted at an alternative. Blunt, 
1907, pp. 80-1,86-7& 88-9. 
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a series of letters in The Times throughout 1877, his main concern being the loyalty of Indian 
Muslims, 'a loyalty which could be secured for Great Britain through the transfer of the 
caliphate from potentially hostile to pliant hands. " 10 Though his concern was not new, his 
proposed solution certainly was. Kramer concedes that nowhere does Blunt refer to 
Birdwood's correspondence in The Times. 111 
A more likely contender 'hitherto unappreciated, 012 according to Kramer, is James Zohrab, 
British Consul in Jiddah. The Blunts travelled to Arabia via Jiddah in the winter of 1880-8 1. 
Blunt described his own mission thus: 
I had an idea that among the Wahhabis I might find a teacher who would give me the Arabian 
as opposed to the Ottoman view of Islam, and that I might devise with him a movement of 
reform in which I should suggest the political, he the religious elements. ' 13 
The origins of Zohrab's own advocacy of a caliphate at Mecca under British protection has 
already been chronicled at some length. It may be recalled that this occurred for the first time 
in late 1879 or early 1880, and also that Ambassador Layard, though ultimately relying on the 
same Arab sources, simultaneously relayed back to London the currency of such propositions 
among certain Arabs associated with the Sharif of Mecca - ideas of which, moreover, the 
Sultan was already aware. It is also worthy of note that both parties submitted their reports to 
Salisbury at the Foreign Office. It is equally likely therefore, given the relative ubiquity of 
such notions before Blunt's meeting with the Prime Minister in mid 1880, and before he met 
Zohrab in Jiddah, l 14 that his contacts at the Foreign Office were the source rather than the 
beneficiary of his ideas. Given these facts, Blunts memorandum to the Foreign Off-ice in late 
1880 advising that 'the position of England might assume of Protectress of the Caliphate 
"0 Kramer, 1986, p. 13, referring to letters in The Times, 25 June 1877,9 July 1877 & 15 October 1877. 
'11 Interestingly, an Arabist by the name of C. P. Badger wrote in response to Birdwood that the Sharif had 
neither spiritual nor political influence beyond his own district and was therefore unlikely to bc thought a suitable 
candidate for caliph by Muslims. Kramer, 1986, p. 17. Unfortunately for the British Middle Eas(ern 
establishment during the Great War, for reasons which constitute th *e 
central subject matter of this thesis, this 
would remain the case even after a great deal of money, political capital and prestige had been invested in the 
Sharifian caliphate project. 112 Kramer, 1986, p. 13. 
113 Ibid., referring to Blunt's Secret History, 1907, p. 65. 
114 Kramer, 1986, p. 13, n. 18, describing Zohrab's despatch of December 23,1880, in which he reports receiving 
the Blunts. Kramer also cites letters from Zohrab to the Blunts written during the first half of 188 1, but makes no 
reference to contact between them before their meeting at Jiddah. 
61 
would assure to her whatever forces Islam can still command. This is the only solution which 
could assure India permanently to her, " 15 is revealed as a superfluity since the same 
recommendations had already been made by Consul Zohrab some months earlier. ' 16 It may be 
that Blunt's reading back of suggestions already familiar to the Foreign Office was simply a 
means of indulging and legitimising his own byronic romanticism towards the Arabs by 
locating a possible coincidence of interests that he might exploit. Of equal importance, in 
relation to Haim's argument, is that the ideas expressed here were already something of a 
commonplace among certain Arab parties even before Zohrab espoused them. 
Finally, after briefly promoting his ideas concerning the future of the caliphate, Blunt realised 
that there was little support for an Arab caliphate among Muslims generally and by early 1884 
ceased propagandising entirely. Ironically in view of what was to come, Islamic theorist and 
reformer, Jamal ad-din al-Afghani, advised Blunt at a meeting in London in January 1883 that 
the Sultan was as popular as ever in India because of the prevalence of rumours; concerning 
British designs on the Hijaz. To Afghani, at least, what would later emerge as the central 
contradiction of Britain's wartime caliphate scheme thirty years later was already apparent - 
namely that British meddling in Islam by its very nature was bound to fail. 
For those who favour the linear diffusion model, their argument is not complete without 
adumbrating the full lineal descent of an idea. The purpose of these comments is to emphasise, 
firstly, that Blunt was not the originator of the idea of a revived Arab caliphate during the late 
I 9th century, and secondly, that, in spite of an ongoing dissatisfaction with the Ottoman Sultan 
as caliph among certain small groups of Arabs, there was no continuity between Blunt's 
advocacy of an Arab caliphate and later support for it in connection with the Sharif of Mecca 
during the First World War. This applies equally to British intelligence officers stationed in 
Cairo and Arab nationalists in Syria. Notwithstanding the fact that certain of Blunt's ideas 
were shared by Kawakibi and later disseminated in the pages of Muhammad 'Abduh's and 
'15 Kramer, 1986, p. 12. Referring to Blunt's Secret Histoq, p. 67. 
" It is surprising that Kramer does not allow the possibility of such conclusions himself, since he cites among 
others, the crucial letter from Zohrab to Salisbury of January 9,1880 (See notes 78 & 79, above). Kramer does 
not, however, refer to British cabinet papers, in particular CAB 37/1 1880, No. 8 & No. 10 (See note 89, above) 
which include the dispatches of Ambassador Layard. 
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Rashid Rida's journal, al-Manar, 117 the 'revival' of such ideas cannot be explained by the part 
played by Wilfred Scawen Blunt. Rather such ideas were immanent and depended for their 
emergence and re-emergence upon the perception of interests and the presentation of 
opportunities for their realisation. It was certain historical conditions which gave rise to the 
inherent logic, whose starting point was the diminishing secular authority of the predominant 
Muslim state upon which the supposed unity of Islam depended. Given that at a certain point 
this process appeared to be irreversible, a range of possible remedies were considered. These 
were not infinite in number; the most conspicuous option being a recourse to the specifically 
religious authority of the caliph, as distinct and conceivably separable from the secular 
authority of the sultan-caliph, which could transcend state boundaries while at the same time 
accommodate other national sovereignties. This then raised the possibility of an alternative, as 
well as purely spiritual, caliphate as an instrument which might be used by Islamic and 
imperial powers alike. Conceived in this light, there is no need to locate any direct continuity 
between the Meccan crisis of 1879-80 and that which would occur in 1913-14. 
2.6 The Intensification of Imperial Rivalry in the Middle East: Islam and 
the 'Prophylactics of Ideology' 
At the political level the inner logic of the 'new' imperialism was driven, in part, by the 
emergence of imperial powers whose economies were fast catching up with Britain's and who 
soon began to seek their own 'place in the sun. ' 118 In other words Britain was no longer alone 
and her ruling classes could no longer debate idly the choice between direct annexation and 
informal control of overseas territory. The new imperative was one which has been described 
as 'prophylactic acquisition, ' that is, the extension of empire in order to preclude the extension 
of rival empires. The turn of the twentieth century saw Britain's entry into the system of 
117 Published in Cairo from 1898. Hourani, 1983, p. 226. 118 This phrase was coined quite late in the game by Kaiser Wilhelm Il in a speech at Hamburg, Germany on 21 
August 1911. Williams, 1975, p. 436. 
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continental alliances 119 which she had hitherto eschewed, and the end of her so-called 
'splendid isolation" 20 . 
At the centre of this alliance system was the Middle East, in particular Arabia where imperial 
designs converged, and where the British route to India jangled with the main thrust of 
Germany's Witteleuropa' and 'Drang nach Osten' 121 policies. The latter were potentially in 
conflict with Russia's atavistic tendency to extend southwards, as well as the relatively limited 
designs of France and Italy in the region, not formally acknowledged in any treaty or alliance. 
By 1914, following the partition of Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia, the Arab and 
Ottoman Middle East remained the only area on the planet which had not been formally 
occupied, partitioned into zones of interest, or expressly designated as a buffer zone. Given the 
logic of the underlying process it would have been natural to assume that any future inter- 
imperial war would be concentrated on the Ottoman Empire. The focus of interest, however, 
was no longer Constantinople. Since the opening of the Suez Canal this had shifted 
southwards to Cairo 122 which, due to the imperatives of imperial defence, 123 and the 
extraordinary influence of men like Lord Cromer 124 and his successors, had become the base 
for British regional expansion and influence. Consequently, Cairo gradually came to be seen 
as the capital of a putative viceroyalty on the scale of India. 
"9 In particular the alliances established between Britain and France in 1903 and 1904 which guaranteed 
Britain's position in Egypt as far as other European powers were concerned, and the Anglo-Russian alliance of 
1907, which, among other things, confirmed Afghanistan's status as a buffer between their respective empires, 
and effectively partitioned Persia into two non-contiguous zones of interest. 
120 Usually denoted by the signing of a treaty with Japan in August 1902, guaranteeing the independence of China 
and Korea one month after Lord Salisbury's retirement as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. This followed 
Lord Salisbury's upholding of isolationism and rejection of an Anglo-German alliance in May 1901. According 
to his daughter the phrase 'splendid isolation' was first used by him, in a speech in November 1896, in 
connection with the 'Eastern Question' and was meant ironically as 'a rebuke to the self-righteousness of his 
compatriots' who had criticised Russia's and Austria's refusal to engage in punitive action against the Turks 
which he had proposed in connection with the Armenian massacres. Cecil, 1932, pp. 85-6. Notwithstanding the 
above, the phrase is used here to in the sense in which it is more popularly understood. 
12 ' The second was an extension of the first and refers to the contiguous extension of German political and 
commercial influence towards the Middle East and India. Fisher, 1999, pp. 27-8. 122 Khalidi, 1980, p. 12. 
123 It was in 1902 that a cabinet sub-committee, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was established in 
order to ensure the application of this very logic to what was already a global empire. 124 Marlowe, 1970, pp. 302-3. Marlowe notes that Cromer was in Egypt longer than any viceroy in India and was, 
likewise, more closely identified with Egypt than any viceroy was with India and suggests that Cromer's views 
had more authority in London than any Viceroy's. 
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Salisbury may have been one of the first Britons to anticipate the demise of the Ottoman 
Empire due to internal unrest. 125 But in spite of Britain's unilateral involvement in its 
dismemberment with the occupation of Cyprus and Egypt in 1878 and 1882 respectively, he 
did not actually discuss partition with another power until 1895.1 26 However, possibly due to 
his experiences of 1879-80, Salisbury had already expressed his expectation of the emergence 
of an alternative Caliphate in Arabia. When discussing the souring of relations between Britain 
and the Sultan of Turkey with Sir William White, the Ambassador at Constantinople, he 
wrote: 
We have shewn that we can govern Mahomedans so as to make them prosperous and contented 
and that on our side of the Red Sea. On the other side of the Red Sea - in Arabia - people have begun to talk and move, and to ask themselves whether eternal misgovernment by Turks is their 
irrevocable doom. And Arabia is the terror of the Sultan's dreams - the joint in his armour: because it is in Arabia that some day an opposition Commander of the Faithful will be 
manufactured. If my view is right, I cannot comfort you with the hope of an early restoration of 
your popularity, though the Sultan may think a certain amount of dissimulation respectable. 
The English are the only people who have shewn that they can conduct Mahomedan 
communities - in India and Egypt - to prosperity and internal security without meddling with 
their religion; and to the Sultan, to whom his position as the first Moslem of the world is 
everything, this rivalry is both exasperating and alarming. [emphasis added] 127 
While this constitutes a legitimisation and rationalisation of possible future British rule over 
Muslim countries it does not amount to the positive advocacy of an Arab Caliphate in 
pursuance of that end. Rather, it views the emergence of such an entity as practically 
inevitable. It would take the re-emergence of Islam as an acute threat to the empire for these 
two possibilities to be combined into a coherent scheme for the extension of empire in the 
Middle East. This is not to say, however, that Islam was in no sense a threat during the 
intervening years. In fact the 'bugaboo' 128 of Islam intensified as empires continued to extend 
into the territories hitherto unoccupied by European powers. 
125 See note 4 1, above 
126 Salisbury discussed partition with Kaiser Wilhelm II while visiting Cowes in August 1895 though there is 
some disagreement as to who proposed it first. Anderson, 1966, p. 256. 127 Cecil, 1932, pp. 388-9. Letter to Sir William White (Ambassador at Constantinople since 1887), September 14,1891. 
128 See note 28, above. 
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As early as 1881-2 the Mahdi of the Sudan declared a jihad against the British, 29 and with his 
successors was later able to sustain an anti-imperialist war which occupied the British for the 
best part of a decade. It was with Britain's first incursion into solidly Muslim territory that 
they discovered that the threat of Islam was not merely the stuff of paranoia. As if to prove his 
utter disregard of British hegemony in the region the Mahdi's successor suggested that Queen 
Victoria convert to Islam. 130 Simultaneously the British in Egypt were bothered by another 
anti-imperialist fighting in the name of Islam, Muhammad bin 'Ali Es-Sanussi, who 
promulgated his own doctrine permitting him to claim the caliphate should the Sultan deviate 
from his own doctrines. His son did in fact adopt the title of 'Khalifa' on his father's death. 
Reginald Wingate, as Kaimakarn of the Egyptian army, was sufficiently impressed by 'the 
Senussi' (as he was generally known) to suggest to Cromer an accommodation with him, 
within the framework of Egyptian government. 131 Wingate's propensity for such adaptations 
would become his hallmark during the First World War when he became one of the first to 
champion, and then to abandon, a policy of collaboration based on the Sharif of Mecca as 
caliph. It was perhaps the formative experiences of Wingate and Kitchener which made them 
more willing than many others to interfere in Islamic politics and to attempt to divert certain 
indigenous tendencies to Britain's advantage. There was, in addition, a more populist 
dimension to the spectre of an Islamic threat: when 'the Senussi' shifted his theatre of 
operations to the Sudan following the British victory over Mahdism, the Daily Express 
referred to his army as a force 'which threatened civilisation. ' 132 
It was during the 1890's, however, that a new factor compounded the fear of Islam in the 
British Government: the courting of pan-Islam by the Germans. There were rumours that the 
Kaiser was about to convert to Islam 133 following 
., 
his visit to Damascus in 1898, and in the 
same year the British were further disconcerted by the engagement of a German arms 
129 SAD WP 100/11/1-7. Translation of the Mahdi's declaration of jihad, AH 1299 (AD 1881- 82), with Arabic 
original. 
130 SAD WP 250/l/528-606. Covering note dated 1/5/87 with handwritten translation of letters from the Mahdi. Original sealed 'Mohamed El Mahdee Abdullah'. 
131 SAD WP 155/5/46-57. Letter to Evelyn Baring from Cairo, dated 6/4/89 enclosing a handwritten report 
entitled 'Memorandum - The Senussi Movement', signed by Wingate, Kaimakam AAG Intelligence EA, 6/4/89. 132 SAD WP 272/5/127. File of newspaper cuttings on the Sudan, Daily Express, 25 July 1902. 133 Landau, 1990, p. 47. These rumours may have been started deliberately. It was reported that the Kaiser wore a 
coat that had an 'Arab-Muslim' appearance from behind. 
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manufacturer in Kabul. 134 Although, after 1900, the Germans showed an increasing interest in 
Islam as an instrument to be used against opposing imperial powers, they were to a 
considerable extent driven by mistaken assumptions. In particular it was believed that the 
British were behind the anti-Turkish revolt in the Yemen, and that they endorsed the 
Khedive's pretensions to an Egyptian empire in the Levant. ' 35 Ultimately it would be this new 
factor, i. e. the threat of a German inspired anti-British jihad, which would be a major stimulus 
inducing the British in Cairo to adopt a coherent Islamic policy of their own. The 
'prophylactics of territorial acquisition' has already been referred to; this subsequent 
development may aptly be described as the 'prophylactics of ideology. ' Though, as will be 
shown later in the context of Lord Kitchener's tenure in Egypt, contained. within the 
imperative of prophylactic acquisition would be a more constructive aspect to Britain's 
response to 'German pan-Islam. ' 
2.7 IslamoDhobia in Context 
For obvious reasons Judeo-phobia, as an instance of imperial anxiety, ' 36 is not generally 
thought to be associated with a fear of Islam. Perhaps because much of the history concerning 
the war-time agreements entered into by the British has been written in the light of the latter- 
day Arab-Israeli conflict, there has been a tendency to designate the leading actors of the 
earlier period as either anti-Semitic Arabophiles or Judeophile Arabophobes. One could just as 
easily substitute 'Islam' for 'Arab' in this formulation. It will be argued here that both of these 
dispositions, are aspects of a single all-encompassing politico-attitudinal complex commonly 
134 McKale, 1998, p. 7. 
135 McKale, 1998, p. 29. Ironically, the revolt in Yemen was finally suppressed in 1911 with the assistance of the 
Sharif of Mecca. 
13" This subject has been dealt with extensively by Elie Kedourie, Kedourie, 1956, pp. 67-86, and, 1974. The 
author deals with Judeo-phobia and anti-Semitism in the context of what he calls 'Levantinism'. This concept 
referred to those inhabitants of the Middle East who had been 'contamina(ed' by modern European political and 
cultural ideas. Such people were considered as either 'hybrids, ' or as inferior types in relation to their nomadic 
cousins who attracted a certain romantic sympathy amongst imperialists like Sir Mark Sykes. This attitude was 
later reflected in Sykes' advice to the Cabinet. Chapter 6, Note 63. 
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found among statesmen, diplomats and intelligence offices operating in, and in relation to, the 
Middle East before and during the First World War. The two aspects of this complex, rather 
than being mutually exclusive, as is frequently assumed, were in fact closely associated, being 
manifestations of a more general fear of all extra-territorial influences, and trans-national 
forms of politics, ' 37 except of course those closely underpinning their own imperial projects. 
The importance of this argument is that the simultaneous support for Zionism and the idea of 
an Arab caliphate, rather than being seen as a contradiction stemming from the duplicity of 
British imperialists, should be viewed as mutually consistent and genetically similar positions. 
Extraordinary as it may seem it was even possible in the minds of some diplomats to assume 
an intimate and subversive association between international Jewry, pan-Islam and the 
caliphate. 138 
The most notable example of the conflation of Judeophobia with Islamophobia was that which 
emerged among British Middle East experts (so-called) in the early years of the 20th century. 
A. L. Macfie relates how Sir Gerald Lowther, British Ambassador in Constantinople, wrote to 
Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, referring to the 'Jew 
Committee of Union and Progress. " 39 A few months later in May 1910, Lowther submitted a 
report, again to Hardinge, which reiterated at length the notion that the CUP, and by extension 
the Ottoman Empire, was run by a clique of Salonica Jews and 'crypto-Jews. ' He went on to 
say that 'every Hebrew seemed to become a potential spy of the occult Committee, and people 
began to remark that the movement was rather a Jewish than a Turkish revolution?, 140 The 
report, actually the work of G. H. Fitzmaurice, dragoman at the embassy, gave the appearance 
of being authoritative and well-researched being some five thousand words in length. Macf1e 
agrees with Elie Kedourie and Bernard Lewis that the notion was completely fanciful and 
ridiculous. 141 In a manner which assumed the world-wide power of Jews, whose first loyalty 
was to their own kind rather than their state of domicile, Fitzmaurice argued, that since 'The 
Jew' hates Russia with whom England is now in alliance, the Jews are now liable to be anti- 
137 The ultimate fear of imperialists would be that of Bolshevism which, being based on working class solidarity, 
was the first form of politics to be truly worthy of the description 'international. ' 138 In comparison with the British notion of a Jewish run pan-Islam, the Nazis' absurdly conceived enemy of 
'Judeo-bolshevism' hardly seems ridiculous. Mayer, 1990, passim. 
139 Maefie, 1998, p. 31, and, Fromkin, 1991, p. 41. Both refer to a letter ofjuly 1909. 
140 Macfie, 1998, p. 32. Quotation taken from an extract of the letter provided by Elie Kedourie. Kedourie, 197 1. 
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British, a prospect which, moreover, the Germans might wish to eXploit. 142 As the British 
Government's sole source of information on the matter, Fitzmaurice's report was inordinately 
influential. The problem of single, uncorroborated sources of intelligence, on which to base 
policy in the Middle East, was one which would become a debilitating factor in relation to 
British deliberations on the merits and demerits of an Arab caliphate. 
In the absence of informed objections Fitzmaurice's language grew ever more inflammatory. 
In 1911 he wrote of the 'baleful Jew-Mason element, ' 143 and in 1912 warned a colleague 
melodramatically that 'if a general massacre ... sweeps over Asia Minor and Syria in an 
expiring spasm of Pan Islamism, now for four years harnessed to the Chariot of Pan Judaism, 
the prairie fire may even reach Egypt. ' 144 
The most remarkable connections, reflecting the ultimate in paranoid fantasies, were 
expressed a few years later by Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the Political Department at the India 
Office, who wrote on the eve of Turkey's declaration of war against the allies: 
The strength of our position vis a vis the Arabs has lain in their own divisions and in their 
hostility to Turkey... moreover, Pan-Islam is a danger that must be steadily born[e] in mind, 
and it seems highly probable that eventually a consolidated Arabia would be a far greater 
danger, alike in Africa and Asia, than the Jewish free-masons who now control the Calij)hate. 
[emphases added) 145 
141 Macfie, 1998, pp. 32-3. 
142 Fromkin, 1991, p. 42. Quotation taken from Kedourie, 1974, p. 261. Fromkin points out that there were only 
four Jews elected to the 1908 Ottoman parliament and that no Jews were elected to the Central Committee of the 
CUP in 1909. He adds that those Jews associated with the CUP distanced themselves from Zionism before and 
during the war. 
143 Khalidi, 1980, p. 255, note 91. 
141 1 have relied on Khalidi, 1980, pp. 245-6. The original is somewhat illegible but likens the situation to the 
storm depicted in one of Turner's paintings exhibited in the National Gallery entitled, Rain, Steam and Speed - The Great Western Railway. FO 800/80, LJM, pp. 88-91, Letter from Fitzmauricc, British Embassy, 
Constantinople, to Tyrell, 5 Nov 1912. 
The language used here anticipates that used by novelist John Buchan in his oft-quoted passage (e. g. Fromkin, 
1991, p. 97) from Greenmantle written in 1916: 'There is a dry wind blowing through the East, and the parched 
grasses wait the spark. And the wind is blowing towards the Indian border. ' Buchan, 1916, p. 6. It is conceivable 
that Buchan, as Director of Information for the British Government during the war, picked this up from 
Fitzmaurice since he also came to believe that the CUP was controlled by Jews. Fromkin, 1991, p. 43. Buchan's 
novel was well read by British soldiers serving in the trenches and was, until the release of Hitchcock's film, The 
39 Steps in 1939, his best selling story. Smith, 1965, pp. 293-297 & 373. 145 McKale, 1998, p. 74. 
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Regardless of the conflation exhibited in such passages, the point being made here is that there 
is not simply a formal similarity between imperial Judeophobia and imperial Islamophobia. 
Rather, the often presumed opposition between the emerging British Islamic (and Arab) 
policy, and British Zionism, may be sublated under a more fundamental principal - that of 
imperial paranoia regarding trans-national forms of political solidarity in general. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The origins of pan-Islam, that is of Islam as a political force harnessed to the task of resisting 
European imperial expansion, has been traced back to 1774. Although this development was 
not immediately threatening to Britain, the Indian Mutiny of 1857 produced in many British 
imperialists, for the first time, a misplaced Islamophobia and a self consciousness of Britain as 
an 'Islamic Power. ' 
It would take the Eastern Crisis of 1875-80 and the revival of the Caliphate by 'Abdulhamid 
11, as the main component of his pan-Islamic policy, to create an acute anxiety in the minds of 
those European empires containing large populations of Muslims while simultaneously 
producing reaction and discontent in certain parts of the Arab speaking provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Meccan Crisis of 1879-80 merely provided the first opportunity for 
collaboration between the two simultaneously threatened parties - an opportunity based on a 
marginal correspondence of interests in which the Sharif of Mecca sought British protection, 
while the British sought the sanction of Islam in support of their imperial order in southern 
Asia. 
The excursus in relation to Wilfred Scawen Blunt serves to, (a) emphasise the lack of 
continuity between Blunt's advocacy of an Arab caliphate and that contemplated by the 
British in Cairo in 1914, (b) draw attention to the similarities between the events of 1879-80 
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and the circumstances obtaining on the eve of the First World War, and (c) underline the 
simultaneity, and conjunctural nature, of British and Arab espousal of an Arab caliphate. Tile 
last point is important in relation to the period since the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci, which 
coincided with the advent of industrial capitalism. This was a period of unprecedented change 
on a global scale in which the most advanced economies came into contact with the least 
developed regions of the globe. And yet the fundamental break with tradition which took place 
everywhere, at the same time necessitated a reinvention of tradition whereby those instigating 
change and those forced to accommodate change, in the words of Marx, 'anxiously conjure up 
the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes 
in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this 
borrowed language. " 46 
It is concluded that, in any event, the origins of the idea of an Arab caliphate cannot be 
pinpointed, 'cartesian-newtonian' fashion, to a unique coordinate in time and space. 
Furthermore, it was proposed that the innovations advocated were, on the part of theorists such 
as al-Kawakibi, consciously revolutionary, rather than being the surreptitious adoption of 
specifically European traditions or the unconscious assimilation of European fallacies. This 
conclusion is based in part on the premis that there was no such thing as a pristine or authentic 
caliphate and that Islam was always open to adaptation. 
The advent of 'New Imperialism' coinciding with the Eastern Crisis of 1875-80 was 
characterised by Britain's having to compete on a more even footing with other industrialised 
imperial powers. The rush for overseas territory, usually described as a 'scramble, ' was 
motivated in many instances by the need to prevent other powers from doing the same. 
Similarly, towards the turn of the twentieth century, powers other than Britain considered 
using Islam to further her own ends vis-ii-vis other empires. This new phenomenon has been 
posited as an example of the 'prophylactics of ideology' whose precondition was the process 
commencing in 1774 through which Islam in general, and the institution of the caliphate in 
146 Marx, 1954, p. 10. 
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particular, were turned into instruments available for 'modular adoption' 147 by Islamic and 
non-Islamic powers alike. 
By situating the fear of Islam within a more general complex, the departure in relation to 
Judeophobia is intended to dispel at the outset the notion that the fear of Arabs and Islam is 
somehow a concomitant of Judeophilism. Rather, depending on the circumstances pertaining 
in a particular location, the fear of Jews/Arabs/Islam is logically consistent with the need to 
accommodate, placate and collaborate with Jews/Arabs/Islam. In the light of this generalised 
form of paranoia British Middle Eastern Policy at this time is revealed as more internally 
consistent than it might otherwise seem, being, as it was, fearful of any form of trans-national 
political association or allegiance perceived as capable of subverting empire. 
Finally, in the following chapter it will be shown how, under Lord Kitchener's rule in Egypt, 
the idea of a British Arabia first emerged in the minds of those who considered themselves 
capable of realising it. It will be argued here that it was the exigencies of empire which 
provided the environment for Kitchener's personal ambitions rather than those ambitions 
determining imperial policy. The force of such ambitions should not be underestimated, 
though the precise mode of their realisation proposed by Kitchener's acolytes was determined 
by their belief that the restoration of an Arab caliphate was ineluctable. In their own minds 
they were simply inserting themselves into an objective process. In a later chapter it will be 
shown how the hitherto disparate elements described above were subsequently forged into a 
coherent 'Western Arabian' 148 policy whose central tenet was an Arab caliphate in Mecca 
under British auspices. 
147 This term is attributed to Benedict Anderson, though it is invariably applied to a reverse process whereby forms of national organisation are adopted wholesale by less developed societies. Anderson, 199 1, pp. 4& 135. 148 This term, which is borrowed from Elizabeth Monroe, recognises the antagonism between British India, and British Egypt, over such matters. Monroe, 1963, p. 36. 
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CHAPTER 3: The 'Hu*az Crisis' of 1914, the Comini! of 
War, and the Caliphate 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter covers the period of Kitchener's tenure in Egypt (1911-1914), however the 
significance of this period is that it contained, in broad outline, a repeat of the crisis of 1879- 
82 in respect of Britain's relationship with Islam in the context of an impending inier-imperial 
confrontation. As in 1879-82 the relationship between the European empires, on the one hand, 
and between the Ottoman Empire and the Hijaz, on the other, should be seen as aspects of 
same underlying crisis. It has already been indicated in Chapter 2 that, notwithstanding 
Kitchener's long-term service in the Middle East, the recurring prevalence of the idea of a 
revived Arab caliphate among British orientalists cannot be explained by his particular 
biography. In this chapter it will be shown precisely how the recurrence of these 
circumstances in 1914, rather than some ideological inheritance, gave rise, once again, to the 
idea of a British-backed Arab caliphate. 
The key features of this period were the Hijaz crisis of 1914 and the onset of a war which 
placed the Ottoman Empire in an alliance with Germany against Britain. The expectation of 
war was accompanied, as is generally the case, by a mutual paranoia concerning the intentions 
of the contending parties. This was especially the case regarding Britain's attitude towards the 
caliphate and Islam, which seemed to be driven forward by what Britain expected of her 
imperial rivals and by what they, in turn, expected of Britain. It is in this context that the 
notion of the 'prophylactics of ideology' comes into its own. Moreover, it was under such 
circumstances that the particular perspective of British Cairo came to predominate in the 
formation of British policy in the Middle East. As will become apparent, the emerging 
imperial vision was to be realised through the manipulation of Islam. 
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Such an analysis stands in marked opposition to the views of Elie Kedourie whose pre- 
eminence in this area rests on his detailed account of the so-called 'Husayn-McMahon 
Correspondence' in which the British caliphate project is not accorded the status of a serious 
enterprise. Kedourie's standing on this issue cannot be ignored it is therefore necessary to take 
issue with his trivialisation of the precise references to the caliphate contained in Kitchener's 
message to 'Abdullah, son of the Sharif of Mecca, on I November 1914. It will be argued 
later, at some length and with further documentary support, that the British in Cairo made a 
positive choice to obtain and sustain an alliance with a section of Arab society who they 
considered to be represented by a single accessible leader and figurehead. This group of 
people, it was hoped, might turn Islam in their favour, or at least prevent it being turned 
against them. What the British did not want was an Arab movement reliant on some form of 
mass or popular politics which they could not control. Rather, they sought to subordinate and 
subvert mass tendencies via the instrument of Islam' which they considered to be fundamental 
to Arab society, and against which secular politics were viewed as an alien import. Rashid 
Khalidi expresses this most forcefully when he writes: 
[Britain] was not at ease with the popular movement which had shown its strength in Syria in 
1912 and 1913, and echoes of which had already caused restlessness in Egypt. Although she 
needed them, Britain was reluctant to work directly with determined and dedicated nationalists 
like 'Aziz'Ali al- Masri and Rashid Rida, who would never fully accept the tutelage which she 
intended to exercise over her new "ally.,, 2 
Kedourie fails utterly to take such factors into consideration and is totally impercipient to such 
distinctions within the 'Arab movement' at this juncture. Consequently, he is misled into 
arguing that because Cheetham, as acting chief of the British Agency in Cairo in Kitchener's 
absence, had reported on 26 October 1914, that representatives of the Syrian Arabs in Cairo 
expected little more than 'a benevolent attitude towards their aspirations for self-government 73 
from Britain, that the embellishments contained in Kitchener's note to 'Abdullah on Turkey's 
entry into the war 'merely [gave] expression to vague sentiments, devoid of any binding 
Recall that Britain's fear of the Young Ottomans under 'Abdulhamid, and the CUP, was based largely on their 
erceived potential for directing Islam against Britain. 
Khalidi, 1980, p. 377. Sir Andrew Ryan's formulation, the central axiom of collaborative logic, is most 
pertinent: 'stron enough to administer, but weak enough to be dependent on us'. Heller, 1983, p. 210, n. 62. 
Ryan was the 2 nf Dragoman at Constantinople and later His Majesty's Minister in Albania. Storrs, 1937, p. 57. 3 Kedourie, 1976, p. 20, with reference to FO 371/2140 63581/46261, No. 222b of 26 October 1914. 
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character, which might be useful in attracting and enticing the Sharif. 4 The despatch to 
'Abdullah was, declares Kedourie, 'an otherwise inexplicable and anomalous action. ' 5 
Consequently, one of the aims of this chapter is to counter Kedourie's 'theory of aberration' 
regarding British involvement in the revival of an Arab caliphate. This will be achieved by 
setting British actions concerning the caliphate in the context of the ubiquitous practice of 
imperial collaboration and the acute necessity of identifying suitable local representatives with 
whom to cstablish mutually beneficial arrangements. 
3.1 Kitchener in Ellypt: The Increasing Necessity for Collaboration. 
Although Kitchener's tenure as Consul General in Egypt did not follow directly from 
Cromer's he was bound to be compared with him. Undoubtedly Cromer was the creator of 
British Egypt and had come to be treated as a virtual viceroy thereby establishing a reputation 
which Kitchener would aspire to surpass. Cromer was a banker and businessman who lacked 
the romantic admiration for the bedouin typical of British imperialists. Kitchener, on the other 
hand, gave little away concerning his personal attitudes and sympathies. He was foremost a 
soldier who had become a living hero of the British Empire after the 'victory' 6 at Omdurman 
in 1898. He then became Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian Army until he 
succeeded Eldon Gorst as Consul General in 1911.7 More importantly, whereas Cromer had 
8 been isolated at the apex of a pyramidal structure of imperial rule, Kitchener spoke Arabic 
and Turkish which perhaps facilitated a more perspicacious form of discourse with important 
locals thereby opening up a whole range of possibilities for collaboration not available to his 
predecessor. 
4 Ibid., p. 20. 
5 Ibid., p. 20. 
6 More accurately described as a massacre than a battle. Kiernan, 1982, p. 80. 
7 Khalidi, 1980, p. 91. 
8 Ibid., pp. 10- 11. 
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The significance of Kitchener's tenure is that it coincided with a renewed and more urgent 
interest in the matter of the caliphate among imperial powers and Muslims alike. 
Unbeknownst to Kitchener, as he took up his post, prominent pan-Islamists were meeting in 
Berlin to make an appeal to the Germans in the name of the Ottoman caliphate. They wished 
to arrest the trend exemplified in Italy's occupation of Tripolitania which they regarded as the 
first piece in a supposed 'domino effect' running from North Africa via the Balkans to Arabia 
which would result ultimately in an Arab caliphate. 9 At the same time, the German Kaiser, on 
the authority of a German archaeologist-spy working in Egypt, came to believe that the British 
Resident in Cairo, Lord Kitchener, was about to take advantage of the Turko-Italian War over 
Libya in order to establish an Arab caliphate under Egyptian and British protection. 10 
Furthen-nore, in early 1911, thirty-five Arab deputies from the Ottoman parliament had 
approached the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin 'Ali, with an appeal to raise an Arab rebellion 
against the Turks. " This coincided with a report submitted to the Foreign Office by Eldon 
Gorst which indicated that Egyptian nationalists suspected Rashid Rida and other local Syrian 
exiles of intriguing in the Hijaz and Yemen against the Turks. Moreover, the Egyptians 
supposed that such overtures had the backing of the Anglo-Egyptian Government. Apparently 
the Egyptian Khedive, 'Abbas Hilmi, had co-opted Rashid Rida in pursuit of his ambitions to 
establish an Arab caliphate and an empire centred on Cairo which would include Syria, Egypt 
and Arabia. 12 The British, were as yet unaware that Rashid Rida had, recently formed a secret 
society whose membership included 'Abdullah, the eldest son of Sharif Husayn., 3 As ever 
during the era of competing empires and pan-Islamic reaction, fear and rumour ran ahead of 
fact. Although, according to Donald McKale: 
Extensive research has illustrated that British leaders before World War I, while they 
accumulated, like the Germans, substantial evidence of the existence of Arab unrest as well as 
of a small nationalist movement, disagreed over what these factors meant and what Britain's 
response to them should be. 14 
9 Landau, 1990, p. 136. 
'0 McKale, 1998, p. 30, referring to Max Freiherr von Oppenheimer. 
11 Ibid., p. 11. Dawn, 1973, p. 13. 
12 McKale, 1998, p. 3 1. This dominion was conceived in the image of that created by Muhammad 'Ali. 
13 McKale, 1998, p. 31. Note however that according to C. E. Dawn it was probably not until the first half of 
1914 that Rashid Rida met 'Abdullah in Cairo and administered him the oath of the Society of the Arab League. 
Dawn, 1973, p. 2 1. 
14 McKale, 1998, p. 30. 
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Later, during the early months of his administration, Kitchener would recommend, for reasons 
of imperial defense, the seizure of Southern Syria and certain Arab provinces which would 
form one or more autonomous Arab states. 15 
The Balkan Wars of 1912-13, like the Turco-Italian War of 1911, had an ultimately 
contradictory effect within Islam. Firstly, although these were essentially national conflicts, 
the King of the Bulgarians proclaimed a 'crusade' against the Turks, inducing the latter to 
rally support in the name of Islam. Sir Gerald Lowther, Ambassador at Constantinople, 
forwarded the translation of a telegram which the Grand Vizier asked to be sent on to Grey, in 
which he noted the effect of the Bulgarian declaration on Muslim sentiment in India and 
Egypt. The Grand Vizier urged Britain to support Islam since, 'England's position in the world 
has this peculiarity: that one half of the two hundred million Mussulmans who dwell on the 
earth are under British nationality and in the colonies of the British Empire. ' 16 The message 
continued: 
Now if, in order to meet the enemies invasion with a greater force, the Caliph, as a reply to the 
crusade so imprudently preached by King Ferdinand, proclaimed a Holy War and summoned to 
it the whole Mussulman world, would not England run the risk of finding herself faced, both in 
Egypt and India, by difficulties on the gravity of which it would be superfluous to dwell? But 
no! The caliph of the Mussulmans would not tolerate the proclamation of a religious war 
incompatible with the principles of civilisation. Nevertheless, the excitement and ebullition of 
feeling caused in Mussulman countries by the news of the proclamation of a religious war by 
the Bulgarian King must not be overlooked; and it is with the object of dissipating the 
uneasiness existing on this score and the inevitable conclusions to be drawn from it, that, as the 
representative of he Caliph of the Mussulmans, I address myself to your Lordship in order to 
point out the greater interests the Sovereign of a hundred million Mussulmans would 
7 
seem to 
have in affording effective support to Islam, as Russia has done in the case of Slavism. 1 
The threat of jihad against Britain was so thinly veiled that except for the niceties of 
diplomatic protocol it might just as well have been naked. 
15 Khalidi, 1980, pp. 100-103. Khalidi refers to a meeting of the in July 1912 which was the first occasion on 
which the British considered an invasion of Ottoman territory on the back of an Arab uprising and realised the 
necessity of reaching a prior understanding with the French. 
16 FO 800/80, pp. 95- 98. Covering note from Sir G. Lowther, Pcra, to Grey, 7 November 1912, enclosing a 
telegram from the Turkish Grand Vizier. 
17 Ibid. 
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Secondly, the continual failure of the Turks against European Christian Powers, as perceived 
by many non-Turkish Muslims within the Ottoman Empire, caused some Arabs to doubt the 
capacity of the Turks to protect Islam and the caliphate and to seek independent solutions. It 
was at this time that British consulates in the Arab provinces of the Empire began to report 
expressions of pro-British sentiment among the local inhabitants with increasing frequency. 18 
It was also during this period that many Arabs and members of the British establishment in the 
Middle East began to contemplate, quite acutely, the disintegration and partitioning of the 
Ottoman Empire and that the first inklings of opportunities for co-operation and the mutual 
satisfaction of interests began to appear. Kitchener, himself, concluded that the 'Arab race' 
would be soon be 'compelled ... to take an independent line of its own. 
19 
Whereas German intrigue was largely a matter of conjecture at this stage, French concerns 
were openly reported. Believing that they were the preferred party in Syria, the French were, 
naturally, alarmed by recent developments. In December 1912, Defrance, the French Minister 
in Cairo reported that the Khedive had ambitions in Syria and hoped to co-ordinate matters 
with the 'Muslim Association of Syria' and the local Masonic Lodges and to put him self 
forward as a 'pan-Arab' candidate for the caliphate. Moreover, Defrance believed that the 
Khedive was acting with British support. 20 In turn the British were dismayed by French 
newspapers reports that Kitchener had received delegations from Syria. Khalidi insists that 
these reports were incorrect but that both Kitchener, and Cumberbatch, the Consul-General in 
Beirut, 'had given the French grounds for suspicion. ' 21 In November and December, Grey 
instructed Cumberbatch not to encourage Syrian overtures since British rule in Syria was 
'neither practicable nor desirable, ' 22 and directed Kitchener to deny such rumours about 
Syria. 23 
18 Rashid Khalidi provides several examples of such reports between late 1912 and the spring of 1913, 
corresponding with the First Balkan War. Khalidi, 1980, pp. 265-290. 
19 Ibid., p. 346, quoting CAB/4/5/177B, CID 'International Status of Egypt when Great Britain is at War', 20 
June 1913. 
20 Ibid., pp. 269-70. 
21 Ibid., p. 272. 
22 Ibid., p. 278, citing FO 371/1507/33672/50279: minute by Grey, 14 Nov. 1912. 
23 Ibid., citing FO 371/1522/52330: Grey to Kitchener, 7 Dec. 1912. 
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Kitchener and the staff of the British Agency in Cairo must have become increasingly aware 
of Islamic sentiment, or perhaps more accurately, of political opinions expressed in the Islamic 
idiom. The loss of Ottoman territory in the Italian and Balkan Wars was perceived by Muslims 
as a threat to the caliphate. The Egyptian press, for example, referred to 'the final tearing up of 
the Khalifa of Islamia. 24 There were newspaper reports concerning a declaration to the Sultan 
presented by a delegation of Arabiap shaykhs awaiting orders to commence a jihad in order, 
they said, 'to defend the glory of the Islamic Khalifate with our blood, money and children. ' 25 
Equally disconcerting were intelligence reports anticipating a possible Sanussi advance on the 
Hijaz via Egypt in order to claim and save the caliphate. 26 It was as if someone had declared 
an 'open season' on the caliphate. 
It should be stressed that, although, by July 1912, the British Cabinet had considered some 
form of Arab protectorate, and certain Arabs had made overtures to the Sharif of Mecca 
regarding a revolt against the Turks, 27 the correspondence of interests remained purely 
objective. At this juncture, the idea of an Arab caliphate under British influence was firmly 
established only in the minds of Turkish pan-Islamists, Egyptian national iStS28 and Britain's 
imperial competitors. It would, however, take rather more exigent circumstances than those 
pertaining at the time for the possibility of a British-backed Arab caliph in the person of the 
then Sharif of Mecca to be regarded as a necessity. It has been emphasised in the introduction 
to this thesis that the minimum prerequisite of a collaborative arrangement is correspondence 
of interests, no matter how transient or flimsy. While a challenge to the established caliphate 
24 PRO 30/57/43 LU4, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 28 July, 1912, Translation from the Arabic 
Press - El Shaab of 25 July 1912. 25 Ibid., LU43, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, Intelligence Report of 22 Jan. 1913 quoting an article 
from the Egyptian press - El Moayed. 26 Ibid., LU3, Intelligence News, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 24 Nov. 1912. 
27 Dawn, 1973, p. 14. According to Dawn, certain 'nationalists' had begged Sharif Husayn to assume the 
leadership of the Arab movement but had not engaged in conspiratorial negotiations regarding an Arab rising. 
This coincided with a rumour that the government in Constantinople was about to remove Husayn from his post. 28 There is some disagreement and uncertainty over whether Kitchener and 'Abdullah first met in 1912 or 1913. 
Khalidi prefers the spring of 1912 rather than early 1913, though in neither case was the meeting reported to 
London. He also believes that it was Kitchener who took the initiative though concedes that this cannot be 
established definitely. Kitchener did report, however that 'Abdullah wished to know whether the British would 
prevent the removal of his father by the Turks. According to 'Abdullah's own account, Kitchener was unable to 
offer help but left the impression that he may be able to in the future. Khalidi, 1980, p. 348. C. Ernest Dawn 
asserts that whenever the first meeting took place, it was the source of speculation in the Constantinople press 
that an Arab revolt was planned with British assistance. This meeting itself followed a rumour in Constantinople 
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was expected and the demise of the Ottoman Empire seemed imminent, there was neither a 
situation in which a British advance on Ottoman territory was deemed necessary, nor an 
obvious candidate for the caliphate who might have a reasonable chance of success. While, 
the first of these would not occur until the actual onset of war, consideration of the second 
would arise in anticipation of such a conflict. A crisis over the Sharifate of Mecca during the 
years before the war would produce an identifiable Arab party which occupied a unique 
position within Islam, and an incumbent with a pressing need for an alliance with extraneous 
forces. 
3.2 The 'Hiiaz Crisis' of 1914 
The situation had been growing ever more uncertain for the Sharif Husayn of Mecca and his 
family since his appointment29 by 'Abdulhamid in November 1908 . 
30 According to Hasan 
Kayali, 'more changes came about in the Hejaz in the first few months following July 1908 
than in any other Arab province. The Sultan's pan-Islamic policy which was adopted by the 
CUP meant that the Turkish Government had to ensure closer control over the pilgrimage, its 
host the Sharif of Mecca, and its environs. ' 31 The Damascus-Medina section of the Hijaz 
Railway, formally opened in September 1908,32 had, officially, been developed to facilitate the 
conve ance of pilgrim traffic to Mecca. The real object of the railway, however, was to y C, 
facilitate a more centralised control over the peripheral portions of the Ottoman Empire from 
Constantinople 33 _a fact not missed by the current Sharif and the bedouin tribes-people of the 
Hijaz whose main means of livelihood had been circumvented. The entire basis of the Sharif's 
in 1912 that the government was planning to remove Husayn. Dawn, 1973, p. 13. Neither author refers to the 
discussion of an Arab caliphate at this meeting, whenever it occurred. 
29 The precise circumstances surrounding Sharif Husayn's appointment as Grand Sharif of Mecca is the subject of 
controversy and uncertainty. Wilson, 199 1, p. 206. 
30 Kayali, 1997, p. 148. It is interesting to note that Husayn was the preferred choice of the British Foreign Office 
who 'exerted influence through the Anglophile grand vizier, Kamil Pasha, as well as the British ambassador. ' 31 Ibid., p. 146. 32 Ibid., p. 147. 
33 Khairallah, 1991, pp. 94-95. 
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power, both economic and political, was being undermined, since his ability to 'service' the 
allegiance of the region's tribes depended on his capacity to extract tribute and offer protection 
against other tribes and/or extraneous powers. This, in turn, depended on his people's ability 
to earn 'fees 34 for the carriage of, and/or granting of permission to carry, goods and pilgrims 
to and from Mecca. 35 Consequently Husayn would have had no difficulty in raising a revolt in 
19 10, or in 1913, after the central government threatened to extend the railway to Mecca and 
introduce the 'Law of the Vilayets. ' 
The Ottoman Government later sought to circumvent the Sharif's power in Mecca more 
directly by interfering through the offices of the Muhafiz of Medina who could now be 
reached quite readily by rail or telegraph. Of particular relevance to European views of Islam 
was the consequence, according to Mary C. Wilson, that 'technological innovations enabled 
Husayn's religious duties to be separated from his administrative ones and thus his activities 
were to be confined to the religious sphere. ' 36 This is an interesting comment which provides 
further support for the argument advanced in Chapters I and 2 that the supposed unity of 
secular-temporal and religious-spiritual functions in Islam is historically contingent. 
Ironically, just as the Ottomans gave a religious rational for extending the imperial railway 
network to the Hijaz, the Sharif opposed such developments on the basis that reform and 
centralisation was contrary to religion. 37 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Sharif's economic 
base was threatened and he was bound to take steps to preserve the capacities inherent in his 
position within the social and economic structure of the Hijaz. Kayali explains however that 
the Turks interest in the Hijaz was not primarily economic, since its commercial potential was 
insignificant. Rather its importance was both strategic and religious. 38 As global conflict 
seemed increasingly likely this fact enabled the Sharif to enhance his position locally and to 
increase his standing in the world at large, while causing Britain to view the possession of the 
Holy Places of Islam by a potential rival, as a strategic threat, much as it had done in 1879-80. 
34 The term 'fees' avoids the negative connotations of 'bribes' or 'protection money' which both imply corruption 
and illegality. Such concepts were inappropriate in the Arabian hinterland where state law had not been imposed. 
35 FO 141/460/1198. Telegram - report from Abdula Kadir Mackawee to Sir R. Wingate, Governor General of 
the Sudan, 25 February 1914. This despatch reports that the Hijaz tribes are against the extension of the railway 
and against inroads from the coast at Jiddah or Yanbu' as this would enable European incursion. 
36 Wilson, 199 1, pp. 2 10-11. 
37 Kayali, 1997, p. 17 1. 
38 Ibid., p. 173. 
81 
The situation for Sharif Husayn became once again more precarious at the beginning of 1914 
when one of his sons was informed by the Ottoman minister of the interior, Talat Bey, that his 
father would be removed if he continued to oppose the extension of the railway to Mecca. 39 
On 15 January 1914 Constantinople appointed Vehib Pasha, a representative of the CUP, to 
the post of Governor of the Hijaz. Significantly, according to Kayali, 'this decision was 
motivated, on the one hand, by the revival of rumors of an alliance of Arabian tribal chiefs 
under an Arab caliph, and, on the other hand, by the intensifying competition between the 
Ottoman and British governments for the allegiance of local Arabian potentates. 1 40 The 
ascription of the epithet 'bogey 41 to Islam has some validity at this stage since the Ottoman's 
application of their pan-Islamic policy to the Hijaz was driven forward by rumours of a British 
search for alliances in the Arabian Peninsula, 42 just as Britain's mounting consternation was 
motivated by Turkish pan-Islam. 
Of further significance for the emergence of an Anglo-Sharifian alliance was that 'while 
Husayn resisted CUP pressure after 1912, he and his sons began to assiduously cultivate ties 
with the Arab nationalists of Syria and with the British in Cairo. 43 Whereas, any previous 
44 
meeting(s) between Kitchener and 'Abdullah (the Sharif's first son) in 1912 or 1913 , or 
between 'Abdullah and the members of certain Syrian Arab secret societies, can be regarded 
as open-ended and inconsequential, such meetings as occurred after the Hijaz crisis of 
J anuary- February 1914 were conducted with far more importunity and purpose by all parties 
concerned. It is also at this time that a difference of approach between the Sharif and his son 
becomes apparent. According to Ernest Dawn, there may have been an unsuccessful approach 
by Arab nationalists to Husayn in late February, 45 it seems likely, however, that sometime 
during the first half of 1914 'Abdullah met Rashid Rida in Cairo and was administered the 
39 Ochsenwald, 1991, p. 192. 
'0 Kayali, 1997, p. 18 1. 
41 Bury, 1919, pp. II- 12. 
42 Kayali, 1997, p. 181. It should be noted that the Sharif's most closely situated rivals in Arabia also based their 
claims to supremacy on their religious standing, namely, Ibn Sa'ud, Imam Yahya and al-ldrisi. 
43 Ochsenwald, 199 1, p. 196. 
44 Dawn, 1973, p. 19. This meeting or meetings at the Khedive's palace to which 'Abdullah was invited were 
routine, were concerned, ostensibly at least, with the conditions of pilgrimage for British Indian Muslims. 
45 Ibid., p. 15. According to Dawn, Husayn 'was still not claimed as an adherent by the Arab officers who sought 
to impress Sir Louis Mallet with the strength of their movement in Iraq and Arabia. ' 
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oath of the 'Society of the Arab League. 46 Simultaneously, 'Abdullah, impelled by a fear of a 
Turkish advance on the home territory, took the initiative of writing to Cairo to solicit a 
meeting with Kitchener . 
47 This was the first occasion, in the context of the recent crisis, on 
which a member of the Sharifian family explicitly sought the aid of the British against the 
Turks. In the meantime 'Abdullah traveled to Constantinople in the hope of obtaining 
assurances about his family's position at Mecca. Being unsuccessful he returned via Cairo 
with the intention of meeting Kitchener, whom he met briefly on 18 April conscious of the 
Sublime Porte's displeasure at such meetings. 48 Later that day at the 'Abdin Palace, 'Abdullah 
was visited by Ronald Storrs, Kitchener's deputy and Oriental Secretary. With the clear 
objective of keeping the Turks out of the Arabian peninsula 'Abdullah conveyed his 
preference for a treaty between his party (as yet undefined) and Great Britain, similar to the 
one which already existed between the Amir of Afghanistan and the Government of India. 49 
It is relevant to the aims of this thesis that 'Abdullah's behavior already betrays a sophisticated 
appreciation of international relations, especially that pertaining between imperial powers. 
Furthermore, 'Abdullah had reasons to be confident in his dealings with the British in Cairo. 
According to Elie Kedourie, 'Abdullah later reported that in an earlier meeting with the 
Khedive in February 1914, 'Abbas Hilmi had confided that although he could never trust the 
British in Egypt, the Hijaz was a different matter. This, he asserted, was because the British 
would never occupy it on account of their trepidation over offending their Muslim subjects. 
50 
This constitutes clear evidence that 'Abdullah not only appreciated British Islamophobia but 
was prepared to exploit it in pursuit of his own interests. He further enhanced his own standing 
by claiming, erroneously but, as it turned out, to some effect, that the Sharifate was supported 
by Ibn Sa'ud, the Idrisi and Imam Yahya. -51 Ultimately, and to greater effect, 'Abdullah would 
be able to combine this discernment with an understanding of Britain's more secular concerns 
by implying, at his meeting with Storrs, that the proposed Hijaz Railway extension was 
46 Ibid., p. 21. 
47 Kedourie, 1976, p. 4. Kedourie calls this approach 'audacious' and very much reduces the episode to the factor 
of personality, rather than treating it as an instance of collaborative behavior typical of someone in 'Abdullah's 
ppsition. 
Storrs, 1943, p. 122. 
'9 Kedourie, 1976, p. 7. 
50 Ibid., p. 11. 
51 Ibid., p. 7. 
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intended to forestall British involvement in the area. This he compounded with a subtle hint to 
the effect that the British might find themselves in competition with the Turks for his 
allegiance since the latter had ordered him not to go to Cairo or to see Kitchener. 52 
Although, it is conceivable that Kitchener was withholding his true intentions from Grey there 
is much to suggest that he had not sought to encourage 'the Arabs of the Hejaz' at this stage. 53 
However, Storrs' own account of his meeting with 'Abdullah, which, remarkably, was not 
submitted to the Foreign Office until December, indicates that the rejection of 'Abdullah's 
overtures was not final . 
54 Elie Kedourie suggests that 'Abas's ambition to become Caliph - 
which may have become more lively after the Young Turk coup d'etat and Abd al-Hamid's 
deposition - was also known to Storrs, and we may safely assume it to form the background or 
context of Storr's conversations with Abdullah. 55 However, this assertion is supported solely 
by reference to a memorandum by Storrs written in May 1915! All that can be said is that 
there is no direct evidence that the question of the caliphate played any part in the 
conversations of April 1914, and one might equally speculate that the issue of an Arab 
caliphate only became significant in the minds of the British in Cairo after that date. Critically, 
what seems to have concerned the British more than 'Abbas Hilmi's personal pretensions was 
the support for his claim to the caliphate proffered by prominent Egyptian nationalists. 56 It 
would become apparent that, in the same way, British interest in an Arab caliphate had a 
strong prophylactic component motivated by the real possibility of the project being adopted 
by a mass movement of nationalists, a movement which they might not be able to contain. 
52 Ibid., p. 9. 
53 Ibid., p. 7; Storrs, 1943, p. 122, Note 2; and, FO 141/460/1198 58 pol. 1914, Printed report by Kitchener to Sir 
E. Grey, II April 1914. 
54 Kedourie, 1976, p. 7. 
55 Ibid., p. 11. 
56 PRO 30/57/45 0015, Note on the Khedive & the Nationalists, Alexandria, 21 May 1914. The Khedive had 
been visited by four prominent nationalists who 'hinted that H. H. could count on Nationalist support in the matter 
of the Caliphate. ' It was alas reported that this support was endorsed by members of the Nationalist Party. 
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3.3 The Sianificance of the lal-Masri Affair' 
Before 1914 Kitchener might plausibly have denied encouraging any Arab party or individual 
from believing that any sympathy the British had for their plight might be translated into 
effective support. This situation was to change drastically with what might conveniently be 
referred to as 'the al-Masri affair' in which Kitchener secured the release of an activist 
working for the liberation of the Arabic-speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire from the Turks. 
Kitchener's efforts on behalf of 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri had been well publicised in the 
European and Egyptian press as had been the activist's arrival in Cairo in April. 
Notwithstanding Kitchener's ostensible purpose in this affair which was to enhance his 
reputation inside Egypt and to aid his dealings with nationalists, 57 'Abdullah can only have 
been reassured when planning his overtures towards the British in early 1914. It was this 
episode, according to C. Ernest Dawn, which caused 'Abdullah to believe that Kitchener 
would eventually offer more than he had been prepared to make explicit at the beginning of 
1914 . 
58 Conversely, that the Egyptians regarded al-Masri as a defender of Islam, Rashid 
Khalidi assumes, must have encouraged Kitchener to explore further the possibility of an 
accommodation with Arabism. 59 
The tendencies inherent in such encounters intensified after the commencement of hostilities 
in Europe at the beginning of August 1914. Milne Cheetham, who ran the Cairo residency, 
reported to London that, whereas al-Masri had rejected approaches from Enver Pasha, in 
conversations with Director of Intelligence, Gilbert Clayton, he had offered 'to lead the Arabs 
(Syria and Irak) against the Turks in order to form an Arab Empire under British suzerainty. ' 60 
Not wishing to alienate the Turks unnecessarily London chose not to encourage al-Masri at 
this critical stage. 61 Cheetham's report of the meeting records that the movement to which al- 
57 FO 141/460/1198 58 pol. 1914, Printed report by Kitchener to Sir E. Grey, II April 1914. 
58 Dawn, 197 3, p. 2 1. 
59 Khalidi, 1980, p. 346. 
60 Kedourie, 1976, p. 26, quoting FO 371/1968,37584, Cheetham's telegram no. 76, Cairo, 9 Aug. 1914 and 
telegram to Cheetham no. 87, London, II Aug. McKale, 1998, p. 72, quoting FO to Cheetham, II Aug. 1914; 
and Cheetharn to Grey, 9 Aug. 1914, IOLR/UP&S/10/464. 
6' Kedourie, 1976, p. 26, with reference to FO 371/2140,46261, 'Precis of conversations with Abd El Aziz El 
Masri', on 16 August 1914, enclosed with Cheetham's despatch no. 143 secret, Cairo 25 August. 
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Masri belonged was unconnected with the 'Arabian Khaliphate movement' (still undefined) 
and consequently had so far been unable to attract the support of Rashid Rida. Of further 
significance to the British, was the fact that the movement had no named leader. 62 
Ultimately, the precise details of such meetings were of less consequence than what certain 
individuals were prepared to make of them. The initial meeting between al-Masri and Clayton 
was most likely the occasion for a Cairo War Office Intelligence Department report on Egypt 
and the Arabian caliphate. This report constituted the first explicit reference, in the context of 
the war, to the incipient illegitimacy of the Turkish caliphate and to renewed counter claims 
resulting from the decline of Turkey's power and her consequent lack of fitness for the task. 
Importantly, the report deprecated the Egyptian claim on the grounds of the Khedive's lack of 
'family qualifications' and went on to say that 'the choice of the Mohammedan near East 
seems now to be centred on the person of the present Emir of Mecca supported by the 
temporal power of Ibn Sa'ud of Nejd, and the co-operation of the Turkish regular troops in 
Baghdad who are chiefly recruited from and officered by Arabs. ' Furthermore, according to 
the report, this choice was supported by Rashid Rida and, contrary to Cheetham's report, by 
al-Masri as well. 63 
3.4 'Appreciation of Situation in Arabia' : Captain Clayton's Memorandum 
of 6 September 1914 
By September 1914 it seemed inevitable that Turkey would ally herself with Germany in the 
current war, and the idea of supporting some kind of Arab movement against the Turks 
quickly gained consensus among the British based in Cairo and Constantinople. There was, 
however, no unanimity over the precise identity of the party to be supported or over the form 
62 FO 371/2140 46261 Letter from Milne Cheetharn at the British Agency, Cairo, to Sir E. Grey, 24 August 1914, 
including a precis of an interview of Aziz El Masri conducted by Capt. R. E. M. Russell on 16 August. 
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which the support should take. Sir Louis Mallet for example, chief among the Turco-philes, 
favoured a rebellion directed through Ibn Sa'ud and the Shaykh of Kuwait. The prevailing 
view in Cairo was given expression by Gilbert Clayton in an intelligence report dated 6 
September headed 'Appreciation of Situation in Arabia. ' This report described a recent 64 
combination of the Arab chiefs against Turkey and Turkish counter-efforts to secure their 
neutrality which had, apparently, been successful in the case of the Sharif of Mecca who 'has 
now definitely thrown in his lot with Turkey. ' In a manner calculated to regenerate British 
imperial Islamophobia, the report added that 'this action appears to have formed part of a 
general Pan-Islamic movement, engineered from Constantinople. ' 65 Clayton sent a copy of the 
report directly to Kitchener under a covering memorandum urging him to get in touch with the 
Sharif and raise with him the possibility of replacing the Ottoman sultan as caliph by a 
friendly Arab leader, while at the same time recommending the Sharif as the obvious 
candidate. Clayton appears to have genuinely believed that the Arab chiefs were united behind 
Husayn, themselves having been encouraged by agents of the Khedive who sought ... an 
Arabia for the Arabs... 66 and the caliphate for himself. 
There followed an exchange of views regarding the caliphate among British officials with 
responsibilities in the Middle East of an intensity not seen since the crisis of 1879-80. It would 
be wrong to assume that all opinions expressed were necessarily forwarded to London or 
shared with other consulates and agencies. There was a marked tendency to forward, and in 
some cases actively disseminate, reports which enhanced there own standing or promoted their 
adopted line of argument. For example, Sir Louis Mallet, during his last days in Turkey 
transmitted a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, Acting First Dragoman at Constantinople, which 
anticipated the destruction of the Ottoman Empire 'up to Syria and Mosul' and the likelihood 
of 'a war of Caliphates. ' Nevertheless, Ryan warned against British meddling in the caliphate 
63 FO 892 Vol 15 PNA 14/1, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo - Intelligence news 'Egypt and the 
Arabian Khalifate', pp. 1-2,13 August 1914. 
64 David Fromkin speculates that the representation of information regarding the supposed union of Arab chiefs 
as if it had just been newly acquired from al-Masri rather than from 'Abdullah in February or April was 
intentional. Fromkin, 1991, p. 101. 
65 FO 882 Vol 13 MIS 14/1, Memo by Intelligence department, WO, Cairo, 'Appreciation of Situation in Arabia', 
6 September 1914. Sir Edward Grey was simultaneously in receipt of Clayton's intelligence report- FO 371/2140 
51344, Letter from Milne Chectham to Sir Edward Grey, British Agency, Cairo, 7 September 1914, enclosing the 
intelligence memorandum of 6 September 1914. 
66 McKale, 1998, pp. 72-3. 
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issue and recommended that Turkey be allowed to retain some nominal sovereignty over the 
Holy Cities. This memorandum was the first to recognise the dangers inherent in such a 
venture and warn against even secret British interference in the Hijaz. 67 
There is no evidence that Lord Kitchener had been made aware of such views and in any case 
was already pursuing his own agenda. On 22 September he acted on the intelligence report of 
the 6 th by having Cheetham instruct Storrs to make further contact with 'Abdullah. He wished 
to ascertain whether, in the event of the Caliph and Sublime Porte being under the coercion of 
Germany taking aggressive action against Britain, 'Abdullah and his father would be 'with or 
against us. ' 68 Kitchener's referring to Turkey in such terms may have been ad hominent, that 
is, designed to appeal specifically to the Sharif's own position within Islam. Alternatively, it 
may simply have reflected Kitchener's fears about an alliance between Germany and pan- 
Islam. Certainly, concerns over the possibility of a German backed caliphate were not new and 
Kitchener in particular had feared a Germano-Turkish alliance since his arrival at the Cairo 
Residency at a time when the Germans were supporting pan-Islamic elements against Italy in 
Libya from their consulate in Cairo. 69 His fears had not been without foundation, since, as 
early as 1912-13, Rashid Rida had been in discussion with a German emissary over the 
possibility of an independent Arab caliphate conjoining with the Egyptian Khedive ruling over 
Arabia and Syria. 70 Moreover, by September 1914, such fears were being expressed in public. 
The newspaper, The Indiaman, referred to a 'German campaign to stir up Islamic feeling, ' 
declaring that, 'apparently the German mind can now think of nothing but blood, and is 
blindly endeavouring to set Islam by the ears in the hope that the resulting chaos would prove 
to Germany's advantage in the end. 71 
The belief in the real possibility of an Arab revolt could only have been reinforced by 
overtures from another of the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In early 
October Louis Mallet forwarded to the Foreign Office a request from a Sayyid Talib of Basra. 
67 FO 371/2140 57234 Louis Mallet to Grey, Therapia, September 22,1914, No. 604 Confidential. 
68 FO 371/2139 52598 Copy of Telegram No. 219, secret, from Kitchener to Mr. Cheetham, Cairo, FO, 
September 24,1914. McKale, 1998, p. 74. 
69 McKale, 1998, p. 33. 
70 Ibid., p. 4 1. 
71 SAD WP 191/3/23, Press cutting from The hidiaman, II September 1914. 
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The magnate wished to prepare the way for negotiations with the British in the event of war 
with Turkey. He too had been encouraged by past contacts with Lord Kitchener. His message 
referred to conversations with the Consul-General in Cairo which had taken place three years 
before, 72 providing yet another example of Kitchener's proficiency in 'opportunity creation. ' 
In the minds of the British in the Middle East such contacts merely reinforced the inevitability 
of an Arab revolt. The crucial question for them was how best to ensure that the ineluctable 
would take a form which was advantageous to Britain rather than her rivals. Unfortunately for 
the policy makers and decision makers hard information was not easily obtained and the 
political intelligence community was acutely aware of its own state of ignorance. General 
Maxwell, commanding general of British forces in Egypt, wrote to Kitchener in early October, 
with reference to the likelihood of an invasion over the Suez Canal and the general lack of 
preparedness for war in the area. He lamented: 'I do not like being so much in the dark as to 
what is going on beyond the frontier. 73 His anxieties had in no way been assuaged by the end 
of the month when he admitted to Fitzgerald, Kitchener's personal secretary, to having 'a bad 
Turco-German bogey' and consoled himself with thoughts of a Russian and Greek advance on 
Turkey combined with a Christian revolt in Lebanon. Maxwell reassured himself that 'an Arab 
caliphate & this will settle the Islam question for some time. ' 
74 
As war with Turkey looked increasingly probable, speculation concerning the likely course of 
events and the options for action intensified. From the outset there was an overwhelming 
concern with the matter of the caliphate. While opinions varied, all agreed that Britain had an 
interest in the outcome. In mid-October, Milne Cheetham forwarded a report to the Foreign 
Office and India Office which raising a number of issues which would remain substantially 
unresolved for the duration of the war. The central contention of the memorandum, written by 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, First Dragoman under Mallet, was that it would be to the advantage of 
Great Britain if the combined spiritual and temporal powers of the Islamic caliphate, the very 
basis of pan-Islam, were separated. More importantly, it was argued that, regardless of 
Britain's stance on the issue, such a separation was a likely occurrence, since 'an anti-Turkish 
72 FO 371/2140 57074, Telegraphic from Sir L. Mallet, Constantinople, to Sir Edward Grey, 7 October 1914. 
According to Elie Kedourie (Kedourie, 1976, p. 26), Sayyid Talib was rebuffed, more or less as al-Masri had 
been. 
73 PRO 30/57/45 00/45, Letter from Maxwell, Cairo, to Kitchener, 5 October 1914. 
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Arab movement may lead to an attempt by the Arabs and other Mohammedans to revert to the 
de jure Arab Khalifate' - as opposed to the de facto Turkish one. The argumentation was 
significant; the report went on to say that the Arabs favoured the Imam of Yemen as he was 
descended from the Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh, 'and, unlike the Khedive is not under the 
control of a non-Moslem Power. ' The author seemed to be unaware of developments in Cairo, 
since, when referring to Mr. Ryan's memo of 22 September, Fitzmaurice opposed inclusion of 
any reference to the caliphate in the British proclamation to the Muslims of Egypt and India 
now being suggested at the Residency. The report most presciently urged a harmonisation 
between the French and Cairo in advance of any endorsement of the Arab movement and 
argued for excluding both the Yemen and the Hijaz 'from the sphere of our activities. ' In his 
covering note Cheetham. expressed his agreement with Fitzmaurice on the separation of the 
caliphate from the Sultanate and on the necessity of this being achieved by Muslims 
themselves. The Dragoman's memorandum seems to have been well received by Grey, 
especially in relation to the separation of the caliphate from the sultanate. Though, while he 
agreed that this change should be brought about by Muslims, Grey opined that it may not be 
possible to leave the Yemen and Hijaz outside the British sphere of action. He argued that 
since the Turks were now stirring up the Arabs there against British Egypt, the British must 
act in self-defence. 75 However, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe, demurred on the 
separation of the caliphate from the Sultanate, 'regard[ing] the creation of a powerful politico- 
religious entity in Arabia with serious misgivings, ' and stated that 'for his own part, he would 
not encourage it even indirectly. 976 The significance of these early discussions concerning the 
caliphate is that the key elements of the debate were, essentially, those that would remain 
prominent throughout the war. 
74 PRO 30/57no, WO/42, Letter from Maxwell to Fitzgerald, 27 October 1914. 
75 FO 371/2140 57234, Minutes (handwritten) initialled 'GMC' (Milne Cheetham), 14 October 1914 attached to 
Memorandum (handwritten) by Mr. Fitzmaurice, II October 1914, and a letter from Ralph Paget, Foreign Off-ice, 
16 October 1914 to the Under Secretary of State, India Office, on behalf of Grey for the attention of The 
Marquess of Crewe, enclosing a copy of Fitzmaurice's memorandum. 
76 F-0 371/2140 61238 File No. 46261, Letter from I. W. Holderness, India Office, Whitehall, London, to the 
Under Secretary of State, FO, 19 October 1914. 
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3.5 Kitchener's Declaration for an Arab Caliphate 
Undoubtedly there were numerous unmediated pressures felt in Egypt which could not have 
been full appreciated in London, aggravated by a worrying combination of ignorance, 
alarming snippets of information, false reports, and disinformation, which forced the pace in 
Cairo. Throughout October, besides the Islamic periodicals calling for a jihad against 
Britain, 77 there were rumours of an impending attack on Egypt, 78 and, not for the first time, 79 
reports that the 'masses' of Syria had been persuaded that the German Kaiser had converted to 
80 Islam and was now fighting the Russians on behalf of Muslims everywhere. Various parties 
within the British imperial administration had begun to respond to the situation with some 
haste, initially in an uncoordinated fashion. With the agreement of Kitchener, India suggested 
sending an army division to the Gulf while London had already instructed Captain Shakespear, 
Indian Government political officer in Kuwait, to secure by persuasion the neutrality of Ibn 
Sa'ud. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office advised Cheetham to act along similar lines in respect 
of Imam Yahya and al-ldrisi in order to preclude their collaboration with the Turks .81 At the 
end of October Cheetham reported that he had already despatched agents to the Arab chiefs of 
Syria and Palestine in response to 'Pan-Arabian' enquiries in Cairo. 82 
This 'scattergun' approach is evidence of the fact that something that might properly be called 
'a British Middle Eastern policy' had not yet come into being. Nevertheless, amid the chaos 
there was a discernable uniformity. With the exception of the Gulf invasion plans, which were 
purely military in execution if not in final intent, 83 all parties acted to secure local alliances by 
whatever means that were deemed necessary within their particular sphere of operations. In 
this context, Cairo's efforts to secure the neutrality or even the active co-operation of the 
77 SAD WP 134/1/41-53, Secret - translation of Issue No. 21 of the periodical Jiltaid Islam (The Muslim World) 
in Arabic, Turkish and Urdu, October 1914. 78 Kedourie, 1976, p. 13. 
79 Similar rumours, probably encouraged by the Germans, followed the Kaiser's visit to Damascus in 1898. See 
Chapter 2, Note 133. 
80 McKale, 1998, p. 70. 
81 Ibid., pp. 74-5. 
82 FO 371/2140 63581 File No. 46261, Telegram from Cheetham, Cairo, to FO, No. 223,26 October 1914. 
83 India's aims in southern Mesopotamia were essentially economic and opportunistic, the proposed invasion 
being a continuation of peace-time policy by different means. 
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Sharif of Mecca were unexceptional. However, as soon became apparent to those closely 
involved the issue of the caliphate, the Sharif's unique position within Islam gave that 
particular enterprise a privileged position in relation to all other similar efforts at 
collaboration. The Government in London had cause to appreciate this situation since the 
Cabinet had received a detailed memorandum from Lord Cromer offering advice on action to 
be taken in the event of war with Turkey. Like Kitchener, Cromer understood the implications 
of entering into a state of war with the world's leading Islamic power, seat of the caliphate and 
guardian of the Holy Places. Most notably, he cautioned against announcing that the Holy 
Places be handed over to the Sharif of Mecca and stressed the importance of proclaiming to 
Muslims everywhere that 'there would be no sort of Christian interference. ' However, he 
simultaneously drew attention to the supposed illegitimacy of the Turkish caliphate but 
thought it improbable that it would be challenged from within Islam. 84 It seems likely that if 
Cromer had been aware of the action which Kitchener was about to propose that he would 
have opposed it strongly. 
On 31 October 1914, the day from which the British and Ottoman empires were effectively at 
war, Kitchener in London, obtained Grey's approval for the text of a message to be sent to 
'Abdullah. Although well-known and frequently quoted, the English original of the message 
actually sent is worth duplicating in full in order to compare it with the draft approved by the 
Foreign Off-ice in Telegram No. 303.85 
Salaams to the Sherif Abdullah. That which we foresaw has come to pass. Germany has bought 
the Turkish Government with gold, notwithstanding that Great Britain, France and Russia 
guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire if Turkey remained neutral in this war. The 
Turkish Government have, against the wishes of the Sultan and through German pressure, 
committed acts of war by invading without provocation the frontiers of Egypt with armed 
bands followed by Turkish soldiers who are now massed at Akaba to invade Egypt, so that the 
-cause of the Arabs, which is the cause of freedom, has become the cause also of Great Britain. 
If the Amir and Arabs in general assist Great Britain in this conflict that has been forced upon 
us by Turkey, Great Britain will promise not to intervene in any manner whatsoever, whether in 
things religious or otherwise. Moreover, recognizing and respecting the sacred and unique 
office of the Amir Hussein, Great Britain will guarantee the independence, rights and privileges 
of the Sherifate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till 
84 SAD WP 193/3/48-5, 'Memorandum by Lord Cromer Respecting the Steps to be Taken in the Event of War 
with Turkey', 16 October 1914, Printed for use of the Cabinet, 27 October 1914. 85 FO 37112139 65589, Handwritten draft telegram from FO to Mr. Cheetham, Cairo, 31 October 1914. FO 
141/460/1198, Telegram from FO to HBM's Agent and Consul General in Egypt, No. 303, November 1,1914. 
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now ive have defended and befriended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall 
be in that of the noble Arab. 
It may be that an Arab of trite race will assume the Caliphate at Mecca or Medina, and so good 
may come, by the help of God, out of all the evil which is now occurring. 
It would be well if Your Highness could convey to your followers and devotees, who are found 
throughout the world, in every country, the good tidings of the freedom of the Arabs, and the 
rising of the sun over Arabia. [emphases added186 
Elie Kedourie makes much of the 'embellishments' of the version approved by the Foreign 
87 88 Office, made by Storrs and Cheetham , supposedly at the encouragement of 
Clayton. But, 
whereas the original begins by addressing 'Abdullah in person and then moves abruptly to 
negotiating with the 'Arabs in general' the final English version associates the two more 
convincingly while at the same time adding the very firm promise of non-intervention in 
'things religious. ' As will be shown later, declarations of non-interference in matters of 
religion by Britain were frequently connected with their opposite in practice. It will emerge 
from this thesis that such reassurances were void of real intent, being either perfunctory or 
mere tokens, symptomatic of an obsessive paranoia. 
The significance of Kitchener's letter to 'Abdullah for this thesis is obvious: it openly declares 
Britain's hope for an Arab caliph. However, the conventional significance of this 
communication resides in the fact that Britain would later claim not to have promised or 
encouraged the transfer of the caliphate to the Sharif of Mecca in person. While the precise 
wording of the letter no doubt facilitated what is now called 'plausible deniability' it would 
require extreme sophistry to deny the intentions of Kitchener and his men in Cairo. Two rather 
simple points may be made against the denial. If at this point someone other than Sharif 
Husayn was being mooted both as caliph 'at Mecca or Medina' and as representative/leader of 
the Arabs, this could only have had the opposite effect to that intended. This would have 
amounted to the suggestion that the Sharifian family subordinate themselves to some other 
Arab chieftain - quite absurd under the circumstances. Moreover, possible candidacy for the 
caliphate was at no time broached with any other Arab leader. 
86 Reproduced in, Kedouric, 1976, p. 19. 87 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 
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3.6 An Excursus on Elie Kedouriels Arguments in Relation to Kitchener's 
Message to 'Abdullah of I November 1914 
It is important to address Kedourie's arguments as propounded in, In the Anglo-Arab 
Labyrinth, since it is largely on account of this book that the author continues to be the pre- 
eminent, if not the definitive, authority on British war-time agreements in the Middle East. In 
the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth endures as one of the most erudite accounts of the so-called 
'McMahon-Husayn Correspondence, ' and for which reason has been heavily relied upon here 
as a secondary source. The challenge being made here, therefore, is primarily on 
methodological and theoretical grounds and concerns the result, in this instance, that the 
contingent is promoted at the expense of the necessary, and the trivial to the exclusion of the 
fundamental. It should also be noted at this point that Kedourie is not primarily concerned 
with the issue of the Arab caliphate. This was not his chosen subject, his main aim being to 
deprecate the Anglo-Sharifian accords in relation to the other promises and declarations of the 
time and against which the matter of the caliphate is treated as incidental. The objective here is 
not to champion the Anglo-Sharifian accords to the detriment of, for example, Balfour's 
declaration of sympathy to the Zionists. Rather, it is Kedourie's assumption of 'incidentality' 
which is at issue here since it is at odds with the findings of the investigation being undertaken 
here. Furthermore, although collateral to the main thesis, it will be argued here that it is only if 
thefull import of Britain's intentions over the caliphate are taken into account, in a way which 
goes beyond a strictly literal or legalistic interpretation of the sources, that the true relationship 
between the war-time agreements may be fully comprehended. 
Kitchener's success in having his message authorised by Grey, has been explained in many 
terms; in terms of his stature and personality, his sleight of hand, his being misled by Clayton, 
and even in terms of Grey's oversight or misjudgment due to pressure of work. Elie Kedourie 
makes use of all of these; his line of argument on this matter may be characterised as a 'theory 
of aberration, ' since he considers that it was only through a series of mishaps that Cairo 
prevailed at this particular juncture. This view may be opposed on three accounts. Firstly, it is 
88 Fromkin, 1991, p. 103. 
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generally understood, as it was at the time, that India's viewpoint was necessarily partial, 
being concerned with the security of a particular portion of the British empire rather than the 
empire as a whole. Furthermore, the Constantinople angle, once equated with Britain's interest 
in the Middle East and directed towards maintaining cordial relations with Turkey, was by 
now obsolete, leaving the 'Cairo view' in the ascendant. Cairo was thus able to predominate as 
the remaining locus of expertise and source of knowledge on the Middle East, Islam and the 
Arabs, and thereby to form the most compelling component in the British imperial perspective 
on those subjects. Thirdly, although this cogency was relative rather than absolute, it will be 
argued here that the 'Cairo view, ' as yet in the process of being formulated, was, above all, 
coherent, if ultimately founded on misapprehension. 89 
Regarding the veracity of the British view in general, it will be recalled that this thesis is less ZD 
concerned with the 'correctness' of British notions of the Caliphate, as measured against, say, 
the object itself, than with explaining the way in which ideas about an Arab caliphate changed 
throughout the First World War and after. In the absence of reliable intelligence the coherence 
of the Cairo view was, in its early stages, necessarily internal, giving great scope to the 
imagination and desires of the individuals concerned. It is impossible, therefore, not to take 
issue with Elie Kedourie's view that this message was merely a case of indeterminate verbal 
gratification, since, it was both internally consistent and, more importantly, represented a 
positive choice for an 'Islamic' solution to Britain's anticipated problems in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the communication of the I` of November took account of, and attempted to 
reconcile in the imperial interest, all that was then known about the politics of the region by 
Kitchener's representatives in Egypt. 
Kedourie describes Clayton's memorandum of 6 September as 'triggering-off'90 the whole 
sequence of events leading up to Kitchener's message of I November and beyond to the 
'McMahon-Husayn Correspondence. ' This occurred largely, argues Kedourie, because 
Clayton had exaggerated or invented the unity of Arab leaders, a fiction which subsequently 
89 Not to be confused with the kind of 'mutual misapprehension' - for example between East and West, Muslim 
and Christian - assumed by the more epistemologically relativist versions of the critique of orientalism referred 
to in the Introduction, Sections 1.01 & 1.02. 
90 Kedourie, 1976, p. 25. 
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became a critical factor in the decision making process. However, it would seem incautious to 
refer to something as having been 'triggered-off' without also considering the extent to which 
the gun was already loaded. If the words 'triggering-off' are anything more than handy 
phraseology it must be taken to mean that Clayton's memo was a necessary causal factor in 
the ensuing sequence of events. This may be countered by pointing out, first, that Kitchener 
was as aware as anyone else of the state of Arab unity or disunity at that time and did not need 
to place such reliance on Clayton. Secondly, in any event such an assessment was unimportant 
since the main concern among the British in Cairo at that time was with what was possible in 
the future. Furthermore, the memorandum of 6 September only spoke of a 'tendency towards 
combination' among the chiefs. In contrast to his prevailing approach, Kedourie chose to 
ignore the effect of Kitchener's well known mode of operation, according to which he was 
generally content to delegate without committing himself openly, especially when he sought to 
conceal his personal ambitions and as long as he could rely on others to promote them on his 
behalf. 91 This is likely to have been the case in this instance. If this is taken into account, 
Kedourie's charge that Storrs and Cheetham were exceeding instructions in redrafting the 
November declaration to 'Abdullah looses force and Storrs' undoubted tendency to 
'embroider on his superiors 92 would have been welcomed by Kitchener. Even Kedourie 
himself admits, 'they may have also thought that this was in line with Kitchener's wishes, 
since the reference to the Arab caliphate in his message itself opened up such 1vide prospects 
and possibilities' [emphasis added]. 93 But this is precisely the point being made here. One of 
the central tenets of this thesis is that the idea of an Arab caliphate under the veiled protection 
of Britain could, in the minds of aspiring policy makers in Cairo, be made consistent with a 
whole range foreseeable and desirable outcomes in the Middle East. 
In this way by relying wholly on the text and not the context of the written record Kedourie 
concentrates on the immediate concerns relating to the imminence of war with Turkey rather 
than the more constructive long-term aspects of the 'Cairo view. ' In so doing Kedourie fails to 
incorporate into his thesis an important aspect of imperialism in general, namely the tendency 
91 Fromkin, 1991, pp. 88-95 & 147. 
92 Kedourie, 1976, p. 17. 93 Kedourie, 1976, p. 20. Kedourie seems unable to decide whether Kitchener was being misled or being told 
what he wanted to hear but does not specifically argue that he was led astray through being pandered to. 
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towards opportunistic expansion. Nevertheless, there are sound archival reasons for taking 
issue with Kedourie on this matter. He is fight in saying that Storrs and Cheetharn ironed out 
the ambiguities of Kitchener's original draft, but one must ask then: if these changes were not 
in accordance with Kitchener's wishes, why is there no hint in the archival record of any 
attempt to redress the situation in the ensuing weeks? Rather, as Kedourie himself points out, 
the general drift of the message to 'Abdullah was if anything amplified in a subsequent 
proclamation to the Arabs which reiterated British support for an Arab caliphate. 94 
Furthermore, this later declaration urges Arab unity, suggesting that the authors did in fact 
recognise the extant fissiparous tendencies of tribal Arabia, a fact which reinforces the point 
being made here: that Storrs & co., rather than supposing a present state of unity among the 
Arabs, were actively engaged in promoting it. 
Kedourie does in fact acknowledge, in passing though to little effect, that Kitche, ner's 
approach to Husayn 'is to be seen not only as a war-time tactic, but as part of a wider and 
more far-sighted strategy. '95 In a private letter to Grey written within days of war being 
declared on Turkey and quoted at length by Kedourie, Kitchener writes: 
Supposing that the Arabs took up arms against the Turks I think it would be our policy to 
recognise a new Khalif at Mecca or Medina of the proper race; and guarantee the Holy Places 
from foreign aggression as well as from all internal interference. If this were done there appears 
to me to be a possibility for allowing Syria to be organised as an Arab state under the Khalif 
but also under European consular control and European guidance as regards Government. 
France would be greatly weakened by having Syria which is not a remunerative possession and 
which from its geographical position must lead France astray from her real objective Tunis 
Algeria Morocco. 
I believe it is more sentiment than anything else which induces France to keep up her influence 
in Syria and if we frankly said, we do not want Syria, they would probably say the same and 
allow the formation of an Arab state that would enable the new Khalifate to have sufficient 
revenue to exist on. 
I think we might tell the Arabs now that this is what we hope for. When there are signs of its 
realisation it will be time enough to recommend the matter to France and induce her to accept 
the situation. 96 
The full import of this rare demonstration of candour on Kitchener's part will be developed 
94 See Section 3.8, below. 
95 Kedourie, 1976, p. 32. 96 FO 800/102, pp. 352-354. Private letter (handwritten) from Kitchener to Grey, II November 1914. 
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more fully in the following chapter. Suffice it to say in relation to the issue at hand that this is 
hardly consistent with Kitchener's having been misled, or with Kedourie's view that the 
message of I November was a case of meaningless gratification. Moreover, the notion of any 
misdirection occurring among these people is inappropriate if one views Kitchener, Storrs and 
Clayton as constituting the nucleus of a community of awareness (or indeed ignorance, 
depending on one's point of view) with regard to British imperial objectives in the Middle 
East. 
In addition, Kedourie seems troubled by the fact that the wishes of Kitchener's subordinates 
prevailed over what he seems to view as the better instincts of the Foreign Office. In seeking 
to delegitimise Cairo's attempts to reach an accord with the Sharif of Mecca as the 
representative of all Arabs, Kedourie contends, with reference to Clayton's memo of 6 
September, that, 'left to themselves, the foreign office would have been very reluctant to 
approach the Sharif, let alone themselves raise the issue of the Caliphate. 97 This betrays a 
certain 'bureacratic conventionalism' - an abstract normative idealism - which supposes that 
the FO might realistically have operated in a political vacuum, that is, in an environment 
where their contact with the world was direct and unmediated. On the contrary, London 
would, necessarily and routinely, have depended on information received from those officers 
of the empire whose representations might well have been distorted by parochial interests or 
warped by personal ambition. 
It is argued here that Kedourie's account of I November message barely qualifies as an 
explanation at all since it takes into account so little of what is known about the context of the 
official communications of late 1914. Indeed, based on the evidence provided by Kedourie 
himself, his logic may be turned on its head by arguing that the apparent discrepancy between, 
Cheetham's communication of 26 October, on the one hand, and his and Storrs' redrafting of 
Kitchener's message to 'Abdullah six days later, on the other, is explicable only if one takes ZD 
cognisance of the crucial distinction made by Khalidi. That is, between a broadly based and 
truly political Arab movement, and a single identifiable figurehead whose authority rests on a 
9' Kedourie, 1976, p. 26. 
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unique position within Islam -a distinction which forms an important part of this thes iS. 98 The 
argument presented here not only explains the general tenor of the message of 1 November but 
also its specific content, such as the stress on Islam and the Caliphate and the implication of a 
wider Arab movement represented by the Sharif. 
It is only under the weight of Kedourie's exclusively textual, as opposed to contextual, method 
that Clayton's memo of 6 September might be scen as accidentally 'triggering-off' Cairo's 
approach to the 'Arab question, ' rather than as the manifestation of a more general and 
necessary tendency towards prophylactic collaboration in all its ramifications. While it will 
not be argued here that Kitchener, Storrs and Clayton were necessarily sincere in anything 
other than their pursuit of empire, Kedourie's view, that 'Kitchener and Storrs, assumed that 
the high-flown rhetoric they affected would be as harmless as they imagined, and as 
meaningless to its recipients as it was to them, ' 99 must be rejected. This judgement is at odds 
with the thesis, in any case acknowledged tacitly by Kedourie, that the Cairo approach 
demonstrated a definite purpose based on a genuine, if ultimately mistaken, belief in the nature 
of Arab politics, and reflected a coherent and internally consistent view of the Arab Middle 
East. 
3.7 The Turkish Proclamation of, Jihad against the Entente 
Although the first act of aggression in the Middle East had been committed by the Turks in 
their bombardment of Russian Black Sea ports on 29 October, the latter did not declare war on 
98 In a similar vein, Kedourie asserts that Cairo's earlier rebuttals of overtures from al-Masri and Sayyid Talib 
reflected Britain's true and undiscriminating attitude towards the Arab movement. The arguments presented here 
V)ply equally to this view. 
Kedourie, 1976, p. 21. In fact, the language used in both Kitchener's original and Storrs' English redraft is 
rather plain in comparison with some of the 'Arabese' used later by Sir Mark Sykes when addressing the officers 
of the Arab Legion. He employed such designations as: 'Oh Arabs! ' and, 'true sons of the Arab Race. ' FO 882 
Vol. If AL 17/14, Message drafted by Sykes to be communicated to Officers of the Arab Legion, FO to AB, 30 
July 1917. 
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Turkey until 2 November. Three days later when Britain and France followed suit'00 the War 
Office Intelligence Department in Cairo reported that Turkey had issued calls to jihad against 
her Christian enemies in the name of the 'Society for Uniting all the Peoples of the Koran. "()' 
Whether the British in Cairo were genuinely alarmed by the immediate threat of Holy War is 
unclear. Nevertheless, those employed in political intelligence were sufficiently concerned to 
counteract the kind of anti-British propaganda couched in the Islamic terms which formed part 
of this and other calls to jihad at the earliest opportunity. Partly, no doubt, due to their recent 
dealings with the family of the Sharif of Mecca they felt particularly vulnerable to claims that 
Britain wished to abolish the Su Itanate-cali p hate and destroy the Ka'ba. Those who supported 
Kitchener's approach to Islam in the context of the war soon found themselves in a cleft stick. 
Having secretly declared themselves in favour of an Arab caliphate they could either remain 
confined by their adherence to the 'Qurayshite policy' or expose themselves to the allegation 
'that [the] British Government has always been [the] enemy of [the] Khalifate of Islam. ' 102 
According to Donald McKale, the series of fatwas, proclamations and manifestos issued by 
the Turks during November 1914 103 were the result of German pressure on the Sultan, as was 
the appointment of pan-Islamist, Cemal Pasha, ' 04 as commander of the 4 th Army in Syria. Both 
were intended to undermine British rule in India and Egypt, and British influence in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East generally. 105 While it was both customary and to be expected 
that a fatwa would be issued on the outbreak of war in order to render the conflict legal under 
shari'a, '[i]n comparison with earlier fatwas this one introduced a novel element as it was 
'00 McKale, 1998, p. 85. 
101 SAD WP 193/4/42-45, Note from WO Intelligence Department, Cairo, 5 November 1914, attached to a 
translation of calls to 'Jehad' obtained from a source in Baghdad. This particular declaration made much of 
Christian atrocities against Muslims during the recent war in the Balkans, and the general desire to convert 
Muslims to Christianity as exemplified in Spain during the reconquista. 
102 FO 371/2147,80326, Sir W. Townley, Tehran, to Sir E. Grey, December 8,1914, No. 366, referring to a 
Turkish Embassy counter-declaration to a pronouncement by the Viceroy of India on the commencement of 
hostilities. This message ends: 'Finally, it is pointed out that British policy towards Islam has always been based 
on Mr. Gladstone's statement in House of Commons in 1894 that "as long as this cursed book (the Koran) exists 
on earth there will be no peace. "' 
103 Antonius, 1938, pp. 140-141. The Sultan's call to jihad reached the Sharif of Mecca at the same time as 
Kitchener's despatch of 31 October. Ibid., p. 142. 
'04 McKale, 1998, p. 85. Kayali, 1997, p. 187. 
105 McKale, 1998, p. xii. There was disagreement among German orientalists over whether such propaganda 
would have any effect at all. The Germans seemed untroubled by the fact that Turkey was acting in concert with 
one Christian power against others. Ibid., p. 85. Note that Kayali, who provides the Turkish as opposed to 
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expressly addressed to all Moslems, especially those under the colonial rule of Turkey's 
adversaries, and not only to the Ottoman subjects, ' 106 and might, therefore, be viewed as the 
'logical outcome of the pan-Islamic policy initiated by Abdulhamid IU 
Lord Cromer, who would later emerge as an opponent of Cairo's Islamic policy, was confident 
enough of the failure of the Turkish call to jihad to compose a letter for publication in The 
Times in tones of such mockery and disparagement as to observe: 'there is something almost 
humorous in the idea that an invitation to war against the infidel could with any hope of 
success be made to appeal to the adherents of Islam when the Kaliph was himself in alliance 
with two infidel Governments. ' 107 Significantly, in a manner apparently at odds with his 
subsequent entreaties to avoid meddling in Islam and the issue of the caliphate, Cromer felt 
content to include an almost insouciant reference to the Sultan's lack of legitimacy 'in the eyes 
of learned Moslems. ' Notwithstanding Cromer's explanation for the failure of Turkey's calls 
to jihad which, in his view, was mainly propagandist in objective: 'The main reason ... was 
that Pan-Islamism lacked any form of political mass organization[J [djespite the exaggerated 
notions with regard to its force and impact prevalent in Europe. ' 108 This was not a judgement 
that the British Intelligence Department in Cairo could have made at the time. It will be argued 
here that Cairo's Islamic policy, constructed around the idea of an Arab caliph in the person of 
Sharif Husayn, was made possible by a lack of real intelligence regarding his true capacity and 
would ultimately fail for that very reason. 
Although at this early stage, each side was not entirely aware of the other's machinations, by 
the end of 1914 there was undoubtedly in progress a prophylactic war over effective control of 
the Holy Places of which the institutional-ideological component was a struggle over the 
caliphate. This, in a certain sense, resembled a hall of mirrors in which it was impossible to 
discriminate between the likeness of truth and its distorted image. The British feared that the 
Sharif of Mecca was already in the hands of the Turks while the Germans considered his 
collaboration with the British afait accompli. With hindsight it has been possible to ascertain 
German view, argues that the former's aims were somewhat limited being designed to garner domestic support 
for the war effort and at most to hamper the Entente's mobilisation campaign in the region. Kayali, 1997, p. 187. 106 Peters, 1979, p. 91. 107 FO 633/31 p. 63. Letter to The Times, December 15,1914. 
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that neither was the case; in fact the Sharif was playing a waiting game and had managed to 
avoid both endorsing the call to jihad and supplying troops for the Turkish 4'h An-ny in 
Syria. 109 However, it would emerge that the struggle for the Hijaz was by no means 
symmetrical. Whereas the Turks, could conceivably take Mecca and Medina by force, the 
British could only gain effective control indirectly and clandestinely if they were to avoid 
alienating Islamic opinion both within and beyond the British Empire. 
3.8 The British Proclamation to the Arabs of 4 December 1914 
In the light of the Turkish call to jihad against the Entente, the December proclamation" 
0 may 
be construed as pure counter-propaganda. However, it would be a mistake to view it strictly in 
these terms since the Sudan Government had already provided an example of such propaganda 
which had been assessed in a more positive light. As early as 7 November, Wingate, Governor 
General of the Sudan, had written to Clayton reporting that a proclamation had been 
distributed among the important religious shaykhs and 'ulama assuring them of Britain's 
friendly disposition towards Islam. Significantly, Wingate conveyed the notion that these 
people in general did not 'admit the right of a Sultan to be the Khalifa of Islam. 
"" Wingate 
being somewhat isolated and ever regretful of not receiving recognition, was always keen to 
advertise his success in maintaining the allegiance of the religious leaders of the Sudan, and, 
through them, that of the population as a whole. Five days later he informed Clayton of the 
supportive messages his government had received in The Sudan Times in response to his own 
proclamation. He wrote: 
108 Peters, 1979, p. 94. 
109 Kayali, 1997, p. 187. 
110 It is unclear from the archival record to what degree and extent this proclamation was distributed; however, 
what is at issue here is the thinking behind the document rather than its effect in the 'field. ' 
111 SAD CP 469M46, Private letter from Wingate, The Palace, Khartoum, to Clayton, 7 November 1914. This 
letter refers to telegraphic messages of loyalty and support in The Sudan Times from 'Sayed Ali cl Morghani' and 
'Sharif Yousef el Hindi. ' 
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Do you think it is realized that such messages as these may result in saving the British 
Government hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions of pounds, for I am very hopeful that 
their effect will be to keep the Sudanese quiet and in good fettle during the present war with 
Turkey? When it is realised that had these Religious Sheikhs taken a different attitude it might 
have been necessary to appeal for large British reinforcements in order to maintain our position 
in this country, I think that some acknowledgement should be forthcoming. 
This plea for recognition contains an oblique reference to a view which counted as an axiom 
for British imperialists operating in the Middle East at this time, specifically that Islam was the 
key to successful governance in this area. This passage is also significant in that it refers, 
albeit indirectly, to the reason for this being the preferred mode of rule - namely, that the many 
could be ruled through the not so many on behalf of the very scarce in order that the vagaries 
of the masses need not be taken into account. 
Elie Kedourie is of the opinion, and there is no particular reason to question his judgement on 
this particular point, that the December proclamation was 'almost certainly composed by 
Storrs' and that the Foreign Office was unaware of its publication. 112 The proclamation was 
addressed to 'the natives of Arabia and the Arab provinces' which implies a distinction 
between the peninsula and what has subsequently been referred to as the 'northern tier. ' The 
body of the text however begins more precisely by addressing 'the natives of Arabia, 
Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia - the countries lying between the Red Sea, Bahr El Arab, 
Persian Gulf, frontiers of Persia and Anatolia and the Mediterranean Sea. ' This could be 
construed as acknowledging non-Arab and non-Islamic minorities except that the remainder of 
the document, seven pages in all, besides being contrived in Islamic terms, refers exclusively 
to Arabs. Significantly, the proclamation (a) defines the Arab area (above), (b) urges Arab 
unity in order to expel the Turks, (c) promises British recognition of Arab independence, and 
(d) guarantees defence against the Turks and outside interference. Regardless of whether or 
not the document was assembled under conditions of ignorance, it would seem reasonable to 
treat its contents in their entirety and in relation to one another, the ideas expressed in it being 
so deliberately and closely juxtaposed. The issue of governance is notably absent except for 
repeated reference to the matter of the caliphate which would seem to constitute the 'principle 
112 Kedourie, 1976, p. 2 1. 
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of unity' by which the Arab area might be ruled. These considerations are clearly linked in the 
following sentence: 
Great Britain knows as well as the Muslums that the Islamic Khalifate is a right to the Koreish 
the tribe of the Great Prophet of Islam and that the Arabs are more powerful than the Turks in 
the administration of government and are better prepared to uphold the elements of progress 
and civilisation - also that the Arabs have a better claim for England's goodwill and 
assistance. ' 13 
The congruence of supreme government and Arab caliphate is later made explicit: 
The Government of Great Britain therefore promises you help if you help yourselves and take 
steps to establish an Empire for the Khalifate to administer your vast countries and she would 
not require of you, in return, to help her in fighting the Turks or others but she wishes you to 
work for yourselves and unite in serving your cause and interests. [emphasis added] 114 
One could speculate that certain sections of this document, if disguised under a bogus 
authorship, might well pass as a founding document of Arab nationalism. 
The proclamation goes on to explain Britain's former disinclination to support the Arabs 
against the Turks in terms of her reluctance to subvert the caliphate and, according to the same 
logic, rationalises the apparent volte-face in terms of the present desire to save the caliphate. 
This document, which refers to Arabs as 'the leaders of Islam, ' 115 argues that, on the 
assumption of the impending fall of the Turkish caliphate, 'there is no nation amongst 
Muslums who is now capable of upholding the Islamic Khalifate except the Arab nation and 
no country is more fitted for its seat than the Arab countries. ' 116 That is, an area more readily 
accessible to British influence. 
113 PRO FO 141nIO13156, 'An official proclamation from the Government of Great Britain to the natives of 
Arabia and the Arab provinces', 4 December 1914. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 
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Remarkably, reference to the December declaration is entirely absent in Ronald Storrs' 
memoirs. ' 17 This could be construed as reflecting an unease or guilt at his former sincerity 
given that he would later have many reasons to deny his part in this whole episode. 
Alternatively, it is conceivable that the December proclamation represented a sophisticated 
concoction intended to induce the neutrality of the Arabs by holding out false promises of 
liberation. However, one would expect to find far more evidence for a deception on this scale 
than is, in any case, commensurate with an emergent policy still in its extemporary phase, and, 
moreover, more evidence than the archival record does in fact yield. Rather, it may be 
concluded that the proclamation of 4 December tends to confirm the underlying import of 
Kitchener's letter to 'Abdullah of 31 October 1914.118 
3.9 India's Obiections: Differences Ememe 
Much has been made of the differences between the Government of India, and Cairo War 
Office, in their approaches to Middle Eastern policy during the First World War. Briton 
Cooper Busch appraises the relationship most succinctly, describing it as one of 'mutual 
ignorance. " 19 Certainly India's objectives were always limited, being confined to more or less 
immediate material gains in Mesopotan-da and effective control of certain strategic points. 120 
Conversely, the War Office, through Kitchener and the eyes and ears of his men in Cairo, 
tended to view the Middle East in relation to the conduct of the war as a whole and in 
connection with the future of the empire in its entirety. Notwithstanding any longer-term 
imperial ambitions which Kitchener may have cherished, in view of the anticipated stalemate 
in Western Europe, he recommended diverting sufficient resources to the Middle East to 
117 Storrs, 1943. 
118 See Note 86, above. 
119 Busch, 197 1, P. 35. 
120 Namely: Aden, Eastern Arabia and Southern Persia. Kedourie, 1976, p. 29. 
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remove Turkey from the war thus allowing the Russians and Serbs to concentrate on Austria- 
Hungary and thereby relieve the Western Front. 121 
Such differences are important when appraising the applicability of strategies of collaboration 
in the various theatres of conflict and were soon evident in the antagonistic attitudes the two 
parties adopted towards the issue of an Arab caliphate. However, the respective views of Cairo 
and India, although antithetical, stemmed from a common premis, namely, that the power of 
Islam under the direction of a caliph ranged against Britain was a potential danger to the 
Empire, particularly in India. More importantly, both parties agreed that to be seen to oppose, 
subvert, or meddle in the caliphate in any way could only hasten the realisation of that danger. 
From this shared premis, nevertheless, India and Egypt drew different conclusions. Whereas 
India's tendency was to appease or placate the caliphate in its existing form, Cairo wished at 
least to neutralise the institution or, better still, make an instrument of it for themselves by 
seeing it transferred to a friendly Arab. Expressed in these terms, these ostensibly opposing 
viewpoints are reconcilable. If for any reason the existing caliphate ceased to be a menace to 
the British Empire with its sizeable Muslim population, then the Cairo project would become 
an unnecessary adventure. On the other hand, an effectively neutralised caliphate under veiled 
British protection would probably satisfy India. Of course at the time no one imagined that 
Turkey would one day abolish the caliphate herself. 
Initially, Cairo's and India's 'policies' were simply uncoordinated, the substantial differences 
as yet unrealised. At the end of October Clayton suggested to Cheetharn the possibility of 
employing al-Masri to organise a pan-Arabian revolt using the Turk's Mesopotamian Army. 
'In short, Great Britain would supply the sinews of war and the Arabs would supply the 
fighting element. In this way a close alliance would be cemented between Great Britain and 
121 McKale, 1998, p. 95. It is frequently assumed that the First World War was not an imperial war because most 
of the combat took place in Europe. However, there were very good reasons for concentrating the war effort in 
Europe. An imperial power which defeats its opponent 'at home' will expect to gain the latter's empire all at 
once. The converse is not true however, since a power that gains substantial territories overseas would expect to 
be deprived of them in a like fashion should it capitulate 'at home. ' In this context the assault on the Turkish 
capital (the Dardanelles campaign) was a hybrid example, containing elements of both strategies. The same 
cannot be said of the 'Alexandretta option, ' however. See Section 4.1. 
106 
the newly-formed Mohammedan Power, to the mutual advantage of both. 
" 22 Towards the end 
of November, the Foreign Office, realising that such a collaborative approach was at odds with 
India's proposed unilateral offensive in lower Mesopotamia, conveyed Cheetham's concern 
regarding British designs on Basra and Baghdad. 123 Evidently Kitchener believed that in 
taking the initiative he was making policy rather than following it, since, when asked by 
Maxwell for some indication of the 'ultimate policy ... regarding 
Palestine and Syria in 
connection with the Arab movement' Kitchener was forced to admit that 'no distinct line' 
could be defined at present. 124 Even before Kitchener's offer to 'Abdullah and the Sharif of 31 
October had become generally known throughout the relevant departments of govemment, the 
Government of India and the India Office were expressing fears of an Arab revolt and of a 
united Arabia under an Arab caliph. As Grant, the Indian Foreign Secretary, saw it, a failed 
Arab rebellion supported by Britain would only be embarrassing whereas a successful one 
would become 'a Frankenstein monster which may be an infinite source of trouble 
hereafter. ' 125 With great prescience Lord Crewe, at the India Office, expressed his preference 
for 'a weak and disunited Arabia, split up into little principalities so far as is possible under 
our suzerainty- but incapable of co-ordinated action against us, forming a buffer against the 
Powers in the West. ' 126 
The India Office did not receive a copy of Kitchener's message to 'Abdullah until 12 
December: an 'oversight' for which the Foreign Off-ice apologised. 
1 27 Apart from recording 
his displeasure at his department's not having been consulted, Hirtzel at the Political 
Department of the India Office, minuted his view that 'the hint to the Arabs to assume the 
Caliphate at Mecca and Medina does the very thing which this Office has always understood 
122 FO 371/2140 77088. Covering letter from Cheetham at the British Agency, Cairo to Grey, No. 177,15 
November 1914, with a copy of a despatch from Lt. Col. Clayton, Intelligence Department, War Office, Egypt, to 
Cheetham, Cairo, 30 October 1914. It may reasonably be assumed that this putative revolt was understood to be 
subsumed under the authority of the Sharif of Mecca as caliph. 
123 FO 371/2140 78239. Telegram from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Viceroy, Foreign 
Department, 27 November 1914. 
124 FO 371/2139 77224. Letter from Sir John Maxwell to Earl Kitchener, No. 332E, 27 November 1914 with lord 
Kitchener's reply to Maxwell, 28 November 1914. 
125 Busch, 197 1, p. 61, referring to a note by Grant dated 5 December 1914. 
12" Busch, 197 1, p. 6 1. 
127 This seems barely convincing. One possible interpretation would be to suppose that the FO intentionally 
afforded Cairo a 'clear run' in establishing a policy before either India or the India Office had opportunity to 
intervene, though the evidence for this is purely circumstantial. 
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that H. M. G. would not do. ' 128 This was far less damning, however, than the opinion expressed 
by Sir Thomas Holderness, the Permanent Under Secretary: 
I doubt if the Foreign Office quite realises wherein the Caliphate consists and what it implies. 
Unlike the Papacy it must, if it is to be more than a mere empty claim, have the substance of an 
extensive temporal empire. The Sherif of Mecca could not, I imagine, make good a title to the 
Caliphate unless he established temporal ascendancy over the states and chiefdoms of Arabia 
and could enforce his will and exercise political sovereignty over Arabia. The guarantee given 
by Lord Kitchener was a guarantee to the Sheik of the status-quo- "the independence, rights 
and privileges of the Sherifate. " But the status quo will not carry him to the Caliphate of 
Arabia, much less of the Moslem world. If we are to hold out hopes of the latter, we should 
have to help him in a career of conquest: and I am sure that this is not intended. 129 
Crewe concurred, observing: 'It is dangerous to mix up the Khalifate and the Sherifate, or to 
suppose that the latter can easily be transformed into the former. ' 130 Crewe seems to have 
mistaken an active endeavour to redirect history for a passive assessment of the past and in so 
doing his views failed to engage with Kitchener's on what was thought feasible for the future. 
Ironically, while India was deprecating Cairo's efforts, less senior representatives of the Indian 
Government were independently involved in schemes which implicated them in a course of 
action which both assumed and tended to enhance the status of the Sharif of Mecca in relation 
to other Arabian chiefs. The Viceroy reported to the Foreign Office in December that the 
Bombay Government had already agreed with the Resident of Aden's proposal to approach 
the Sharif of Mecca and guarantee his family's hereditary rights. However, the Foreign Off-ice, 
wishing to assert their authority and impute some consonance into the proceedings, enjoined: 
'But in view of it and of fact that His Majesty's Government have also asked Bin Saud and 
Sheikh of Koweit to address Grand Sherif ... 
it is undesirable to approach him through a third 
channel. ' 131 
Captain Shakespear, through whom India had maintained contacts with Ibn Sa'ud, a month 
later expressed a view which might have been used to support either India or Cairo: 
128 Kedourie, 1976, p. 30. 129 Kedourie, 1976, p. 30. Minute dated 5 January 1915. 
130 Ibid. 
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A Jihad, especially if proclaimed at Mecca by one of the Sherif's standing in Islam, is a 
contingency of which the consequences are unforseeable and incalculable. Such a proclamation 
would, at least, raise the whole Arab World.... This contingency -a 'Jihad, ' proclaimed by the 
acknowledged and accepted descendant of the Prophet at Mecca -I venture to submit needs the 
most serious consideration, and to be constantly kept in mind at the present critical time in all 
our dealings with Arab Chiefs in general. 132 
The point of citing such testimony is to illustrate the fact that, without regard to the ultimate 
viability of their respective preferences, in spite of the ostensible differences between Cairo's 
and India's attitudes, there was a common understanding regarding the importance of the 
Sharif of Mecca which derived from his unique position within Islam. 
3.10 Conclusion 
'Abdullah's reply to Kitchener's was received in Cairo on 13 December. The translated 
version contained the line 'our country has come to hold most conscientiously to your 
suggestions" 33 which seemed to summarise the general attitude, and, while committing no- 
one to anything in particular was not preclusive of future collaboration. The matter of the 
caliphate was not referred to in the written reply and it may be assumed that this was an issue 
of some sensitivity for the Sharif too. However, on returning to Cairo on 8 December, Storrs' 
messenger conveyed orally the express view of the Sharif to the effect 'that the Ottoman 
caliphate no longer existed. ' 134 Importantly, a range of possible future arrangements based on 
the anticipated demise of the Turkish caliphate had been mutually acknowledged by both 
parties. 
The formal correspondences between the situation of 1879-80 and 1914 regarding Britain and 
the Hijaz are apparent. These, rather than the notion of some linear causal link between these 
13 1 FO 371/2147 83620 Letter from the Viceroy to the Foreign Office, II December 1914 and letter from the 
Foreign Office to the Viceroy, 14 December 1914. 
132 Westrate, 1992, pp. 13-14. Referring to FO 882/5,149. 
133 Kedouric, 1976, p. 21. 
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respective episodes, are stressed here in order to emphasise that it was the recurrence of 
immediate possibilities for collaboration based on a perceived concurrence of interests, which 
precipitated Cairo's endeavours in 1914. In both episodes Britain, or at least those of her 
subjects charged with protecting the empire, felt threatened by Islam, not Islam per se, but 
Islam directed by some authority inimical to Britain's imperial interests. In both episodes the 
authority of the Sharif of Mecca, understood to be the second most eminent individual within 
Islam, was under threat from the first, namely the Turkish Sultan as caliph. Needless to say, 
the insecurity of all parties concerned was felt far more acutely in 1914 than it had been in 
1879-80, in large part because European imperial rivalry and the desire for autonomy among 
certain Arabs had intensified during the intervening period. Finally, from the British 
perspective, the idea of Arab independence was accompanied by vague notions of the 
inevitable restoration of an Arab caliphate. It was the conjunction of these factors, not in 
themselves unrelated, which provided both the impetus, and opportunity, for collaboration in 
each instance. 
The points made against what has been described as Elie Kedourie's 'thesis of aberration' 
need not be repeated here. What has been emphasised in its place, however, is the notion that 
the origins of Cairo's Islamic policy, or what Elizabeth Monroe has termed the 'Western 
Arabian' 135 view, were rather more entrenched in circumstance than is generally supposed. 
This is evidenced by the similarity between certain initiatives undertaken by Cairo and India in 
spite of their apparent differences and, in turn, the convergence between the latter's underlying 
assumptions with Turkish, German, and even French expectations, well ahead of the actuality 
of an Anglo-Sharifian alliance. This suggests, regardless of its ultimate feasibility, a certain 
universal currency to the idea, in very general terms, of a European power collaborating with 
an Arab caliph in order to subvert the power of pan-Islam and, at the same time, help 'liberate' 
the Arabs from Turkish rule. 
The relative objectivity of the idea of a restored Arab caliphate at this time is further supported 
by the fact that the idea of ruling 'through' it, as it were, occurred simultaneously to Egyptian 
131 Ibid. 
135 Monroe, 1963, p. 36. 
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nationalists wishing to restore Egyptian hegemony in Syria and Arabia, and to Arab 
nationalists, proto-nationalists and separatists based in Syria. This fact in turn added an extra 
dimension to the emerging competition over political pan-Islam which, for the British at least, 
motivated their competitive bid for the allegiance of the Sharif of Mecca as prime candidate 
for Arab caliph. Furthermore, such facts could have only encouraged the view, held by the 
British in Cairo that, one way or another, the restoration of the Arab caliphate was inevitable 
and had better be turned to Britain's advantage. In other words, intervention in the matter was 
imperative. It is worth remarking at this point that the British felt unwilling to endorse any 
Khedival bid for the caliphate since this off ice was already too closely and too obviously 
connected with Britain. Moreover, a Khedive as calipli, supported by Egyptian nationalists 
who presented the same problems to Britain as did the Syrian based nationalists, was unlikely 
to remain pliant from a British point of view. 
The force and apparent reasonableness of Clayton's assessment of 6 September and the action 
then taken by Kitchener can only have been enhanced by the Turkish response to the outbreak 
which took the form of a jihad against the allied powers. Moreover, the line taken by Cairo 
was reinforced rather than undermined by the British declaration to the Arabs of early 
December 1914. In addition, discussions over press censorship 136 in Britain concerning the 
matter of the caliphate indicate that deliberations over future intervention in the matter were 
being undertaken in earnest at all levels of government. On the basis of this evidence the view 
that the idea of the revival of the Arab caliphate with the aid of Britain was one of central 
importance in the conduct of Britain's wartime Middle Eastern policy must be upheld. 
The foregoing should not be assumed to support the notion that the manipulation taking place 
during this episode was strictly unilateral. Successful collaboration is, in any event, based on a 
degree of mutual knowledge and understanding. At this particular juncture, however, the 
Sharif's estimation of imperial affairs, like al-Masri's, appeared more advanced than Britain's 
comprehension of either Arab or Islamic politics. Britain's backwardness in this regard, it will 
be argued later, contributed to the ultimate failure of Cairo's collaborative endeavour. This 
disproportionality between power and knowledge will be revisited in the conclusion to the 
136 FO 371/2147; and, HO 139/3/3/PT, December 1914, various. 
thesis in making certain final comments on some of the alternative approaches to the subject 
matter referred to in the Introduction. 
Finally, the British idea of an Arab caliphate as the basis of a collaborative enterprise had been 
conceived only in broad outline by the end of 1914. As such the suggestions made to 
'Abdullah at the end of October expressed an uncorroborated wish for the future as much as it 
reflected an informed assessment of historical fact. That the extent and quality of British 
intelligence very much lagged behind the need for action meant that for the time being the idea 
of a British-backed Arab caliphate would develop autonomously. It is therefore the intenial 
consolidation of the idea and its intimate association with the vision of British suzerainty over 
the Arab Middle East which will form the basis of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: Removal of the Caliphate from Enemy 
Influence Becomes the Sine Qua Non of British Middle 
Eastern Policy 
4.0 Introduction 
By the end of 1914, the idea of a revived Arab caliphate in some kind of arrangement with 
Britain existed only in outline. In a certain sense, therefore, Kitchener's actions, that is his 
propositions to the Sharif of Mecca and the December declaration to the Arabs, were ahead of 
the underlying theory. This chapter will examine how the British understanding of Arab 
politics and Islam moved from impulsive speculation towards a coherent, if highly abstract, 
view of a restored Arab caliphate, though still construed on the basis of imperial desire rather 
than reliable and up-to-date information. The coherence of this vision was already evident in 
an unusually candid note sent by Kitchener to Grey in January 1915 in which he confided his 
preference for a British landing at Alexandretta. This, he hoped, would result in an Arab state 
under a caliph with effective European control. 
The significance of the 'Alexandretta option' for this enterprise serves to illustrate the 
conceptual integrity of the 'Cairo vision. ' The main components of this theoretical 
construction are a 'Greater Arabia' severed from Turkey in which an Arab revolt, sympathetic 
to, and dependent upon, Britain, leads to the restoration of an Arab caliphate in Mecca. The 
new Arab state was to include Syria as the main source of its revenues and would be 
nominally unified under the caliph though subject to the effective control of Britain. What 
remained contentious from the outset as indeed it would throughout the war, however, was the 
question of whether Britain should proceed clandestinely in this matter of central importance 
to the future of Islam, or declare her aims to the Arabs directly in order to ensure their support 
against Turkey. 
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The earliest discussions over the future of the Arabic speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire 
indicate that questions of collaboration and the need to identify suitable local 'representatives' 
were paramount. Furthermore, early deliberations over the future of areas such as Palestine, 
Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hijaz serve to illustrate the inherent flexibility and adaptability of 
the British caliphate idea, and to emphasise the key role anticipated for the caliphate in 
preserving a semblance of unity among territories to be disposed of in a variety of ways. It is 
significant in this context that Palestine in particular emerges as an unknown quantity, which, 
if only according to the logic of imperial collaboration, would predispose Britain to approach 
it in tandem with an extenzal collaborator. 
An early report ordered by the Governor General of the Sudan is examined in some detail as 
an outstanding and influential document which, from a British point of view, proposed an 
'Arab solution to the Islamic question' and an 'Islamic solution to the Arab question. ' The 
inevitable demise of the Ottoman Empire, it was supposed, would induce Muslims in general, 
and Arabs in particular, to strive for an independent Arab caliphate. Here too, the imperative 
of Qurayshite descent was emphasised, as was 'a system of autonomous Arab states. ' In 
conjunction with an external British protectorate, Wingate's more sophisticated solution 
corresponded neatly with that already proposed in the Kitchener-Clayton-Storrs scheme. 
Having outlined the development of the idea of a restored Arab caliphate among the political 
intelligence officers working in Cairo and Khartoum, this chapter will go on to examine the 
part played by deliberations over the caliphate in what amounted to the first coordinated 
attempt to establish Britain's long-term aims with regard to Arabia and the Arabic speaking 
parts of the Ottoman Empire. It invariably goes unremarked that at least fourteen percent of 
the final report of the de Bunsen Committee, a sub-committee of the CID, was devoted 
exclusively to the issue of the caliphate. Although the conclusions of the committee were not 
definitive, and the occasionally disjointed contributions of the participants did not reflect the 
abstract coherence assumed in Cairo, considerations over the caliphate emerged as 
fundamental to the general drift of policy. It will be argued here that the deliberations of the de 
Bunsen Committee show how the notion of an alternative caliphate under effective British 
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control became an irreducible precondition of British rule in post-war Arabia and was thereby 
established as the cornerstone of British Middle Eastern Policy during the great War. 
4.1 Towards a Derinite and Coherent Caliphate Policy 
The link between what is referred to here as the 'Alexandretta option' and British 
encouragement of an Arab uprising has been acknowledged by several authors, it being 
generally accepted that Kitchener was the leading proponent, one author even referring to it as 
Kitchener's 'own pet project. ý2A British landing in northern Syria, ostensibly a purely 
military concern, was in fact part of a more comprehensive proposal which, according to 
Isaiah Friedman, 
suggested nothing less than a complete hegemony of the Middle East, an alluring enough 
prospect to prompt British officers in Cairo to devise a scheme which could simultaneously 
wrest Syria from the Turks and eliminate rival claimants, [of which the] centre-piece was a 
landing at Alexandretta, whence the invading force was to cut Turkish communications to 
Aleppo and foment a local uprising. 3 
John Fisher goes further in saying that 'Kitchener attached such importance to the acquisition 
of Alexandretta because he believed that its possession represented the lynchpin in a broader 
strategy evolved by himself and Storrs, whereby the Khalifate would be transferred to Arabia 
and a substantial Arab Empire would emerge under British auspices. 14 
1 Khalidi, 1980, p. 369. Westrate, 1992, p. 12, refers to the idea as having been favoured by Kitchener, Wingate, 
and John Maxwell the commanding general of the British forces in Egypt. 
2 Busch, 197 1, p. 35. 
3 Friedman, 1973, p. 97. 
4 Fisher, 1999, p. 2. 
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A military assault on some part of the Ottoman Empire had been considered as early as 1906 
as a result of the 'Aqaba incident' 5 and thereafter came increasingly to be associated with a 
revolt among the Arabs of the region which would sever (Greater) Arabia from Turkey. By the 
onset of war in the Middle East the idea of a British attack on Syria was regarded in certain 
quarters as the means to ruling Arabia through a revived Arab caliphate. In this connection, 
Kitchener's note to Grey of II November 1914 6 (quoted in full in Section 3.6) is worthy of 
further consideration, since, in spite of its being more usually referred as an illustration of 
Kitchener's attitude towards France, it indicates that Kitchener had already considered the 
implications of a wide-open Arabia and offered some relatively concrete solutions. 
Specifically, the letter envisages an Arabia, united under an Arab caliph guaranteed by Britain 
within which Syria would be controlled by France. It will be seen later that this notion has 
important implications when considering the relationship between a united Arab caliphate and 
Britain's support for Zionism in Palestine 7. This entire scheme is conceptually incoherent 
without the Arab caliphate as a unifying principal. 
The fact that Syria is seen as being essential to the whole scheme as a source of revenue for 
the impoverished but symbolically vital Hijaz is proof that some kind of unity, no matter how 
nominal, was envisaged. This letter marks a new departure, insofar as an Arab revolt, 
originally viewed as an adjunct to a military plan to save Egypt from Turkish invasion, now 
becomes crucial for the installation of an Arab caliph through which Britain might extend her 
empire, whether as an end in itself or out of externally imposed necessity. Furthermore, a 
landing at Alexandretta, soon to become Kitchener's preferred option, is now seen as 
subordinate to the exigency of an Arab revolt. 
Clayton too preferred the 'Alexandretta option' which, in comparison to a landing at Haifa 
was 'a far more attractive proposition' since it severed the Syrian Army from its base and 
opened up the greatest range of subsequent actions. Moreover, Alexandretta was linked 
implicitly to the Arab caliphate idea, though Clayton added a note of caution insisting 'that 
5 Khalidi, 1980, Ch. 1, pp. 1-56. This episode which grew out of tensions over the status of the Sinai peninsula 
(over whether it should form part of Egypt or the Turkish Empire), began with a build-up of British and Turkish 
forces around the port of 'Aqaba, and ended with a Turkish capitulation in the face of a British ultimatum. 
6 FO 800/102 pp. 352-354. Private letter (handwritten) from Kitchener to Grey, II November 1914. 
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any proposal as regards an Arab Khalifate should come from the Arabs themselves' while 
allowing that Britain 'guarantee the integrity of the Khalifate [illegible] and of the Holy Places 
against all external aggression. ' It is important to stress, however, that Clayton's caution was 
over means rather than ends since, with oblique reference to the issue of Qurayshite descent he 
added that Britain 'desires to see the Khalifate occupied by one who is fully entitled to that 
high office and who would command the reverence and support of the Mohamedan world. '8 
There appeared to be considerable consensus among Britain's orientalists at this early stage 
over the issue of Qurayshite descent. Lord Cromer, who was, to say the least, lukewarm about 
the idea of Britain's involvement in the issue of the caliphate, received advice from his former 
Oriental Secretary, Boyle, that in the event of the fall of the Turkish Sultanate 'the question of 
the Khalifate would be a curious one academically. ' However, Boyle concluded that 'it is 
essential that the Khalif be an Arab of Koreish descent. ' 9 
By the beginning of March the War Cabinet had decided to proceed with a landing in the 
Dardanelles without as much as a diversion at Alexandretta. Kitchener and his associates in 
Cairo were, naturally, disappointedlo though it is hard to imagine how the 'Cairo scheme' 
could possibly have been ready for implementation by mid-March. T. E. Lawrence would later 
boast that he remained 'unrepentant about Alexandretta scheme which was from be-inning to 
end, [his] invention. "' There is simply no archival evidence to support this claim. In fact the 
question over Alexandretta as it emerged in the earliest weeks of the war in the Middle East is 
indicative of serious deficiency in British thinking about the region. British knowledge about 
the caliphate was at this stage, scant, to say the least, as was British intelligence concerning 
the society over which it was intended the new caliph would rule. People like Clayton were, 
however, sufficiently experienced in imperial governance to prefer local partners with 
traditional authority over a more secular nationalist leadership with a broad independent 
political base. This was Clayton's concern when he wrote of 'the Pan-Arabs' in January 1915 
that, 
' See Section 5.5, and Note 58, below. 
8 SAD CP 694/3/1-6, Note by Lt. Col. Clayton, DOI, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 3 January 
1915. 
9 FO 633/24 p. 56-57. Boyle to Cromer, 3 March 1915. 
10 PRO 30/57/61 WL/5 Birdie to Kitchener, 3 March 1915. 
11 Garnett, 1938, pp. 85-7, Item 32, Letter to D. G. Hogarth, Grand Hotel, Cairo, 18 March 1915. 
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they are inflamed with ideas of an independent Arab Empire including Syria and Mesopotamia 
& all ruled over by an Arab Khalifa at Mecca, and they push [? ] for England's guarantee to 
support this idea. This is going a great deal further than our Gov't is likely to follow, especially 
as regards Mesopotamia, over which we shall undoubtedly require control. I have therefore 
avoided coming into close contact with him just lately and have confined myself to very vague 
generalities. 12 
British Middle Eastern policy taken as a whole, in contrast to the scheme being hatched in 
Cairo, was far from coherent and evidently wanting at this stage -a fact of which those 
imperialists operating locally were acutely aware. One of these, Sir Reginald Wingate, based 
in Khartoum, had a tendency to overcompensate for his remoteness from the centre of policy- 
making by corresponding with as many people as possible. He did so in order to persuade 
those with more direct influence in London to adopt a Cairo-centred policy based on some 
kind of British accord with Islam. In mid-January, Wingate set out his views on Arabian 
policy from the perspective of the western littoral of the Red Sea. It is significant that, like 
many other British imperialists in the area, his entire approach was premised upon the primary 
distinction between the spiritual and temporal dominion of Turkey in Arabia. While he 
recognised that the Wahhabi and Shi'i populations of Arabia were not susceptible to the 
spiritual dominion of the Turkish caliphate, the 'pre-eminence of the Turkish Empire in the 
world of Islam' and its ability to safeguard the Holy Places against Christian European 
aggression was paramount. He concluded, therefore, that 'provided that the Turkish temporal 
dominion can be overthrown without raising the religious susceptibilities and fanaticism of the 
Arabs, the spiritual dominion will probably dissipate at once. ' The only danger to Britain in 
the area then was 'the cry of "Islam in danger. "' The success of such endeavours would 
depend on convincing declarations being issued by Britain to the effect that she had no 
territorial ambitions in Arabia, especially the Hijaz, and that great Britain was well disposed 
towards Islam. 
A significant difference is apparent between the methodology of the Cairo residency and that 
of Wingate. Whereas the former started from certain rudimentary ideas about Islam as a whole 
combined with a strategic view of empire, the latter began by examining the proclivities and 
12 SAD WP 194/l/292-294, Private letter from Clayton, Intelligence Office, War Office, Cairo, to Wingate, 
January 1915. 
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capacities of each Arab chieftain in terms of their amenability to collaborative arrangements 
with Britain. Nevertheless, the two approaches were ultimately complimentary due to the 
congruity of their underlying assumptions concerning Islam and Middle Eastern politics. 
Although he did not explicitly link the Sharif of Mecca to the idea of an Arab caliph at this 
stage, Wingate judged the Sharif to be ripe for collaboration due to his vulnerability vis-ei-vis 
the Turks and other Arab chiefs, especially Ibn Sa'ud. Furthermore, the Sharif entertained an 
ambition for 'spiritual dominion in Arabia, and consequently throughout Islam. ' 13 Regardless 
of their different starting points, Wingate's thoughts as recorded in mid-January pointed 
towards the solution which was already being proposed in Cairo. The convergence of these 
respective viewpoints is evidenced in a report drafted on his behalf by his private secretary, 
captain Symes. 
4.2 Cat)tain Svmes' Ret)ort of Februarv 1915 
Wingate became increasingly concerned with what he perceived as the 'drift' in Middle 
Eastern policy and the unwillingness of London and India to take the advice of those like him 
and Clayton with longstanding experience in the area. He confided to Clayton his reluctance to 
speak out on matters of policy unless specifically requested. 14 Nevertheless, on receiving 
Symes' report of 15 February Wingate was induced to write directly to Grey 15 in the hope of 
influencing the formation of policy in London. Symes' report set out to link the Arab and 
Muslim 'Questions, ' doing so on the stated assumption that Muslims viewed the future of their 
faith in terms of 'its perpetration as an independent political system, as opposed to a creed or a 
mere school of ethics. ' Significantly, Symes linked the Muslim 'sentimental attachment' to the 
13 SAD WP 194/l/92-95, Secret - 'Note on British Policy in Arabia in Reference to the Situation on the Red Sea 
(Arabian) Littoral', signed R. W., II January 1915. 
14 SAD WP 194/2/101-2, Letter from Wingate, Governor General's Office, Khartoum, to Clayton, 18 February 
1915. 
15 SAD WP 194/2/178, Letter from Wingate, Khartoum, marked 'Very Private' to Clayton, 27 February 1915, in 
which lie explains that he had 'decided to drop what might perhaps be thought a dog-i n-the- manger attitude and 
let one or two of the Authorities have our views for what they are worth. ' 
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Ottoman Caliphate with the centrality of Arabia and the Holy Places. In view of the impending 
collapse of the Turkish Empire, therefore, 
it is evident to all that, as a result of the present war, existing conditions may be shattered at 
their base; and in seeking a means of reconstruction and the preservation of their ideals, the 
thoughts of many Moslems turn, not unnaturally, to the glory of the former Arabian Empire and 
the possibility of its revival under a new Arab Khalifa. 
He then quoted an unnamed member of the 'Young Arab Party' to the effect that, 
without the guarantee afforded by an independent Khalifate the future state of the Moslems will 
be that of the Jews - namely, complete political dependency: ... the territorial 
integrity of the 
(Asiatic) Arab countries is essential to the existence of such a Khalifate; and ... the 
inviolability of the Holy Places of Islam to access by non-Moslems can only be secured if their 
approaches, at any rate by land, are allowed to remain under independent Moslem control. 
importantly, Symes noted that the pan-Arabians were aware of the practical difficulties 
involved in the realisation of their ideals, especially the tendency towards political 
fragmentation, but that 'they cl[ulng to the conception of an Arab Khalifate' as the essential 
condition for the conservation of 'the temporal and spiritual power of Islam, and justify their 
hopes by an appeal to sentiment and tradition. ' The significance of this report was, firstly, that 
it corresponded with, and reinforced, the policy already set in motion by Kitchener. Secondly, 
it appeared to reconcile Cairo's Sharifian policy with the minimum requirements of the secular 
minded pan-Arabians for whom Islam was an instrument of temporal rule in much the same 
way as it appeared to the British. 
Symes' report concluded that the defeat of Turkey was likely to result in a diminished 
attachment to the Ottoman caliphate but that neither the complete abolition of the institution 
nor a caliphate under direct British or Christian protection would be acceptable, even to the 
Muslims of the empire. It followed, therefore, that 'the possibility of re-establishing an 
Arabian Khalifate will merit very careful consideration. ' Symes advised that 'the contingency 
of its realization should certainly be allowed for in any declaration of British Moslem policy. ' 
On an even more practical level, Symes advised that Britain should offer the Arabs, under a 
caliph, protection from the outside. The report was forthright in indicating the need for a 
120 
prophylactic collaborative enterprise motivated by the fear of pan-Islamic reaction against 
Britain: 
If an undertaking of this kind were given, and stress laid on the traditional claims of the Arabs 
(Koreish) to the Sceptre of Islam, the destruction of the temporal dominion of Turkey might 
assume, in Arab and Anglo-phil Moslem eyes, the character of a blow struck on behalf of the 
rightful protectors of Islam (the Arabs) against the Turkish Usurper of the Khalifate. This 
interpretation, by safeguarding our reputation as the friend of Islam, would also do much to 
check the spread of insidious German influences which base their claims to Moslem sympathy 
on the alliance with Turkey and the convenient fact that Germany is the titular sovereign of no 
Moslem state. 16 
The significance of this argument, was that it pointed to one collaborative enterprise in 
particular: that involving the Sharif of Mecca due to his paramountcy based on his Qurayshite 
descent. 
The Foreign Office copy of Captain Symes' report has attached to it copious notes made by 
Grey's Private Secretary, G. R. Clerk, dated 17 March 1915.17 Clerk advised that Islam be 
allowed to exist 'in an independent state' otherwise it would perish and that Muslim 
disaffection in Egypt and India alongside hostility in Arabia, Persia and Afghanistan might 
strain Britain's resources to the extent that she become 'a negligible factor in the European 
war. ' The issue of Islam could not have been put in starker terms. If Britain did not deal with 
the matter effectively the war could be lost. Britain's material interests in Mesopotamia taken 
in conjunction with the possible alienation of Muslim feelings suggested a solution whereby 
Britain would encourage the idea of a Muslim state (to include Mesopotamia and an outlet at 
Alexandretta) in return for a recognition of Britain's special position in the area of Basra and 
the Persian Gulf. Clerk, however understood the sensitivities entailed in direct involvement in 
such a project and, therefore, suggested 'a system of autonomous Arab states, recognizing and 
paying tribute to a spiritual Khalifa at Mecca, but politically independent of him. ' Again, the 
adaptability, and broad appeal within imperial circles, of the caliphate idea is demonstrated, 
being premised on the functional separation of spiritual and temporal powers and presumed to 
meet the essential pan-Arab requirement of symbolic unity. 
16 SAD WP 134/2/54-62, Report by Captain Symes, Khartoum, 15 February 1915, headed, 'Secret -A Further 
Note On British Policy In Arabia and its relation to British Moslem Policy. ' 
17 FO 800/48 pp. 306-320. Private letter from Winga(e, Khartoum, to Grey, 27 February 1915 attached to Symes' 
report. Ibid., number 306898, March 16,1915. 
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Not everyone in receipt of Symes' report was so convinced by his arguments; in fact some 
were rather concerned by the apparent eagerness with which certain parties were prepared to 
submit to Arab demands. Although Lord Curzon, soon to become a member of the War 
Cabinet, accepted that the question of the caliphate was an important one and even agreed on 
the likelihood of a future Arab caliph, he later wrote to Lord Cromer alarmed that 'the Arabs 
are now opening their mouths very wide and appear to want a new Arabian State and Khalifate 
from the Persian Gulf to Egypt and from Egypt to Syria (which it is to include). '18 
Nevertheless, rather than concede to these demands immediately, Curzon advocated a 
continuation of ad hoc arrangements with individual Arab chiefs in a manner which, he 
anticipated, might well pave the way for an eventual alternative caliphate. 
Meanwhile, spurred on no doubt by Symes' persuasive and provocative report, Wingate 
elaborated a more comprehensive scheme for the Arab Middle East. A draft letter to a friend 
indicates his growing confidence in promoting his own solutions. Wingate began by pointing 
out the inconsistency in the declared policy of non-interference in Islam while engaged in a 
war against the world's leading Islamic state which would in all likelihood result in the fall of 
the present caliph. There followed the outline of what might be referred to as a 'ring-fencing' 
policy for Arabia in which an independent Arab caliphate would be surrounded by British 
colonies. On the presumption that 'most of the Orientals are deceived by outward show' 
Wingate envisaged a financially dependent Arabian government which, 'would have to give 
guarantees and securities for this borrowed money and other concessions etc. This would 
practically put the whole country in charge of Great Britain, although the administration of the 
country may apparently be in the hands of the Arabs. [emphasis addeff The objective of this 
scheme was the exclusion of other powers and the taming of Islam since, 'if this Arabian 
Government was formed under the prestige and auspices of the rightful Khalifa of Koreish, 
with Great Britain as a friend and not an opponent, the effect on the Mohammedans in the 
British colonies would be marvellous ' and, 'if it [The Arabian Khalifate] should ever exist, 
the management of its affairs would in reality be in the hands of Great Britain' and therefore, 
18 FO 633/24 pp. 77-79. Letter from Lord Curzon to Cromer, 22 April 1915. Curzon added: 'What evidence have 
they shown of their capacity to organise or administer such a stateT 
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'it would not make any difference to Great Britain if the Arabs hold the titles of independence 
while the management of their affairs is in the hands of British ofticials. ' The true nature of 
the kind of 'Arab independence' contemplated by Wingate and the underlying purpose of his 
recommendations is revealed in his concluding remark: 
Before I close this memorandum I must say that most of the Orientals look on things 
superficially, and therefore they prefer to have simply the name of being independent than any 
other sort of Government, such as a Protectorate &c. 
Great Britain could follow something of this policy and leave to the [A]rabs the nonlinal 
independence they are so keen upon and gain all the benefits to which I have already alluded 
without taking any fresh responsibilities. [emphasis added]19 
Likewise, Wingate's conception of Arab unity was not of a straightforward political unity but 
of a unity achieved 'through the intermediary of their religion. ' Wingate later explained to 
Hardinge that, 'it is curious how intimately connected are religion and politics amongst the 
Moslems, and how distinct these two factors may be kept amongst Christians - That is the 
essential difference between the two and it is often very much misunderstood by the British 
Public. 920 What Wingate did not conceptualise, however, was some category, unique to Islam, 
which both united and transcended religion and politics, but a politics conveniently confined to 
religion occupying, as it were, a discrete social space and therefore not incompatible with 
European political administration introduced exogenously. Naturally such involvement was 
presumed to be beneficial for those subjected to it. It is from such a conception, generally 
accepted among the community of oriental 'experts' stationed in Cairo and Khartoum, that the 
possibility of secular rule by Britain, interposed between the figurehead-caliph and the pious 
public, emerges. 
19 SAD WP 134/3/54-6. Draft of Memorandum by Wingate (in pencil) addressed to 'My dear Friend' dated 9 
March 1915. It is unclear to whom the memorandum was addressed or indeed whether the memorandum was 
ever despatched. Regardless, the document is a pertinent and revealing record of the direction of Wingate's 
thinking at that time. Importantly, this is the first explicit reference to 'nominal independence. ' 
20 SAD WP 134/5/34-6, Private letter from Wingate, Erkowit, to Hardinge, 28 April 1915. 
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4.3 Further Thoujzhts from Cairo and London 
In early March Storrs wrote to Kitchener's assistant, Fitzgerald, saying that, '[a] North African 
or Near Eastern Vice-Royalty including Egypt and the Sudan and across the way from Aden to 
Alexandretta would surely compare in interest and complexity, if not actual size, with India 
itself. 21 Although it would have been quite alien to Kitchener's rnodus operandi to promote 
himself openly as a potential 'Viceroy of the Middle East, ' or to associate himself with the 
idea of a viceroyalty 22 even in the most tenuous way, he saw fit to submit a memorandum to 
the CID in which he argued quite explicitly that, 'it is to our interests to see an Arab kingdom 
established in Arabia under the auspices of England, bounded on the north by the valley of the 
Tigris and Euphrates, and containing within it the chief Mohammedan Holy Places, Mecca, 
Medina, and Kerbala. ' In this scheme, in a manner which echoed Wingate's 'ring-fencing 
policy, ' the possession of Mesopotamia in conjunction with Britain's other colonies in the area 
would effectively secure 'all the approaches to the Mohammedan Holy Places. ' 23 Remarkably, 
the Sharif of Mecca is not referred to here; rather the key emphasis is on the physical 
protection of the Hijaz. 
Ironically, the Committee of Imperial Defence had already been apprised of the merits of the 
Sharif of Mecca as caliph only two days before, not from Cairo or Khartoum, but by an India 
Office report. In a manner which pre-empted Kitchener's emphasis on effective control of the 
Holy Places, the report argued that 'if the defacto possessor of the Holy Places is Caliph' and 
'if the Grand Sharif of Mecca definitely dissociates himself from the Turks, he will ipsofacto 
become Caliph. ' Although the author thought this caliphate might be temporary, the only 
potential danger to it was presumed to come from Ibn Sa'ud who, being a Wahhabi, had little 
interest in preserving it. However, the India Office had been assured by their agent in the area, 
Captain Shakespear, that if the present Sultan were to be displaced by Enver Pasha 'the 
21 PRO 30/57/47 QQ/I 8. Letter from Storrs, The Residency, Cairo, to Fitzgerald, 8 March 1915. 
22 There is no record of Kitchener's ever having committed himself on the matter of a Middle Eastern 
viceroyalty. It was not in his nature to do so, however, it was no secret that he coveted the viceroyalty of India at 
least up to the outbreak of war in August 1914. Pollock, 200 1, p. 37 1. 23 CAB 24/1 Secret G-12. CID The War - Alexandretta and Mesopotamia- Memorandum by Lord Kitchener, 
March 16,1915. 
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Caliphate will by common consent of Islam revert to the descendants of the Prophet's family 
in Mecca, of whom the present head is the Sharif, and who [Capt. Shakespear felt] ... would 
command Bin Saud's support in such an event rather than his antagonism. ' The report added, 
in a somewhat comforting and self-satisfied tone: 'In that case the question will have solved 
itself, as we desire, and in favour of a candidate whom we have guaranteed against attack. ' 
What followed, amounted to a version of the 'ring-fencing' policy in which it only remained 
to 'complete the network of agreements' with local chiefs. The report concluded that 'The 
"protectorate" over Arabia therefore amounts to nothing more than Arabia for the Arabs under 
the aegis of Great Britain. ' 24 Again, on paper, Kitchener's Sharifian policy appeared to be 
consistent with existing arrangements in Arabia as well as demands for future independence, 
at least in the peninsula and desert areas. 25 
4.4 The Search for Historical Collateral: The 'Pirie-Gordon - Lukach 
Memorandum' 
By the time that the sub-committee directed to determine 'British Desiderata in Turkey In 
Asia' had been convened, the CID had been made aware of the essentials of the 'Cairo 
scheme. ' What the home authority lacked, at this stage, was some historical background to the 
ideas underlying the particular policy being put before them. Perhaps in appreciation of this 
deficiency, Clayton as Director of Intelligence in Cairo, ordered two of the most able oriental 
'experts' under his command, Lieutenants H. Pirie-Gordon and H. C. Lukach, to prepare a 
report for submission to the Foreign Office. It is perhaps not surprising that the historical 
24 PRO CAB 24/1 G- 16, 'The War - The Future Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia'. Notes by the 
Secretary, Political and Secret Department, and the Military Secretary, India Office, March 14,1915. Attached to 
this report is a telegram from the Viceroy, addressed to the Secretary of State for India, urging complete non- 
interference in the issue of the caliphate and the future of Arabia. 
25 It is important to note that at this stage British references to Arabia were quite inconsistent. Arabia might refer 
to (a) the entire Asiatic Arabic-speaking area, or (b) the peninsula, or (c) the peninsula plus the northern deserts, 
that is, excluding Greater Syria and Mesopotamia. The separation into a 'true' Arabia and the more 'hybrid' 
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collateral provided by the Cairo Intelligence Office should so unambiguously support the 
Middle Eastern policy then being advocated. In Section 8.22 of this thesis further examples of 
historical evidence will be cited which 'happened' to emerge as the 'Cairo scheme' fell apart 
and were used to rationalise its abandonment. 
The Pirie-Gordon/Lukach report is worth examining in some detail since it provided a timely, 
and seemingly authoritative, argument for the Sharif of Mecca as caliph supported by Britain. 
This effect was achieved with some subtlety, by and large, with reference to arguments which 
appeared to rest on a convergence between Islamic orthodoxy and the requirements of modern 
imperialism. The report began by describing the original caliphate as a spiritual and temporal 
monarchy, a combination of a 'Vicar of God' with 'Commander of the Faithful' '(Enzir Al 
Murninin)' - or in other words: 'Pope and King. ' The authors then went on to give an outline 
history of the caliphate which they conveniently reduced to three stages. 
In the first stage, following the death of the Prophet, the caliph was his elective successor and 
encompassed both theocratic and temporal rule but after the first three caliphs the 
4ecclesiastical' aspects of the office receded into the background. In the second stage, under 
the Abbasids, the caliphate became an hereditary puppet under the protection of the strongest 
Muslim dynasty whereby the princes '(enzirs)' were nominally invested by the 'Supreme 
Imam' and discharged temporal authority themselves. The report went on to describe how, 
after the Mongol invasions of the 13 th century AD, the temporal power of the caliph ceased 
altogether while the 'ecclesiastical' function survived accidentally. As if pointing towards 
possibilities for the present epoch, the report described the situation under the Mamelukes 
which featured 'a spiritual Khalifate free from temporal prerogatives. ' The report argued that, 
tas long as Egypt remained independent, the Abbasids enjoyed their dignity' raising the 
renewed prospect of a "'Moslem Papacy bereft of its Temporal Power, maintained by and 
under the protection of Moslem kings. " 126 The third stage, was characterised by a reversal of 
periphery appeared somewhat later as a post-rationalisation of imperial policy and is a concomitant of Sykes' 
notion of 'Levantinism. ' See Chapter 2, Note 136. 
26 At this point and elsewhere the report quotes Lukach's book, The city of dancing dervishes and other studies, 
(London, Macmillan, 1914). This work is thoroughly anecdotal and by any standards amateurish. It is an 
indication of the paucity of serious scholarly works in the area of Islam and the Middle East available in English 
that this book stands as one of the most authoritative sources in the pre-war era. In this regard, it is perhaps 
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the original position, in which the principal Muslim monarch must by necessity be the 'Chief 
Imam. ' One might add that only in the second and third stages did the supposed spiritual and 
temporal powers of the caliph become conceptually distinct, though less functionally separate 
in the third stage than in the second. 
The report is remarkable in that it historicises the relationship between the Islamic faith and 
secular power, and may have been the first occasion on which it was recognised unequivocally 
that 'Abdulhamid II 'endeavoured to redress his territorial losses by increased spiritual 
authority. ' The report then lists the currently recognised qualifications for the caliphate - 
election by the 'Assembly of the Faithful, ' possession of certain sacred relics, and possession 
of the Holy Cities of Islam: Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and the most powerful Muslim throne - 
but goes on to locate the chink in the present incumbent's armour. It was only before the onset 
of the present war that the Sultan as 'the greatest prince in Islam, and de facto ruler of the holy 
cities' could 'ignore what no theological ingenuity can disguise, namely that he is not an Arab 
of the tribe of the Qoreish. ' 
Regarding the present situation, Pirie-Gordon and Lukach were of the opinion that: 
The development of the doctrine that the Khalifate belongs of right to the strongest Moslem 
prince has of late years tended to develop further in the direction of disintegration, and many 
Mussulman rulers seem now to adhere to the theory that the Khalifate may belong to any 
powerful Moslem Prince. 
It was only towards the end of the report that the Sharif of Mecca was mentioned at all. Both 
the Sharif and Imam Yahya of Yemen were described as pretenders to the caliphate, however, 
neither were likely to secure more than local support 'unless [their) pretensions to the 
possession of the Supreme Imamate were to receive the approval of one or other of the Great 
Powers having Moslem interests in their own dominions. ' Finally, the case against British 
abstentionism in the matter of the Islamic caliphate is made by a process of imperialist logic 
according to which all candidates except the Sharif of Mecca are ruled out as unacceptable 
remarkable that Britain, although the leading imperial power, especially in the domain of Islam, was less 
productive than either Holland, Germany or Italy, in academic endeavour directed towards an objective 
assessment of Islamic and Arab history. It would be some years before British orientalists availed themselves of 
this foreign expertise and fully appreciate the implications of 'Abduthamid's policy. See Section 8.22. 
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from a British point of view. The Sultan of Morocco and the Sanussi were discounted on 
account of their being under French/Spanish and Italian sway respectively, while an enhanced 
Amir of Afghanistan was thought to be a threat to India. Additionally, the Sultan of Egypt is 
ruled out on account of the Islamic objection that he is under direct British rule, and Imam 
Yahya is eliminated due to his not being in possession of the Holy Places: 
Finally there remains the Sherif of Mecca, who, in view of the commanding position which he 
holds in the eyes of innumerable Moslems in all parts of the world as the actual guardian of the 
Holy places, and his personal qualities as a Sheikh (? Chief Sheikh) + of the tribe of the 
Qoreish from which all earlier Khalifs, both orthodox and heterodox, were sprung, is a very 
reasonable candidate - offensive to no Power inasmuch as he would be under the immediate 
influence of no other Power, and is already in possession of Mecca, which in its turn could very 
well be the spiritual capital of the Moslem world and residence of the Supreme Imam. 
27 
In the final paragraph of the report the importance of Mecca as the seat of the proposed caliph 
is re-emphasised by pointing out that being closed to non-Muslims it was, therefore, unlikely 
to be subject to political intrigue among the powers. In spite of this, the report assumed, 
because the Sharif would be dependent on Britain, Mecca would effectively be controlled by 
her. 
By the time the de Bunsen Committee was appointed by the Prime Minister on 8 April 1915 
28 
those in charge of policy making in respect of the Middle East were in possession of a broad 
range of material which indicated, at times subtly, at other times rather pointedly, the benefits 
of a collaborative arrangement with the Sharif of Mecca. The emerging proposal, according to 
which his candidacy for the caliphate would be endorsed by Britain, was posited as a solution 
to the so-called Arab and Islamic 'Questions. ' In this regard the only outstanding 
consideration, it might be thought, would have been how to promote and support that 
individual effectively and materially without appearing to interfere in Islam or seeming to 
violate the Holy Places. It is, on the face of it, rather surprising then that the available material 
seems to have played so small a part in the deliberations which ensued. The reasons for this 
will be examined in the following section. 
27 FO 141/587 545/1 'A report on the Moslem Khalifate by Lieut. H. Pirie-Gordon, R. N. V. R. & Lieut. H. C. 
Lukach. ', stamped by High Commissioner, Egypt, 29 March 1915, attached to a covering note from the 
Intelligence Department, WO, Cairo, to Sir Milne Cheetham, The Residency, Cairo, 29 March 1915, signed by 
Clayton, Dol. 
28 Fromkin, 1991, p. 146. 
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4.5 'British Desiderata in Turkey In Asia' : The de Bunsen Committee and 
the Idea of an Arab Caliphate 
On the face of it, the de Bunsen report represented a setback for Kitchener's associates in 
Cairo and Khartoum in as much as it equivocated on the desirability of their 'grand design. ' 
The committee's final enumeration of 'British Desiderata' - nine items in all - included: 
(vii) To ensure that Arabia and the Moslem Holy Places remain under independent Moslem 
rule. Dependent upon this, we should seek for a settlement which will appeal to, or at least not 
antagonise, Indian Moslem feeling, and will provide a satisfactory solution of the question of 
the Khalifate, 29 
and under (ii), 'generally, [the] maintenance of the assurances given to the Sherif of Mecca 
and the Arabs. ' However, the report failed to draw firm conclusions on the matter of the 
caliphate, tending to defer the issue while deprecating arguments in favour of the Sharif. 
Nevertheless, the report's broad-brush approach effectively left the field open for solutions 
along the lines of those sought by Cairo since it raised many questions which had already been 
anticipated by the intelligence community there. More importantly, however, the committee 
did establish the removal of the caliphate of Islam from German-Turkish control to effective 
British control as a sine qua non of British Middle Eastern policy. 
it is only by examining the proceedings of the de Bunsen Committee which led to these 
conclusions that the significance of the issue of the caliphate is fully revealed. 'The main 
advantage of the de Bunsen committee was, ' according to Elizabeth Monroe, 'that it caused 
members of the Foreign Office, War Office and India Office, Admiralty and Board of Trade to 
sit down together and thrash out a programme. 930 The committee was aided by Maurice 
Hankey, secretary to the CID, and his new assistant, Sir Mark Sykes. Kitchener was well 
represented on the committee, on the one hand, by General Sir Charles Callwell, Director- 
General of Military Operations, and on the other, by Sykes in his capacity as Kitchener's 
personal representative. Sykes attained his new position through having become known as the Cý 
29 CAB 42/3/12 e Bunsen Committee, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, printed report dated 30 June 19 IS. 
30 Monroe, 1963, p. 29. The findings of the Committee had not been published at the time this book was written. 
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Conservative Party's Ottoman expert, a status conferred upon him as a result of his travels in 
the Ottoman Empire as a youth, and through having published several books on Islamic 
31 
matters based largely on his travels. Posterity has given Sykes the reputation of an amateur, a 
shallow synchretist and a 'fixer. ' It was such qualities which would serve him well as a key 
policy maker in view of the diverse and apparently irreconcilable desiderata which he 
encountered under Maurice de Bunsen in the spring of 1915. After the de Bunsen Committee 
Sykes would become 'the London bureaucrat charged with responsibility for Middle Eastern 
affairs throughout the war. ' [emphasis added]32 
The committee met thirteen times between 12 April and 28 May 1915; four of these meetings 
were concerned, to a considerable extent, with the issue of the caliphate, the rest, not at all. At 
those meetings where the caliphate was discussed, Sykes was the outstanding contributor. At 
the fourth meeting held on 17 April, Sykes reduced the post-war future to two options: (a) a 
reduced Ottoman Empire with the partition of the non-Turkish portions, and (b) the 
continuation of Turkey's Asiatic empire partitioned into 'schemes' of interest. Under the first 
of these, according to Sykes, the caliphate would be transferred to the Sharif of Mecca, 
Palestine attached to Egypt, Iraq would be made a separate state, and the Arabian chiefs would 
obtain complete independence. The main advantage of this scheme, argued Sykes, was that the 
caliphate would be placed under British protection and Islam thereby dissociated from the 
CUP. Remarkably, the main difficulty with this scheme, it was imagined, was that although 
the Sharif of Mecca as caliph would be acceptable in India due to the prestige attached to his 
present position, such an appointment might not be so warmly received in Iraq/Mesopotamia. 
In Arabia, apparently, he was just another Arab chief. 
Under the second option Sykes still insisted that it was essential for the security of India that 
the caliphate be removed from CUP influences, and that 'the only outward change in the 
present state of affairs would be that the Sherif of Mecca would be recognised as an 
independent prince. ' The relative advantage of this scheme was that the seat of the caliphate 
31 Sykes main publications were: Through Five Turkish Provinces, 1900; Dar Ul Islain, 1904; and, The Caliphs' 
Last Heritage, 1915, published after the conclusion of the de Bunsen Committee. Sledmere Papers, Christopher 
Simon Sykes, The Visitors'Book, (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1978). 
32 Fromkin, 1991, p. 146. 
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would be removed to a separate zone lying between those of the powers, i. e. Damascus, rather 
than to the remoteness of the Hijaz. The argument being that a caliph at Damascus was more 
accessible and, unlike the Sharif of Mecca, 'in reach of Christian arms owing to the fact that it 
is fundamental that no Christian should approach the Holy Places. ' It was assumed that this 
arrangement would be satisfactory to the Arabs since the caliph would reside in an Arab area. 
Significantly, no such scheme had been entertained in Cairo by this time. Further 
disadvantages of the scheme of partition (zones of interest with Arab caliphate) were indicated 
by Clerk, Grey's Private Secretary. He maintained that Muslims would be against partition 
and reiterated a point made by Kitchener to Grey in November 1914,33 specifically, that an 
Arabia isolated to the south of an intermediate British zone would be cut off from its source of 
potential wealth (Syria and Iraq). According to Clerk, 'an Arab State and Khalifate was 
therefore impossible. ' 34 
At the fifth and sixth meetings of the de Bunsen Committee the issue of the caliphate received 
a brief airing, though there was by now a discernable inclination to negate the course of action 
implicit in Kitchener's original overtures to the Sharif of Mecca. On the assumption that the 
Sultan as caliph be removed to Damascus the Sharif of Mecca would merely obtain custody of 
the holy places. Clerk, however, pointed out that resistance to the removal of the Sultan might 
be expected from the CUP. The fifth meeting was held the day after Lord Cromer had taken 
the opportunity of a debate in the House of Lords to effect what amounted to an announcement 
to the world in general, and to the Muslim world in particular, that Britain would, under no 
circumstances, interfere in the matter of the caliphate. The full consequences of Cromer's 
6campaign' will be examined in the following chapter. Suffice it to say, in the context of the 
de Bunsen Committee, that the proceedings coincided, perhaps not accidentally, with a period 
of considerable sensitivity and anxiety over the issue of the Islamic caliphate. 
33 See Ch. 3, Note 96. 
34 CAB 27/1 Committee of Imperial Defence, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Report, proceedings and 
appendices of a Committee appointed by the Prime Minister, 1915, Minutes of the 4 th Meeting held at the Foreign 
Office, 17 April 1915. 
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While tending to sidestep the caliphate issue, the India Office suggested an exclusively British 
sphere in a confederated Arabia. 35 This idea induced a number of concerns to be voiced at the 
sixth meeting. Clerk did not perceive any incongruities between declarations already issued by 
Britain on Arabia and the caliphate, nor with the agreements made with Kuwait, nor with 
those about to be made with Ibn Sa'ud. In relation to the Grand Sharif of Mecca, Sykes 
insisted that it was only essential to 'guard our protigi from the aggression of a foreign 
Power' 36 but not to get involved in disputes between him and other chiefs. Possibly in view of 
the apparent vagueness and lack of resolve in the proceedings, a few days later the India 
Office wrote to the secretary of the CID urging effective British control over Arabia, 
conceived as a 'negative' (i. e. prophylactic) sphere of influence. Evidently surprised at the 
apparent diffidence with which the 'Cairo view' was being espoused, the India Office quite 
pointedly suggested that Kitchener 'come off the fence' 37 with regard to his assurances about 
'an Arab of true race' and the caliphate. 
Matters came to a head at the eighth meeting, which opened with de Bunsen announcing that 
Sykes wished to make certain observations concerning the caliphate. He began by reiterating 
the point he had made before: that if the Powers decided on the spheres of influence option, 
and Muslims generally did not demand a change in the caliphate, it was essential that the 
caliphate be removed from Anatolia and the likely influences of the CUP. On this occasion de 
Bunsen himself questioned Britain's entitlement to choose the site of the Sultan's capital. This 
induced Sykes to insist even more forcefully that this was a difficulty attendant on spheres of 
interest 'and it was his opinion that if we could not decide to ask for the removal of the 
Khalifate to Damascus, then it would be necessary for the Committee to recommend 
partition. ' There followed an exchange between Sykes and Clerk, the latter evincing a degree 
of concern over the prospect of a caliphate shorn of temporal powers, to which Sykes replied 
that 'the Khalifate could be just as powerful without as with temporal powers. ' To Clerk's 
insistence that, unless both temporal and spiritual powers were combined in the caliphate 
Muslims would consider Islam doomed, Sykes rejoined with an argument from history - that a 
35 Ibid. Minutes of the 5 th Meeting held at the Foreign Office, 21 April 1915. 
36 Ibid. Minutes of the 6 th Meeting held at the Foreign Office, 23 April 1915. 
3.7 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/l 1, Note by the India Office on Arabia, for the Secretary of the CID, Confidential, 
27 April 1915. 
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purely spiritual caliphate would resemble the later Abbasid period when the caliphs power was 
confined to Baghdad. Finally, Sykes repeated, 
that as far as he was concerned, he felt he could not take the responsibility of recommending 
the partition of Asiatic Turkey into spheres of interest without stipulating for the simultaneous 
removal of the Khalifate from the influences which could not help being a menace to it if it 
were left in Anatolia. 
Sir H. Llewelyn-Smith, representing the Board of Trade, who could have known little of either 
Islam or the caliphate, agreed that as the 'first Moslem Power, ' Britain's sphere of influence 
must contain the seat of the caliphate if possible, adding that, 'certainly it could not remain 
under the influence of any 'foreign European Power. ' 38 In this way, to pseudo-expert and 
amateur alike, the matter of the caliphate proved decisive in the development of British 
Middle Eastern policy. More precisely, the removal of the caliphate from Anatolia into the 
Arab area, had become a sine qua non of Britain's policy towards Turkey in Asia. 
The report's conclusions were predicated on the ultimate fall of Constantinople and the 
consequent effect on Indian Muslim feeling and incorporated the view that, 
We should have destroyed the political power of Islam as represented by Turkey, and at the 
same time, by our annexation of Mesopotamia, have made it clear to all Moslems that any hope 
of an Arab Khalifate acquiring material wealth and prosperity sufficient to restore a Moslem 
State that would count among the Governments of the world was henceforth impossible. 
The report reproduced Sykes' argument that it would be unacceptable to Britain for the 
Ottoman capital to 'be situated in the zone of any other Power' since 'we cannot afford to see 
the Khalifate exposed to foreign influences. ' Under 'Miscellaneous Questions' common to 
each of the proposals considered, the report acknowledged the absence of a central 
government or predominant chief in Arabia and the need to protect Mesopotamia from attack. 
However, this issue remained unresolved, it merely being noted that the obvious solution of 
placing the whole of Arabia under a British protectorate, even 'of a purely negative character, ' 
was inconsistent with the stipulation that 'the Moslem Holy Places should remain under 
independent Moslem rule. ' 
38 CAB 27/1 CID, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Minutes of the 8 th Meeting held at the Foreign Office, 29 
April 1915. 
133 
The de Bunsen Report, published on 30 June 1915 included an appendix written by Sykes 
entitled, 'Note on the Khalifate' which had also been published as a pamphlet by the Foreign 
Office a few weeks earlier. 39 This memorandum was, to say the least, ambivalent on the 
question of promoting the Sharif of Mecca as caliph. The note undermined the general tenor of 
the memoranda and reports which had emanated from the intelligence communities in Cairo 
and Khartoum, who had stressed the cardinal necessity of the continuity of the caliphate of 
Islam. Following a brief history of the institution, the note stated that, (a) the caliphate is not 
hereditary, (b) the stipulation of Qurayshite descent appealed only to 'Arabs of true race, ' (c) 
there was currently no Sunni movement in favour of an alternative caliphate, (d) the caliphate 
was not recognised in North Africa, Persia, Southern Arabia and Southern Mesopotamia, (e) 
the caliphate was not essential to Sunnis, and (f) that the possession of the Holy Places does 
not automatically carry the caliphate with it. Furthermore, the note warned against 
exaggerating the importance of the caliphate adding that, 
the Caliph's position is neither that of a Pope in religious matters nor Caesar in civil affairs. 
According to Sunni theories Islam is fixed and sufficient, the Caliph can make no new laws, no 
dogmatic pronounce ments, nor change any matter of religious discipline, it is doubtful whether 
he can proclaim a general religious war, and it is pretty certain that he cannot call on distant 
individuals to take part in a local one. 
Even indirect control of the caliphate by Britain could not be contemplated and the 
appearance that a caliph had been imposed from outside Islam must be avoided completely. 
Finally, the report suggests a two track approach, stating that it would be advantageous to 
Great Britain that the Ottoman dynasty retain some territory where it could continue 
independently while at the same time the independence of the Sharif of Mecca should also be 
recognised so allowing [non-Arab SunniS]40 to determine whether the caliphate remain with 
the present dynasty or go to the Sharif and his family. Sykes' note on the caliphate was, in the 
end, thoroughly ambiguous. However, as only two choices of caliphate are allowed for, and 
removal of the Turks from the Arab peninsula is advocated elsewhere in the report, the point 
that, 'in event of Ottoman control being removed from Hejaz it is very possible that the Sherif 
39 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/4 85, A confidential pamphlet published by the FO entitled 'Note on the Khalifate' 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes. 
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might assume the title for himself, his connection with the holy places, his intercourse with 
pilgrims, combined with independence, would give him an especial claim in the eyes of non- 
14l Ottoman Sunnis , can only 
be taken as endorsement of the Sharif's candidacy for caliph. 
The final report considered four options rather than the two set forth by Sykes at the opening 
of proceedings. The four were: 'A. ' Two 'Scheme[s] of Annexation' - one which placed 
Alexandretta within British territory and the another substituting Haifa for Alexandretta. Each 
envisaged a continuous band of British territory linking the Mediterranean to the Gulf-, '13. 
Zones of Interest' - including a British zone extending from Palestine to the Gulf-, 'C. 
Ottoman Independence' - with British annexation of the area around Basra; and, 'D. Ottoman 
Devolutionary Scheme'- with British annexation of the area around Basra and a British 
'sphere of enterprise' linking the Mediterranean with the Gulf. 
The committee concluded in favour of course 'D, ' preferring course 'B' to 'A. v42 The order of 
preference was argued for on the basis that the two most favoured schemes allowed for 'an 
outwardly independent Moslem State' [emphasis added] which 'should therefore soothe 
apprehension in India. ' Although Kitchener was, on the face of it, well represented on the 
committee, neither of his representatives had much experience in the area under consideration. 
Besides which Wingate had refrained from 'worrying' him with more substantive reports on 
the caliphate because he assumed that Kitchener was already receiving such material through 
the Cabinet. 43 Consequently, in comparison with the deliberations and recommendations of 
Kitchener's former subordinates in Cairo and Khartoum, the conclusions of the de Bunsen 
Committee had a rather abstract sense about them. Furthermore, regardless of Britain's 
readiness to indulge the inhabitants of the region, there was remarkably little discussion of 
what 'the Arabs' might have wanted out of the war. The overriding concern throughout the 
entire discussion was that of inter-imperial relations rather than specific collaborative 
enterprise being hatched in Cairo and Khartoum. Nevertheless, the report left the field wide 
40 The report actually says 'Non-Moslem Sunnis, ' however it is clear from the context what as intended since 
elsewhere 'Non-Ottoman Sunnis' are referred to. 
41 CAB 42/3/12, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, 30 June 19 IS. 
42 CAB 27/1 CID, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, Minutes of the I 3'h Meeting held at the Foreign Office, 28 
May 1915. 
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open for British opportunism in general, and for the future consolidation and promotion of the 
'Cairo view' in particular. 
In the final analysis, it may be said that the de Bunsen Report did not determine British policy 
in the Middle East. Rather it raised a number of questions, to which, it will be argued here, the 
proponents of a British backed Arab caliphate scheme already believed they had the answers. 
That Sykes was not in regular contact with military intelligence in Cairo until after the 
Committee had completed its deliberations demonstrates both the general unpreparedness of 
the British establishment with regard to Islam and the Middle East, and the extent of Sykes' 
extemporising, at the time. In a manner which tends to confirm these inadequacies, having 
completed his duties in London in respect of the Committee, only then did Sykes embark on a 
'fact-finding tour' of the Near and Middle East. 
4.6 Sir Mark Sykes' Tour of the Middle and Near East 
As early as 12 June Sykes wrote to Callwell from Athens of having been in touch with an 
Ottoman prince who sought the help of the Allies in raising a revolt in Turkey. This member 
of the Ottoman royal family who purported to be popular in Turkey hoped to effect certain 
reforms including separation of religion from the state. The latter would be achieved through a 
transfer of the caliphate to a member of the Quraysh, specifically the Sharif of Mecca whose 
independence in Mecca and Medina he supported. One Ottoman prince, 'Saba-ed-Din, ' 
apparently believed that 'possession of the Caliphate engendered the ill-will both of France 
and England. '44 Sykes later wrote from Sofia that he had heard from the ex-Russian dragoman 
at Constantinople that 'a portion of Moslem clergy' sought Allied help in removing the 
Ottoman caliphate from the Ottoman dynasty to residence in a 'vaticanised' part of Damascus. 
According to this scheme the caliph would thereafter be elected. Surprisingly, after Sykes' 
43 SAD WP 134/6/27-29, Private letter from Wingate, Governor-General's Office, Khar(oum, to Fitzgerald, 15 
May 1915. 
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endorsement of something similar during the de Bunsen deliberations, he wrote 
unenthusiastically that, 'the scheme is only conditional on hypothetical events, and nothing 
more may be heard of it. ý45 
During his six months in the Middle East, Sykes also took the opportunity to canvass opinion 
in as discreet a manner as possible, on the secret conclusions of the de Bunsen Committee, 
having already sent draft copies of the report to Athens, Cairo and Delhi. 46 Sir Valentine 
Chirol, a correspondent on The Times with a special interest in the Middle East, thought option 
'D' 'the least objectionable' but did not 'underrate the difficulty of setting up any ruler with 
sufficient authority to preside over such an Arab State, especially as it would include both 
French and British spheres of influence. ' However, Chirol also believed that unless the 
caliphate were transferred 'into other hands than those of the Ottoman Sultans, ' 47 scheme 'D' 
would not resolve the problem of pan-Islamic propaganda. The conclusions of the Committee 
began to look a little half-baked. It is interesting, though, that Chirol envisaged a nominally 
united Arab state divided, somehow, amongst the powers. This was precisely the solution 
which Sykes had in mind when he negotiated the famous accord with the French a year later. 
Scheme 'D' met with disapproval elsewhere. High Commissioner McMahon, for example, 
preferred outright partition to zones of interest, and an exclusively British Damascus for 
Islamic reasons. Maxwell, the commanding general of British forces in Egypt, on the other 
hand, though concurring with the Committee, did so only on the basis that the caliphate be 
removed from the Ottomans. He insisted that 'the powers of the Entente made the declaration 
of independence of the Sherif of Mecca a preliminary of the adoption of the devolutionary 
scheme. ' His confidence in such a solution was based on the belief that under such conditions 
'the transfer [of the caliphate] would be spontaneously demanded by Moslems generally 
44 FO 371/2486 93937, Communication from Sir Mark Sykes, Athens, to DMO Major-General Callwell, No. 4, 
12 June 1915. 
45 FO 371/2486 87220. Telegram from 'British Minister' [Mark Sykes], Sofia, to DMO, 28 June 1915, included 
with, WO to FO, 30 June 1915, B. 20/I/94 (M. 0.2. ), DMO to Under Secretary of State, FO, forwarding 
information for Grey and requesting that it be passed to McMahon in Cairo. 
46 Kedourie, 1976, p. 62. 
47 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/ll 6, Enclosure in Sir Mark Sykes' despatch No. 9 of July 7,1915 - Memorandum by Sir Valentine Chirol. 
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without any direction on our part. 48 He even contemplated Syria under the Egyptian 
Government with its Sultan confirmed by the Sharif as caliph. This meant that Storr's version 
of the 'Cairo scheme' could be realised without direct and unilateral interference from Britain. 
Otherwise he preferred Scheme 'A' (Annexation), though he wanted to see a 'protected native 
administration' in Qurna-Basra. 
On 14 July, Sykes summarised the feeling in Cairo as follows: 
The three Ayalets [i. e. Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine] could ... be under the government of the Sultan of Egypt and the spiritual dominion of the Sherif of Mecca. Worked as one unit these 
regions are united by language and financially self-supporting. 49 
It would seem, however, that many of those consulted, while formally concurring with the 
Committee's conclusions, tended to see within Scheme 'D' the fulfillment of their own 
preferences. In a communication to Wingate, Clayton saw as consistent with 'No. 5 , 50 a 
'division into separate states under the notrdnal central authority of Turkey but with 
practically complete autonomy under the guarantee and guidance of the Power in whose zone 
each state lies' [emphasis added]. He added later that, 'there is one vital necessity, though and 
that is the sultan of Turkey must give up the Khalifate & leave it to the Moslem world to select 
a successor. ' 51 This scheme amounted to a simple inversion of the situation which had given 
rise to Britain's perennial fear: pan-Islam under the sway of the CUP. However, two weeks 
later Clayton confided to Wingate 52 his fear that the fall of Constantinople would not mean the 
end of the CUP and its pan-Islamic intriguing, anticipating that it would simply relocate its 
activities to Cairo and al-'Azhar mosque-university. Clayton's paranoia, it seems, was 
indiscriminate since he also feared the CUP playing its Zionist 'card. ' Importantly, Clayton 
48 SAD WP 15817n-28. Covering note from Clayton, Cairo to Wingate marked 'Very Secret', 6 August 1915, 
attached to three letters from Sykes, Shepherd's Hotel, Cairo, to Major-General C. E. Callwell, DMI, WO, 
Whitehall - letters No. 12,14 & 17, dated 14 July, 14 July &2 August, respectively. 49 Kedouric, 1976, p. 64, quoting FO 371/2490,108253, copies of Sykes' despatches to Callwell, no. s 12 and 14, 
July 14,1915. 
50 A reference to Map V which a accompanied 'Scheme "D", ' there being two maps showing alternative versions 
of 'Scheme "A... (Annexation). 
5' SAD WP 158/6/16-25, Private and Secret letter from Clayton, Intelligence Office, WO, Cairo, to Wingate, 14 
July 1915. 
52 SAD WP 158/6/41-45, 'Strictly Private' letter from Clayton, Intelligence Department, WO, Cairo, to Wingate, 
27 July 1915. 
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was in no way satisfied with the results of the de, Bunsen Committee and continued to believe 
that Middle Eastern policy was being allowed to drift. 
Except in Cairo and Khartoum, there was little consensus over whom should succeed the 
Sultan as caliph. While visiting Aden, Sykes was told that Colonel Jacob, Acting Resident, 
was of the opinion 'that a moribund Caliphate in an atrophied Turkey, even under Russian 
influence would have fewer potentialities of danger than a Caliphate situated in Arabia where 
the vital spark of Islam survives. ý53 This was, however, in line with the attitude generally taken 
by the Indian Government, the Viceroy himself responding indifferently to de Bunsen, his 
only stipulation being that Britain took no initiative on the issue of the caliphate. 54 
The conclusions of the de Bunsen Committee, besides reflecting Sykes' lack of expertise and 
experience, were simply the net resultant of the institutional forces represented on the 
committee itself. Unlike India, and the Foreign Office, the views of the Cairo and Khartoum 
intelligence communities were not represented directly by a dedicated department but only 
indirectly via the War and Foreign Offices. Just as the relative emphases placed on the various 
Middle Eastern theatres of war reflected the standing of the departments supporting them so 
their relative success in the field would ultimately determine the standing of these departments 
in formulating future Middle Eastern policy. For example, whereas the advance towards 
Baghdad, under the command of the Indian Government, had progressed relatively well up to 
the publication of the de Bunsen report, in the west the Turks had advanced virtually 
unchecked up to the Suez Canal during January and February. Furthermore, the April landing 
at Gallipoli, upon which the success of the 'Western Arabian' enterprise would ultimately 
depend, had quickly run aground. The Arab caliphate scheme would not acquire direct 
institutional representation until the creation of the Arab Bureau at the end of 1915. 
53 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/lI 7, Letter from MS to Sir [illegible - probably Edward Grey 1, No. 16, Aden, 23 
July 1915. Note that this letter along with the two communications cited in Note 47 were later forwarded by 
Callwell to Grey at the FO. FO 371/2490 108253, Secret despatch, DMO, WO to FO, B. 20/1/130 (M. 0.2. ), 6 
August 1915. 
54 Busch, 197 1, p. 69. 
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To a considerable degree 'British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia' was produced in a vacuum 
55 
and depended on people, like Sykes, whose authority was inversely proportional to their 
expertise in the field of Middle Eastern affairs. This is substantiated in the fact that Sykes, 
having posed as the 'resident expert, ' and having to some degree undermined the scheme of a 
British sponsored Arab caliphate, was later converted to the ideas of Storrs and Clayton during 
the months following the report's publication. 56 
4.7 Conclusion 
In retrospect, the realisation of the plan for a British Middle East through a landing at 
Alexandretta during the first weeks of 1915 seems an unlikely event. The possibility may be 
dismissed if for no other reason than its being based on the conflation into an amorphous 
'Arab movement' of disparate tendencies lacking a coordinating leadership. The failure to 
distinguish between the possible candidacy for caliph by the Sharif of Mecca and an Arab 
proto-nationalist/separatist movement in Syria would in practice have ensured the early 
abandonment of the 'grand plan. ' It is even conceivable that a British invasion of Syria in 
conjunction with an Arab uprising there would have precipitated precisely the result which the 
British later learned to fear -a campaign for an Arab caliphate subordinated to a popular Arab 
nationalist movement. The apparent confidence of those advocating the 'forward policy' at 
this stage is indicative of the gulf which existed between theory and practice in the 
development of British Middle Eastern policy. The indefinite deferral of the Alexandretta 
option by the British Cabinet was, at least in the short term, fortuitous for the 'Western 
Arabians, ' since it allowed them to consolidate their backing of an Arab movement linked to 
an Arabian caliphate. Apart from illustrating the early coherence of the 'Cairo vision' for a 
future British Middle East, the issue of the 'Alexandretta option' raises the question of 
55 Wingate later warned Clayton not to take Sykes' views too 'au pied de la lettre' since he was capable but 
lacked experience and although able to pick peoples brains, his success depended upon whether he had the right 
material. SAD WP 196/3/11-12, Letter from Wingate to Clayton, I September 1915. 
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whether the removal of the military lynchpin of a landing in northern Syria was the cause of 
an increased emphasis on the supposed Islamic authority of the Sharif of Mecca in order to 
advance the Cairo scheme. 57 In other words, it is necessary to ask whether the relinquishment 
of direct military intervention in support of an early Arab rebellion in Syria made necessary a 
transfer of effort towards more symbolic undertakings. If so, this would constitute an instance 
of what has been referred to in the introduction to this thesis as 'the prophylactics of 
ideology. ' Whether this was in fact the case can only be dealt with in the context of Britain's 
caliphate policy as it evolved throughout the course of the war and, therefore, will be 
addressed more fully in the following chapters. 
The outstanding features of the 'grand plan' which, as long as it was not put into practice, 
ensured its continued salience and intrinsicality to British Middle Eastern policy-making were 
its flexibility and almost infinite compatibility. These features were, in turn, based on the 
belief that the spiritual authority, symbolic unity and nominal independence afforded by a 
revived Arab caliphate would permit the covert insertion of exclusive British rule 
superimposed over diverse territorial concessions. The latter might include concessions to 
Zionists, Arab chieftains and imperial partners/potential rivals such as France, not to mention 
Britain's material interests in Mesopotamia. The underlying presumption was that 'orientals' 
would be satisfied with symbolic unity and nominal independence as long as their passions 
were not misdirected by alien political notions, or by direct agitation introduced from Europe. 
Hence the preference for a solution to the 'Arab question' which, in theoretical terms at least, 
overlapped to a large extent with a solution to the 'Islamic question' and found expression in 
the idea of a revived Arab caliphate. it was this common assumption among British 
imperialists in the Middle East which ensured the convergence of policy proposals emanating 
from Cairo and Khartoum respectively. Moreover, the Arab caliphate solution appeared to 
respond to two countervailing tendencies observed in Arabia: namely the demand for national 
unity alongside the fissiparous tendency associated with tribalism. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding an Ottoman Empire wishing to compensate for its relative decline, in 
56 Fromkin, 199 1, p. 169. 
57 Isaiah Friedman is of the opinion that with the demise of the 'forward policy' High Commissioner McMahon, 
having inherited Kitchener's idea of a collaborative bridgehead to Mecca, was forced through lack of alternatives 
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conjunction with an ambient Islamophobia based on the historical relationship between a 
British Empire with its large number of Muslim subjects in India and Egypt, the British took it 
as read that the restoration of the Arab caliphate was practically inevitable. Consequently, they 
were more than ready to accept Symes' far-reaching conclusion that the issue of Islam could 
not be sidestepped, and if not addressed squarely by Britain might even lose her the war. As 
will be shown in the following chapter not everyone connected with British Middle Eastern 
policy found such conclusions palatable and some would later use their eminent status to 
advocate complete non-interference in all matters associated with Islam and the caliphate. 
The role of Islam in the 'Cairo scheme' may be inferred from Storrs' reference to Palestine 
taken in conjunction with his other statements on Britain's 'Arab policy' in which he promotes 
the idea of an Arab area with some semblance of unity, as yet undefined. It seems that the 
unity which was being spoken of was conceived only at a certain level, the symbolic level, in 
the midst of which would sit, in glorious impotence, the proposed Arab caliph in Mecca. From 
this office, it was imagined, would be effected some manner of social control via the apparatus 
of pan-Islam. Interposed unobtrusively between these two more visible extremes would 
operate the effective, secular and exclusive rule of Britain. It is only on this basis that Britain 
might conceivably have gained any comfort from the separate 'Moslem Kingdom' in Palestine 
to which Storrs refers. However, under the symbolic unity embodied in an Arab caliph, 
dependent on Britain, all manner of secular arrangements could be imagined, including, for 
example, a Zionist Palestine within which the Muslim inhabitants would be content to 
entertain a kind of extra-territorial loyalty to the Arab caliph in Mecca. 
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The 'Pirie-Gordon - Lukach memorandum' represents the first serious attempt to provide 
historical collateral for a specific solution involving the Sharif of Mecca after considering a 
number of options on their own merits and according to their desirability from a British 
imperial perspective. Remarkably, this document historicised the institution of the caliphate 
to accommodate Husayn. Friedman believes this was implicit in McMahon's letter to the Sharif of Mecca of 24 
October 1915, part of the renown 'Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. ' Friedman, 1973, pp. 101. 
58 This was actually the drift of Storrs' letter to Fitzgerald in which he contemplated large-scale Jewish 
immigration into Palestine only if it were to be ruled from Egypt. This is further indication of the 
inappropriateness of the latter-day Arab-Israeli conflict as a framework for the analysis of British policy-making 
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and, untypically for the time, did not essentialise the Islamic faith and even went so far as to 
acknowledge the relationship between Turkey and the European empires as the source of 
'Abdulhamid's pan-Islam. Accordingly, this report emphasised the impossibility of abstention 
over the future of Islam, since competing powers were bound to involve themselves to the 
detriment of Britain's imperial prospects. 
The deliberations of the de Bunsen Committee, it has been shown, occurred in a partial 
vacuum, in so far as the participants were not fully engaged with the arguments being 
expounded, in Cairo and Khartoum. This disarticulation from the 'front line' of empire and the 
role played by the dabbler-fixer, Sykes meant that the proceedings and conclusions of the 
Committee, especially with regard to Britain's attitude towards the future of the caliphate, had 
a somewhat schematic and abstract air about them. Consequently the Committee's findings 
raised as many questions as they provided answers for, which Sykes no doubt realised when 
he embarked on his fact-finding tour of the Middle and Near East only after the Committee 
had issued its report. Importantly for this thesis the Committee was, after all, constituted to 
confirm British desiderata in the region and not to determine the future course of action. 
Nevertheless, it did establish the requirement that, whatever else might occur, the caliphate of 
Islam could not be allowed to fall under the control of a power, Islamic or imperial (or worst 
of all - both! ), inimical to Britain. Notwithstanding the centrality of this indispensable 
condition, the coherence of the schemes devised to bring about this result remained internal to 
them. 
during the First World War. PRO 30/57/45oon3 Letter from Storrs, British Agency, Cairo to Fitzgerald, 28 
December 1914. 
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CHAPTER 5: The Competition for 'Authentic' Sources 
and the Emergence of the Idea of British Rule 'Behind the 
Veil of Islam' 
5.0 Introduction 
The separate treatment of Wingate's promotion of the idea of a British backed Arab caliphate 
in which he relied upon the testimony of the two most eminent Islamic figures to be found in 
the Sudan is not simply a matter of historiographical convenience. Neither does it result from 
the imposition of an arbitrary narrative demarcation. Rather it reflects the relative autonomy of 
the respective dialogues and lack of co-ordination in British Middle Eastern policy during the 
early months of the Great War. It is necessary, therefore, to shift attention away from Cairo 
towards ideas about the caliphate developed in Khartoum. The aim of this chapter is to show 
how the Governor General's recourse to 'authentic' testimony with regard to the nature and 
future of the caliphate influenced the determination of policy in London. 
The stimulus for Wingate's newly invigorated espousal of an Arab caliphate in some kind of 
collaborative arrangement with Britain was his dialogue with the Grand Qadi, an Egyptian by 
the name of Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi, and with the anglophile Sayyid 'Ali al- 
Mirghani, CMG, l the most prominent Islamic shaykh of British Sudan. The correspondence 
between Wingate and his two informants concerning the nature and future of the caliphate 
took place in three phases. The first of these occur-red in February and March 1915 and 
resulted from Wingate's instigation of a process of consultation from which he hoped to obtain 
'authentic' Islamic backing for his views. Firstly, he was urged to issue a declaration 
favourable to Islam and in support of Arab independence, and secondly, he was informed that, 
1 Commander of the Order of St. Michael & St. George - awarded by Cromer. FO 633/24 pp. 45-48. Letter from Wingate, The Palace, Khartoum, to Cromer, 24 February, 1915. 
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contrary to certain British intentions, the institution of the caliphate necessarily encompassed 
civil as well as religious powers. Wingate was also warned that Britain should do nothing to 
violate the independence of the caliphate, while, at the same time, reassured that the Arab 
government would be poorly resourced, both materially and in terms of political experience, 
and therefore bound to be dependent upon British support. From the outset, Wingate was in 
receipt of opinion which reinforced British notions of a nominally independent Arabia under a 
caliphate. The result of these early exchanges was Grey's approval for a confidential 
declaration supporting the independence of Arabia and the Holy Places. In spite of the passage 
which stated that the future of the caliphate was a matter for Muslims alone to decide, it is 
clear from Wingate's correspondence that it was broadly agreed amongst members of the 
British Middle Eastern establishment that Britain should support the creation of an 
'independent' Arab caliphate. 
Wingate's propagation of such views created alarm and consternation in certain quarters. The 
most notably example was Lord Cromer who took the opportunity of a House of Lords debate 
on Middle Eastern policy to counter anti-British propaganda by urging on his compatriots a 
policy of absolute non-interference in all matters appertaining to the Islamic religion. 
Objectively, however, his views, which corresponded with the declared official policy, were at 
odds with the general import of the de Bunsen committee where it had emerged that the 
removal of the caliphate from the hands of Britain's enemies was a sine qua non of British 
Middle Eastern policy. In any case Cromer's efforts backfired and sparked an open discussion 
of the caliphate in the British press in which certain parties advocated, with equal 
forthrightness, the replacement of the Turkish caliphate because of its lack of Qurayshite 
pedigree. This brought about a second phase of correspondence in the Sudan in late 
April/early May in the course of which the Qadi insisted that a sound secular base rather than 
Qurayshite descent was the critical factor in the selection of the caliphate. It was also pointed 
out that the 'Cairo scheme' contained a central flaw: specifically that a caliphate visibly 
dependent on a Christian power would never attract the allegiance of Muslims generally. 
Wingate's other informant quickly countered this by suggesting to Wingate that Britain rule 
Arabia 'behind a veil. ' While Cromer then adopted the Qadi's objection, Wingate proffered 
Mirghani's solution. 
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As a result of the third phase of correspondence, which took place during August 1915, 
Wingate was persuaded to adopt a 'pan-Arabian' solution. This was predicated on an effective 
deferral of the caliphate issue until such a time as Sharif Husayn had strengthened his position tD 
vis-a-vis the other Arab chiefs. In other words a viable caliphate in the hands of Britain's 
friends meant an 'independent' Arabia. Significantly, the testimony of Wingate's informants 0 
did nothing to discourage the belief that the Arabs would be satisfied with a nominal 
independence and unity under which all manner of territorial dispositions were conceivable. In 
this way British imperial desiderata along with those of the emergent Arab movement would 
be realised under the same scheme, a conjunction which, nevertheless, depended upon the 
return of the caliphate to Arabia. 
5.1 Winate Seeks an 'Authentic' Islamic Voice: The Innuence of the 
Informants 
-Say-vid 
'Ali al-Mirghani, CMG, and Muhammad Mustafa al- 
Miraghi, the Grand Oadi of the Sudan 
It has already been pointed out that Wingate prided himself on the good relations he 
maintained with the principle shaykhs and notables of Sudan, however his routine affairs 
assumed a more purposeful bearing following the outbreak of war in the Middle East. As early 
as November 1914, Wingate had obtained 'assurances of satisfaction with the [Sudan] 
Government 92 from the Grand Qadi, Mufti and board of 'ulama and was confident that Enver 
Pasha's Islamic propaganda would have no effect there. Wingate's cordial relations with the 
religious leaders of the Sudan gave him the advantage over Cairo and India of ready access to 
apparently authoritative sources of information on Islam and the politics of Arabia. These 
2 SAD CP 469n146, Private letter from Wingate, The Palace, Khartoum, to Clayton, 7 November 1914; and, 
469n156, Private letter from Wingate, The Palace, Khartoum, to Clayton, 12 November 1914, in which Wingate 
explains the savings in terms of money and man-power to be obtained by maintaining good relations with such 
people. 
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sources, however, were not immune from the particular interests appertaining to their 
positions, nor from the problems associated with obtaining critical information from those 
whose status had been conferred by the grace of the person making the inquiry. As Elie 
Kedourie points out, the Varna tended to confirm Wingate's Anglo-Sharifian preferences, 
'perhaps out of desire to please, perhaps out of genuine conviction. ' 3 
Al-Mirghani was the first to advise Wingate in response to his canvassing of Muslim opinion. 
In his first note he disparaged the influence of the Turks in Arabia and the Sultan's claim to be 
the protector of the Holy Places and advised Wingate that 'the title of Khalifa which the 
Moslems consider most sacred and honourable, is claimed by the Arabs as one of their most 
holy rights. ' As the power with the most Muslim subjects, al-Mirghani thought, Britain should 
issue a proclamation explaining that the war against Turkey is not a war against Islam and 
declaring respect for the integrity and independence of the Arab tribes. 4 Clearly Wingate 
thought these views to be of some consequence since he had notes of his conversations with 
Mirghani sent to McMahon, the Viceroy and Sir Edward Grey. 5 
Al-Mirghani's submission was, nevertheless, rather modest in comparison to the Grand Qadi's 
memorandum of 23 March, which, in translation, filled seventeen typed pages devoted entirely 
to the subject of the caliphate. Miraghi purported to be candid though this must be doubted 
unless his subsequent espousal of the Sultan of Egypt as caliph can be construed as a genuine 
change of mind. The Qadi noted the current disquiet concerning the future of Islam, Arabia 
and the Holy Places and the fact that it had been a source of controversy from the outset, 
though he stressed that its importance should not be underestimated now. According to 
Miraghi the caliphate encompassed both civil and religious powers, either one alone being 
insufficient, but that the latter consisted in nothing more than preserving the authority of the 
tulama, all else in Islam being fixed once and for all. Nevertheless, the caliph 'is a Civil Ruler 
in every sense of the word and at the same time he is the Defender of the Faith. ' Significantly, 
the Qadi's insistence that, 'if a Mohammedan Khalifa did not possess full civil powers and 
3 Kedourie, 1963, p. 210. 
4 SAD WP 194/2/190-194, Translation of a memorandum by Sayyid Ali al-Morghani, undated but thought to be 
February 1915. 
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influence, he would be merely like a mute statue and it would be impossible for the 
Mohammedans to acknowledge him in the sense revealed by their religion, ' seemed to 
undermine the aspirations of Kitchener and his associates in Cairo. 
Although the Sharif of Mecca was nowhere mentioned in person, the Qadi's stipulations were 
unambiguous: an Arab, Qurayshite who is a member of the family of Hashim being the 
preferred candidate, and Arabia the preferred seat of the caliphate. Elsewhere, in a manner 
bound to confirm British prejudices (and enhance his own standing), al-Miraghi makes an 
interesting distinction. According to him, whereas the educated and intelligent Muslim was 
more concerned with his 'national' rights, 'the Arab ... [J he is easily led by religion. ' He 
insisted that the 'quietness' of Muslims during the present war should not be explained by 
Allied policy towards them but by the fact that the most learned Muslims favoured an Arab 
caliphate. However, their patience and effective neutrality should not be taken for granted nor 
'utilised to the benefit of the Allies and prove detrimental to the hopes they cherished for the 
independence of the Arab country and the Moslems. ' Nevertheless, the British declaration in 
support of the Arabs and Islam had inspired confidence. It was essential, therefore, to sustain 
the hope of Arab and Muslim independence. The reason that most ordinary Muslims continued 
to support Turkey was partly that aggression against the Sultan-caliph was viewed as 
aggression against Islam and, more importantly, that most people were not yet confident that 
ta new Arab Khalifate will be formed and given its independence. ' It was imperative, then, 
that the Allies declare their intentions sooner rather than later and help bring about 'an 
independent Arab kingdom in the country of the Arabs ... governed by an independent Arab 
Khalifa. ' 
AI-Miraghi's approach was very much 'carrot and stick. ' Whereas, he sought to assuage 
British anxieties by reassuring Wingate that, 'there would be absolutely no fear of the Arabian 
Government if formed. This Government must remain for several centuries to come under 
great obligation to Great Britain: besides, this Government will remain poor and weak for 
5 SAD WP 194/2/178, 'Very private' letter from Wingate, Khartoum, to Clayton, 27 February 1915, enclosing 
copies of letters to McMahon, the Viceroy and Sir E. Grey. 
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many years to come, ' 6 he also issued the veiled threat that there would be trouble for the 
'colonists' if Islam were disappointed. Conversely, al-Miraghi's conception of Arab 
'independence' coincided neatly with that which Wingate had confided to a friend two weeks 
earlier, 7 since it was construed, in effect, as a nominal independence under which the 
attentions of the mass of subjects would be directed towards religious rather than secular, 
political matters. The fly in the ointment was, however, the suggestion of a predominantly 
secular caliphate in conjunction with maximalist territorial aspirations. In other words the 
political space reserved for Britain in Wingate's own scheme would be shared with an 
educated Arab dlite. 
Regardless of these impediments, Wingate's receipt of the Grand Qadi's memorandum 
precipitated a positive response from the highest office of British government with 
8 
responsibilities for Middle Eastern policy. Grey was sent a copy almost immediately . By the 
end of March the document had been seen by McMahon and Hardinge, and sometime later by 
Cromer, to whom Wingate conveyed his fears that unless corrective action were taken, 
Muslims would remain convinced that 'we do not mean to support the independence of an 
eventual Arab Khalifate. ' In the same vein Wingate also referred to rumours circulating the 
Sudan that Husayn Kamil had been made Sultan of Egypt under the protectorate in order to 
make him caliph under British aegis and thereby destroy the independence of the Islamic 
caliphate. He went on to urge a declaration of British policy in order to counter the effects of 
Austro-German propaganda in the region. 9 
With direct reference to the Grand Qadi's memorandum on the caliphate and Kitchener's 
support in the Cabinetlo Grey soon responded by granting Wingate permission to make open 
declarations of British policy in the following terms: 
You should inform Sir R. Wingate that I authorise him to let it be known, if he thinks it 
desirable, that H. M. G. will make it an essential condition in any terms of peace that the Arabian 
6 SAD WP 194/4/1-17, Translation of a memorandum addressed to His Excellency, General Sir Reginald 
Wingate by Mohamed Mustafa, Grand Kadi, Khartoum, 23 March 1915. 
7 See Chapter 4, Note 19. 
8 FO 800/48 pp. 326-342, Mohammed Mustafa's memorandum on the Caliphate, 23 March 1915. 
9 SAD WP 194/3/298-301 Letter from Wingate, HQ Egyptian Army, to Cromer, 31 March 1915. 
10 Antonius, 1938, p. 160. 
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Peninsula and its Moslem Holy Places should remain in the hands of an independent sovereign 
State. 
Exactly how much territory should be included in this state it is not possible to define at this 
stage. 
H. M. G. feel that the question of the Khalifate is one which must be decided by Moslems 
without the interference from non-Moslem Powers. Should Moslems decide for an Arab Khalif, 
that decision would naturally therefore be respected by H. M. G., but decision is one for 
Moslems to make. 
Whether this represents a retreat from Kitchener's encouragement of a Sharif Ian caliphate in 
November 1914 is a moot point. However, bearing in mind the public relations function of the 
declaration proposed here, and the fact that no-one in authority had taken the trouble to 
disabuse Wingate of his presumption that Britain actively sought an Arab caliphate, it might 
well be concluded that the Sharifian tendency was in no way affected by Telegram No. 173. 
Clayton conveyed the message to Wingate on behalf of the High Commissioner on 18 April. 
Wingate appears to have been satisfied with the response and, given the latitude afforded him 
by Grey, proceeded cautiously. On receipt of Grey's permission, Wingate immediately drafted 
a declaration employing Grey's language faithfully and asked Symes to distribute Arabic 
translations to the 'Grand Kadi, Mufti, Sheikh and Ulema, Sayid Ali, Morghani and Sherif 
Yusef El Hindi' with a note announcing: 
This communication is of a confidential character and no further publicity will be given to it. 
Should, however, you desire to mention the matter in conversation with any well educated and 
well disposed religious sheikh in your Province, I am to say that you are at liberty to do SO. 12 
5.2 Cromer's Speech in the House of Lords 
Prompted in particular by Wingate's reports of rumours concerning Britain's supposed 
promotion of the Sultan of Egypt as caliph, and impelled by his own concerns over British 
" FO 141/587/545, p. 58, Telegram No. 173 from Grey, FO, to McMahon, 14 April 1915. 
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meddling in Islam, Lord Cromer took the opportunity afforded by a House of Lords debate to 
effect what amounted to an announcement to the world that Britain would not interfere in the 
matter of the caliphate. His speech of 20 April began by referring to Arab suspicions over 
British intentions and proposed that further declarations be drafted 'in conjunction with 
Moslem authorities themselves. ' As part of a performance which had the character of a well 
rehearsed double-act, Lord Crewe concurred 'that the future of the caliphate must be a matter 
for the Moslem world itself, ' and that Britain must neither impose a caliph on the Muslim 
world nor 'bring about by forcible means a situation which would in practice compel the 
choice to fall on a particular individual. ' As if in a competition with the Secretary of State for 
India to see who could do most to assuage Muslim suspicions, Cromer retorted that, 'we might 
go so far as to give them some sort of assurance that we recognise that the Caliph should not 
only be a Moslem [sic] but a Moslem of such a position as to be independent of any European 
pressure of any kind or sort. ' [emphasis added] 
If Cromer's House of Lords announcement had been intended to settle, for the time being, the 
matter of Britain's disposition towards the caliphate, then it failed spectacularly. Rather than 
stemming discussion and speculation it induced even more open argument, and even a subtle 
form of resistance from Cairo. Notwithstanding the moratorium on any discussion of the 
caliphate in the press which had been issued in December 1914, it was not possible to prevent 
the reporting of Cromer's speech in the media of the day nor to halt the debate which 
followed. The publication of a letter by Cromer in The Times three days later initiated an 
exchange which brought to the fore the contradiction lying at the heart of Cromer's endeavour 
and which undermined what was quickly becoming Britain's 'official' policy of disinterest in 
the matter of the caliphate. 'Great Britain, as a great Moslem Power" 3 could not be other than 
interested in what befell the caliphate. While Cromer allowed that the caliph may be other than 
the Turkish Sultan he emphasised that the caliphate must be politically independent and could 
not remain under non-Muslim influences. Whereas Cromer's letter gave the impression 
(intentional no doubt) of his desiring the independence of the caliphate for the sake of Islam, 
The Times editorial comment, although formally agreeing with Cromer, both questioned the 
12 SAD WP 134/5/3-6, GS Symes, Erkowit, to Major H. D. Pearson, Assistant DOI, Khartoum, 20 April 1915. 
13 FO 633 32 Speeches &c. 1915, Letter to the Editor of The Thnes headed 'The Khalifale - Lord Cromer's 
Warning, ' written 21 April 1915 and published 24 April 1915. 
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legitimacy of the present caliphate, and spelled out in the starkest terms Britain's own interest 
in the 'independence' of the institution itself. The Times declared: 'By prescription the 
ICHALIFA should be of the blood of the Koreish, the tribe of the PROPHET. That is a 
qualification to which the Sultans of Turkey cannot lay claim, ' and went on to say that the 
present Sultan is 'the involuntary instrument of the Committee of Union and Progress, and is 
now in German bondage. He is thus an independent ruler, such as Islam prefers to venerate, in 
name alone. ' 14 
In other words Britain had an interest in the transfer of the caliphate to someone outside the 
Ottoman dynasty. A more knowledgeable and discerning reader might have deduced that since 
both independence and Qurayshite descent were essential conditions of a viable caliphate, and 
that a good deal of the Muslim world was already under European control, there were few 
remaining candidates for caliph. Moreover, those that did remain were for the most part 
Arabian. If anything The Times' thoughtful adjunct to Cromer's letter produced precisely the 
opposite effect to that which Cromer had sought. 15 
Cromer could not have imagined the consequences of his House of Lords 'declaration. ' Only 
the day before the publication of his letter to The Times he was confident enough to write to 
Wingate claiming Lord Curzon's support in advocating the use of 'secret service money' to 
obtain the co-operation of the Arabs of the peninsula in the current war since 'Arabs are cheap 
and they would not require very much. ' 16 Such a strategy, he hoped, would obviate the need to 
interfere in the central institutions of Islam. 17 Wingate, however, appeared somewhat satisfied 
with Cromer's speech, possibly due to the effect it had had on his local informants. 18 The 
periodical, The Near East, reported both the speech, and Cromer's letter to The Times 
14 Ibid. Editorial Comment in The Titnes, 24 April 1915. 
15 Cromer later insisted, rather unconvincingly, that, 'the real reason why I alluded to the subject [of the 
caliphate] in the House of Lords and subsequently wrote to the Times was that I wished to snuff out the idea that 
Sultan Hussein should pose as another candidate. In this I think I have been successful. The notion was certainly 
more or less entertained in Cairo. ' SAD WP 196/2/72-72, Letter from Cromer, Ardgowan, Greenock, to Wingate, 
7 August 1915. 
16 SAD WP 134/5/13, Private letter from Cromer to Wingate, 23 April 1915; and, SAD WP 134/5/15-16, Letter 
from Curzon, Carlton Terrace, London SW, to Cromer, 22 April 1915. Regarding the 'cheapness' of Arabs, 
nothing could have been further from the truth. See Chapter 7. 
17 This is precisely the opposite of the rationale used by Wingate and more closely corresponds with what 
eventually occurred. 
18 FO 633/24 pp. 81-2, Wingate to Cromer, 24 April 1915; and, pp. 82-3, Wingate to Cromer, 29 April 1915. 
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favourably, adding helpfully that, although the legitimacy of the present caliph had been 0 
brought into doubt due to its lack of Qurayshite descent, 'if the Moslems themselves have no 
desire to raise these problems, they have Great Britain's assurance that they will not be raised 
outside Islam. ' 19 
Meanwhile, in London the Islamic Society responded somewhat negatively to The Times 
editorial by objecting to the notion that the caliph need be a member of the Quraysh, since the 
caliphate had been bequeathed legitimately to Sultan Selim I by the last Abbasid caliph. 20 
However, at a general meeting held in mid-May, the Society adopted a more strident position, 
when the secretary wrote directly to Grey asserting that mere discussion of the caliphate in 
both the House of Lords and the British press was 'a source of annoyance, irritation and alarm 
to Muslims. ' The letter went on to quote the resolutions of their recent meeting to the effect 
that there was currently no controversy among Muslims regarding the caliphate, that the 
present caliph was as respected as any of his predecessors, and there was no desire for change 
among Muslims. A second resolution declared: 
That Muslims strongly resent and will not tolerate any interference either directly or indirectly 
on the part of any non-Muslim in the question of the Khalifate as they firmly hold it to be 
beyond the province of any other people or Government to encroach upon the exclusive 
prerogative of Muslims regarding this or any other Islamic affair. 21 
It may reasonably be assumed that by 2 May Ronald Storrs was aware of Cromer's speech in 
the House of Lords and the resulting comment in The Times. Since on that day he sent a secret 
memorandum on the subject of the caliphate to the Foreign Off-ice via the Cairo Residency in 
which he suggested that it 'will presumably be not disagreeable to Great Britain to have the 
strongest spiritual in the hands of the weakest temporal power. 22 The precise meaning of that 
rather pregnant but cryptic remark becomes obvious when it is realised that also on that day 
Storrs wrote in more explicit terms to Kitchener's Private Secretary, Fitzgerald, on the same 
subject. Clearly alarmed by the fuss surrounding the rumours of a British backed Egyptian 
19 SAD WP 134/5/38, Copy of The Near East, issue of Friday, April 30,1915, Article headed, 'The Khalifate. ' 
20 FO 633/112, News Cuttings, p. 71, a letter published in The Times, 27 April 1915, headed 'The Khalifate, ' 
from The Islamic Society, 158 Fleet Street, EC, 24 April 1915. 
21 FO 371/2486 72671, letter from Hon. Offg. Secretary. M. Ehsan El-Bakry, The Islamic Society, London, to Sir 
Edward Grey, 30 May 1915, enclosing the resolutions of the 'General Meeting of May 14 th 1915. , 22 FO 141/587/545/2, Secret Memorandum by RS (Ronald Storrs) headed 'The Khalifate', Cairo, 2 May 1915. 
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caliphate, and wishing to hasten matters in the direction originally set by Kitchener, Storrs sent 
a handwritten note containing the following: 
3. Khalifate: I enclose a little note, gist of wh. I have given to Sir H. & Clayton. Do not forget 
the [illegible] majority of Egyptians are wholly indifferent & will always accept the de facto 
Khalifa, whoever and wherever he may be. As soon as things calm down, Abdalla might be 
asked here, or some one sent to him (at Jedda). He is most friendly and intelligent. 23 
All things considered, it may be concluded that Cromer's attempt to calm the waters merely 
presaged a storm, the most immediate effect being in the Sudan where news of Cromer's 
speech generated a contest for influence amongst Wingate's principal informants. 
5.3 The Oadi and al-Miriihani Again 
Although the Qadi may well have been satisfied with Cromer's performance in parliament he 
was most certainly disconcerted by the response it evoked in the British press, particularly that 
in the London 'Times, which he was able to read in the columns of The Sildcul Times in Arabic 
translation. Before doing so, however, Muhammad Mustafa al-Miraghi again approached 
Wingate advocating, as he had before, an 'Arabian Sultanate and Khalifate' though, on this 
occasion the Qadi introduced a note of doubt. The project of an Arab caliphate would, in his 
view, require a degree of co-operation between the 'ulama and the educated classes, but, he 
added ominously, 
I consider that the direct assistance of the Allies, although most necessary, may have one 
serious drawback, because the Mohammedan hates to see the traces of a Christian hand in any 
matter he thinks related in any way to religion. It is extremely difficult for him to see that 
Christian Powers have interfered in the formation of the Mohammedan Khalifate and 
Government. 24 
23 PRO 30/57/47 QQ/21 Hand written note by Storrs, The Residency, Cairo to Fitzgerald, 2 May 1915. 
24 FO 633/24 pp. 83-92, letter from Wingate to Cromer, I May 1915, enclosing a memorandum from the Grand 
Kadi, Mohammed Mustapha. The latter is, in all likelihood, the Qadi's second memorandum to Wingate on the 
subject of the caliphate as referred to in, SAD WP 101/33/1, Original of Arabic letter from Mohammed Mustafa 
Meraghi to Wingate, 28 April 1915, with pcncil translation; and obliquely in, SAD WP 134/6/19-23. See Notes 
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Although the recognition of this difficulty, the central contradiction of the whole 'Cairo 
scheme, ' would later determine the precise modalities of the collaborative enterprise 
eventually worked out between Britain and the Sharif of Mecca, this was not Wingate's most 
immediate concern. 
The Qadi's subsequent reading of The Tinies editorial on the caliphate, in particular what he 
referred to as 'the clause' declaring the illegitimacy of the Turkish caliphate due to the 
absence of Qurayshite descent, induced him to write immediately to Wingate to provide him 
with ample arguments to the contrary. It was not that the Qadi advocated loyalty to the 
Ottoman caliphate; rather, he asserted the political autonomy of Islam by insisting that it was 
for Muslims to judge whether the Ottomans had been good for Islam or indeed whether there 
should be a change in the caliphate. Of equal concern to Wingate was al-Miraghi's effective 
historicisation of the supposed Qurayshite qualification on the basis of a combination of 
historical and Islamic arguments. Although a qualified Qurayshite candidate for caliph would 
have precedence over all others similarly qualified, the crucial factor was the 'general well- 
being' of Islam. ' Al-Miraghi then used a subtle historical argument which had obvious 
implications for the situation then prevailing to show how, as he believed, the Prophet's 
original nomination of a Qurayshite caliph was due to the strength of that particular tribe in 
relation to the others of the region. He added: 
It is evident that the spirit of faith alone, if not supported with sufficient power, is insufficient 
to ensure continued peace and tranquillity among people because the ambitions and interests of 
men are so different that it is not possible that religion alone could have sufficient control over 
thcM. 25 
Moreover, this statement was a direct contradiction of one the most fundamental tenets 
underpinning the 'Cairo view, ' namely that religion, specifically, Islam, was the key to both 
understanding and ruling Middle Eastern society. It may be argued even, that the Qadi's view, 
expressed, as it was, in general terms with universal applicability, indicated a rather more 
29 and 31, below. Inexplicably, this memorandum was not filed by the Foreign Office until 8 September 1915. 
FO 371/2486 127420 
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sophisticated appreciation, not only of his own society, but of the world in general. Had 
Wingate and the political intelligence community in Cairo been capable of apprehending the 
full import of this observation they might have saved Britain a lot of time and wasted effort 
during the remaining course of the war. The British in the Middle East would have done well 
to assimilate also the following advice from the Qadi: 
It is evident that things which depend on the special conditions and reasons obtaining at one 
time will only remain and continue to exist as long as these conditions and reasons existed, and 
will be discontinued when they vanish. 26 
A further effect of the Grand Qadi's memorandum to Wingate is evident in a lengthy note 
drafted by Storrs four days later in which he emphasised, rather more forcefully than before 
and with apparent historical backing, the issue of the caliph's Qurayshite descent and the 
illegitimacy of the present incumbent. Such was the impact of al-Miraghi's testimony that 
Storrs' previous argument for a new caliphate with incommensurate temporal and spiritual 
powers was now undermined by his pronouncement that, 'in Islam it [the caliphate] is the title 
given to the successor of Muhammed, who is vested with absolute authority in all matters of 
state, both civil and religious, as long as he rules in conformity with the law of the Quran and 
Hadis. ' [emphasis added] 27 The implications of Storrs' claim, that although the Sultan of 
Turkey was prayed for in Hyderabad and Bengal this had been a fairly recent phenomenon, are 
clear, and constitute further evidence of the struggle over the caliphate then taking place 
among British orientalists. 28 
Elie Kedourie is of the opinion that al-Miraghi's new argument was intended to leave the field 
open for one caliphate only - an Egyptian one. This would seem correct in view of al- 
25 In view of the arguments set out in the Introduction to this thesis against the idea of an 'authentic' caliphate 
against which all other versions may be measured, there is no need to take issue with Miraghi's view on the issue 
of Qurayshite descent as Elie Kedourie does. Kedourie, 1963, p. 211. 
26 SAD WP 134n/15-26, Pencil translation of a submission by Mohammed Mustafa Meraghi, Grand Qadi of the 
Sudan, to Wingate, undated. This is the document cited and reproduced by Elie Kedourie in, Kedourie, 1963, 
Appendix, pp. 243-248. Kedouric dates this submission at the end of April/beginning of May 1915, this would 
seem to be consistent with the available evidence. 
27 FO 882 Vol 13, MIS 15/3, memorandum by Storrs, 'The Khalifate, ' dated 6 May 1915; and, FO 
141/587/545/3, Memorandum headed 'The Khalifate, ' signed RS (Ronald Storrs), 6 May 1915, stamped by High 
Commissioner, Egypt, 20 May 1915. 
28 Although this was probably aimed at assuaging Indian squeamishness on the issue, it risked taking the potency 
out of the pan-Islamic 'bogey, ' a two-edged sword in any case. 
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Miragahi's next conversation with Wingate in which he mentions Egypt by name, though not 
the Sultan himself. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, however, this preference 
suffered from the same central contradiction as did any alternative caliphate reconstituted with 
the aid of a European power, namely that a caliphate with too obvious a relationship with a 
Christian power was not feasible. This was a contradiction that Wingate now implicitly 
recognised. He immediately confided to Cromer that, 
having had some experience of the Machiavellian methods of Egyptian Nationalists, it occurred 
to me that he had been put up to this by the Cairo Nationalists in the hope that if His Britannic 
Majesty's Government sanctioned the arrangement, it would be a means of reasserting 
Egyptian independence - for, it is obvious, that the new independent Khalif and Sultan could 
not owe his position and title to a Christian Protector, 29 
adding that 'a recrudescence of Egyptian nationalism under the guise of the embryonic 
independent sovereign state and Khalifate may be anticipated. ' 
Al-Miraghi's apparent volte-face which, insofar as it detracted from the idea of a British- 
Sharifian alliance, may well have pleased Lord Cromer, was also the occasion for rivalry 
between Wingate's two foremost informants who began to compete with one another for the 
Governor-General's attention. Wingate describes how on this occasion, 'as Sayid Ali el 
Morghani handed me his suggestion about the Sherif of Mecca within a few minutes of the 
Grand Kadi's departure, it was clear that he smelt a rat and determined to go one better by 
announcing his nominee straight away. ' 30 
'Ali al-Mirghani's following memorandum of 6 May was, in certain respects, the antithesis of 
the Qadi's submission of late April/early May. Whereas the latter was almost casuistic in its 
enunciation, the former was merely declaratory, and, whereas the Qadi supported his position 
with subtle historical and Islamic arguments, al-Mirghani used none. However, the reception 
of these submissions by Wingate did not depend on such principles: Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani 
C. M. G. had the distinct advantage, which he no doubt anticipated, of telling Wingate what he 
wanted to hear. 
29 SAD WP 134/6/19-23, Wingate, Khartoum, to Cromer, 14 May 1915. 
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Al-Mirghani urged on Wingate an official public declaration to the Arab chiefs on the subject 
of the Islamic caliphate. The caliphate, he said, should be in Arabia, which must included 
Syria and Iraq. This was, nevertheless, a flexible position, since, according to Wingate, al- 
Mirgahni had agreed that parts of Mesopotamia should remain in the British Empire. In an 
obvious stab at al-Miraghi, al-Mirghani asserted, without offering any justification, that Egypt 
was unsuitable (as were all other Islamic countries other than Arabia). He acknowledged that 
there were many Arabian chiefs who were 'Ashraf, ' some of whom would aspire to the 
caliphate, but stated that the Sharif of Mecca was best suited to the role due to his being 
located in the Hijaz and his being universally honoured. The possibility that some Arab chiefs 
might be reluctant to recognise the Sharif as caliph was not a problem, opined al-Mirghani, as 
long as the majority of Muslims did. However, the Sharif would need both material and moral 
support. The lack of subtlety in al-Mirghani's presentation was more than compensated for by 
his appreciation of Wingate's desiderata in the Middle East. In a manner clearly intended to 
resolve the underlying contradiction of such a collaborative enterprise which his opponent had 
identified he added: 
It is beyond doubt that Great Britain is the most competent Power to render to the Khalif this 
assistance and support. Such assistance, however, should be tendered secrctly or behind a very 
thick veil in accordance with conditions and circumstances, and to do this Great Britain could 
utilise the services of some of the Mohammedan Emirs, Sultans and Chiefs who are under her 
control and protection and whom she could trust. Such assistance, if it come directir from such 
Chiefs to the Great Emir (Khalif) will be of very great advantage. [emphasis added] 
Significantly, Wingate did not copy the Qadi's memorandum to Cromer, the Foreign Office, 
or anyone else as he did al-Mirghani's, merely referring to a conversation in his letter to 
Cromer of 14 May. However, rather than suppressing the former entirely, 32 he chose to convey 
its import to Cromer and others in a manner which juxtaposed its covertly threatening aspects 
to al-Miraghi's more accommodating views. The latter was thus presented as a solution to the 
problems associated with the Qadi's preferred outcome so dreaded by British imperialists. In 
this way the 'prophylactic' argument was applied equally to the task of circumventing a 
30 Ibid. 
31 FO 633/24 pp. 104-112, Letter from Wingate, Governor-General's Office, Khartoum, to Cromer, 14 May 1915 
(as SAD WP 134/6/19-23), enclosing a copy of a Memorandum from Ali al-Morghani on the caliphate. 
. 12 It is perhaps significant that unlike all similar memoranda filed by Wingate, the translation of this particular 
document is undated and the Arabic original entirely absent. This suggests that Wingate withheld the Qadi's 
memorandum from circulation because of its adverse implications for the Sharifian policy. 
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nationalist (Arab or Egyptian) controlled caliphate as it was to precluding one under the sway 
of some imperial rival. For example, when writing to Cromer, Wingate simply amplified the 
gist of al-Mirghani's memorandum whilst flavouring his account with terminology designed to 
placate his correspondent's scepticism, describing 'an independent Arab Sovereign State and 
Khalifate' as 'Utopian at the present stage' [emphasis added]. He also took the opportunity to 
point out, once more and with obvious implications for India, that it was only by launching his 
own propaganda first 33 that he had succeeded in combating 'Turco-German Jehad propaganda' 
in the Sudan. Wingate's circumspection when dealing with Cromer is illustrated by his rather 
feeble postscript expressing his hope that 'the Sherif of Mecca idea is entertained. ' 
The Governor-General circulated al-Mirghani's 6 May memo with enthusiasm to Grey, 
Hardinge, McMahon and Clayton. To Hardinge, Wingate copied 'two more notes from 
natives, ' the Grand Qadi, and al-Mirghani 'the most powerful religious leader in the Sudan. ' 
However, the note from the Qadi was an earlier one advocating an Arab caliphate, which, 
therefore conveyed a unanimity which no longer existed. As for al-Mirghani's naming of the 
Sharif as preferred caliph, Wingate adds that he is 'inclined to think that this nominee has 
many of the required attributes - he is not on good terms with the Turks, but they greatly fear 
his power over the Arabs and for that reason they keep him very short of funds. ' 
34 The 
following day he wrote a similarly worded letter to Grey urging a declaration to the Muslims 
due to 'the crisis in their religious and national existence' 35 and suggested giving veiled 
support to the Sharif via Indian Muslim, chiefs. To Clayton, Wingate was more effusive. 
Besides passing on al-Mirghani's 6 May memorandum he warned Clayton, as he had Cromer, 
of a likely Egyptian nationalist bid for an Egyptian caliphate and also repeated the words he 
had used when writing to the former Consul-General about an 'Arab Sovereign State and 
Khalifate' being 'Utopian at present. ' 36 Although the letter was not substantially different 
from the one he had sent Cromer, he finished by expressing his wish to keep such views 
between himself, Clayton and McMahon. However, when writing to the latter on the same 
33 There would be many occasions on which Wingate would criticise the Government of India for failing to 
propagandise their Islamic populations as he had done in the Sudan. For example, SAD WP 135/3/49, Private 
letter from Wingate to Hardinge, 23 September 1915. 
34 SAD WP 195/2/59-60, Wingate to Hardinge, 14 May 1915. 
35 SAD WP 134/6/30, Private letter from Wingate to Grey, 15 May 1915, enclosing a copy of 'Translation of 
Memorandum by Ali Morghani of 6h May 1915; ' and, FO 371/2486 77713. 
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day, also enclosing the 6 May memo, Wingate took the opportunity of suggesting that the 
Sharif of Mecca be contacted via 'Ali al-Mirghani, adding that he had asked Clayton to 
explain his views personally to him. 37 Significantly, to both McMahon and Clayton, Wingate 
added the sweetener that, on the basis of some of the comments made by al-Mirghani, 'the 
Arabs' were beginning to accept that they would have to give up their claims to certain parts 
of Mesopotamia and Syria. This would tend to confirm one of the arguments of this thesis: 
that to its British advocates at least, the idea of an Arab caliphate was seen as compatible with, 
if not actually facilitating, a partitioned, and less than sovereign, Arabia. 
Clayton was clearly delighted by al-Mirghani's 6 May memo and was both disappointed and 
incredulous at the High Commissioner's exclusion of any reference to the caliphate in the 
declaration to the Arabs then under preparation in Cairo. It is also evident that Clayton felt 
some urgency over luring the Sharif to the British side with intimations of an enhanced status, 
since, in referring to the al-Mirghani memo, he wrote to Wingate: 
It came very opportunely as I had been urging on the High Commissioner that the Moslem 
world was undoubtedly looking for some sign as to our intentions regarding the Khalifate, and 
suggesting that when he was able to communicate with the Sherif of Mecca, it might not be a 
bad thing to hint to him "very secretly" that he would not be considered an unsuitable candidate 
by HMG, should the Moslem World select hiM. 38 
5.4 Cromer Seeks an 'Authentic' Voice: The Tactic of Deferral 
Cromer's response to Wingate's letter of I May was a mixed one. Initially he appeared to be 
convinced by the force of Wingate's argument. He confessed that, 
36 SAD WP 195/2/64-67, Wingate, Erkowit, Sudan, to Clayton, 15 May 1915. 
37 SAD WP 134/6/3 1, Letter from Wingate to McMahon, 15 May 1915, enclosing a copy of 'Translation of 
Memorandum by Ali Morghani of 6 th May 1915; ' also, FO 882 MIS 1515. 38 SAD WP 195/2/146-15 1, Private from Clayton, Intelligence Department, WO, Cairo, 22 May 1915. 
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as a matter of theory, I rather cotton to the idea of establishing an Arab kingdom - not because 
it is a very good solution, but rather because if the Turk disappears I do not see any other - at 
the same time the practical difficulties in the way of doing anything are enormous. Just 
consider what your Grand Kadi says. 
However, Cromer's attention alighted upon the central contradiction of the 'Cairo scheme' 
when he objected to the fact that, '[the Qadi] wants us to do the stage management of the 
Khalifate, and at the same time he recognises that if we attempt to stage manage the whole 
thing will be a failure! Both propositions are probably quite true, but it is rather difficult to 
reconcile them. ' 39 The Governor-General responded positively to the dilemma posed by 
Cromer by contending that 'we have to work more or less behind the curtain, and I see no 
reason why we should not help them to that extent without of course committing ourselves to 
any very definite line in matters which concern the religion pure and simple. '40 Clearly, for 
those favouring a British-backed Arab caliph, the offlicial and declared policy of non- 
interference in matter's appertaining to the caliphate and the Islamic religion was precisely 
that and nothing more. 
Evidently appreciating the nature of the 'game' being played by Wingate, and wishing to 
counter Wingate's efforts in favour of the Sharif of Mecca, Cromer decided to acquire an 
'authentic' Islamic source of his own. Living in central London, as he did, he cannot have had 
much scope. His reply to Wingate's letter of 14 May opened on a note of desperation. Cromer 
admitted that 'the whole of the question of our future relation with Moslem, more especially in 
the matter of the Khalifate, bristles with more difficulties than any political problem which I 
have as yet had to consider' and went on to say that he had been making general enquiries 
about the credentials and standing of the Sharif of Mecca. The editor of The Near East 
informed Cromer that the Agha Khan 41 believed that, in the event of the disappearance of the 
39 SAD WP 134/6/35-6, Letter from Cromer, Wimpole Street, to Wingate, 18 May 1915; and, FO 633/24 p. 280- 
28, in which he also bemoans the fact that 'there is at present no member of the Government who really has a 
f, rasp of Eastern questions. ' 
0 SAD WP 134n/io-i I& 195/4/197-8, Private letter from Wingate, Erkowit, Sudan, to Cromer, 21 June 1915. 
41 In fact Cromer had already been in receipt of suggestions involving the Agha Khan. Gertrude Bell had 
suggested to Cromer in October 1914 the possibility of a combined assault on the Hijaz by Ibn Saud and the 
Sharif of Mecca with the encouragement of a proclamation based on consultations with the Agha Khan. FO 
633/23 pp. 190 - 195, Letter from Gertrude Bell, Rounton Grange, Northallerton , Yorkshire, to Cromer, II October 1914. 
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Ottoman caliphate, the future caliph should be determined by some kind of 'Mahommaden 
ecclesiastical synod. 942 
The immediate consequences of al-Mirghani's declared support and offer of mediation in 
relation to the Sharif's candidature for caliph were threefold. Both Wingate and Grey 43 sought 
to capitalise on the opportunity afforded them by al-Mirghani's proposals. Secondly, the India 
Office and Indian Governmen 04 responded constructively, giving qualified support to the idea 
of the Sharif as caliph, though, like the Agha Khan, tended towards a deferral of the whole 
issue. Thirdly, al-Mirghani later revised his position with regard to time-scale in a manner 
which tended to converge with the Government of India's position. 
The express preference for the Sharif of Mecca as caliph in conjunction with the official 
policy of non-interference seems to have troubled the India Office barely more than it did 
Wingate. In response to al-Mirghani's memorandum of 6 May, Thomas Holderness, 
Permanent Under Secretary at the India Office, referred to the author's advocacy of the Grand 
Sharif of Mecca as caliph as being 
in general accord with the views of His Majesty's Government, though it is their policy - as 
stated by Sir E. Grey in his telegram of the 14 th April and by the Marquess of Crewe in the 
House of Lords - to treat the question as one which Moslems should decide for themselves 
without interference from the Powers, 
but thought it unwise to follow the latter with 'secret attempts to intervene through the Muslim 
chiefs of India. ? 45 However, Austen Chamberlain, Secretary for India, believed that Britain 
should encourage the Sharif through relationships with other Arabian chiefs, not to become 
42 SAD WP 134nn, Private letter from Cromer to Wingate, II June 1915; and, FO 633/24 pp. 283-284. 
43 FO 371/2486 77713/15, Letter from E. A. Crowe, Foreign Office, to the Under Secretary of State, India Office, 
19 June 1915 (enclosing Morghani's memorandum of 6 May), which conveys Grey's desire to replicate, in 
Arabia, the declarations already distributed in Egypt and Sudan on the basis of telegram No. 173 from the FO to 
HC, Cairo, 14 April 1915 (See Note 11, above). McMahon later informed the Foreign Office that an unsigned 
leaflet had been distributed by plane on the Hijaz coast guaranteeing the independence of the Arabian Peninsula 
and Holy Places but without reference to the caliphate. FO 37112486 87023, Telegram No. 306, McMahon to the 
FO, 30 June 1915. 
44 SAD WP 134nl4-5, Private letter from Hardinge, Viceregal Lodge, Simla, to Wingate, 10 June 1915. 
However, the Viceroy would concur with the Qadi's subsequent remarks which 'knock[ed] the bottom out of the 
theory that the Khalif must belong to the tribe of "Koreish". ' SAD WP 135/1/12, Private letter from Hardinge, 
Viceregal Lodge, Simla, to Wingate, 15 July 1915. 
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caliph directly, but as the independent ruler of the Hijaz. Chamberlain assumed that the 
ultimate success of the caliphate enterprise would depend on the extent to which the caliph 
claimed sovereignty over the territory of other Arab chiefs. He could not have appreciated that 
this issue was one which the abstract subtleties of the 'Cairo scheme' had already catered for. 
Moreover, it was one that Wingate would soon be forced to address directly. 
5.5 Wingate's Conversion to 'Pan-Arabianism' 
Just as Wingate was making best use of a]-Mirghani's latest memorandum to elicit prompt 
action in support of a liaison with the Sharif, his informant submitted a lengthy addendum 
which seemed to retreat somewhat from his previous position. It began with the words: 
It is not likely that any development could take place in the question of the Arabian Khalifate, 
before the fall of Constantinople, because the existing Turkish Khalifate is up till now, the 
acknowledged Khalifate of Mohammedans, although only nominally, and is respected as such 
everywhere, 
adding that, 
It is not necessary that an Arab Khalifate should be held in readiness to be proclaimed as soon 
as Constantinople is captured. Nobody expects this to take place with such promptitude, 
because the Arabian Khalifate, or the Arabian government, hitherto have had no real existence, 
and it is necessary to give sufficient time for the formation of this new government and the new 
Khalifate. 
This memo acknowledged competing claims to the caliphate and raised the danger of their 
being backed by rival European Powers. Although al-Mirghani seemed to be conceding to a 
deferral of the reconstitution of an Arab caliphate, he was, at the same time, doing his utmost 
to create a sense of urgency among the British which, he hoped, would precipitate their 
prompt commitment to the Sharif of Mecca. Besides repeating his commendations of the 
45 FO 371/2486 84355, Secret letter P. 2299/15 from Holderness, India Office, Whitehall to Under Secretary of 
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Sharif, al-Mirghani advised that Britain assist the Sharif, both morally and materially, while 
aiding other chiefs only to a moderate degree, 'the object of this [being] to establish the 
position of the chosen individual by making him more powerful than the others. This is the 
only way to give to the would-be-Khalifa, power sufficient to gain for him the respect and 
reverence of all others. This is the only method to gain for him the support and allegiance of 
all other chiefs. ý46 Al-Mirghani may, in fact, have apprehended, ahead of the British, one of 
the key factors which would result in the ultimate failure of the 'Cairo scheme, ' namely that 
the enhancement of the Sharif's temporal power was a precondition of his acquiring the 
caliphate and not the other way round. At the same time, it seems likely that al-Mirghani's 
sudden trepidation over too early a commitment by Britain to the Sharif as caliph reflected an 
underlying agenda according to which the idea of a revived Arab caliphate was subordinate to 
a more comprehensive national (if not outright nationalist) project. In either case, Wingate 
registered no awareness of the latter possibility and immediately distributed the memorandum 
47 to Grey, Hardinge and McMahon , without supporting comment. Hardinge's reply indicated 
that he was comforted by the apparent convergence of views since he was quite sure that 
Indian Muslims had 'not so far contemplated the possibility of a change in the Khalifate. 948 
Any satisfaction which Wingate might have felt could only have been short-lived, since, less 
than a week later, he received a further submission from the Qadi. Al-Miraghi, s note of 18 
August assumed and promoted a degree of Arab and Muslim autonomy which even the 
'Western Arabians' would have found alarming. Again, the subtlety of the Qadi's reasoning 
combined with a sophisticated knowledge of British desiderata and British anxieties was 
demonstrated. The Qadi desired, above all else, Islamic unity rather than to be involved in any 
intrigue over the question of the caliphate. In order to help Muslims consider their future he 
urged Britain and her Allies 'to announce their intentions with regard to the countries which 
they were prepared to consider as subject to the Mahommedan Sultanate, ' even going so far as 
to request Britain's help in building up such a state. It is evident that al-Mirachi was aware 0 
State, Foreign Office, 24 June 1915. 
46 SAD WP 135/2/6-11, Pencil translation of a Memorandum by 'Sidi Ali Morgliani', dated by the translator, 12 
August 1915. Also, FO 882 Vol. 15, PNA 15/3, pp. 12-17, typed copy of above. 47 SAD WP 135/2/12 -14, letters dated 14 August 1914, to Grey, Hardinge and McMahon, enclosing Morghani's 
memo of 12 August. Also, FO 371/2486 121174; and, FO 141/461/1198/4. 48 SAD WP 135/3/3, Secret letter from Hardinge, Viceregal Lodge, Simla, to Wingate, I September 1915. 
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that Britain was contemplating a caliphate whose secular power would be confined to the 
Hijaz. He contended that if the caliphate were 'to be placed within a small portion (of the Arab 
country)' then Britain would have no need 'to expunge from the minds of the Mahommedans 
the fears and suspicions that already exist there, ' declaring that Britain's present, seemingly 
benevolent, disposition towards the Muslim world would be judged as 'a mask to hide their 
real intentions. ' AI-Miraghi then reminded Wingate that the declaration which Britain had 
already made had caused the recipients to understand that the Arabian peninsula was the only 
country that would come under the direct rule of the caliph. Unfortunately for Britain, 
Muslims would not agree to this and as a result would remain attached to the present caliphate. 
The Qadi's proposal was not merely maximalist in territorial terms but supposed a long-term 
material commitment on the part of Britain since he urged Great Britain to declare her support 
for 'an Arabian Government and Khalifate according to the principles of expansion and 
development. '49 Finally, as if to emphasise the confidence and independence of will of Islam 
and the Arab movement al-Miraghi declined to prejudge either the seat of the caliphate or the 
identity of the new caliph but instead proposed a general caliphate conference which would 
preclude the interference of the Powers. If Britain's support for a revived Arab caliphate was 
ever intended to divert or circumvent the historical development of either pan-Islam, or 
secular, political Arab nationalism then their task must have looked simultaneously more 
urgent and more difficult. 
Despite appearances, there is no direct evidence of collusion between al-Mirghani and the 
Qadi at this stage. On the basis of their past behaviour it would seem more likely that the close 
pursuit of the Qadi's note by a further memorandum from al-Mirghani on 22 August was an 
indication of their competing for a position in the final disposition of the British Middle East. 
Although there is no archival evidence, it is conceivable that both men had been approached 
independently by representatives of the Arab movement based in Syria. In fact there was little 
of novelty in the Shaykh's latest submission except for its note of urgency and its more 
practical collaborative posture. On this occasion al-Mirghani emphasised that 'the Arabs are 
49 SAD WP 135/2/16-22, Translation of a note addressed to his Excellency Sir Reginald Wingate by 'Sheikh 
Mohammed Mustafa, Grand Kadi of the Sudan' - original signed 'Mohammed Mustafa' and dated 18 August 
1915, Khartoum. 
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bound by motives of personal interest to look towards Great Britain and to appeal to her for 
her help. ' Again he urged a combination of open but Ihnited material aid to Arab chieftains 
generally, with greater but clandestine support to 'the man who is considered to be the 
suitable and right man to be the head of the future Arabian Government. ' In notable contrast to 
al-Miraghi, however, al-Mirghani being equally aware of British anxieties tended to encourage 
the notion that Britain would maintain the dominant position in any relationship with the 
Arabs. However, his stress on the necessary dependence of the inhabitants of Arabia was two- 
edged. Al-Mirghani explained that the Turks would not wish to relocate their caliphate to the 
Hijaz because 'the natives in Arabia are mostly nomads and could not support the Khalifa and 
establish a civilized and modem Government. ' However, inclusion of Syria in the scheme was 
not merely implied since, besides belabouring the urgency of establishing routine and reliable 
communications with the Sharif of Mecca, which he believed could be achieved from the 
Sudan, al-Mirghani echoed the logic of the 'Alexandretta option. ' He stated his hope that 
Britain would undertake a temporary occupation of Syria, firstly, on account of the natives 
'being better disposed to accept the scheme of the Arabian movement, 50 and secondly, in 
order to prevent the Turks from decamping there. 
That Wingate was swayed by these latest memoranda - the 'stick' of an independent Islamic 
revival threatened by al-Miraghi, and the 'carrot' of a backward Arabia dependent on Britain 
foreshadowed by al-Mirghani - is attested to by a memorandum he and Symes drafted barely a 
week later. Wingate's 'Note on a British Policy in the Near East, ' which he forwarded to 
McMahon almost immediatel Y, 5 1 represents a development and consolidation of his 
previously held position. This report took his reasoning to a level of abstract coherence and 
sophistication which at the time exceeded that achieved by his colleagues in Cairo. Referring 
to the 'present confusion of ideas and policies' concerning Arabia, and the ineluctability of 
Muslim criticism from one quarter or another, Wingate announced: 'I am increasingly drawn 
to an attempted solution on Pan-Arabian lines. ' This, he argued 'might wean Sunnite Islam 
50 SAD WP 135/2/23-3 1, Translation of a 'Memorandum by Sayyed Ali El Morghani', C. M. G., dated Khartoum, 
22 August 1915. 
51 882 Vol. 13 MIS 15110, Letter from Wingate, Governor-General's Office, Khartoum, to McMahon, 27 August 
1915, in which Wingate refers to a note on the question of the caliphate which he and Symes had just completed. 
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from the aggressive pan-Islam of the Ottoman school. ' Not every British imperialist would 
have agreed, however, with his basic assumption, 
that our cardinal aims - apart from any questions of political expediency - arc to discredit Pan- 
Islamism, as exploited by the committee of Union and Progress, as a political creed, and to 
secure an enlightened government to the Moslem and Christian populations of non-Turk-ish 
race hitherto subject to the Ottoman Empire. [emphasis added] 
On the stated assumption that Ottoman cohesion depended upon the 'fusion of the temporal 
and spiritual power in the person of the Sultan, ' Wingate argued through a series of seemingly 
logical steps that although no country protected by a Christian power could host the caliphate, 
and although it was at present unlikely that any 'soi-disant Khalifas' who might emerge from 
Arabia 'could obtain other than local support, ' only the Arabs could effectively counterpoise 
the Ottoman hold on Islam. 
From this apparently irresolvable dilemma Wingate then argued for wholesale British 
commitment to the most suitable candidate since 'an Arab "Pope" buried away in the sands of 
the Arabian Peninsula - even though the integrity of these sands is fully secured to him - will 
appeal to Moslems nowhere. ' Anything less than such a comprehensive arrangement, he 
maintained, would render the outcome 'a new focus ... of political pan-Islamic intrigue. ' The 
core of Wingate's message was that such issues could not be avoided, nor the responsibility of 
at least attempting such an arrangement shunned. His advocacy of such a scheme verged on 
the grandiloquent when he declared: 
Approaching the question from this standpoint, I am inclined to the view that in the theory of 
Arabian union, and by concessions to the Pan-Arabian ideal, may lie not merely a partial 
solution of many of our present difficulties, but possibly the foundation of a really constructive 
scheme for the future. 
Without noting the irony, Wingate referred to 'the illusive character of Arabian political 
conceptions' before going on to outline an arrangement whose juxtaposition of constituent 
elements defied all conventional understanding. However, his proposal stands as a unique 
demonstration of the inherent flexibility and near-universal compatibility of the British backed 
caliphate idea. The scheme which he envisaged, incorporated 'the terrestrial independence of 
the Arabian peninsula, ' while preserving 'the principles of Arabian unity ... in the adjacent 
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countries. ' 52 These adjacent countries were to include a British zone extending northwards to 
Haifa, stretching to the Gulf and including Mesopotamia, adjacent to a French zone in Syria, 
and even a 'special arrangement' in Palestine. This scheme, under which the so-called 
'principle of Arab unity' was adhered to solely through the symbolic device of the Arab 
caliphate, was in many respects the antecedent of the arrangement which would be worked out 
some nine months later between Sir Mark Sykes and the French Government. Once again, 
what was being proposed here illustrates the abiding preconception upon which the whole 
edifice stands - the presumption that the respective domains of Islam and secular politics 
could be made to occupy discrete levels of social reality. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The memoranda which Wingate received from the Grand Qadi and from the honoured Shaykh, 
and the partiality which Wingate showed in conveying their import are almost paradigmatic of 
the general process by which interested parties, amongst the forgers and subjects of empire 
respectively, find one another. The example of al-Mirghani's and al-Miraghi's submissions are 
an outstanding example of how those suitably placed within subject societies are able, through 
a sophisticated appreciation of imperial aims and the exploitation of imperialist anxieties, to 
manipulate their correspondents and thereby influence imperial policy. Though, it must be 
emphasised, this always takes place within the unequal relations of imperialism. Even in the 
domain of abstract ideologies, without reference for the time being, to the more foundational 
social-structural limits on imperial practice, it can be shown how imperial policy is never 
simply a matter of unilateral imposition. Neither is the interaction one between once-and-for- 
all predetermined positions. Rather, the relationship may be characterised as one of 'dialectical 
52 FO 882 Vol. 13 MIS 15/9/A, pp. 378-38 1, 'Note on a British Policy in the Near East, ' Wingate, Khartoum, 26 
August 1915. Wingate declared his pan-Arabian sympathies using precisely the same words in letters written to Cromer and Hardingc the following day. SAD WP 196/2/257-263 & 265-269, Letters from Wingate, Khartoum, 
to Hardinge and Cromer respectively, 26 August 1915. 
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extemporisation' according to which the mutual realisation of privileged interests is pursued 
conjointly and relationally. 
In the instance cited the effect was to move Wingate from a vision of a British Middle East 
based on a politically circumscribed 'spiritual' Arab caliphate towards a more comprehensive 
pan-Arab scheme, and, less importantly, to enable him to recover from his former diffidence 
with regard to his superiors in London. It was only from this new position, strengthened by the 
testimony of his two most able informants, that Wingate was able to counter Cromer's efforts 
to stifle debate and speculation about the caliphate and as a consequence contribute, perhaps 
decisively, towards obtaining Grey's support for the 'Cairo scherne. ' It is important to stress 
that the successive options considered by Wingate, a subversion of pan-Islam via an Arab 
caliphate, and pan-Arabism under a caliph, were both conceived within the imperial Islamic 
problematic and did not at this stage represent a cognitive shift from Islamic-religious to 
secular-nationalist solutions. The impact which the spectre of mass Arab politics had on the 
British caliphate policy is the predominant theme of the following chapter. 
The examples of al-Mirghani and al-Miraghi provide a demonstration of two ostensibly 
opposing tendencies. Firstly, a certain convergence and mutual accommodation may be noted 
between Wingate's and al-Mirghani's preference for a flexibility predicated on a type of 
caliphate under which almost anything was possible - at least nominally. At the same time 
these parties moved towards a practical deferral of the caliphate issue, which apparently 
satisfied pan-Arabians as well as members of the British establishment who were both nervous 
of direct and immediate support for a new caliphate. The second tendency was one of 
competition over tradition and the resources of history, each party selecting from tradition(s) 
according to their agenda. The correspondence between Wingate and his informants indicates 
how, with regard to the caliphate, Britain as well as Arab and Egyptian nationalists were 
playing the same game. That is, they each sought to subvert the institution to the furtherance 
of their respective projects, in which context an alternative caliphate is shown to be an 
instrument subordinated to a more comprehensive secular scheme. 
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Undeniably, there is a danger in attempting to post-rationalise the intrinsically incoherent and 
nonsensical. There is no guarantee that the utterances and statements of any particular British 
Middle Eastern official or informant, even those occurring within a relatively short span of 
time, are mutually consistent or based upon an underlying logic. There is, therefore, a question 
mark over whether two of the most fundamental and widely held ideas among serving British 
officials in the Middle East are reconcilable or simply the result of muddle and wishful 
thinking. Firstly, was the belief, encountered in this and earlier chapters, that in Islamic 
societies political power is transmitted primarily through the medium of religion and that 
secular politics is subordinated or displaced by religion. Secondly, there was the frequently 
declared preference, as regards the future of the region, for a purely spiritual caliphate, in spite 
of the realisation that in the past the caliphate had combined both religious and temporal 
functions. These developments in the spring of 1915 suggest that, regardless of what had 
prevailed hitherto, certain parties, both Islamic and British, were contemplating a definite 
change in the nature of the caliphate and had not misunderstood its supposed 'true' nature. 
Secondly, they illustrate that what Britain feared most of all was a revived caliphate 
incorporating the power of pan-Islam and 'modem' secular PolitiCS, 53 the latter being 
understood to be largely absent from, and quite alien to, the Islamic societies of the Middle 
East. Moreover, this is consistent with the idea of an interposed British rule over the entire 
region at minimum cost operated at arms length behind the 'veil of Islam. ' Finally, in spite of 
a degree of sophisticated historicisation of the institutions of Islam by one of Wingate's 
informants, it must be said, that certain misconceptions remained useful, at least in the short 
term, from the point of view of imperial rule. 
An increasing urgency may be discerned in the communications passing between Cairo, 
London and Khartoum up to the September 1915, however, this urgency had its origin in 
propaganda and was not dictated by actual events. Although the Sharif of Mecca had emerged 
as the preferred candidate for caliph, no reliable and routine contact was established between 
his family and Cairo until the July of 1915. Consequently, the advances that had been made in 
53 This conclusion is supported by the fact that one of Britain's main preoccupations in the Middle East before the 
war was their fear of pan-Islam, and the caliphate in the hands of the CUP. The latter, although regarded as a 
modern political movement, was widely supposed to have arisen as the result of alien influences, specifically, a 
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the consolidation of the 'Cairo scheme' remained largely theoretical. Several alternative 
collaborative options remained open to the British at this stage, though the respective 
candidates were by no means equally pliant and accommodating, some demanding more 
independence and autonomy than others. Importantly, none were so closely associated with 
the future of the caliphate as was the Sharif of Mecca. The consideration of these options and 
the preparation for practical intervention will be examined in the following chapters. 
combination of cosmopolitan Jewish intrigue with the methods, if not the principles, of Jacobinism. See Chapter 
2, Notes 143 and 145, and, Kedourie, 1956, p. 82. 
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CHAPTER 6: The 'Husayn-McMahon Correspondence' 
and the Idea of an Arab Caliphate 
6.0 Introduction 
The central concern of this chapter is the relationship between the British notion of an Arab 
caliphate and the diplomatic engagement generally known as the 'Husayn-McMahon 
Correspondence. ' This chapter, therefore extends the analysis from mid-August 1915 - at 
which point, it will be recalled, the main British contributors to the debate over the future of 
Arabia had, between them, constructed a coherent vision based largely on the testimony of 
their respective local 'informants' - to the end of December 1915. It was during this month 
that it was finally decided to establish an institution, the Arab Bureau, in Cairo charged 
spccifically with the responsibility for propaganda and intelligence gathering and the co- 
ordination and implementation of policy in the area. More importantly, this was also the point 
when negotiations with Sharif Husayn had proceeded to the point where British support for a 
revolt under his leadership was finally confirmed as a central plank in British policy. 
The first section of this chapter deals with the initial exchange of letters in August 1915 and 
the second exchange during September-October 1915. It is significant for the development of 
this thesis that with the exception of Husayn's first letter to McMahon there was no further 
mention of the caliphate. This fact, therefore, requires explanation in accordance with the 
theoretical framework established in the Introduction. With that aim in mind the second 
section of this chapter will evaluate the impact of the 'al-Faruqi episode' on British thinking 
concerning the future of the Arab Middle East. In particular, this section will examine how the 
testimony, of Muhammad al-Faruqi, self-styled representative of the Arab movement, 
informant and would-be collaborator, resulted in firstly, a modification of the role played by 
the revival of the Arab caliphate in British plans for an effective extension of imperial control 
in the region, and secondly, a somewhat cryptic acceptance of Sharif Husayn's demands. It 
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will be argued, contrary to the generally accepted view, that above all else al-Faruqi's arrival 
afforded the Cairo Military Intelligence Department an urgently sought opportunity to further 
their scheme for resolving the 'Arab' and 'Muslim questions' to the satisfaction of British 
imperial interests. 
The final section of the chapter will be devoted to a brief elaboration of a phase of ambiguity 
in British thinking with regard to the relationship between the assumed functions of an Arab 
caliphate and secular government in the future Arab state, which occurred as a result of al- 
Faruqi's testimony. Regarding the central question of this chapter, it will be concluded that for 
a number of mutually reinforcing reasons the issue of the caliphate receded somewhat during 
the period of the 'Husayn-McMahon correspondence. ' Firstly, this period constitutes a 
tentative first step from theory towards action in relation to the precise mode of imperial 
governance to be adopted in the Arab Middle East during which little more of a practical 
nature could be achieved towards the restoration of the Arab caliphate. Secondly, a policy of 
deferral of the issue became attractive in order to avoid irresolvable differences, both within 
the British Middle Eastern establishment, and between the latter and representatives of the 
Arab movement - both secular and Sharifian. Thirdly, the officially declared policy of 
disinterest and non-interference in the matter of the caliphate united those who understood the 
central dilemma of the British caliphate policy (that to succeed, British support must remain 
invisible), with those who were, in any event, squeamish about intervention in matters of 
special importance to the Muslim faith. Finally, and most importantly in relation to the 
specific scheme of collaboration under examination, as far as the various parties engaged in 
negotiations were concerned, both Arab and British, Sharif Husayn's pre-eminence with 
regard to the future of the caliphate was no longer a point of contention. In fact, rather than 
being a proscribed topic it had become the res hidicata of British Middle Eastern policy. 
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6.1 The Part Played in the 'Husayn-McMahon Correspondence' by the Idea 
of an Arab Caliphate 
6.11 Introduction 
Many of the better known accounts of British Middle Eastern policy during the First World 
War are concerned largely with the comparison of the wartime accords and declarations of 
sympathy involving Britain and various other 'interested' parties. The series of letters 
exchanged during the second half of 1915 and early 1916 between Sharif Husayn and the High 
Commissioner for Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, along with the so-called 'Sykes-Picot 
Agreement' and the 'Balfour Declaration, ' are generally treated in relation to one another in 
order to determine to what extent they are mutually compatible or contradictory. In particular, 
the question of whether Palestine, supposedly promised to Zionism in the 'Balfour 
Declaration, ' was included in the area comprising the Arab state as delimited in the 'Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence' has been the subject of earnest political and academic debate for 
generations. 
Most authors have adopted a straightforward literal-legalistic reading of the agreements and 
conclude, one way or the other, whether Palestine was specifically included in or excluded 
from the territory designated by McMahon as 'Arab' in his correspondence with the Sharif. 1 
The various stances adopted in this debate have often been reliable indicators of a particular 
author's position in relation to the latter day Arab-Israeli conflict it being supposed that all 
imperialists of the former period may be usefully characterised as either pro-Arab, or Zionist 
Judeophiles. Against this presumption it is argued here that the British hypothesisation of a 
revived Arab caliphate as an instrument for the attainment of a symbolic unity and nominal 
sovereignty in Greater Arabia facilitated, in the abstract, i. e. in remoteness from their 
implementation, a degree and quality of compatibility amongst the various wartime 
Stein, 1961; Friedman, 1973; and Kedourie, 1976, all conclude that Palestine was excluded from the area of the 
Arab state according to the understanding reached between McMahon and Husayn. Antonius, 1938; Sykes, 1967; 
Tibawi, 1978; and more recently, Fromkin, 1991, maintain that it was included. Sanders, 1984, may be added to 
the latter and offers a partial explanation which is augmented by the arguments presented here. C, 
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tagreements' 2 not generally appreciated. This emerges as an aspect of the inherent flexibility 
of the 'Cairo scheme' already described. However, the main aim of this thesis is not to 
propound a revised account of the conduct of British wartime diplomacy, but to adumbrate the 
trajectory of the idea of an Arab caliphate in British Middle Eastern policy in all its 
ramifications. This chapter, therefore, will deal with the Husayn-McMahon correspondence 
only to the extent that it related to the issue of the caliphate with the aim of explaining why by 
September 1915, and with apparent abruptness, it had ceased to be a matter of explicit 
concern. 
6.12 Antecedents of the 'Husavn-McMahon CorresDondence' 
Before going on to examine the correspondence itself it is necessary to show that although it 
was undertaken with some urgency and under conditions of ignorance regarding the Middle 
East it represents an extension of British policy rather than, as some authors have asserted, a 
decisive turn. Specifically in relation to Britain's combined Arab-Islamic policy, the 'Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence' had antecedents at the highest level of decision making and did 
not arise out of the negligence, incompetence or subterfuge of any particular individual or 
individuals. It is important to note that the case for continuity between the earlier proposals 
and what was ultimately agreed between McMahon and Husayn relies heavily on the 
adaptability afforded by the idea of a revived Arab caliphate. 
Undoubtedly, Kitchener's letter to 'Abdullah of October 1914 loomed large in the mind of his 
successor in Cairo, and being relatively naYve in matters oriental McMahon seems to have 
placed great store by doing what he thought Kitchener might have done based on what his 
predecessor had, apparently, already set in motion. In any case McMahon continued to be 
influenced by those who, having previously worked with Kitchener in Cairo and the Sudan, 
2 It is generally pointed out that neither the 'Sykes-Picot Agreement' nor the 'Husayn-McMahon 
Correspondence' were regarded as binding by the British diplornatists involved in their making. It is, however, 
seldom appreciated that the 'Balfour Declaration' was merely an expression of sympathy with the aims of 
Zionism conveyed in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to a British Jewish peer. 
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shared the War Minister's outlook and imperial ambitions - in particular Wingate and 
Clayton. 
Foreign Office Telegram No. 173 of 14 April has already been cited. Referring, as it did, to 
'an independent sovereign Moslem State' in the context of 'the Arabian Peninsula and its 
Moslem Holy Places, ' 3 this communication, taken in conjunction with Britain's 'official' 
position of non-interference in matters appertaining to the caliphate, represented a substantial 
confirmation of the policy being propounded in Cairo. Interestingly, McMahon's reply to Grey 
concerning his own conveyance of the import of Telegram No. 173 to his subordinates in 
Egypt and the Sudan hinted at some anxiety over Grey's use of the term 'independent 
sovereign State. ' The High Commissioner explained: '[the] term ... has been interpreted in a 
generic sense because idea of an Arabian unity under one ruler recognised as supreme by the 
other Arab chiefs is as yet inconceivable to Arab mind. ' [emphasis added]4 McMahon added 
that it would be in British interests to see the Sharif as caliph but that it would be 
counterproductive to attempt to influence Muslim opinion. In this context he went on to say: 
'All we can usefully do to assist Shereef's prospects is to increase public confidence in our 
determination to safeguard welfare of independence and integrity of Hedjaz. '5 
Although Elie Kedourie concedes that both McMahon and Storrs believed that expressions 
such as 'sovereignty' and 'independence, ' 'did not bear their ordinary or literal meaning' 
when used to Arabs' 6 he insists that 'it is by no means certain what interpreting such 
expressions "in a generic sense" exactly means or entails. ' 7 However, the generally accepted 
sense of 'non-specific, ' if taken in conjunction with the prevailing assumption among British 
orientalists that the extra-territorial religious suzerainty afforded by an Arab caliphate in the 
Hijaz would facilitate some kind of 'nominal sovereignty' throughout Arabia. Unfortunately 
for Kedourie such a conclusion rests on an appreciation of the internal coherence of the 'Cairo 
3 See Chapter 5, Note 11. 
4 371/2486 60357, Telegraphic No. 188, McMahon to Grey, 14 May 1915. 
5 Apart from alluding to the central, and ultimately fatal, flaw in the Anglo-Sharifian scheme this quotation 
anticipates the 'official' policy of non-interference formally adopted later in the year. It also contains within it a 
benchmark against which the sincerity of Britain's adherence to her official disinterest in the matter of the 
caliphate may be measured - that is, in relation to the extent to which her actions in the Middle East did in fact 
'increase public confidence' in the Sharif, for the reasons implied. 
6 Kedourie, 1976, pp. 24-5. 
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scheme' in which the Sharifian caliphate was a key component, and to which his 'aberrational' 
thesis is diametrically opposed. 
8 Sometime after 19 May 1915, in accordance with the general meaning of Foreign Office 
Telegram No. 173,9 a leaflet was distributed along the Hijaz coast which promised on behalf 
of the British and Indian governments that on the conclusion of the present war the terms of 
peace would incorporate the condition that 'the Arabian peninsula and the Mahommedan holy 
places shall remain independent. "o Although Kedourie makes much of the fact that the text of 
this leaflet was not sent to London until 30 June when Grey's subordinates voiced their 
concerns over the implications for Aden, implying that it only received retrospective approval, 
it should be recalled that it was on that very day that the de Bunsen Committee issued its final 
report which included very similar terms in its final desiderata. In fact the Committee's 
formulation was more explicit, referring to 'independent Moslem rule' which it linked, albeit 
imprecisely - one could even say generically - to a solution to the question of the caliphate. 
II 
While the Foreign Office might reasonably have objected to the public declaration of British 
desiderata in the region, it could not reasonably have found fault with the specific content of 
the leaflet. Regardless of Foreign Office concerns, taken in conjunction with the message that 
he had already received from Kitchener, Sharif Husayn's knowledge of this leaflet can only 
have caused him to believe that he was to have a pivotal and powerful position within the 
scheme then being developed in Cairo. 
Undoubtedly his familiarity with the correspondence referred to above, which in any case 
reiterated the essentials of Cairo's proclamation of 4 December 1914,12 gave the naYve 
7 Ibid., p. 24. 
8 Clayton refers, on 22 May 1915, to an identical declaration having already been made public. FO 882 Vol. 13, 
MIS 15/6, Note by Clayton to [Storrs ?? - illegible], Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 22 May 1915. 
However, the Viceroy Of India refers to a 'proclamation issued to Arabs in Arabia, Sudan and Western Desert on 
13'h June. ' FO 371/2486 83311, Despatch from Viceroy to FO, 23 June 1915, in which he refers to having just 
seen the proclamation and expresses concern that the term 'Arabian Peninsula' restricts their activities in Oman 
and implies withdrawal from Aden. 
9 Strictly speaking, Telegram No. 173 merely allowed Wingate to 'let it be known'. It was not until 19 May, in 
response to McMahon's Telegram No. 188 (See Note 4, above), that Grey formally authorised McMahon and 
Wingate to make a public announcement in accordance with Telegram No. 173. Kedourie, 1976, pp. 23-24. 10 Ibid., p. 24. 
11 See Section 4.5. 
12 See Section 3.8. 
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McMahon the confidence to extemporize within the parameters of British Middle-Eastern 
policy as he now understood them. What McMahon may not have appreciated at this juncture, 
however, was that British support for an independent Muslim Arabia, including the Holy 
Places, had already been incorporated into what became known as the 'Constantinople 
Agreement' - actually a series of correspondences between British, French and Russian 
foreign ministries conducted between early March and early April 1915. On 12 March the 
British Ambassador informed the Russian Government that as soon as it becomes known that 
Russia is to take Constantinople, 
Sir E. Grey will wish to state that throughout the negotiations, His Majesty's Government have 
stipulated that the Mussulman Holy Places and Arabia shall under all circumstances remain 
under independent Mussulman dominion. " 3 
The penultimate item of the agreement, a note from the Russian Foreign Minister to the 
Russian Ambassador in London of 20 March 1915, shows that the Russians concurred with 
Britain's position on Arab independence. The note also stated that 'the Imperial Government 
desires that the Caliphate should be separated from Turkey. ' 
14 Notably, in relation to the latter, 
no demurral was registered by either Britain or France in the context of this agreement. 
Hasan Kayali's view of this agreement is unequivocal: it 'provided the basis for the secret 
correspondence that took place between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry 
McMahon, and Sharif Husayn between July 1915 and January 1916. '15 However, Kayali's 
conclusion may be preferred for the simple reason that the 'terms' of the 'Constantinople 
Agreement' were reproduced in far more definitive and formal way in the secret 'London 
13 Hurewitz, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 8-9. British Memorandum to the Russian Government, 12 March 1915, reproduced 
as item 2 of, 'The Constantinople Agreement, ' 4 March-10 April 1915 [Gregorian dates]. Note, however, that this 
memorandum records that British desiderata are not yet completely formulated. 
14 Ibid., pp. 10- 11. 
15 Kayali, 1997, p. 190. So keen is Kedourie to undermine the authority behind the entire Sharifian policy that he 
avoids direct reference to the 'Constantinople Agreement'. His intention is evident from the fact that instead he 
cites some of the background documentation, the terms of which, he eagerly points out, were 'much less ID 
categorical than what Grey was to tell McMahon on 14 April' - i. e. Telegram No. 173. Kedourie, 1976, p. 57. 
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Agreement' 16 made between the Entente Powers and Italy on the 26 th April 1915, Article 12 of 
which reads: 
Italy declares that she associates herself in the declaration made by France, Great Britain and 
Russia to the effect that Arabia and the Moslem Holy Places in Arabia shall be left under the 
authority of an independent Moslem Power. 17 
Although the issue of the caliphate is not mentioned specifically, the total dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire is contemplated in Article 9 of the agreement. One may infer the 
implications for the caliphate issue if this fact is taken in conjunction with the terms of Article 
12, reproduced above. Moreover, given that the population of the Hijaz was known to be 
exclusively Muslim, the constant reiteration of a Muslim power (singular) in addition to the 
stipulation of independence seems somewhat superfluous unless something more 
consequential is intended. 
6.13 Husavn's First Letter to McMahon 
The letter which Sharif Husayn wrote to High Commissioner McMahon on 14 July 1915 
under a covering note from his son, 'Abdullah, to Ronald Storrs, did not arrive in Cairo until 
18 August. ' 8 This letter 'request[ed] ... the approval"9 of certain provisions which, with one 
minor and one major addition, were practically identical to the conditions which had been 
enumerated earlier by the leaders of the nascent 'Arab movement' in Syria in the so-called 
'Damascus Protocol. 720 The major addition, inserted after the provision concerning borders, 
was the stipulation that 'Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab caliphate of 
16 Significantly, it was the promise of a share in the territorial spoils of the Ottoman Empire which induced Italy 
to enter the war on the side of the Allies in May against Austria-Hungary, and in August against the Ottoman 
Empire and Germany. 
17 Hurewitz, 1956, Vol. 11, pp. 11-12. Secret (London) Agreement: The Entente Powers and Italy, 26 April 1915, 
'[Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1920, Misc. No. 7, Cmd. 67 1 
18 Kedourie, 1976, p. 67. 
19 Antonius, 1938, pp. 414 - 415. This was the wording according to Antonius' translation which does not differ 
significantly from the copies of English translations included in FO 882, Series B, Vol. 19, AB 1511; and, SAD 
WP 158/6/29-30. 
20 The 'Protocol' listed the terms on which Arab leaders would support Britain against Turkey. These were, 
among others: (a) the recognition of the independence of 'the Arab countries' lying within certain borders, (b) the 
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Islam. ' Significantly, the regime envisaged is described as 'The Sharifian Arab Government, ' 
singular, and the territory under its jurisdiction was to include the Arabian peninsula and all 
the other Arabic-speaking areas south of the 37"' parallel. Elie Kedourie's and David 
Fromkin's description of the letter as a 'demand 921 may be justified by the barely concealed 
threat with which the letter ended. Husayn warned that if he did not receive an affirmative 
reply within thirty days of the letter's arrival in Cairo 'the entire Arab nation' reserved the 
right to act freely in absolution of anything agreed earlier, meaning, in November and 
December 1914 between his son 'Abdullah and the British Agency in Cairo. 
Kedourie describes the Sharif's letter as 'audacious, ' and Fromkin refers to the recipients 
being 'surprised' since its arrival was 'sudden' and its contents 'unexpected, ' though, he 
concedes, not 'unreasonable. ' In view of the fact that Wingate had written to Grey a month 
earlier saying that he would 'not be altogether surprised if the Sherif himself [did] not secretly 
seek our assistance, ' 22 it is difficult to believe that the Foreign Secretary, at least, was so 
surprised at the suddenness of the letter's arrival. Secondly, both the territory referred to, and 
the nature of Arab government contemplated by Husayn were consonant with the declaration 
23 to the Arabs issued by Cairo on 4 December 1914 . Notwithstanding the 
fact that the latter 
was a rather vague document, and that it may subsequently have been regarded by the British 
as a mistake, only the profoundest contempt for its recipients could have disallowed them such 
an interpretation. 
Certainly, the British were, at this time, unaware of the 'Damascus Protocol, ' and of the moral 
backing which Husayn had received from the Syrian Arab secret societies (as it turned out - an 
overture prompted by weakness). One may speculate that the British would have reacted 
differently had they known what had precipitated the demands on the Arab side. None of this, 
however, explains British consternation. Apart from the fact that the British had lost the 
initiative at this point in their dealings with the Arabs what must have caused great alarm, 
especially in Cairo was the manifestly secular nature of the demands and the inversion of the 
abolition of capitulations, (c) the conclusion of an alliance between Britain and 'the future independent Arab 
state, ' and (d) the granting of economic preference to Britain. Antonius, 1938, pp. 157-8. 
21 Kedourie, 1976, p. 66; and Fromkin, 1989, p. 174. 
22 SAD WP 196/l/162-3, Wingate, Khartoum, to Grey, 20 July 1915. 
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relationship between temporal and spiritual authority they had hitherto assumed. Much of the 
extant literature on the subject focuses on the issue of borders, 24 however these can only have 
been of such concern if taken in conjunction with the precise nature of Arab rule as suggested 
in Husayn's letter. On the face of it the scheme proposed therein simply left no political 
'space' for British or European rule. Although Britain was supposedly in a privileged 
relationship with the new Arab state vis-a-vis the other Powers, the absolute, as opposed to 
nominal, sovereignty assumed meant that the relationship would simply be too even-handed 
for any imperial power wishing to exert indefinite and effectively exclusive control. 
The conjunction of a single and undivided Arab government with the Sharifian caliphate, 
although within the bounds of reasonable inference based on Britain's pronouncements in the 
Middle East, was the antithesis of the circumscribed and 'domesticated' Arabia upon which 
the 'Cairo scheme' rested. Moreover, taken at face value, the idea of a revived Arab caliphate 
referred to by Husayn lacked the kind of flexibility the British were hoping for, that is a 
flexibility which could encompass varying degrees of Arab independence and sovereignty, and 
even the involvement of other Powers. It was these facts, rather than the issue of borders pel- 
se which so alarmed the British. On the presumption of the kind of flexibility reflected in 
McMahon's notion of 'generic independence' and embodied in the British notion of a revived 
Arab caliphate there is little of significance to divide the terms of Husayn's opening gambit 
from the already established presumptions of the 'Cairo scherne. ' However, Husayn appears to 
have interpreted the notion of 'independence' rather too literally for the British. Ironically, it 
would take the later arrival of a representative of the secular Arab movement in Cairo to 
qualify the Sharif's demands in such a way as to restore the degree of flexibility and 
compliance which the British found necessary. 
In fact, between the despatching of Husayn's letter on 14 July and its arrival in Cairo on 18 
August, the main proponents of the 'Cairo scheme' were moving even closer to the overtly 
secular nationalist position underlying the Sharif's demands on behalf of 'the entire Arab 
nation. ' The apparent idiosyncrasy of Wingate's conversion to pan-Arabism is mitigated by 
23 See Section 3.8. 
24 See authors listed in Note 1, above. 
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the fact that Clayton had moved towards advocating 'an early proclamation of the 
independence of Arabia' on the grounds that it would 'go far towards increasing the claims of 
the Sherif to the Khalifate. ' He was also quite clear in his own mind that 'the idea of the 
Khalifa as not only the religious head but also the greatest temporal power in Islam appeals 
strongly to a large section of Moslems who dream of a mighty Mohammedan Empire once 
more taking the lead in the world. ' Although he thought such an enterprise unrealisable he 
argued that 'nothing less than the real independence of the Khalifate will satisfy them and any 
shadow of protection by a Christian Power would be fatal. ' [emphasis added]25 There was, 
however, a sound imperialist rationale underpinning his argument since Clayton put it to 
Wingate that French involvement in Syria in particular, and, indeed, European partition of the 
'Arab speaking countries' in general, might well induce a 'Holy War' on the part of a 
Qurayshite caliph. 26 The significance of these arguments is twofold. Firstly, Clayton could not 
have been surprised at the conjoining of caliphate and Arab empire in Husayn's letter, and 
secondly, the official policy of disinterest in the matter of the caliphate was seen as a 
necessary adjunct to the Sharifian caliphate policy rather than its antithesis. 
In replying to the Sharif's first letter to McMahon it is evident that the Foreign Office wished 
to detach Husayn from his wider constituency and curtail his standing for 'Arabs in general. ' 
On the basis of suggestions from the India Office, Grey approved McMahon's proposed reply 
allowing him to add, if he thought it advisable, a private message offering discussions in 
Egypt on the 'independence, rights and privileges' of the Sharif, to be conducted with 
'Abdullah or some other representative. Regarding the caliphate, Grey suggested that 'Lord 
Kitchener's communication of last November' 27 might be referred to solely in the context of 
25 SAD WP 135/1/534, Note by Lt Col G. F. Clayton, Dol, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 24 July 
1915. On the necessity for secrecy in this regard, Clayton had been equally explicit in a minute to the War Office. 
He wrote of the Sharif, 'To place him in a position in which he might be said to be under British Protection 
would be detrimental to his chance of succeeding to the independent Khalifate which alone would be acceptable 
to the bulk of Moslem opinion. ' FO 982 (Series B) Vol. 19, KH 15/2, Minute by Clayton to Sir Milne Cheetham, 
Intelligence Department, War Office, London, 14 July 1915. With the exception of Clayton's open advocacy of 
the renunciation of the caliphate by the Turkish Sultan, Wingate was 'generally in agreement with [his] statement 
of policy' but urged him not to show the note of 24 July to anyone. FO 882 (Series B) Vol. 19, KH 1515, 
Telegram from Governor General, Erkowit, to Clayton, Cairo, 31 July 1915. 
26 SAD WP 135/1/44-5 1, Private letter from Clayton, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, to Wingate, 27 
July 1915, enclosing a summary of interviews with Syrians interviewed at various times. 
27 FO 141 461 1198/3, Telegram from Foreign Off-ice to High Commissioner, Egypt, No. 598,25 August 1915. 
Kitchener's original message is quoted in full in Section 3.5. 
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His Majesty's Government's 'welcom[ing] the resumption of the Khalifate by an Arab of true 
race. ' It is telling that a preliminary draft of the relevant passage merely referred to the 
'acknowledgement' 28 of the resumption of the caliphate. However, the back-translation of the 
final Arabic version of this document provided by George Antonius is far less ambiguous on 
the identity of the intended caliph since 'an Arab of true race' reads as 'a true Arab bom of the 
blessed stock of the Prophet. ' 29 This adjustment, taken in conjunction with the precondition 
that the Sharif be proclaimed caliph 'with the consent of his co-religionists, ' can only be taken 
as a true indication of the British Government's policy at that time. 
In the event, McMahon did 'not fully avail [him]self of the permission to make certain 
additions to the message. ' His reasoning merely highlights the significance which was 
attached to the Sharif's ultimate assumption of the caliphate. The High Commissioner wrote to 
Grey: 
The moment in my opinion has not arrived when we can usefully discuss even a preliminary 
agreement, and it might at this stage injure the Sherirs chances of the Khaliphate to advertise 
his dealings with us by sending a son or other notable to treat with us. 
I have also omitted any explicit mention of the Sherif as the future Khaliph as the terms of illy 
message will be sufficiently clear to him on this point. To do so moreover might limit the 
extent to which he might otherwise make use of my letter. 30 
Regardless of what McMahon's reply did or did not resolve, the matter of the caliphate, if 
mentally abstracted from all other issues (which of course it could not be in practice), appears 
to have been settled once and for all as far as the intentions of these two parties were 
concerned. If for no other reason, it should not be surprising, then, that the matter received 
almost no further attention in the remaining exchange of documents known as the 'Husayn- 
McMahon Correspondence. ' 
It is conceivable that, in avoiding any allusion to the matter of the caliphate in his first letter to 
Husayn, the High Commissioner was acting on the advice of Ronald Storrs who, in any case, 
was closely involved its drafting. 31 Storrs had argued that, 
28 Kedourie, 1976, p. 69. 
29 Antonius, 1938, p. 416, Appendix A, item No. 2. 'Sir Henry McMahon's First Note to the Sharif Husain, 
Cairo, August 30,1915. ' 
30 FO 141461 1198/5, Letter No. 94 from McMahon, The Residency, Ramleh, to Sir E. Grey, 26 August 1915. 
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The situation ... requires no action in the sense of canvassing or proposals of any kind, and demands only a guarantee for the non-violation by external aggression of the Holy Places and 
the approaches thereto. But it will be observed that even with these limitations the actual Sherif 
of Mecca will necessarily be brought into prominence as being the recognised guardian of the 
Holy Places; and if this recognition should in any way further his candidature for the Khalifate, 
it will presumably be not disagreeable to Great Britain to have the strongest spiritual in the 
hands of the weakest temporal power. [emphasis added]32 
The feelings of satisfaction and resolution felt in certain quarters concerning the Sharif's first 
letter and McMahon's reply of 30 August, and the extent to which this depended on the 
likelihood of Husayn's eventual assumption of the caliphate, is evident in the views expressed 
later by Storrs. Kitchener was advised by his Oriental Secretary that if the Sharif were soon be 
'able to conciliate his powerful neighbours of Nejd, Yemen and Asir, and to impress upon 
them that he has no idea of pretending to any temporal rights within their territories, his 
chances of a general - though hardly yet of a universal recognition as Caliph will be very 
good. 933 Wingate, by now fully apprised of both Husayn's demands and of certain proposals 
regarding McMahon's reply, expressed similar satisfaction in the flexibility afforded by a 
Sharifian caliphate. Wingate intimated to a friend that as far as the idea of allotting 'Zones of 
Interest' to individual Powers was concerned, he did 'not think that the Mohammedan 
supporters of the "Arab Union" would object. ' 34 Ironically, it was Clayton, who had done so 
much to promote the Arab caliphate idea, who now saw danger in the scheme. He confessed to 
Wingate: 'if it were really to succeed should we not have created rather a "Frankenstein"V 
adding that, 'a mighty Mohammedan Empire situated in the heart of the British Empire is a 
questionable advantage. ' 35 
Although McMahon replied within thirty days as requested, he did not respond definitively to 
the Sharif's most concrete and definite demands regarding the territorial limits of Arab 
independence. The Sharif responded promptly on 9 September. This letter, though less strident 
31 With reference to the drafting of the reply Clayton later told Wingate, 'it was apparently run by Storrs. ' SAD 
WP 196/3/94-98, Pencil note from Clayton while convalescing at the Anglo-American Hospital, written on 
'Intelligence Office, WO, Cairo' - headed paper, 8 September 1915. 32 FO 141/587/545/2, Secret Memorandum by RS [Ronald Storrs) headed 'The Khalifate, ' Cairo, 2 May 1915 - 
not to be confused with Storrs' more historical memo also entitled 'The Khalifate' but dated 6 May, referred to in 
Chapter 5, Note 27. 
33 PRO 30/57/47 QQ/38, Letter from Storrs, The Residency, Bacos, Alexandria, to Fitzgerald, 6 September 1915. 
34 SAD WP 196/3n4-77, Letter from Wingate to Wigram, 6 September 1915. 
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than the first, went on to justify the territory required by Arabs in terms of its representing the 
natural limits of the 'populations of our race' adding that the proposed boundaries were 
'vitally and economically essential. ' There was very little of an Islamic nature about the 
arguments presented by Husayn on this occasion. The only reference to the caliphate must 
have caused pangs of discomfort among those Britons who saw it as an effective sop designed 
to subvert, mitigate and redirect demands by Arabs for sovereignty of a more conventionally 
political nature. Husayn simply wrote: 
For our aim, 0 respected minister, is to ensure that the conditions which are essential to our 
future shall be secured on a foundation of reality, and not on highly-decorated phrases and 
titles. As for the caliphate, God have mercy on its soul and comfort the Moslems for their 
IOSS! 36 
Within days of this letter being received in Cairo, events were to occur which would hasten a 
qualified accommodation of Husayn's demands. The following section will examine the 
impact of Muhammad al-Faruqi's arrival in Egypt on British concerns over the caliphate 
particularly in relation to their appreciation of pan-Arabism. 
6.2 The 'al-Farugi Episode' and the Modirication of the 'Cairo Scheme' 
Ostensibly, the arrival in Cairo of Arab political activist and Ottoman army officer, 
Muhammad al-Faruqi marked the first major setback for, Cairo's Arab caliphate policy as it 
has been set out here. The purpose of this section is to determine the effect of the 'al-Faruqi 
episode' upon the development of that policy and, in particular, whether this event constituted 
a vitiation, or confirmation, of the prejudices and assumptions of those who adhered to the 
idea of British rule behind the 'veil' of a revived Arab caliphate. 
35 SAD WP 196/3/94-98. See Note 3 1, above. 
36 Antonius, 1938, p. 417, Appendix A, item No. 3. 'The Sharif Husain's Second Note to Sir Henry McMahon, 
Mecca, Shawwal 29,1333. [September 9,1915.1. ' 
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The relevance of al-Faruqi's dialogue with the Cairo Intelligence Department is that it is 
generally considered to have induced the British to accept the territorial and political demands 
conveyed by Sharif Husayn in his correspondence with High Commissioner McMahon during 
August and September 1915. The letter conveying this acceptance, which itself contains no 
reference to the subject of the caliphate, has become the most famous constituent of the 
'Husayn-McMahon Correspondence. ' This, in turn, became the most controversial of the 
tagreements' made between Britain and the various parties to the war in he Middle East. Some 
have gone further: this note, according to George Antonius, writing in 1938, 
is by far the most important in the whole correspondence, and may perhaps be regarded as the 
most important international document in the history of the Arab national movement. It 
contains the pledges which brought the Arabs into the War, openly on the side of the Allies. 
37 
The significance conventionally accorded the episode is adequately reflected in David 
Fromkin's view that, 
not only the McMahon letters, but also-and more importantly-the negotiations with France, 
Russia, and later Italy that ultimately resulted in the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov Agreement and 
subse 
3Y 
ent Allied secret treaty understandings were among the results of Lieutenant al-Faruqi's 
hoax. 
Elie Kedourie describes the event as having 'a far-reaching influence' 39 on the subsequent 
actions of the authorities in Cairo. Eliezer Tauber is equally emphatic about the significance of 
al-Faruqi's arrival: 
A comparison of McMahon's first letter to Husayn, of 30 August, with his second, of 24 
October, shows that the arrival in Cairo of the deserter Muhammad Sharif at-Faruqi brought a 
complete turnabout in the British attitude towards Husayn and the Arab movement. What he 
told the British, and to which they gave absolute credence, brought the British to accept the 
lion's share of Husayn's demands, and they considered him the authorized leader of a powerful 
Arab movement. 40 
What the above quotations suggest is that the British authorities in Cairo were, quite simply, 
deceived by the testimony of this individual into doing something they would not otherwise 
37 Ibid., p. 169. 
38 Fromkin, 199 1, p. 189. 
39 Kedourie, 1976, p. 73. 
40 Tauber, 1993, p. 76. 
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have done, and that the consequences were momentous. Against these common assumptions it 
will be argued here that the occasion of al-Faruqi's arrival in Cairo provided Clayton, among 
others, with an opportunity4l to promote the 'Cairo scheme' with even greater conviction than 
they had done earlier. Furthermore, the same people were able to convince themselves that al- 
Faruqi, along with the secular Arab movement he purported to represent, had become 
4unwitting instruments, much less interested in an Arab nation than in a pan-Arab union 
presided over by an Arab caliph, which Britain could utilize to preserve and even increase its 
power and influence in the Middle East. s42 
In early September the Military Intelligence Office in Cairo compiled a report based on 
conversations with an unnamed informant which referred to a committee of junior officers in 
Syria who hoped to displace Turkish rule in Syria, Mesopotamia and the Hijaz. Their first 
scheme had come to nothing, apparently due to the failure of the British to land at 
Alexandretta in February, but, the report went on: 'They hope to find [a] leader when action 
has given him a chance to show himself. Their Sultan is to be temporal only, and to have no 
power in the Hedjas, which is to go under the Sherif as Khalifa. The Sherif is party to their 
scheme. 143 Collectively, the 'Committee-men, ' were assumed to be a great mobilising force in 
both Syria and Mesopotamia since they were 'members of the largest land-owning farnifies, ' 
and 'of course all their tenants in the army will follow them to any extent. ' It is significant that 
the social basis of the Arab leadership's power is identified in this way. Although this 
authority was assumed to have been of a secular, as opposed to a religious, nature it was of a 
sort which the British might feel comfortable with since it did not depend on the political 
autonomy of the mass of the population. More importantly, it was compatible with a scheme 
of collaboration involving a dependent, yet influential, elite. 
41 That the encounter with al-Faruqi was regarded in certain quarters as timely and propitious is evidenced by 
various remarks made during the following weeks. Moreover, various private communications by Clayton and 
Wingate on the subject were rife with the metaphors of opportunism: SAD WP 134/4/10-13, 'Strictly private' 
letter from Clayton, Intelligence Department, WO, Cairo, to Wingate, 9 October 1915; SAD WP 158/9/27-34, 
'Strictly Private' letter from Clayton, Cairo, to Wingate, 13 October 1915; SAD WP 236/3/18-20, Private letter 
from Wingate to Callwell, 19 October 1915; and, SAD WP 197/l/175-8, 'Strictly private' letter from Wingate to 
Clayton, 20 October 1915. 
42 McKale, 1998, p. 154. 
43 Sledmere Papers, DDSY/(2) 4 90, Copy of Secret Report of an Informant, MI Off-ice, Cairo, 5 Sep(ember 1915. 
187 
This report, it transpired, was the result of Cairo's first interrogation of al-Faruqi. The officer 
had arrived in Cairo on I September after deserting the Ottoman army at Gallipoli and 
crossing over to the British lines. He had agreed to do so at a secret meeting with other 
members of al-'Ahd in Aleppo some time after the earlier rebellion plan had failed. At 
Gallipoli he had declared himself to be a member of the same secret society as 'Aziz 'Ali al- 
Masri and expressed a desire to meet with Sharif Husayn. Al-Faruqi was immediately 
despatched to Egypt. 44 
A more thorough interrogation was conducted on 12 September by a Lebanese assistant who 
submitted a report of his findings together with a translation of a comprehensive statement by 
al-Faruqi. It was this subsequent testimony which has been described, with only partial 
justification, as comprising a hoax or a confidence trick, though it will be argued here that 
regardless of al-Faruqi's intentions Clayton and his colleagues were more than willing 
'victims. ' In his statement al-Faruqi describes how he had come into contact with the Arab 
secret society, 'Fetat al-Arab' (al-'Arabiah al-Fatah), in Damascus and how members of the 
society 'had already paid allegiance to the Sherif of Mecca as Khalifa' and renounced their 
allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey. He was also aware of the Sharif's contact with the 
Egyptian High Commissioner and presumed that the British were willing to support Husayn 
with arms and ammunition in pursuance of the latter's overriding aim, namely the 
establishment of an Arab empire under his own leadership. The Sharif's dominions were 
initially understood to include those of 'the Sherif and those who follow him. ' It had been the 
dissatisfaction felt in Damascus with this strictly 'dynastic 05 definition of the area of Arab 
independence which had prompted the society to insist on the northern limit of the 'Mersina- 
Diarbekr' line. Al-Faruqi also told of how the conspiring Arab officers who had been sent to 
Constantinople had undertaken to reach the Sharif and continue to work towards a revolt with 
their 'brethren in Syria. ' The interrogator's report went on to emphasise al-Faruqi's Arab, as 
opposed to Muslim, credentials and his belief that help in the form of arms and ammunition 
would be required from a European power, preferably Britain. 
44 Tauber, 1993, pp. 66 & 70-7 1. 
45 This is not to suggest that the leadership of the Arab movement in Damascus would have articulated their 
concern precisely in this way. The notion of rule refcrrcd to here corresponds closely to a description of the 
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The form of Arab government envisaged by the Arab movement was expressed in terms of 
five 'Principles of Government. ' Most importantly, in relation to the argument being 
propounded here, two of these rested explicitly on the re-establishment of an Arab caliphate. 
The centrality of this feature as a principle of unity under which a variety of governmental 
forms were thought feasible is evident in the wording of the report. Not only did it include the 
rather obvious condition that a treaty be established with Britain 'based on an exchange of 
interests, ' but the overriding stipulation that, 'the Arab countries [are] to be governed by the 
principles of decentralisation; each country to have the sort of government which best suits it, 
but to be ruled by the Central government, i. e. the seat of the Khalifate. ' The third principle 
named Sharif Husayn of Mecca as 'Khalifa and Sultan of the new empire. ' Somewhat 
contradictorily, though in a conspicuous attempt to assuage British fears concerning Islam, the 
fourth and fifth 'principles' stated that 'although the new empire we wish to establish is to be 
headed by a Khalifa, its basis will be national and not religious. It will be an Arab, not a 
Moslem, Empire, ' adding that 'Christian Arabs, Druses and Neseiria will have the same rights 
as Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law. 946 
It is clear from the foregoing that whatever the precise genesis of these 'principles' as 
recorded on 12 September they coincided very closely with the private aspirations of Clayton, 
Wingate and, perhaps more consequentially, Sykes. The envisaged Arab state was based on a 
flexible notion of the institution of the caliphate as somehow distinct from the actual 
government of the various countries within the anticipated Arab empire. As such, and in spite 
of the forthrightness of al-Faruqi's testimony, the report could not have posed a threat to the 
adherents of the 'Cairo scheme. ' Al-Faruqi's exaggerations and straightforward falsehoods 
were somewhat superfluous. If the official record is to be believed, it would seem that what 
impressed Clayton was the extent to which the aspirations of Arab movement confirmed, and 
conformed to, the views already held in Cairo regarding the preferred solution to the 'Arab' 
and 'Muslim questions. ' These were, in most important respects, identical to the scheme now 
dynasteia of King Ptolemy as 'wherever his writ ran at any moment. ' Finley, 'The Ancient Greeks and Their 
Nation', p. 13 1, quoted in, Davidson, 2000, p. 23. 
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being proposed on behalf of the Arab movement. In other words it was not the power of this 
movement which impressed Clayton but the compatibility of its aims with Britain's. Clayton 
would later tell Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary, that, 'the proposition is an attractive one and 
would appear to fall in with the general movement which we hope that the acceptance of our 
proposals will start. 947 
In fact the 12 September intelligence report indicated little more than a widespread support for 
Sharif Husayn and the borders he had already demanded, plus a resolve to obtain a semblance 
of Arab unity and independence in the Arabic-speaking countries lying south of the 37 1h 
parallel. Rather than instigating a significant shift in the balance of power between the 
respective parties to a putative collaborative alliance, the 'information' contained within this 
report may be better construed as part of a rather desperate, though none the less, audacious, 
bid to impress the British in the hope of securing such an arrangement. 
Clayton did not report the results of the al-Faruqi interview to McMahon for submission to 
London until II October . 
48 Although it is almost certain that there were further 
interrogationS49 there is no suggestion that anything of further significance emerged. It seems 
likely that much of what al-Faruqi was reported to have said had emerged in a process of 
negotiation in which he may have re-presented his views in such a way as to seem compatible 
with British desiderata. This would have enabled Clayton to interpret the aims of the Arab 
movement in a way which would mollify to his political masters in London. 
50 The effect of 
the 'al-Faruqi episode' is that whereas, hitherto, it had been assumed by supporters of the 
'Cairo scheme' that an Arab caliphate would constitute a spiritual 'veil' behind which Britain 
would rule. Now it seemed to perform the function of reconciling two forms of secular rule, 
British and Arab, and of subsuming pan-Arabism under a pliant and accessible figurehead - 
effective Arab government being fragmented and local, while Sharifian rule would serve to 
46 FO 882 Vol. 15, PNA 15/6, Report by the Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, 12 September 1915, 
comprising 'Statement of Captain 'XV and 'Notes on Captain "X" and his statement' signed by 'Naum 
Shoucair. ' 
47 FO 882 Vol 11, AP 15/6, Letter from Clayton to Tyrrell, 30 October 1915. 
48 FO 882 Vol. 15, PNA 1518, Clayton, Intelligence Department, WO, Cairo, to McMahon, II October 1915. 
49 Kedourie, 1976, p. 73. 
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promote a semblance of unity, independence and sovereignty. It was only on the basis of such 
a construction that Clayton might have imagined that Arab 'independence' was compatible 
with a predominantly British Middle East. Only under the caliphate could there be a 'Greater 
Arabia' which was at once unified and, either exclusively British, or predominantly British 
with some concessionary role allotted to France. 
Suffice it to say that Clayton's attempt to precipitate an agreement based on the demands 
made by Husayn in his letter to McMahon of 14 July, and repeated on 9 September, was 
ultimately successful. His efforts resulted in an ambiguously qualified acceptance of the Arab 
party's delimitation of the borders of the hoped-for Arab Kingdom. In this way the advocates 
of the 'Cairo scheme' attained their immediate objective: the consummation of a collaborative 
alliance with Sharif Husayn, the foremost candidate for Arab caliph. 
It has been shown that the immediate effect of al-Faruqi's visit to Cairo on British plans for 
the region was to shift the emphasis from a purely 'Islamic solution' to the problem of 
imperial expansion into the Middle East, towards an accommodation with secular Arabism in 
which the caliphate would, none the less, play an essential role. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
episode initiated a phase of ambiguity and, on occasions, inconsistency among British Arabists 
regarding the precise relationship between the caliphate and the anticipated form of secular 
government. Furthermore, notwithstanding the 'positive, ' i. e. constructive empire-building, 
aspects of Britain's caliphate policy there was a re-emphasis of the Turco-German pan-Islamic 
'bogey. ' For example Mark Sykes advocated that Britain 'propagandize Islam in a definite and 
offensive manner' without 'making apology for our acts but attacking the enemy on the score 
of injustices, crime, unorthodoxy, and hypocrisy, in our own press, in the native press, and by 
means of leaflets. '5 I Similarly, Major Vivian Gabriel, a close associate of Kitchener at the War 
Office with responsibilities in the Near Eastern arena, although not greatly impressed by the 
secular Arab movement thought it worth supporting in order to undermine German pan-Islam 
-'o FO 882 Vol. 13, MIS 15/13, Clayton's 'Memorandum on conversations held with Lt. Mohammed Sherif El 
Farugi in the Turkish Army, ' enclosed with, Lt. Gen. Maxwell CIC, Egypt, to the Sec. WO, London, 12 October 
1915. 
51 FO 882/13 MIS 15/16, Despatch No. 23 from Sykes on SS Khyber, Reed Sea, to Callwell, DMO, WO, 
London, 15 November 1915, enclosing a 22 page report by Sykes dated 28 October 1915. The report contained 
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by removing the geographic focus of Islam outside the Turco-German sphere. " Wingate also 
continued the stress the importance of the 'Islamic question' for Britain. He told the War 
Office that 'Arab racial and religious affinities provide a binding force that cannot be ignored' 
[emphasis added] and hoped that 'by upholding the principle of Arab Nationality, we shall be 
... [inter alial creating an efficient counterpoise to 
Turkish Pan-Islamism. t53 
Increasingly during the last three months of 1915 the 'official' policy of non-interference in 
the matter of the caliphate was reiterated and, as far as public declarations were concerned, 
enforced. In December McMahon was forced to placate the Foreign Office in even more 
solemn terms. He regretted giving the impression that he had been 'actively interesting 
[himself] in the question of the Khalifate' adding: 
I need hardly say that I have always carefully abstained from doing so. The matter is one 
which, as I have myself stated to H. M. G. on more than one occasion, must be left entirely to 
the Moslem. I have moreover no reason whatever to think that any British official here is 
departing from this correct attitude. 54 
However, as the remainder of this thesis will indicate officials in Cairo and London would 
4actively interest' themselves in the question of the caliphate for several years to come. 
Grey was apprised of the conclusions drawn by the Cairo Intelligence Department concerning 
their contact with al-Faruqi in McMahon's letter of 18 October. In this both the 'carrot' of the 
apparent flexibility of the Arab party's offer, and the 'stick' of the dire consequences of 
refusal or even delayed acceptance, had been conveyed in the starkest termS. 
55 The immediate 
effect was that at a sub-committee of the War Cabinet 
Grey was convinced by arguments suggesting that negotiations with the Arabs had reached a 
critical stage and that a tangible demonstration of British strength was necessary to ensure their 
unity and loyalty. .... The Arab kingdom, if it were realised, would 
be under British auspices 
the following sections: Section I- Military Situation in Mesopotamia, Section 11 - Indian Moslems and the War, 
and Section III - General Situation. 52 FO 882 Vol If, AP 15/8 Minute from WO to Director of Military Operations (DMO), 21 November 1915, 
enclosing a 5-page memorandum by Major Gabriel, headed 'Note on Arab Movement. ' 
53 SAD WP 135n/179-182, Private letter from Wingate to Callwell, War Office, London, 23 December 1915. 
54 FO 141/587/545/14, Telegram from High Commissioner, Egypt, to Sir A. Nicholson, FO, London, 31 
December '15. 
55 SAD WP 158/9/54-55, Telegram from McMahon to Sir Edward Grey, 18 October 1915. 
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whilst, if it failed, Britain, by virtue of her support of it, would have a strong moral claim to 
occupy and retain those territories pertaining to it. 56 
Grey's attitude, so described, is indicative of a concurrent 'maximum' and 'minimum' 
programme. At the same time the al-Faruqi episode enabled the Arabists in Cairo and 
Khartoum to modify their original, rather grandiose, scheme in favour of something which 
took account, and advantage, of the apparent weakness of the Arab party. This transformation, 
then, is precisely the opposite of that depicted by Kedourie. 
On the basis of the arguments constructed by Clayton and then relayed by McMahon to Grey, 
the High Commissioner was authorised to draft a constructive response to the Sharif's 
demands. The reply of 24 October 57 is (in)famous for its passage concerning Britain's 
preparedness to recognise, with certain modifications, the boundaries of Arab independence. 
The ensuing dispute concerning McMahon's assurances to Husayn, between the parties 
involved, and later among historians, is not of concern here. That no explicit mention is made 
of the caliphate in this document, nor in the subsequent letters comprising the 'Husayn- 
McMahon Correspondence, ' is explicable by the fact that it was no longer a point of 
contention and was, for the time being, considered settled by all parties concerned. Rather, for 
the time being the idea of a Sharifian caliphate operated implicitly and continued to perform an 
essential, though frequently ambiguous, role within the alliance then being forged. In fact, it 
was the inherent vagueness of the 'Cairo scheme, ' based on the restoration of the Arab 
caliphate which, accounted for its currency. It will be shown later that it was only as the 
relationship moved from the level of abstraction at which affairs had thus far been conducted 
to one of concreteness that the practical limitations and contradictions inherent in the scheme 
were revealed. 
56 Fisher, 1999, pp. 19-20, referring to, CAB 42/4/22/2, Meeting of the Dardanelles Committee, 21 October 1915. 0 It is significant that the logic of this argument regarding 'the strong moral claim' is identical to that underpinning 
Britain's later endorsement of the Zionist colonisation of Palestine. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
Late 1915 marked the apogee of abstract coherence with regard to Britain's Arab caliphate 
policy during the course of the First World War. It is important, therefore, to recapitulate in 
some detail before going on to deal with period during which practice began to impact on 
theory in a decisive way. It has been noted that the issue of the caliphate, which had been an 
essential constituent of the imperial scheme of collaboration hatched in Cairo since October 
1914, played no further part in the 'Husayn-McMahon correspondence' after the Sharif's 
oblique but rather prescient reference in his letter of 9 September 1915. The main objective of 
this chapter has been to explain this fact. It should be noted, first, that what had been 
established as the 'official' position - that the future of the caliphate was not the concern of 
Britain and should be decided by Muslims alone, had, in fact, been self-imposed as an integral 
part of the caliphate policy from the outset. Kitchener's letter to 'Abdullah of 31 October 1914 
referred to Britain's non-intervention in 'things religious. ' 
58 The reiteration of this 'official' 
policy at various intervals cannot in itself, therefore, be taken as proof that the transfer of the 
caliphate to Arabia had become a taboo topic. Notwithstanding British consternation at the 
secular nature of Sharif Husayn's opening demands, fronz a British point of view there was an 
underlying conceptual continuity between the Husayn-McMahon negotiations and the earlier 
dealings between Cairo and the Hijaz based on a common understanding over the future of the 
caliphate. Furthermore, it has been shown that, although largely absent from the 
correspondence itself, the caliphate continued to play a pivotal role in British thinking about 
the Middle East during this period. 
Regarding the 'al-Faruqi episode, ' although historian Donald McKale believes that Clayton 
was simply 'duped, 59 he provides a number of collateral reasons for al-Faruqi's apparent 
success. These include: the anticipation of failure at Gallipoli which would require relief in the 
form of an Arab rebellion; the fact that Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers' offensive 
57 Antonius, 1938, pp. 419-20, Appendix A, item No. 4. 'Sir Henry McMahon's Second Note to the Sharif 
Husain, Cairo, October 24,1915; ' also, Kedourie, 1976, p. 97; and, FO 882 Vol. 19, AB 15/9, High 
Commissioner, Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo, to Sherif of Mecca, 24 October 1915. 
58 See Chapter 3, Note 86. 
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against Serbia on 6 October; the general fear of a German-backed jihad, especially one 
involving al-Sanussi on the western flank of Egypt; and, finally, the fear of an imminent attack 
on Egypt from the direction of the Suez Canal. Undoubtedly these immediate military- 
strategic factors created an atmosphere of urgency, even desperation, during the later months 
of 1915 and most certainly played a part in nudging Britain towards a collaborative alliance 
with a movement that barely existed. However, they do not explain why the specific content of 
al-Faruqi's 'proposal' was so attractive. One may add to McKale's list of urgent 
considerations one quite specific to the triangular relationship which obtained between Cairo, 
al-Faruqi and the Sharif of Mecca. Given that certain Cairo officials had already accepted the 
inevitability of the fall of the Turkish caliphate and its removal to Arabia, al-Faruqi's claim 
that the Syrian secret societies had already reached an understanding with Husayn and Faysal 
can only have induced the fear that the secular Arab movement might, at some stage, 'run 
away' with the Sharif and, by extension, the Arab caliphate. In other words, the British, in 
seeking a collaborative alliance, would find themselves in some kind of competition over the 
Sharif and the caliphate and, therefore, needed to act decisively in order to rectify the adverse 
relationship of local political forces. 
It is significant in assessing the impact of the 'al-Faruqi episode' that the 'Damascus Protocol' 
did not refer explicitly to the caliphate. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that it was the 
weakness, rather than the strength, of the secular Arab movement (such as it was) that had led 
al-Faruqi to confirm the prejudices and beliefs of his British imperial interlocutors. This would 
suggest that al-Faruqi's subsequent incorporation of the caliphate issue into his professed 
programme was intended to appeal to the prejudices of the British as far as they were known 
to him. It seems likely that, in the course of his dealings with Clayton, it would have become 
apparent to al-Faruqi that Husayn had already been nominated as the preferred candidate for 
the caliphate by Kitchener and McMahon. It may be assumed, therefore, that al-Faruqi 
endorsed this arrangement simply bccause it was a matter which had already been settled. Al- 
Faruqi may also have come to realise that his movement also, needed the symbolic leadership 
of Sharif Husayn. Notwithstanding al-Faruqi's secularism, it may be assumed that the 
requirement of a 'principle of unity' was an objective factor common to his scheme and that 
59 McKale, 1998, p. 154. 
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being promoted by the British in Cairo. It has been argued that Clayton was neither 'duped' 
nor the victim of an elaborate hoax, however, the veracity or otherwise of al-Faruqi's 
'testimony, ' of which we only have Clayton's record, is not an issue here. What both parties 
required from the opportunity was an effect - specifically the furtherance of a particular 
collaborative alliance. The semblance of Arab unity, sovereignty and independence required 
by both parties and contained in the idea of a revived Arab caliphate facilitated what would 
these days be termed 'constructive ambiguity. ' This would enable any likely practical 
stumbling blocks and points of difference to be deferred, at least through a period of 
seemingly productive collaboration during which the respective aims and interests of Britain 
and the Arab parties might be advanced. 
It would appear that the officially recorded testimony of al-Faruqi resulted not from deception 
but from negotiation, in which the Arab movement's ambassador to British Cairo qualified 
and tempered Sharif Husayn's original demands and restored the kind of equilibrium between 
Arab caliphate and Arab government which Britain preferred. The point must be made, 
however, that the al-Faruqi-Clayton accord was, in part, a product of Britain's necessary 
reliance upon a small number of informants. That is, individuals possessing specific capacities 
within their own social and political milieu who, concomitantly, had an interest in the changes 
about to effect the political environment in which they were situated. Notwithstanding, the 
actual weakness of the political movements which al-Faruqi purported to represent, which 
Clayton may privately have acknowledged '60 al-Faruqi's strength 
lay in his accurate 
assessment of British desiderata which enabled him to tailor his demands to conform with the 
prejudices and preconceptions of his interlocutor. The apparent correspondence of al-Faruqi's 
proposals with Clayton's own ideas about the future of Arabia was, therefore, besides being a 
result of the objective requirement for a principle of unity, in part a consequence of British 
ignorance about the region. Undoubtedly it was a case of Clayton's 'desire to form and 
influence policy getting in the way of dispassionate evaluation of intelligence. ' 61 However, 
there were simply no alternative sources of information by which to corroborate or invalidate 
60 For example, Kedourie maintains that a careful reading of al-Faruqi's statement at the time would have shown 
that the Arab secret societies in Syria were already a spent force. Kedourie, 1976, p. 78. It must be equally likely 
that Clayton conducted such a reading but chose to disregard the evidence as detrimental to his agenda. 
61 Ibid., p. 77. 
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the Clayton-Faruqi concoction. Finally, in relation to this episode, the possibility must be 
allowed for that just as the British regarded the caliphate as a cover for imperial 
aggrandisement, the understanding over the caliphate was also a smoke screen behind which 
the Arabs hoped to attain secular power. They were aware of Britain's fear of pan-Islam and 
chose to exploit it. 
There can be no question that the British would have wished to steer a course between the 
Scylla of pan-Islam and the Charybdis of populalfi2 nationalism. To the British in Cairo the 
conjoining of al-Faruqi's Arab movement with the Sharif's potential in relation to the 
caliphate represented the mutual cancellation of these two hazards. As a result of Clayton's 
engagement with al-Faruqi in September 1915 the abstract simplicity of the original 'Cairo 
scheme' had been disturbed. In the process of its gradual realisation it underwent a subtle 
modification in which issues of immediate practical significance were distinguished from what 
could be deferred. It was acknowledged that before Britain's desiderata in the Middle East 
(including Sharif Husayn's accession to the caliphate) could be obtained, and before Britain 
would be in a position to sponsor an Arab revolt, the Foreign Office would need to reach an 
accord with her main ally, France - an eventuality already provided for in McMahon's second 
letter. There was, therefore, a suspension of the caliphate issue in practice pending further 
developments in these areas. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 1915 there is a certain ambiguity in British thinking regarding the 
relationship between the idea of an Arab caliphate and a more secular version of pan-Arabism. 
This ambiguity was overlaid by the apparent convergence of views which had taken place 
between the enthusiasts in Cairo and the War Office, on the one hand, and the gainsayers in 
India and the Foreign Office, on the other. This was a superficial harmony however, as fragile 
as the understanding reached between Britain and the Sharif. Whereas, for the 'Sharifians' the 
shift from the use of rhetoric geared to the problem of pan-Islamism to the idioms of secular 
nationalism had been a positive response to the 'al-Faruqi episode, ' for the others, the more 
62 'Popular' nationalism is taken to mean, either a national movement which is accompanied by demands for 
democracy, or a movement led by a demagogue who purports to represent 'the will of the people' and in the 
absence of popular democratic representation is forced to initiate symbolic acts of confrontation against internal 
and external enemies. 
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earnest adherence to Britain's official attitude of disinterest in the caliphate concealed a 
genuine squeamishness with regard to such grandiose projects. In a certain sense the 
'nationalist turn' in British thinking post-Faruqi came as something of a relief amongst those 
who had deep-seated reservations about interfering in the traditions of Islam. This change of 
emphasis rationalised a more rigid insistence that reference to British support for the Sharif of 
Mecca as caliph be avoided completely by enabling a more open support for the Arabs in 
secular terms. On the one hand, there were those in the Government of India who sought to 
undermine any arrangement involving Britain and an Arab caliphate and whose endorsement 
of the 'official policy' was undoubtedly sincere, and, on the other, those who were content to 
defer the issue on practical grounds in the hope of obtaining a degree of secular underpinning 
for a Sharifian caliphate in the meantime. For these reasons, it becomes increasingly difficult, 
during the second half of 1915, to determine whether the 'Islamic bogey' was being raised 
sincerely or opportunistically whenever the adherents to the Cairo scheme felt unsure about 
their ability to persuade on more rational grounds. 
Al-Faruqi's testament was even used to assuage those, again mostly members of the Indian 
Government, who were as fearful of a strong Arab state as they were of an Arab caliphate. In 
retrospect, it can be seen how the modified scheme of a weak and divided Arab 'empire' 
merely brings to the fore the objective requirement, shared by those British imperialists in 
favour of a Sharifian solution and the leadership of the Arab movement alike, for a political- 
ideological device which might give a semblance of unity and independence in the future Arab 
state. The fact that the British had already chosen to further their intervention through an 
accommodation with the Sharif of Mecca on account of his supposed pre-eminence within 
Islam met the requirement of the more secular conception of an internally divided, and 
variously governed, Arab 'empire' for a principle of unity. Consequently, the Sharif's 
candidature for the caliphate had gained an additional, rather than an alternative, significance. 
That is an internal, national, as opposed to an external, Islamic, one. 
It has been noted that the British preference for an Islamic solution to the problems of imperial 
rule in the Middle East had been partly motivated by an aversion to mass secular politics, that 
is, collaborative alliances with 61ites who were likely to be more dependent on their local 
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subordinates than on their imperial sponsors. What attracted certain individuals to the 
combination of al-Faruqi and the Sharif was that they embodied a particular articulation of 
forces which subordinated the secular Arab movement to the symbolic leadership of Sharif 
Husayn as Arab caliph. The relationship between Arabism and Islam in British thinking at this 
stage is best illustrated by reference to the views of Sir Mark Sykes. In his capacity as a key 
advisor to the cabinet committees dealing with the Middle East Sykes observed: 
With regard to the Arab question, the fire, the spiritual fire, lies in Arabia proper, the intellect 
and the organising power lie in Syria and Palestine, centred particularly at Beirut. I should like 
also to mention that the intellectual movement, which is behind the Arab movement, is not 
revolutionary like the Young Turk, because education in Syria, unlike modern education in 
India and in Turkey, has been confined in Syria to the property owning classes, and 
consequently you have not a lot of very poor men who have got a little education and greater 
ambitions. That is an important point with regard to the intellectual force at the back of this 
movement. [emphasis added]63 
This was then, above all, an 61ite, rather than a popular, movement. 
Although, it will be recalled, Clayton had insisted on the 'real independence of the 
Khaliphate, '64 he could do so precisely because he thought genuine Arab unity, independence 
and sovereignty a practical impossibility. Besides which, a Sharifian caliphate with secular 
power confined to a formally independent and sovereign Hijaz would suffice. In this regard, 
the al-Faruqi episode allowed the British authorities in Cairo to believe that they could harness 
certain features of pan-Islam and pan-Arabism in an arrangement according to which Arabia 
would be partitioned under the nominal unity and independence of an Arab caliph. The latter 
would be maintained as a hostage of the British Empire in such a way that both pan-Islam and 
Arab nationalism would, they hoped, be rendered innocuous from a European imperial 
standpoint. By the end of 1915 the matter of removing the caliphate from Turkey and the 
influence of Germany had been resolved in theory. By constituting a principle of unity and 
providing a simulacrum of sovereignty a Sharifian caliphate contained within it an answer to 
the central problem of a subverted pan-Arabism as conceived in Cairo. On the face of it, al- 
63 Sledmere Papers, DDSY/(2) 4 95, 'Printed document for CID, Secret G. 46, War Committee, Meeting Held at 
10, Downing Street, Thursday, December 16,1915. Evidence of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M. P., 
on the Arab Question. ' This evidence was presented before Prime Minister Asquith, Kitchener, Balfour and 
Lloyd-George. See Chapter 2, Note 136, for the background to Sykes' attitude. 
64 See Note 25, above. 
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Faruqi's Arab movement provided the secular underpinning for the Sharif's anticipated 
caliphate bid. However, the precondition of secular power merely emphasised the Sharif's 
necessary dependence on Britain, since the entire move was premised on the deprecation of 
independent Arab capacity for political organisation. From the British point of view the 
accommodation of Husayn resulting from the 'al-Faruqi episode' was, at the same time, the 
subversion of the secular Arab movement. The enormity of the practical task of re-ordering 
the Middle East along these lines is obvious. The following chapter will examine the practical 
unfolding, and indeed unravelling, of this project, and the impact that such an experience had 
on Britain's interest in the future of the caliphate. 
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CHAPTER 7: From Theory to Practice: The Impact of the 
Hu*az Revolt on the Idea of an Arab Caliphate 
7.0 Introduction 
The prime concern of this thesis is with British perceptions, knowledge and understanding of 
Islam in connection with the idea of a possible revival of the Arab caliphate. However, it is 
necessary at this point in the enquiry to reiterate one of the theoretical premises of the thesis, 
introduced in the context of Edward Said's notion of 'intertextuality': specifically, that in the 
long run knowledge (or ideology) does not develop autonomously. Ideas and perceptions 
concerning the encountered world must ultimately find confirmation in external reality. Put 
simply: in the long run, ideas do not have an independent life of their own; neither is an idea 
bound to be realised simply because it exists in the minds of the powerful. There has to be a 
point at which the ideological chickens come home to roost in the practical world which 
nurtured them. 
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to show, in connection with the early experience of tile 
Hijaz revolt, and by cursory reference to the context of the social milieu of the Arabian 
peninsula, how the caliphate idea met its demise. Thus far, this thesis has been concerned with 
the internal coherence of Britain's ideas concerning the future of the caliphate and the Arab 
Middle East. During the period covered in this chapter (the year 1916) the advocates of the 
'Cairo scheme, ' in moving from a speculative-theoretical phase to one of practical 
implementation, were forced to grasp its fundamental contradiction which hitherto may only 
have been inferred in the abstract. The Sharif's Arab movement had become the preferred 
collaborative option for Britain, firstly, because of its lack of independent capacity for political 
organisation, but also on account of the Sharif's position within Islam and his pre-eminence in 
the caliphate stakes. It emerged in the course of the Revolt that the first reason necessitated 
military intervention while the second precluded it. 
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Before dealing with the Revolt itself, however, it is necessary to refer to several preliminary 
matters which, though not relating explicitly to the issue of the caliphate, had some bearing on 
the articulation of the caliphate idea within British Middle Eastern circles at that time. The 
question of a landing at Alexandretta will be referred to once again, since its resolution in the 
negative made the instigation of the revolt against the Turks even more pressing. The creation 
of the Arab Bureau and the negotiation of an agreement with France are included since they 
were both important prerequisites for the eventual raising of a rebellion in the Hijaz which was 
anticipated to have a far-reaching impact on the future disposition of the Arab Middle East. 
As will be shown in the rest of this chapter, consequent to the repudiation of the 'Alexandretta 
option, ' the implementation of Britain's caliphate policy as adumbrated in the famed 'Husayn- 
McMahon correspondence' was determined, initially by Britain's failure to engage proximally 
with the Arab movement in Syria, and, subsequently, by her inability to do so in direct 
association with the Sharif's forces in the Arabian peninsula. As this chapter will indicate, the 
dilemma for the British was that there was an unequivocal pay-off between the possibilities for 
a purely political exploitation of Sharif Husayn on the one hand, and the possibility of actually 
supporting him on the other. In other words: within the ftamework of the British caliphate 
policy, to aid him effectively was to render him worthless. 
7.1 The Return of 'The Alexandretta Option' 
The full consequences of the failure to land at Alexandretta earlier in the war had not been 
appreciated until September 1915. Although the actual effect of Cernal Pasha's destruction of 
the nascent Syrian Arab nationalist movement must always remain a matter of conjecture, the 
mere suggestion of a British attack on Alexandretta to be welcomed by a separatist 
insurrection must have been a major contributory factor leading to the violent suppression 
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which took place in Syria during February and March 1915.1 By 1916 the advocates of the 
'Cairo scheme' must have become acutely aware that they had, thus far, obtained nothing 
more than an accord with the Sharif of Mecca and a verbal understanding with a self-styled 
representative of 'the Arab movement' - itself an unknown quantity - neither of which said 
anything about what was to be done. Of all the spheres of conflict involving the British up to 
this point, the 'Western Arabian' theatre was unique in not having been embroiled in actual 
combat. Reading the correspondence of these people almost a century later, one might be 
excused for believing that they operated in a separate world, insulated from the hazards and 
privations of war as experienced in the Dardanelles, Mesopotamia and the Western Front. 
They dealt in propaganda, rumour, and intelligence rather than the more visceral aspects of 
conflict. However, the d6bAcles at Gallipoli2 and Ctesiphon 3 soon impinged on their 
ambitions. So dire was the situation by the end of 1915 that Lord Hardinge, being inimical to 
the entire 'Cairo scheme, ' was able to derive comfort from the belief that unless Britain made 
some gains on the battlefield 4 McMahon's promises to Husayn would amount to little. 
The urgency felt in Cairo and Khartoum towards the end of 1915 manifested itself in two 
ways. Firstly, a good deal of energy was directed towards convincing London of the need for a 
Cairo-based department directed towards the development and implementation of policy in 
respect of Islam and the Arab Middle East which would act as a counterweight to the 
Government of India. Secondly, there was a revival of the 'Alexandretta option. ' The renewed 
advocacy of a landing at this northerly port as a means of realising Britain's war aims in the 
region was prompted by al-Faruqi's insistence that an Allied landing in that vicinity was a 
prerequisite of any action by the Sharif. It was perceived, therefore, as a precondition of the 
entire Anglo-Sharifian scheme. 5 While visiting the Dardanelles in November, Kitchener, who 
had been an original advocate of the scheme, was, once again, convinced by McMahon's and 
Maxwell's arguments of the desirability of a landing at Alexandretta. He later told the Prime 
1 Westrate, 1992, p. 15. 
2 The evacuation of the Gallipoli peninsula was effected in two phases: (he first from 18 to 20 December 1915, 
and the second from 8 to 9 January 1916. 
3 The 'Battle of Ctesiphon' was fought on 22 November 1915 and resulted in the retreat of the British forces to 
Kut al-'Amarah. 
4 SAD WP 197/3/287-90, Letter from Hardinge, Viceroy's Camp, India, to Wingate, 28 December, 1915. 
5 FO 882 Vol. 13, MIS 15/17, Mark Sykes' telegram to FO for DMO, WO, 20 November 1915. This was passed 
on to the FO by McMahon. FO 371/2486 175418, Telegram from McMahon, Cairo to FO, 20 November, 1915. 
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Minister that, 'the political situation in the East in our opinion so seriously affects the purely 
military situations as to outweigh those military disadvantages which might otherwise be 
weighty. ' 6 
In respect of the earlier abandonment of the 'Alexandretta option' Isaiah Friedman remarked 
that, 
with the prospects of the 'forward plan' vanishing, McMahon became all the more eager to 
accommodate Hussein, expecting from him a double advantage: of detaching the Arabs from 
the Turk and using them to lay the foundation for British predominance in the area. This was 
implicit in McMahon's crucial letter of 24 October 1915.7 
If Friedman is correct, then the 'final' rejection of the plan by the War Cabinet in October 8- 
December 1915 was accompanied by further commitment to the Sharif of Mecca by agreeing 
to fund Husayn to the tune of ; E20,000 in preparation for a revolt. As far as the War Council 
was concerned, the 'Alexandretta option' had been replaced by an offensive to be launched 
from Egypt, which, in conjunction with an agreement with the French over the partition of 
Greater Syria, comprised the preconditions for the effective backing of the Arab movement. 9 
However, in the minds of those most directly associated with the 'Cairo scheme' there was 
indeed a pay-off between military intervention and political/moral support for what was now 
perceived as a seamless whole incorporating the Sharif and the Arab movement. Wingate 
lamented the abandonment of the 'forward policy' but argued that a Turco-German jihad 
might yet be avoided if Britain responded generously to the Sharif's proposals. 10 In a letter to 
Sykes, Clayton conceded that, 'with regard to the forward policy, I think too much time has 
been lost, and that to pursue it would be extremely difficult, if not dangerous, ' though he 
remained convinced that, 'combined with a carefully engineered Arab movement, it would 
6 Wilson, 1990, p. 224, quoting a telegram from Kitchener to Asquith, 13 November 1915. 
7 Friedman, 1973, p. 101. 
8 CAB 42/4/15, Dardanelles Committee, 21 October 1915, Annex I to verbatim minutes: 'The Present And 
Prospective Situation in Syria and Mesopotamia, ' Appendix II ' Operations in Syria. ' Notes by Admiralty War 
Staff. 
9 FO 882 Vol. 11, ARB 15/4, Letter from Mark Sykes to Clayton, Thursday, 20 December, 1920, referring to a 
War Council decision of 13 December 1915. 
10 SAD WP 135nll 19-24, private letter from Wingate to Parker, 10 December 1915. 
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have gone far to restore our position all over the East. ' [emphasis added]" Clayton's 
assessment was prescient. As will be seen later, a transfer of military effort from Syria to the 
coast of Arabia was precluded by the very reasons that Britain had sought an alliance with the 
Sharif of Mecca in the first place: his prominence within Islam and his dominion over the 
Holy Places. 
7.2 The Arab Bureau: The Institutional Expression of the Cairo 'Grand 
Plan' 
It has already been stated that throughout 1915 the grandeur of the plan for Britain's control of 
the Arab Middle East hatched in Cairo was not matched by the degree of coherent institutional 
support afforded it. That is, its advocates were not combined in such a way as to possess the 
kind of distinct organisational pedigree associated with the War Office, Foreign Office, India 
Office or the Government of India. Essentially, the Cairo Residency served these other 
departments via the Foreign Office. Already by the beginning of December 1915 the Foreign 
Office had taken steps to centralise communications with the Arab movement by prescribing 
that all correspondence be referred to McMahon in Cairo. 12 It remained however for Wingate 
and Clayton to press for a dedicated Bureau in Cairo rather than London. 13 
It had generally been the case that the 'Western Arabian' view had been communicated in 
London either by Mark Sykes or, to an ever diminishing degree, by Lord Kitchener when not 
" Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/Il 10, Letter from Clayton to Sykes from Intelligence department, WO, Cairo, 13 
December 1915. 
12 SAD WP 135n116, Telegram from FO to the High Commissioner, Cairo, 2 December 1915. That in practice 
the division of responsibilities between Cairo and India continued to cause problems is evidenced by Clayton's 
terse response to the news that a treaty had been concluded between Delhi and Ibn Sa'ud on 26 December. He 
told Wingate that he had asked the Residency 'that terms of Treaty should be telegraphed here' and had added 
with pointed understatement that 'it may have a considerable bearing on Arab question as a whole. ' SAD WP 
197/3/317, Telegram from Clayton, Cairo to Hakimam, Khartoum, 31 December 1915. 
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otherwise engaged. It was Sykes who first made specific proposals for a 'department of the 
Near East responsible for Egypt, Arabia ands Mesopotamia under a Secretary or Under 
Secretary. ' Sykes' rationale for this particular remit is significant in that, except for the 
inclusion of Egypt, it corresponds with the delimitation of. the Arab national area as promoted 
by Sharif Husayn and Muhammad al-Faruqi. In October 1915 Sykes explained to Lord Robert 
Cecil, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: 
You will notice that the area I suggest is one in language and practically in race and its 
unification under one department would give the Government of the day an engine to deal with 
the Arab situation both national, strategic, and economic, a personelle of wide and intimate 
acquaintance with the problems, and consequently give English statesmen an opportunity of 
following a consistent line. 
To Sykes, the inveterate synchretiser, the Arab area stipulated by al-Faruqi and the Sharif 
provided territorial definition to the vague caliphate-vice royalty idea originated by Storrs in 
1914 which Sykes was now urging on Kitchener via Fitzgerald. 
14 Moreover, the geographical 
area so defined corresponded to an established sphere of imperial experience and orientalist 
4 expertise. ' Somewhat inconsistently, in London Sykes recommended the formation of an 
'Islamic Bureau. ' He did so in the hope of reconciling the discordant views of Islam held by 
officials in Egypt and India respectively, and in anticipation that Germany's manipulation of 
Islam would 'not end with the war. '15 However, this was rejected by the Committee of 
Imperial Defence on the grounds that the new bureau would appear to be dealing with the 
whole of Islam when in fact its concern would be limited to the Arabs. 
16 
As might have been expected, the Government of India were anxious over what amounted to 
the institutionalisation of the 'Western Arabian' view and a challenge to their exclusive 
13 SAD WP 135n/28-30, Private Letter from Clayton to Parker, 3 December 1915; SAD WP 135nll 19-24, 
Private letter from Wingate to Parker, 10 December 1915; and FO 882, Vol II, AP 15/14, letter from Clayton to 
Parker, 10 December 1915. 
14 PRO 30157no wo/48, Covering note from Sykes to Fitzgerald attached to a memorandum in the form of a 
letter also to Fitzgerald, dated 30 January 1915. Also, PRO 30/57/59 WI/93, Letter from Lord Esher, Roman 
Camp, Callander, to Fitzgerald, 2 February 1916, in which Esher concurs with the viceroyalty idea - i. e. with 
Kitchener as incumbent - in reply to Fitzgerald's recent advocacy of it to him. 15 Sledmcre Papers, DDSY (2)/12 Appendix A. 1, Letter from Mark Sykes to Lord Robert Cecil, 4 October 1915. 
Copied to George Clerk, senior clerk at the Foreign Office, Fitzgerald, Kitchener's personal military secretary; 
and, Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India. 
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authority over matters pertaining to the Gulf, Eastern Arabia and Mesopotamia. Clayton's 
response to the Viceroy's concern is instructive in so far as it is explicitly links the caliphate 
with nominal leadership. He confided to Wingate: 
India seems obsessed with idea that we mean to form a powerful Arab kingdom. Such was 
never the intention and would in any case be impracticable. Whole idea was to retain friendship 
of Arabs by agreeing to recognize principle of Arab independence and promising to assist them 
to establish such forms of administration under British and French guidance as may be found 
most suitable in the various districts. The various ruling chiefs will naturally remain practically 
independent and, though the Sherif might become the nominal head of the Arab confederation 
and thus qualify himself to assume the Khalifate, the lack of cohesion which is always quoted 
is our main safeguard against the establishment of a united Arab Kingdom which might be a 
threat against British interests. 17 
The differences over the Arab Bureau brought the issue of the caliphate to the fore. Wingate 
was of the view that India's backing of Ibn Sa'ud to the detriment of Sharif Husayn's standing 
would ensure the continuation of the Turkish caliphate. So incensed was Wingate at India's 
obduracy that he took the unusual step of requesting the High Commissioner to convey his 
representations directly to the Foreign Office. 18 
Finally, it was decided to establish an 'Arab Bureau' in Cairo where all Middle Eastern 
intelligence and propaganda would be centralised. According to its constitution the first 
function of the Bureau was 'to harmonise British Political Activity in the near East, and to 
keep the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty, War Office and Government of India, 
simultaneously informed of the general tendency of German and Turkish policy. ' The 
centrality of Islam, however, was evident in the second stipulated function which 
acknowledged both the 'Indian problem' and the relevance of Islam to some of Britain's 
imperial allies. The subsidiary purpose of the Bureau was to 'co-ordinate propaganda in favour 
of Great Britain among non-Indian Moslems without clashing with the susceptibilities of 
Indian Moslems and the Entente Powers. '19 Although the Bureau was responsible for 
16 FO 882 ARB 16/4, 'Committee of Imperial Defence, Establishment of an Arab Bureau in Cairo, Report of an 
Inter-Departmental Conference, ' January 10,1916. The committee was composed of representatives of the War 
Office, Foreign Office, India Office and the Admiralty. 
17 FO 882112 IND 16/1, Telegram from Clayton to Governor General, Khartoum, 28 January 1916. 
18 FO 882 Vol. 8, IS 16/2, Telegram from the Governor General, Khartoum, to Clayton, Cairo, 15 February 1916. 
19 CAB 42n124, Secret 230-B, Committee of Imperial Defence, Meeting of 7 January 1916. 'Establishment of an 
Arab Bureau in Cairo, Report of an Inter-Departmental Conference; ' and, FO 882, ARB 15/3, 'Constitution and 
Function of the Arabian Bureau, ' undated. 
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propaganda and intelligence throughout the entire Arab region, the divergent modi operandi 
are evident in the fact that, in 'Egypt, Arabia and Turkey' these functions were to be exercised 
'directly' through 'native agents, ' whereas in the case of 'Aden, Mesopotamia and Persian 
Gulf' they were to be conducted 'indirectly' through their respective 'Political Officers. ' 
Given the discrepant proclivities of Cairo and India and the tendency for informants and 
information gatherers to reinforce each other's views the antagonism over the future of the 
caliphate was more likely to be reinforced than resolved. 
Nevertheless, Bruce Westrate is correct in his view that, 'the decision to incorporate the new 
bureau into Cairo's intelligence network had the ineradicable effect of identifying it closely 
with wartime Cairo's view of the Arab world. t2o The significance of the Arab Bureau for this 
thesis is not that it was constitutionally bound to a particular Middle Eastern policy - let alone 
the revival of an Arab caliphate, since officially the Bureau was not the institutional expression 
of that idea. Rather it combined, either directly or through association, many of the individuals 
already engaged in political intelligence work in the region who already favoured that 
particular outcome. As such the Bureau was, in practical effect, the institutional embodiment 
of the 'Cairo vision' and went some way towards facilitating the sort of coordination of 
Britain's Arab policy predicated upon the Sharif of Mecca's pre-eminence in any future bid 
for the caliphate. 
7.3 Svkes-Picot and the CaliDhate 
Before going on to examine the impact of the Arab Revolt on the idea of a an Arab caliphate 
in British thinking it is important to establish the true nature of the relationship between the 
provisional Anglo-French understanding of 1916 and the initiatives taken in Cairo in 
preparation for a revolt. There is fundamental disagreement amongst historians over the 
20 Westrate, 1992, p. 32. 
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relationship between the Anglo-Sharifian accordS21 and the so-called 'Sykes-Picot 
Agreement. ' Whereas, for example, John Fisher maintains that there was 'incompatibility 
between the "Arab" policy embodied in the McMahon correspondence and Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, ' 22 Elie Kedourie believes that the two agreements were ultimately reconcileable. 23 
Although it is not difficult to show that agreement with the French was sought primarily in 
order to fulfill the policy which had been advanced on the basis of the promises made to 
Husayn, it does not follow from this that these accords were, in fact, compatible. All that will 
be argued here is that in the minds of officials in Cairo there was indeed a compatibility 
predicated on the idea of a nominal unity and sovereignty embodied in the restoration of the 
Arab caliphate in the person of Sharif Husayn of Mecca. 
In support of the notion that 'Sykes-Picot' came out of 'Husayn-McMahon' it is worth 
recalling that Sykes himself considered that the scheme of 'a progressive state under the 
suzerainty of the Sherif would merely 'be qualified by agreements with France and Great 
Britain. ' [emphasis added, 24 A Foreign Office memorandum addressed to the High 
Commissioner in December 1915 referred simply to a meetin., with Picot 'regarding the future 
French sphere in the proposed Arab state. ' [emphasis added]25 While negotiations were under 
way, a War Office memorandum written to Sir Arthur Nicholson (who had headed the 
negotiations before being replaced by Sykes) referred, within the context of 'the approximate 
limits of the country which we and the French propose to let [the Sharia rule, ' to 'British and 
French spheres of influence in that district. ' [emphasis added] 26 Elsewhere, Nicholson 
referred to combined French and British assistance 'in the creation of an Arab State or 
21 It is a usual exercise on undergraduate Middle Eastern history courses to 'contrast and compare' these with the 
British Government's expression of sympathy with Zionism, better known as the Balfour Declaration. There is 
something of a hierarchy suggested in the generally accepted titles: 'Agreement' followed by 'Declaration' 
followed by 'Correspondence' which is not suggested by, for example, the terms 'Accord, ' 'Provisional 
Understanding, ' and 'Expression of Sympathy, ' which, it might be argued, are equally valid. 
22 Fisher, 1999, p. 87. 
23 Kedourie, 1976, pp. 126 & 232. 
24 FO 882 Vol. 13, MIS 15/18, Telegram from Sykes to Cox, 22 November 1915. 
25 FO 882 Vol II, AP 15/17, Despatch from the Foreign Office to the High Commissioner, Egypt, 27 December 
1915, enclosing a memorandum of 21 December regarding the 'Arab Question. ' 
26 FO 371/2767 385 1, MacDonagh, War Office to Sir Arthur Nicholson, 6 January 1916. 
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Confederation of Arab States. 927 The priority in this arrangement was made explicit in a 
subsequent meeting War Committee where it was stated that, 
it soon became apparent that the Arabs expected as a sine qua non condition of their entry into 
the war on the side of the Entente to be guaranteed a free Arab State or Confederation of States; 
and it became essential, therefore, to arrive at some understanding with the French on the 
question, in view of their interests in Syria. 29 
Regardless of whether either assertion was true or not, it was generally believed by British 
'Arabists' that not only had Kitchener started the Arab movement by suggesting 'the creation 
of an Arab Khalifate at Mecca and the freedom of the Arab race'29 but, according to Sykes, 
had personally 'ordered the Anglo-French negotiations . 930 Furthermore, the order of priorities 
is clear when it is realised that Clayton, for example, believed that the Sykes-Picot agreement 
ought merely to 'serve as a useful guide' and that 'this understanding should remain an 
informal one. ' 31 
The operative salience of Sharifian rule as conceived in Cairo and Khartoum is evidenced in 
Wingate's understanding of the relationship between the two agreements. He opined in the 
April of 1916 that McMahon's letter to Husayn of 26 October 1915 'would appear to include 
the districts in question in the sphere of influence over which we were prepared to admit the 
Sherif's nominal authority, although it is sufficiently vaguely worded as to admit of the 
eventual extension of French influence in these regions. ' [emphasis added]32 It is not 
surprising then that M. Picot should have deprecated the strength of the Arab movement13 and 
of pan-Islam. It would have been plain that Britain's special relationship with Sharif Husayn 
in conjunction with a revived Arab caliphate in Mecca would have afforded a rival imperial 
power an extra-territorial authority, albeit vicarious, within their own area of influence. It was 
27 FO 371/2767 23579, Arthur Nicholson to Grey, Foreign Office, 2 February 1916. This is the same report as 
that presented at the War Committee of 23 March: CAB 42/11/9, Minutes of 791h Meeting of the War Committee. 
28 CAB 42/11/5, Secret, Arab Question, Note by the Secretary War Committee of 18 March 1916. 
29 SAD CP 694/4/1-3, secret printed report headed: 'The Sherif Of Mecca and the Arab Movement, ' signed by 
the General Staff, War Office, I July 1916. 
30 PRO 30/57/91 GA2/8, Letter from Mark Sykes to George Arthur (appointed as Kitchener's official biographer 
after his death), 12 September 1916. 
31 SAD CP 694/4/4-6, Note on the Arab Question, signed GFC, 5 July 1916. 
32 SAD WP 136/5/66-68, Private letter from Wingate, Erkowit, to Clayton, 24 April 1916. 
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recorded in cabinet minutes that when Sykes entered the discussions 'he had only the de 
Bunsen Report to guide him. ' 34 The centrality of the caliphate in this important document has 
been given considerable emphasis in a previous chapter. Nevertheless, the part played by the 
caliphate issue in Britain's negotiation of the 1916 Anglo-French agreement may only be 
inferred, since nowhere is it made explicit. For example, at the same time that the Anglo- 
French negotiations over the disposition of 'Greater Syria' were being conducted Sykes 0 
expressed the view that, 
The Mosque of Omar represents, next to Mecca, the most holy and venerable shrine in Islam, 
and it must be a sine qua non that the mosque of Omar itself should be under the sole control of 
Moslems, and that the Chief of the Arabian confederation should have an equal voice in the 
administration of Palestine. 35 
While the caliphate is not explicitly referred to, Sykes' insistence provides evidence of the 
extra-territoriality implicit in the notion of some form of 'Islamic' rule by the Sharif extending 
into areas lying beyond the bounds of his secular jurisdiction. It may even be argued that the 
arrangements envisaged in the Anglo-French agreement in relation to the 'sub-contracting' of 
imperial spheres of influence within a unitary Arab state (or confederation of states), could 
only be contemplated by the British, on the presumption of their collaborative alliance with 
the Sharif of Mecca based on his unique position within Islam. In other words it was the 
specific nature of the Husayn-McMahon understanding predicated on the Sharif's eligibility 
for the caliphate which both necessitated the Sykes-Picot agreement and provided the basis of 0 
a theoretical reconciliation of the two accords. 
33 FO 892 Vol. 11, AP 15/9, record of meeting between Nicholson and Picot being the results of the second 
meeting of the Committee to discuss Arab Question and Syria - attended by those at the first meeting plus 
M. Picot, 23 November 1915. 
34 CAB 42/11/5, Secret -Arab Question, Note by the Secretary. This note was circulated at the meeting of the 
War Committee of 23 March 1916 per the minutes of the 79th meeting filed under CAB 42/11/9. 
35 FO 882, Vol. 16, SP 16/2, War Department, Secret Series, Section 1, Note by Sir Mark Sykes, 5 January 1916. 
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7.4 The Arab Revolt and the Caliphate: Ideolo2y in the Face of Practice 
According to the original conception of what has been referred to as the 'Grand plan, ' a revolt 
against Turkey by the tribes of the Hijaz led by the Sharif of Mecca ought to have presaged 
the consummation of the Western Arabian vision whose theoretical coherence, it has been 
argued, rested on the eventual restoration of the caliphate to Arabia. Providing an explanation 
of the fact that this was not the outcome, and that the idea of replacing the Ottoman caliphate 
with one at Mecca lost favour among members of the Arab Bureau during the course of the 
Revolt, is the object of this section. The tactical and logistical minutiae of the Revolt, 
therefore, are pertinent to this purpose only in so far as they impinge on British attitudes to the 
matter of the caliphate. 
Bruce Westrate's remark that, 'as for the caliphate, the Arab bureau had initially hoped to 
establish Hussein as caliph in order to enhance the international prestige of the hoped for Arab 
federation. ' [emphasis per original]36 is an indication of the changes that were about to occur. 
It is to be expected that the rather speculative issue of the caliphate might temporarily recede 
into the background during a period of military conflict, and certainly the matter was 
discussed less intensely during the early months of the Revolt. Nevertheless, there was a 
discernible change in the import of references to those issues once the Revolt started, that is, 
from one of hopeful anticipation to one of reluctant association. Though it should be stated 
that already by the end of 1915 the Cairo authority's project had encountered an impediment 
to its practical implementation. The seemingly irrevocable rejection of the 'Alexandretta 
option' by the War Cabinet in November 1915 37 was the occasion for Clayton to remark that 
too much stress had been laid on the 'positive' advantages of an alliance with the Arabs. 
Clayton believed that the 'very great "negative" advantages of denying them [the Arabs] to the 
Germans and Turks have been rather overlooked. ' This was perhaps the first indication of a 
retreat from the original grand empire-building scheme. 
36 Westrate, 1992, p. 143. 
37 CAB 42/5/8, Summary Notes of a Meeting of the War Committee, Nov. 12,1915; and, Busch, 197 1, pp. 115-6. 
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Already, then, some six months before its inception, the Arab Revolt was being re-depicted 
not as a stage in the realisation of the 'Grand plan' but purely in terms of its prophylactic 
effect. The latter would come to function as the Arab Bureau's 'fall-back position. ' The 
consequences of such a reappraisal are far-reaching. If the success of a project is to be 
measured according to its diminishing effect on some malign influence rather than by its 
contribution towards the fulfillment of some seminal vision, its implementation may be 
abandoned should that negative influence be deemed innocuous or otherwise removed. The 
full implications of this observation will be reexamined in the following chapter. 
7.41 Preparation for the Revolt and the Early Deprecation of the Sharif's Capacity for 
Aggrandisement 
For those who were enthusiastic about the idea of an Arab revolt, it was important to 
emphasise and enhance whenever possible both the secular and spiritual prestige of Sharif 
Husayn. Within the Anglo-Sharifian scheme the two factors were intimately related: his 
primacy in terms of the caliphate and his fitness to lead the Arab people in revolt being 
mutually dependent. However, whereas Husayn's standing in secular matters depended on his 
potential in the religious sphere, his attainment of the caliphate would hinge on his actual 
attainment of secular authority. Although, the Sharif had grasped this explicitly, a fact which 
had been explained by McMahon to Grey, 38 the British in Cairo were unaware of the true 
magnitude of Sharif Husayn's potential. The conceptual i sation of their collaborative 
enterprise, therefore, was based on assessments which were to a considerable degree 
speculative, being based on prejudice, supposition and wishful thinking. In this context Bruce 
Westrate's description of the situation is most apt: 
In June 1916 Sherif Hussein of Mecca raised the standard of revolt. In the frenetic weeks 
preceding this event the Arab Bureau was busy plumbing the depths of scholarly arcana for the 
most basic anthropological and geographic information about Turkish territories. At the time, 
13 FO 371/2767 30674, telegram from McMahon, the Residency, Cairo, No. 26, to Grey, 7 February 1916, 
attached to 'The literal Translation of a Letter addressed to the "Honourable Sayyid, " (Ali El Morghani), scaled 
and dated at Mecca, the 28 th December 1915. ' 
213 
the British were alarmingly ignorant with respect to geographic and political conditions in the 
Arabian Peninsula. 39 
Britain's pressing for an Arab revolt in early 1916 was bome partly out of desperation, with 
the situation in both Europe and the Middle East. The spring/summer of 1916 would turn out 
to be the lowest point of the war for Britain, the Easter of 1916 being the absolute nadir of CY 
British fortunes. Besides the surrender at Kut on 29 April, coming only four months after the 
evacuation of Gallipoli, closer to home cracks were beginning to show in the apparently solid 
edifice of the British Empire with the Easter Rising in Ireland on the 24'h. On the Western 
front some two months later, more British soldiers perished on the opening day of the Battle of 
the Somme than were lost in any single day of fighting throughout the entire war. 
40 One may 
assume that success against the Turks in Arabia, even if achieved vicariously, would have 
been most welcome. 
The problem for the Arab Bureau and its associates, however, was that as often as they made 
arguments in favour of the Sharif, others, in particular those employed by the Government of 
India, would provide evidence which denigrated his status. In January Sir Percy Cox 
circulated a memorandum reporting that neither Ibn Sa'ud nor the Shaykh of Kuwait had the 
slightest interest in the question of the caliphate .41 On seeing this report, 
Wingate responded as 
he had done to the interventions of the Agha Khan by pointing out that Ibn Sa'ud was a 
Wahhabi and therefore would not be expected to have an interest in the matter of the caliphate. 
When commenting on the Indian objection to a strong and independent Arabia to Clayton, 
Wingate responded by inferring the obvious: that 'the Indian fear that the Arab State thus 
constituted might become a menace to British interests is sufficiently discounted by the views 
expressed by these and other Eastern Arabian chiefs. 42 
39 Westrate, 1992, p. 55. 
'0 Gilbert, 1995, p. 260. 
41 SAD WP 136/l/17-18, Copy of telegram No. I. G. 1912, despatched 5 January 1916. General Force "D" to 
Intrusive Cairo, Chief of General Staff, Secretary of State and Egypt, reporting Sir P. Cox's interview with 'Ibn 
Saoud near Bahrein' on 26 December 1915, and with the 'new Sheikh of Koweit, Prince Jabar Ibn Mubarak, ' 
date not given. Cox proffered a rather different view in April 1918. See Chapter 9, Note 18. 
42 SAD WP 136/2156, Draft of telegram from Hakimam [Wingate] to Clayton, Cairo, No. 122,15 February 1916. 
The views contained in this letter were later conveyed by the High Commissioner to the Foreign Office: FO 141 
587 545/15, Letter from McMahon to Grey, No. 34,29 February 1916. 
214 
Clayton went further by insisting that it was precisely these fissiparous tendencies, presumed 
to be inherent within Arabian society, which they intended to rely on. It is only within this 
context that the subtlety (at least too subtle for India) of the idea of a nominal unity and 
sovereignty to be expressed through the caliphate and intended to satisfy the demands of pan- 
Arabism without prejudicing British rule, may be fully apprehended. He argued that Sharif 
Husayn's lack of influence in many areas was 'one of the advantageous aspects of our scheme 
& one of our great safeguards against a really powerful temporal Khalifate as opposed to the 
spiritual one which we hope will be produced out of the present chaos. ' Clayton later told 
Wingate, again in relation to India's 'obsess[ion] with the idea that we mean to form a 
powerful Arab kingdom, ' that, 'the various ruling chiefs will naturally remain practically 
independent ... though the 
Sherif might become the nontinal head of the Arab confederation 
and thus qualify himself to assume the Khalifate. 
03 He was yet to realise that even the latter 
would be precluded by the structural incapacity of the Sharif which he now celebrated. 
Moreover, the evident duplicity of this formulation was not to everyone's liking. While the 
Permanent Under Secretary at the India Office appreciated that the policy 'enabled [the Arabs] 
to present a suitable faqade to the world' he minuted that 'the danger of it ... lies 
in its 
disingenuousness. 944 
Importantly, the Arab Bureau now argued for their policy in terms which diverged 
significantly from the original rationale. Where once they spoke of 'capturing Islam' 
45 for the 
benefit of Britain, they now merely assumed that for Britain 'the threat of Islam will have 
ceased to exist if Islam can be divided against itsel f. 46 While this may not have been in 
contravention of Kitchener's original intention it represents a development not suggested 
explicitly at the beginning of the war. It would appear that besides acknowledging the need to 
4settle up with France in regard to Syria 47 Cairo now sought to recast their scheme in terms 
which inight appeal to India. 
43 FO 882 Vol. 8, IND/16/1, Telegram from Clayton to the Governor General, Khartoum, 28 January 1916. 
44 L/P&S/10/586, P 705, Minute by Holderness, 23 February 1916. 
45 This is according to the phrase coined by David Fromkin in the title of Chapter 10, Fromkin, 1991. 
46 Quoted from the 'Arabia Reports' of the week ending 16 February 1916. Ibid. 
47 Thus characterised by Sykes in PRO 30/57noWO/48a, see Note 14, above. 
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In a manner which illustrates the pure instrumentality of Arab unity from a British point of 
view, when the Indian Government cited some Nawab's objection to 'a pan-Arab union with a 
temporal authority for the Sherif, ' Sir Ronald Storrs told Clayton that only 'sufficient 
cohesion, if only for a sufficient time to expel the Turks' had ever been contemplated. Though 
he did allow that 'some form of religious supremacy for the Sherif, should surely be within the 
bounds of practicability. 948 One aspect of the 'Cairo vision, ' the functional separation of 
incommensurate temporal and religious authority based on the essential condition of the 
eventual restoration of the Arab caliphate, remained intact. McMahon, however, went further 
still by satisfying Grey of the fact that the Arab movement necessarily lacked 'organization 
and cohesion. ' The High Commissioner came close to undermining the entire scheme by 
arguing that it would be impossible 'to perfect a general organized Arab combination against 
the Turks. ý49 
As ever, Cairo continued to receive information via the courtesy of interested parties. While 
the Sharif informed the High Commissioner in February that although all of 'the persons upon 
whom they could depend' in Syria had been killed or dispersed by the Turks, his son, Faysal, 
still expected that a force 'of not less than 100,000' would congregate there with which they 
hoped to commence the 'movement. 50 To this the Sharif attached a request for E50,000 per 
month in addition to which the messenger conveyed a verbal request from 'Abdullah for 
E3,000 'for myself for my scheme. ' This he would use to convene a powerful committee of 
Muslims gathered from Arab countries who would then 'offer' the Caliphate to his father. 51 
The sheer vanity of Faysal's hope would not be grasped in Cairo for another two months but 
once apprehended would have marked consequences for the eventual conduct of the Revolt. 
There are indications that the staff of the Cairo Residency were still capable of deceiving 
themselves in order to maintain the integrity of their vision. For example, Clayton had no 
"3 FO 141 587 545/15, pp. 103-118. Handwritten notes on the caliphate, stamped by the High Commissioner, 6 
March 1916, including notes 'of certain conversations between Lt. Colonel The Nawab Sir Afsur Mulk Bahadur 
K. C. I. E. M. V. O. of Hyderabad, India, and Lt. General Sir Edwin Locke Elliot, dealing with the district of 
Hadjaz, and the Mohamadan religion as it effects the political situation in the present war, ' and, Note from Storrs, 
The Residency, Cairo, to Clayton, 6 March 1916. 
49 FO 371/2767 54229, Telegram No. 204, from McMahon, Egypt, to the Foreign Office, 21 March 1916. 
so FO 882 Vol. 19, AB 16/5, Sherif of Mecca to HC, 18 February 1916. 
51 Kedourie, 1976, pp. 120-121. 
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problem in arguing that the Sharif's recent overtures to Imam Yahya, and his intention to wean 
al-ldrisi from the Turks, constituted 'further proof of the manner in which the Sherif has been 
able to expand his influence and of the extreme value of having him definitely on our side. ' 52 _ 
even though it quite obviously did nothing of the sort. During March, however, Wingate and 
Clayton 53 were able to confide to one another that they were satisfied with the way things were 
now moving, Wingate being 'full of hope that the Arab Policy which we initiated so long ago 
is really going to materialize. ' 54 Surprisingly, this policy received a welcome fillip vis-b-vis 
the objections of the Indian Government. Captain Lawrence, now working for the Arab 
Bureau, reported from Basra that Shakespear of the Indian Political Service, and Political 
Agent in Kuwait, had written, shortly before his death that, 'if the Sultan of Turkey were to 
disappear the Khalifate by the common consent of Islam would fall to the family of the 
Prophet the present representative of which is the Sherif of Mecca. In this case he would 
command the support of the Ibn Saud. ' These words were of particular significance coming 
from someone who, apparently, had 'entered into relations of political and personal friendship 
with Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. 55 Shakespear's original report was by now well over a year old 
and might reasonably have been considered obsolete, however, a note had been added 
pointedly to Lawrence's cablegram which said: 'This posthumous dictum of Major 
Shakespeare [sic] is of interest in regard to India contention that Sherif is of no influence in 
Arabia generally. ' 56 
7.42 The Confinement of the Revolt to the Hijaz 
On 18 April 1916 the Sharif wrote a letter to McMahon in which he emphasised the fact that a 
revolt could not possibly commence in Syria due to the large number of Turkish troops 
stationed there, unless Britain landed in Syria in order to sever the railway connecting it to 
52 SAD WP 136/3/1, Letter from Clayton, Army HQ, The Force in Egypt, Cairo, to Wingate, 3 March 1916. 
53 SAD CP 693/10/17-18, Letter from Clayton, Intelligence Section (Cairo), General HQ, EEF, to Wingate, 28 
March 1916. 
54 SAD CP 470/l/94-101, Private letter from Wingate, at a 'Canip near El Obeid, ' to Clayton, 17 March 1916. 
55 Fromkin, 199 1, p. 107. 
56 FO 141 857 545115, p. 122, Cablegram from Capt. Lawrence, Basra, to Intrusive, Cairo, 9 April 1916, 
containing an extract from a letter from Shakespear, Riadh, to Cox, 17 January 1915. Seven days later 
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Anatolia. 57 According to Eliezer Tauber, Faysal had already decided that the revolt should be 
started in Hijaz and not Syria and had 'also recommended that his father postpone the Revolt 
until contacts with the British were concluded, and preferably until a landing by the allies at 
Alexandretta. 958 While the British had always sought a collaborative alliance with an Arab 
party who would remain dependent on its imperial sponsor it would always be a fine balance. 
However, once an intervention in Syria had been ruled out, Sharif Husayn and the increasingly 
elusive 'Arab movement' must have appeared to them as something of a liability with no 
organisational capacity of their own. 
Clayton's reaction to the news was unequivocal being one of chagrin. He confided to Wingate: 
The SHERIF allows that SYRIA is useless for revolutionary purposes. Can we expect that the 
HEDJAZ Arabs with their proverbial lack of organisation, and far from their base, can do more 
than waste our money and supplies in a series of aimless and indecisive raids in a country 
which they are too uncivilised ever to rule as it should be ruled? 
His overriding concern, however, seemed to be for the ultimate transfer of the caliphate to the 
Sharif, since he added that, 'if the SHERM is sufficiently powerful temporally to accept the 
Khalifate if offered to him by consensus of Moslem opinion, it is sufficient. ' Wingate's reply 
is instructive in linking the Sharif s prospects of becoming caliph to the features of Syria 
referred to earlier. The Governor General offered the view that although, CD 
it might be more convenient if the Sherif would confine his activity to the "desert" and 
Southern Arabia ... 
it must be remembered that his desire to strengthen his position in the 
Syrian hinterland is intimately connected with his aspirations to the Khalifate, and that these 
latter aspirations are at least as important an influence on his actions as his hostility to the 
Turks. 59 
Wingate was less equivocal the following day when he explained more fully his reservations 
about limiting the Sharif s operations to the Hijaz. He wrote: 'I do not think we ought to risk a 
serious difference of opinion with him on this point, as no doubt his aspirations, especially in 
Shakespear was killed while witnessing a battle between Ibn Sa'ud of Najd and Ibn Rashid chief of the Jabal 
Shammar region of central Arabia. McKale, 1998, pp. 99-100. 
57 FO 882 Vol. 19, AB 16/ 10, Sherif of Mecca to the High Commissioner, 18 April 1916. 
58 Tauber, 1993, p. 78. 
59 SAD WP 136/5/65, Secret telegram no. 448 from Governor General, Erkowit, to Clayton, Cairo, 23 April 
1916. 
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the direction of the Khalifate, must lie largely in his acquiring influence, both temporal and 
spiritual, in the northern districts of his embryonic kingdom. ' 60 As will be seen later, the 
Sharif's confinement to what amounted to his own backyard would have serious consequences 
for his wider aspirations whether temporal or spiritual. 
For Clayton the only compensating factor was that the threat of jihad would have been largely 
dispelled since once the Sharif had committed himself to fighting the Turks the British would 
have succeeded in 'draw[ing] the guardian of the Holy Places to the side of the Allies' and in 
damaging 'Turkish prestige in the Mohammedan world. 96 1 The High Commissioner, on the 
other hand, was content to see the Sharif clear the Turks from the Hijaz and the Yemen. 62 In 
May Faysal's 'northern project' was formally vetoed and the Residency cautioned the Sharif 
to confine his operations to the Hijaz and Yemen. Husayn had little choice but to agree. 
Internally the doubts over Faysal's Syrian ambitions were rationalised in terms of 'French 
susceptibilities, ' 63 however, these were somewhat superfluous in the light of the fact that it 
was already understood that a revolt in the north would depend on British intervention at 
Alexandretta. It is impossible to say with certainty whether the British would have supported 
the revolt in Syria regardless of French objections, had such an uprising been expected to 
succeed. Wingate, evidently sensing that his grander vision might never be realised, continued 
to petition, unsuccessfully, for a landing at Alexandretta, 64 however the Chief of Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS) deprecated all adventures outside the main theatre in France being a 
strong advocate of concentration on the Western Front. 65 Kitchener's death in early June 
made it unlikely that any person of lesser status with access to the Cabinet would champion 
the 'Alexandretta option' ever again. 
60 SAD WP 136/5/66-68, Private letter from Wingate, Erkowit, to Clayton, 24 April 1916. 
61 'FO 882 Vol. 19, AB 16/18, Clayton to Director of Military Intelligence, War Office, London, 17 May 1916. 
'52 FO 882 Vol. III, HRG 16/4, Telegram from Clayton, Cairo to Governor General, Erkowit, 22 April 1916. 
63 SAD WP 159/5/8-11, Private letter from Clayton, HQ Army of Occupation, Cairo, to Wingate, I May 1916; 
SAD WP 159/5/64-65, Private letter from Wingate to Wilson, 7 May 1916; SAD WP 136/6/46-5 1, Telegram no. 
360 from Clayton, Cairo, to Hakimam, Khartoum, 10 May 1916; and, FO 882 Vol 19, AB 16/17, Reply from the 
High Commissioner to the Sharif of Mecca, 22 May 1916. 
64 SAD WP 2oo/4n- i o, Private letter from Wingate to Clayton, 22 May 1916; and, SAD WP 137/5/14-16, Letter 
from Wingate to General Robertson, CIGS, War Office, London, 22 June 1916. 
65 SAD WP 138/8/46, Letter from Sir William Robertson, War Office, to Wingate, II July 1916. 
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Towards the end of May 1916, Husayn recalled Faysal from Syria 66 in order to concentrate all 
efforts in the south and to prevent him being taken hostage by the Turks on their receiving 
news of a rebellion in the Hijaz. On 5 June the Sharif of Mecca informed Storrs that he was 
ready to start the revolt. 67 With the notable exception of Clayton, no Briton would ever speak 
again about Sharif Husayn's prospects of becoming caliph with anything approaching 
enthusiasm. The precise reasons for this will be examined in the remaining sections of his 
chapter. 
7.43 'Sharif Husayn's Revolt' and the Question over Landing British Troops in the Hijaz 
The Arab Revolt was begun at Medina by the Sharif's sons, Faysal and 'Ali, on 5 June 1916, 
and was soon followed by actions under the leadership of Husayn and 'Abdullah at Mecca, 
Ta'if and Jiddah . 
68 The end of the Revolt is conventionally marked by the taking of Damascus 
at the beginning of October 1918. In fact, Damascus had already been occupied by an 
Australian cavalry brigade on I October, two days before Faysal's 'triumphal' entry into the 
city. This had been a mistake, a deviation from Clayton's and General Allenby's 'script. 69 
This final act of the Revolt, and the pretence which ensued, is indicative of its conduct almost 
from the outset. It may be argued that only the first six months of the insurrection - that is 
before the instigation of a British-led guerrilla war - may properly be called 'Sharif Husayn's 
Revolt, ' though even this phase of the Revolt had been sustained by British assistance. It was 
the problems associated with the provision of direct British support which soon induced a 
revision of the Sharifian policy, and which are of particular interest here in so far as they 
affected British attitudes towards the future of the caliphate. 
One way or another the Revolt had been in preparation since the arrival of Husayn's first letter 
at the Cairo Residency sometime in August 1915. It later became a matter of some urgency for 
Husayn when he was informed by Cemal Pasha that the Turks were about to send a force to 
66 SAD WP 136/6/126-13 1, Telegram no. 143 from Wilson, Port Sudan, to Hakimam, Khartoum, 26 May 1916. 
67 FO 882 Vol. 19, AB 16/20, 'Sherif of Mecca' to Storrs, 5 June 1916. 
68 Wilson, 1990, p. 287. 
69 Fromkin, 1990, pp. 336-37. 
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the Hijaz in order to crush him. Notwithstanding the assertions subsequently made by those 
who championed the Revolt, it may be said with some justification that, in terms of the claims 
originally made by its advocates, it was an almost complete failure. This is evident from the 
indicators summarised by David Fromkin: 70 
(a) The expected mass defection of Arab troops from the Ottoman army never took place - 
certainly not the 100,000 suggested by Husayn. 
(b) There was no defection of important political or military figures. 
(c) al-Faruqi's secret military organisation failed to appear. 
(d) Husayn never formed a regular army. Only a few thousand subsidised tribesmen joined the 
Revolt, who, it may be added, turned out to be quite unreliable especially when the 
subsidies were delayed or not forthcoming. 
(e) There was no visible support for the Revolt in any other part of the Arab world. 
Nevertheless, it should be stated clearly at this point that, taken in its entirety, the Revolt did 
aid British ambitions considerably, albeit not in the terms in which it was originally conceived. 
There can be no question that the Revolt prevented the Turks from reinforcing their garrisons 
in the Hijaz to a critical degree, nor that by distracting, and absorbing the energies of, the 
Ottoman army east of the Jordan it enabled the British to prevail in Palestine. It may be argued 
that because of the Revolt many tribes, although not actually affiliating to the Sharifian 
movement, failed to fight for the Turks and so assisted the Allied cause. One may speculate 
that the predominantly 'Sharifian' nature of the Revolt lessened the likelihood of a potentially 
less compliant secular Arab movement from emerging at that time. 
More importantly in relation to the reappraisal which would follow, the successes which could 
be claimed on behalf of the Revolt depended very much on British military, logistic and 
organisational support, even before the phase of guerrilla war under T. E. Lawrence's 
guidance and leadership during 1917-18. Almost immediately, the Sharif's forces proved 
inadequate against Ottoman artillery and were immediately repulsed at Ta'if, Mecca, Medina 
and Jiddah. Although Rabigh and Yanbu' were overrun with ease they were barely defended, 
70 Fromkin, 1990, Chapter 28. 
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and in any case the Red Sea coast was, by then, under the protection of the Royal Navy. 
Jiddah was only taken after a British air and sea bombardment, and Mecca and Ta'if with the 
help of Egyptian Muslim troops supplied by Britain. Most notably, Medina was never taken 
from the Turks during the war and was only given up after the Mudros armistice. 71 According 
to Clayton the Revolt had gone off at 'half cock. ý72 The fact that he expressed the view, as 
early as July 1916, that for the sake of British and Sharifian prestige it would preferable for the 
Turks to relieve the siege at Medina rather than it be taken by Husayn only for it to be lost 
shortly afterwards, is an indication of the rapid loss of confidence experienced by British 
enthusiasts for the Arab movement. Moreover, the lesson leamt was an expensive one - the 
final cost to Britain of this entire episode has been estimated at approximately LIO million, a 
huge sum at the time. 73 
Given the solemn pledge made by Britain to Muslims at large, to the effect that there would be 
no interference by Britain in matters of a religious nature, and more specifically that the 
independence and inviolability of the Holy Places would be respected under all circumstances, 
it is understandable that there was considerable unease felt by the British concerning anything 
amounting to more than symbolic support for the Hijaz revolt. One might also have expected 
that Cairo and India would have been in agreement over this issue at least. However, only ten 
days into the insurrection, the latter were moved to object to the naval bombardment of Jiddah. 
Significantly, the Arab Bureau director's defence of the action was couched in Islamic- 
religious terms. Hogarth argued that Jiddah was in no way considered to be a 'Holy City' and 
that the ... Haram" (holy precinct) of Mecca is fixed east of Haddah which is 28 miles inland 
from Jiddah. 74 Nevertheless, one can imagine that the actual landing of Christian troops in the 
vicinity might have been regarded as something of a taboo by all concerned. The discussion 
turned very quickly to the provision of Muslim troops, though this was not without problems 
of its own also connected with religious sentiment. Wingate originally proposed sending 
71 This entire summary is gleaned from, Fromkin, 1989, Ch. 29. 
72 FO 882 Vol. 11, ARB 16/17, Clayton to French, 27 July 1916. Apart from Medina being better defended than 
other cities by the Turks it was inaccessible to (he British for politico-religious, as well as geographical, reasons. 
73 Fromkin, 1990, p. 311. This sum may be estimated to be of the order of one percent of the entire cost of the 
war to Britain according to the statistics provided by Colin Nicolson. Nicolson, 2001, p. 249. However, the 
Revolt did provide 'legitimising cover' for the acquisition of new colonies. 
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Sudanese troops since he believed that Egyptians may well have been induced to 
conscientiously object on the grounds that they may not be forced to support a 'cause which 
mean[t] the ousting of the present Khalif of Islam and his substitution by a pretender. ' 
75 
Assessments of the Revolt's progress became ever more pessimistic with the very real 
prospect of the Turks recapturing Mecca. The main British concern was 'the grave damage ... 
to [British] prestige throughout the Moslem world. ' The effect on a policy predicated on the 
usurpation of the caliphate by the Sharif of Mecca need hardly be stated. The author of an 
Arab Bureau report wrote: 
I fully appreciate the political and religious objections to landing British Government troops in 
the Hijaz and the capital which hostile propagandists will make of such action, especially in 
India, but it is a matter for H. M. G. to decide whether this would not be preferable to the very 
serious situation which might result from the total collapse of the Arab movement, which it 
must be remembered has the sympathy if not the actual support of the majority of Arab raceS. 
76 
Such was the degree of sensitivity felt on the Sharif's side that, according to al-Faruqi, Husayn 
had even forbade British troops, engaged in unloading armaments, ammunition and other 
much-needed supplies, from coming ashore at Rabigh in order to stem rumours that he was 'in 
the hands of the British. ' According to Wilson, the Sharif merely wished 'to show the people 
that [he] could give what orders he pleased to the representatives of the British Government. 77 
Hogarth, on the other hand, thought it unlikely that the Sharif would 'admit [British] armed 
co-operation to [the] interior of [the] Hejaz' because he did not want 'to be thought to wish to 
divide Islam, or oppose the Caliph, or, in any way, prejudice the stability of the Faith. '78 Since 
Hogarth believed that tribal chauvinism and ignorance would become a critical factor even if 
the Sharif s permission were forthcoming, 79 he resolved to push for the secret appointment of 
Colonel C. E. Wilson as military liaison officer with the Sharif. 80 
74 FO 14 in 10/3156, File headed 'Public assurances to the Arabs in regard to their independence, the inviolability 
of the Holy Places, ' note from D. G. Hogarth, General Staff, Intelligence Section HQ, Savoy Hotel, Cairo, to 
McMahon, 15 June 1916. 
75 SAD CP 470/l/91-94, Very private letter from Wingate, Erkowit, to Clayton, 18 June 1916. 
76 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/30, Arab Bureau memorandum, July 1916, [probably authored by T. E. Lawrence or 
C. E. Wilson]. 
77 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/31, Cornwallis to the Director of the Arab Bureau, 8 July 1916. 
78 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/32, 'Note on the situation in the Hejaz and the Arab Movement, ' 30 July 1916. 
79 SAD WP 160/1/31-32, Letter from Hogarth, Arab Bureau, Savoy Hotel, Cairo, to Wingate, 13 July 1916. 
80 SAD WP 138/11/8-9, Copy of telegram No. 587, McMahon, Bacos, to Wingate, Erkowit, Sudan, 16 July 1916. 
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Faysal's attitude towards the matter betrayed a more secular pan-Arab approach than his 
father's. According to Wilson's account Faysal told him in September that a visible show of 
support by Britain was exactly what was required to 'buck up the Arabs and ... make 
"fence- 
sitters" get down on the Sherif's side. 81 Conveniently for Faysal, who had his own ambitions 
in the north, the British presumed that the religious objections to a landing in the Hijaz would 
not apply to a British occupation of 'Aqaba. 82 Notwithstanding such exceptions, the upshot of 
these reports during the early weeks of the Revolt was that it soon became apparent that the 
perceived religious factor, that is, the Sharif's geographical position in the Hijaz combined 
with the prestige associated with his supposed pre-eminence in any future competition over 
the caliphate, had overwhelmingly negative effects on the ability of Britain to support the 
Revolt. Ironically, apart from the taboo against landing Christian troops in the vicinity of the 
Holy Places there was the increasingly evident fact that the quality and extent of the Sharif's 
following, such as it was, was in no way determined by ideological or religious factors. 
Rather, the rallying of the tribes to the Sharif's cause would depend largely on his ability to 
pay for their allegiance, and, to a lesser degree, on the morale and motivation contingent upon 
success in the field. 83 Such a view was bound to have an effect on the importance hitherto 
attached to the matter of the caliphate, and in particular, to Britain's effective endorsement of 
Sharif Husayn's claim. 
In spite of the foregoing, and even as expectations concerning the future of the Revolt 
diminished, discussion of a landing in the Hijaz continued into 1917. In October 1916 the War 
Committee in London rejected such a request from Wingate and McMahon. The did so, not ID y 
only because of the likely reaction of the Muslim world to a Christian incursion in the vicinity 
of the Haramain (Holy Places, specifically Mecca and Medina), but on the grounds that such 
an action would be a violation of Britain's pledge of non-interference in the area of the Islamic 
Holy Places. 94 Again in November, the War Committee considered the option of landing 
81 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/42, Wilson to McMahon, dispatch No. 5, concerning a meeting with Faysal at 
Yanbo, I September 1916. 
82 PRO Arab Bureau Papers, FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/43, 'Note on the occupation of Akaba by a British Force, 
as affecting the operations at present conducted by the Sherif of Mecca, ' 2 September 1916. 
83 Ibid. 
84 McKale, 1998, p. 188. 
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troops at Rabigh. General Robertson's summing up, in which he placed much reliance on a 
report drafted in September by Sykes, was entirely negative. He described such an action as 'a 
leap in the dark' since, 'it is quite uncertain what the effect of such action upon the Arabs may 
be, and even if we receive satisfactory assurances from the Shereef, it must be remembered 
that his authority over the Arabs is of the slightest. It is, therefore, conceivable that the 
proposed expedition may defeat its own ends. ' The Committee did, however, agree to an 
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) occupation of al-'Arish and to the support of a Sharifian 
force at 'Aqaba, although, Sykes' rationalisation of the former as a means of saving the Arab 
movement in the Hijaz by 'menac[ing] Southern Palestine' belied Britain's independent 
agenda there. 
Although Robertson's conclusions seemed absolute, it was perhaps natural that Lloyd- 
George's new Government 85 should review the option of a landing at Rabigh at their first War 
Committee on 9 December. Nevertheless, it seems more likely that it was the imminent 
collapse of the Sharif's revolt which induced them to reconsider. At this juncture the question 
of British military prestige and political standing in the Muslim world seems to have overtaken 
the issue of Islamic sensitivities over a Christian intrusion into the Hijaz in their deliberations. 
The meeting was in fact inconclusive: while the Indian Government were flatly against a 
landing, the Secretary of State for India thought it a lesser evil than allowing the Sharif to 
collapse. 86 This dichotomy, above all else, illustrates the very real contradiction at the heart of 
the Sharifian policy which had hitherto remained theoretical. 
The views expressed within the Arab Bureau during the last quarter of 1916 87 were rather 
more diverse, which, given the usual concordance over British aims and means found within 
the institution, is an indication of the intractability of the issue. While George Lloyd NIP was 
more concerned with the effect on Husayn's credibility among the tribes, Parker supported a 
British landing on the grounds that withdrawal would indicate a lack of interest in the Sharif's 
retaining the territory. Hogarth, on the other hand, was against intervention for fear of enerny 
propaganda concerning British territorial aspirations, whereas Fforde opposed it because he 
85 A new coalition government under Lloyd-George replaced the one under Asquith on 6 December 1916. 
86 CAB 23/1, Minute II of WC 1,9 December 1916. 
87 Westrate, 1992, pp. 64-66. 
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thought it would actually lead to a permanent British occupation. Although Hogarth believed 
that 'the Hejaz must be signally infringed in order to purge Islam of its medievalism, and 
neutralise for ever its potentiality of being an armed conspiracy, ' now was not the time to 
'affront ... the Moslem world. ' 
There was, nevertheless, one member of the Arab Bureau who continued to view the caliphate 
issue as paramount. Wilson, who was positioned more closely to the Sharif than any of his 
colleagues, advised the Arab Bureau in January 1917 that, 
we run a dangerous risk of general Moslem trouble if we have not the Sherif's request for 
British troops ... and it is possible that the landing of troops 
in Hejaz would seriously prejudice 
the Sherif's claim to Caliphate which, in my opinion, is the greatest asset we would obtain from 
his revolt apart from getting the Arabs on our side during the war. 88 
Taken together, the views expressed here indicate that in certain quarters at least Islamophobia 
continued to be a significant feature of British deliberations about the future of the Middle 
East and even at this stage manifested itself in both its negative (antagonistic) and positive 
(collaborative) forms. As the quotation from Wilson shows, in spite of the experience of the 
Revolt, the 'Grand plan' inherited by the Arab Bureau was perhaps moribund, rather than 
dead, at the end of 1916. 
Although Wingate was eventually given permission in December to land a brigade of British 
(Christian) troops in the Hijaz, in fact he had none to spare. At the same time it was hoped that 
news of the Sinai offensive might assist the Sharif's campaign. It was anticipated, wrongly in 
fact, that this would induce the tribes of Southern Palestine to join the Sharif's revolt and that 
the Turks would be isolated in Medina and starved of provisions. Consequently the Rabigh 
request was no longer considered an urgent matter. 89 
Finally, in mid-October 1916 a solution was proposed to the problems associated with direct 
and overt British engagement in the Arab Revolt which took account of the kind of human raw 
material upon which Sharif Husayn was forced to rely. During his brief tenure as Chief of 
88 FO 14 1 f736, folio 231, telegram from Wilson, Jeddah, to Arbur, Cairo, 7 January 1917. 
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Staff of a section of the Sharif's forces, 'Ali al-Masri9o suggested to both Storrs and Lawrence 
the idea of an Arab guerrilla campaign against the Turks. He did so in order to obviate the 
need for the direct support of either Allied Christian or Muslim troops for the reasons already 
discussed. Al-Masri's idea was subsequently taken up by Colonel Wilson 91 and adopted with 
even greater enthusiasm by Lawrence. Lawrence later recommended that he (Lawrence) join 
with Faysal in a clandestine guerrilla war in which he would engage in brief skirmishes with 
the Turks and sabotage the Hijaz Railway. In this manner it was hoped that Faysal's ambition 
of a movement towards the north could be combined with the exclusion of the French from 
military engagement in that area: a firmly held objective among Lawrence's colleagues in the 
Arab Bureau. 
The story of Lawrence's part in the Arab Revolt in the northern Hijaz, Transjordan and central 
Syria - or at least legendary versions of it - are well known. Lawrence took up his new 
position in December 1916, his campaign being sustained with shipments of gold from Cairo. 
His endeavors received the wholehearted support of Wingate who replaced McMahon as High 
Commissioner in January 1917. It is sufficient, for the purposes of this thesis, to point out 
what is generally overlooked, which is that the part of Lawrence's career for which he later 
became famous evolved as a necessary consequence of the central contradiction in the British 
Sharifian caliphate policy. That the Sharif had been selected by Britain as a collaborative 
partner in her Middle Eastern scheme primarily because of his supposed spiritual-religious 
credentials, was the very factor that now prevented Britain from aiding him directly and 
openly. As has been reiterated throughout this thesis, for the first two years of the First World 
War this policy rested on the idea of the restoration of the Arab caliphate with Britain's 
support. However, the developments described above caused the British to revise their policy, 
particularly in relation to the more grandiose aspirations appertaining to the caliphate. It is the 
precise development of this reappraisal which is the subject of the following section. 
89 CAB 23/1, Minute 5 of WC 8,15 December 1916; Minute 3 of WC 11,19 December 1916; and, Minute 4 of 
WC 29,8 January 1917. 
90 Fromki n, 199 1, pp. 220 & 225-7. 
91 FO 882, Vol. VI, HRG 16/93, Wilson, Yanbo, to Wingate, 28 December 1916. 
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7.44 The Sharif's Revolt and the Reappraisal of Britain's Arab Poligy 
Within two weeks of the commencement of the Revolt, Mark Sykes distributed a report 
headed 'The Problem Of The Near East. ' He did so however not directly in connection with 
the early fortunes of the Sharif's rebellion but in response to a report emanating from the 
Political Department of the India Office. There was little remarkable about Hirtzel's 
memorandum except-that it opened with a quotation from an academic source. A German 
author had written earlier that year: 'If the alliance between Central Europe and the East can 
be broken up English world-power is saved. If not, even tolerably favourable terms of peace 
elsewhere will hardly compensate. ' The report went on in the familiar alarmist tones about 
'Germany's Mittel-Europa scheme' and the fact that 'The pan-Islamic danger [was] a real and 
permanent one. ' 92 Unusually, however, the report acknowledged the part played by the 
Government of India, in particular the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909,93 in making Muslim 
opinion a corporate political force. The implications for Britain's Sharifian policy were 
obvious: support for the Sharif must not result in a strong Arab or Muslim political identity 
which might later prove troublesome. 
While agreeing with Hirtzel's premises Sykes did not concur entirely with his conclusions. In 
response Sykes spelled out the dangers of a caliphate, which, like the current one, retained 
control over Islam. Such an institution, in his view, might remain 'an international pawn in 
Palestine which gives her a hold at once over the Zionists, the papacy and the Orthodox, a 
strangle hold on Russia in the Bosphorus, and a monopoly of certain oilfields essential to 
maritime, aerial, and industrial power. ' 94 Although Sykes advocated support for the Sharif's 
92 FO 371/2778 130553, Memorandum by Political Department, India Office, 25 May 1916. The quotation is 
taken from a Dr. Rohrbach in a paper entitled "Deutsche Politik", p. 292, published on II February 1916. 
Anxiety over 'Mittel-Europa' (see Chapter 2, Note 121) may have been felt more acutely in India, since the 
scheme was an imperial one designed to sever communications between the colony and the metropolis. A 
detailed map outlining the scheme was filed at the India Office in September, 1916. UP&S/10/586, File 
705/1916 pts 1,2. Arab Revolt : Sir Mark Sykes' report etc. 1916-17, includes a map headed 'Berlin - Baghdad 
or "Mittel Europa". ' 
93 These were the reforms instigated by John Morley, Liberal Secretary of State for India, and Minto, the Viceroy 
which introduced representation along confessional lines in an attempt to weaken the force of class politics, 
especially that of the lower classes. 
94 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/Il 13, 'The problem Of The Near East' - Secret, 20 June 1916. 
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revolt in terms which were entirely anti-Turk there was no hint of any desire to enhance the 
Sharif's standing or secure his future as an independent secular or spiritual ruler. 
In a later memorandum Hirtzel was subtly contradicted by his under-secretary, Holderness, 
who wrote, 'there is reason to conclude, both from the past history of Muhammedanisrn and 
from the events of the present war, that pan Islamism as a motive force can easily be over- 
rated. ' He went on to describe 'want of cohesion' and 'sectarian divisions and animosities' 
and added, presciently, that, 'it may be said that in the regions where Muhammedanism has 
been dominant nationality has been stronger than community of creed. ' With regard to the 
threat of German pan-Islam he declared: 
It would be strange if, on his attempting to direct the movement and asserting himself for this 
purpose, he did not find himself in collision with it. ... For any European Power to fan the 
flame of pan-Islamism, while itself aiming at the supreme control over a Muhammadan State, 
would in all probability prove in the long run a dangerous game. 95 
Hirtzel would later come to the same view. In October he submitted a paper to the War 
Cabinet in which he quoted another German author at great length, again undermining the fear 
of political pan-Islam which had inspired much of Britain's policy towards Arabia during the 
war. Pertinent among the ten pages of quotations is a passage which read: 
The pre-supposition for an immediate general rising of Islam would have been the recognition 
of the Turkish khalifate by all orthodox Mohammedans and complete unity of Islam. But these 
are unattainable, if only because of the diversity of economic interests, which in many places 
are so closely bound up with those of the English, French, &C. 96 
This too would prove prophetic, anticipating the situation which eventuated after the war. 
However, for the time being, the effect of such an assessment was that it took the wind out of 
the sails of a policy driven, to a considerable extent, by Islamophobia. The irony was that this 
tentative re-examination was generated not by information supplied by the British intelligence 
services but by views originating within the German academe. 
95 FO 371/2778 130553, note by the Under Secretary of State, India Office, T. W. Holderness, 13 June 1916. 
96 CAB 42/23/6, Paper, dated 31 October 1916, submitted by Sir A. Hirtzel for circulation at the War Committee 
summarising a book by Dr. Franz Stuhimann entitled, The FightforArabia between Turkey and England. 
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During the first months of the Revolt a more fundamental, though equally unsystematic, 
reappraisal of the Sharifian policy also took place in Cairo, the War Office and Foreign Office 
which resulted directly from the early failures of the revolt in the Hijaz. In late June an Arab 
Bureau memorandum warned of the possible consequences for Britain of a total collapse in the 
Sharif's movement. In particular the report was concerned that, 'Accusations would be made 
that we had callously exploited Islam for our own purposes: we should be looked upon as a 
faithless friend and a feeble enemy. Our position in the Mohammedan world would deteriorate 
greatly and other most unfortunate results might folloW. 997 The only optimism which the Arab 
Bureau could generate at this time was of a somewhat spurious nature. It was probably no 
coincidence that al-Faruqi, no doubt wishing to maintain British enthusiasm for the Sharif, 
reported that both al-ldrisi and the Imam of Yemen had already accepted Husayn's suzerainty, 
and, moreover, that the Sharif was hopeful of forming a regular army of 30,000 men with a 
view to invading Syria. 98 
As for the War Office, a report signed by the General Staff surmised that although, 
he has always represented himself, in his correspondence with the High Commissioner, as 
being the spokesman of the Arab nation, ... so far as is known, 
he is not supported by any 
organization of Arabs nearly general enough to secure, even throughout the larger part of the 
Arab area, the automatic acceptance of the terms agreed to by him. It would, therefore, befiaile 
to treat with him alone and to assume that through him all Arabs could be influenced and 
bound. [emphasis added]99 
It is clear from the report that it was intended to re-examine the promises made to Husayn in 
order to reduce their effect to a minimum should this prove necessary. Furthermore, doubts 
were expressed over the 'religious' import of the uprising and it was thought unlikely that the 
Revolt would have much effect on the Turkish army by inducing major desertions and 
defections. More importantly, at the meeting of the War Committee of 6 July those present 
were reminded by Sykes that Britain had never agreed to 'do more than approve an Arab 
Khalifate, if set up by the Arabs themselves. "Oo Such a reiteration of policy at this juncture 
97 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/20, Arab Bureau memorandum, 25 June 1916. 
98 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/27, Cablegram Arbur to Dirmilint, London, 3 July 1916. 
99 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/II 14, 'The Sherif Of Mecca And The Arab Movement' - Secret, signed - General 
Staff, War Office, I July 1916. 
100 CAB 42/16/-, Appendix 'A' of papers circulated at the War Committee of 6 July 1916, headed: 'Points 
relating to the Agreement between the Shereef and Great Britain. ' 
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was most pertinent given that this must have looked an unlikely prospect at that time. Given 
that the Sharif was clearly in need of British support, by implication the ability of the Arabs to 
establish a caliphate 'by themselves' would in fact depend on Britain. Sykes' presentation to 
the War Committee was in all likelihood based on a report prepared by Hogarth which had 
used identical language. However, Hogarth, conceded that, in the negotiations between 
McMahon and Husayn, although 'nothing was stipulated about either the union of the 
independent Arabs under the Sherif or any other single chief ... some spiritual union may be 
implied in the provision about an Arab Khalifate. '101 
Even Wingate, the most consistent Sharifian stalwart, was forced to revise his assessment of 
Husayn's prospects within days of the opening of the Revolt. He told General Murray, 
Commander of the EEF, that the Hijaz revolt had barely impacted upon Turkish pan-Islamic 
propaganda in India, though he argued that Husayn should therefore be supported all the more 
wholeheartedly. 1 02 Clayton was in agreement with this conclusion, and in late July while still 
in London wrote to Wingate to say that both the Foreign Office and India Office had lost 
enthusiasm for the Revolt largely due to negative reactions in India., 
03 Wingate was both 
puzzled and disappointed by such news. While he insisted that as a device for dividing Islam, 
the Sharif's revolt was still the 'best card in the pack, ' he confessed despairingly: 'I fear we 
don't know how to play it. "04 While the implications of the foregoing for Sharif Husseins' 
caliphate ambitions are obvious, the issue was little discussed during the early months of the 
Revolt. It would appear that the subject had become something of an embarrassment which 
merely served to highlight the shortcomings of British policy and, more to the point, of British 
policy makers, advisers and intelligence operatives. 
The War Office, although still enthusiastic about the meagre successes of the Revolt, now 
feared 'that [the Sharifs] triumphs might have made him a little "previous" with regard to the 
101 FO 882 Vol II, AP 16/2, Report by Hogarth, [undated but probably completed sometime between late March 
and the outbreak of the Revolt]. 
102 SAD WP 138/3/31-32, Letter from Wingate, Erkowit, to Murray, 4 July 1916. 
103 SAD WP 160/l/68-9, 'Very Private' Letter from Clayton, General Staff HQ, Savoy Hotel, Cairo, to Wingate, 
20 July 1916. 
104 SAD WP 201/3/106-109, Letter from Wingate to Clayton, Cairo, 30 July 1916. 
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Khalifate. ' 105 They remained hopeful that the Sharif would have the sense to bide his time. In 
certain quarters, then, there was still a desire to see the Sharif attain the caliphate eventually, 
however, whereas before, their tendency might have been to act to hasten such an outcome, 
now they were more inclined to intervene in order to postpone the very same. 
Just as in the past, the enthusiasts of the 'Cairo scheme' had always resorted to defending their 
policy by resort to the 'Islamic bogey' when hard pressed, so they would again when it 
appeared to fail in practice. By the end of September, even Clayton, one of the foremost 
advocates of the Sharifian policy, was reduced to upholding the Revolt in the most defensive 
and negative terms. In a secret note he wrote that, 
the main factor that recommended the Sherif's revolt was that, whether it succeeded or failed, 
our military commitment would be small and we should be able to counteract, by diplomacy 
alone, the evil effects in eastern eyes upon British prestige caused by the evacuation of Sinai, 
the retreat from Ctesiphon, the retirement from Lahej and the evacuation of Gallipoli. 
The Sherif's revolt has shattered the solidarity of Islam in that Moslem is against Moslem. It 
has emphasised the failure of the Jehad and endangered the Khalifat of the Sultan. [emphasis 
added]106 
Although there is an important truth in Clayton's passing allusion to the economy of such a 
policy it cannot have been anticipated that direct intervention would be ruled out completely 
should practical implementation be stalled in the way that it eventually was. Clayton's defence 
constitutes further evidence that he, among others, had really hoped for something more grand, 
specifically, an Arab Middle East subject to effective British control and under the nominal 
unity of a purely spiritual caliphate in Mecca. 
7.45 Tribalism: The Critical Factor 
Although the Arab Bureau did not undertake anything like a systematic investigation into the 
obvious failings of the policy they had previously endorsed, there followed a rather haphazard 
105 SAD WP 139/2/34-35, Letter from General Callwell, War Office, to Wingate, 7 August 1916. 
'()6 SAD WP 140/8/51-2, Secret note by General Clayton on the effect of the collapse of the Sharif, 28 September 
[19161. 
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analysis of events in which certain explanations were forthcoming. Though this analysis was 
not rigorous by the standards of inodern-day social science, it did produce, in an ad Iloc 
fashion, certain consistent conclusions which rested on an appreciation of the Sharif's 
capacities in the context of the social and cultural milieu in which he operated. Some of the 
views expressed at this time reflected a tacit acknowledgment by British officials in Cairo that 
their attempts to re-organise Arabia on behalf of their imperial superiors had ultimately come 
up against certain inherent limits. 107 These were, specifically, the social forces they had set out 
to manipulate, and the structurally intrinsic (in)aptitude of the 61ites with whom they had 
chosen to collaborate. 
Within two months of the outbreak of the Revolt it was reported that the Syrians would be 
unable to join the Revolt due to their lack of organisation and general condition of privation. 108 
The Arab Bureau then received a report from one of their informants, one Dimitri Bey, who 
had visited the Hijaz in early August, which told them that neither Ibn Sa'ud, Ibn Rashid nor 
Imam Yahya were showing much inclination to join forces with, or under, Sharif Husayn. 109 
An even more pessimistic assessment was provided in late August by an unnamed Arab 
Bureau informant"O who had interviewed Rashid Rida. He wrote that, even if the Sharif 
became independent of the Turks and was supported by the rulers of Najd and 'Asir, there was 
no capacity for effective government in the Hijaz on which the Caliphate could depend, since, 
the Shcrif cannot be the real independent king whom the Arabs demand, neither will he be the 
renewer of the Khilafat of Islam which all the Moslems guard as independent; because to be 
independent in temporal government [the] Khilafat involves the possession of wealth and 
strength. 
107 As will emerge in the Conclusion, this is not to argue that such limits are absolute since the structures which 
determine them are, under certain circumstances, capable of being transformed. 
108 CAB 37/153/26, Papers submitted for the use of the Cabinet, August, 1916, including a note by Sykes, 8 
August 1916. 
'(ý9 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/38, Statement by Dimitri Bey on his visit to Jeddah and Yanbo between 30 July and 
17 August 1916. Dimitri Bey had worked as a translator for Clayton from early 1915, having been recommended 
by Wingate; in particular he had gained the trust of Rashid Ridha and translated his letters and expositions for the 
Residency. 
110 This may well have been Ibrahim Dimitri who had recently been in the Hijaz. See Note 109, above. 
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The writer then asked, rhetorically: 'Are these two factors found in the Hejaz? " II While the 
British authorities in Cairo may not have regarded Rashid Rida as a suitable partner in their 
schemes on account of his forthright manner and independent attitude, for the very same 
reasons they respected the veracity of his views. In fact the Shaykh's assessment would prove 
more accurate than anything so far produced by the hive of 'experts' residing in the Savoy 
Hotel, Cairo. 
The monetary expense of the Sharifian revolt has already been emphasised. However, it was 
not until September 1916 that it was fully appreciated at the Arab Buredu that the 
disproportionate cost was an inescapable consequence of the nature of the social structures 
within which the Sharif operated. ' 12 The fact that Sharif Husayn was entirely dependent upon 
the loyalty of the tribes of western Arabia was significant in two ways. It was soon realised 
that his supposed spiritual standing counted for little in its own right, neither did it serve to 
enhance his prestige as a secular political leader. The other side of the coin, however, was that 
with unlimited financial backing, the Sharif might purchase the allegiance, or neutrality, of 
almost any tribal chieftain less endowed than himself. ' 13 
From this point on, most intelligence reports on the progress of the Revolt concentrated on 
tribal affairs with detailed accounts of which tribes and chieftains had joined the Sharif, those 
that were actively opposing him, those that remained neutral, those that were estimated 
unlikely to support him in the future, and those who might be persuaded to switch allegiance 
and under what circumstances. A memorandum entitled 'Summary of the Arab situation' 
drafted by Sykes in late August was one such report. In it he contrasted the 'progressive 
educated Arabs of Syria' who were the originators of the Arab movement, and 'the 
courageous and disorderly elements of Arabia. ' 114 The success of the Revolt from a British 
point of view was now quantified in terms of how much Turkish military manpower it 
111 FO 882 Vol. 11, AP 16/5, 'The Opinion of the Elect on the Arab Question, ' by Sheikh Seyyid Rashid Ridha, 
August 29,1916. 
112 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/43, Young, British Consulate, Jeddah, to the Director of the Arab Bureau, 21 
September 1916. 
113 One should be wary of applying the term 'backward' to the purchasing of the allegiance of one sovereign unit 
by another since this is precisely what occurs routinely, for example, between the powerful and less powerful 
r 
member states of the United Nations in the run-up to voting on important resolutions. 
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absorbed rather than in relation to the grand vision upon which British support had once 
rested. Another such report, probably by Lawrence, which analysed the disposition of the 
tribes in the utmost detail was almost iconoclastic in its conclusions. The report stated: 
the idea of an Arab nation or Arab state is foreign to the Arab mind. They are in a pre- 
nationalist sate of political existence, their religion and past history has familiarised them with 
the ideas of an Arab aristocracy of ancient lineage, and of a Theocratic Empire, but the idea of 
a State with fixed laws and boundaries is unknown to them. The bonds of unity among Arabs 
are language, literature, and pride of blood. The causes of dis-union are jealousy, fickleness, 
and suspicion. 
The report finished: 'the Arab movement would contribute to improve a good situation, but 
would not help a bad one. ' 115 
In October Lawrence submitted another report to the Arab Bureau which gave a detailed 
assessment of Sharifian politics and further emphasised how the loyalty of the tribes was 
maintained purely by the payment of cash or gold which took up the greater part of Husayn's 
budget. As if to emphasise the utter dependence of the Sharif's campaign on Britain, he also 
pointed out that over ninety percent of Husayn's income was derived from the British 
subvention. Significantly, the report contained a thoroughgoing account of the Sharif's 
'backwardness, ' the very factor, it has been argued here, which had once seemed attractive 
insofar as it would ensure his dependence on Britain and, hopefully, stem the emergence of 
mass political mobilisation in Arabia. Importantly, Lawrence was unable to identify the 
slightest capacity for government nor locate the kernel of any future administration, even 
within the Hijaz. He described Husayn's rule as 'patriarchal' and related how the operative 
legal system had 'regressed' from the Ottoman civil code to the shari'a and tribal law. 
Although the Sharif had enhanced the authority of the tribal shaykhs as intermediaries this was 
accompanied by the adverse consequence that 'within the tribe ... their nominal autocracy, 
[was] so hedged about by tribal opinion and custom as to be little more than general assent in 
practice. ' Moreover, this was all within the context of a general 'opposition between town and 
country. ' 116 
114 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/Il 20, 'Summary of the Arab Situation' by Sykes, 30 August 1916. See also, 
Ch. 6, n. 63. 
115 Sledmere Papers, DDSY(2)/4 112, 'A Paper on the Arab Situation, ' author not given, II September 1916. 
116 FO 882 Vol. V, HRG 16/57, Report by T. E. Lawrence, 27 October 1916. 
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A subsequent report by Lawrence was even starker in its implications. He surmised that the 
real objection to a landing of Allied troops in the Hijaz was not religious. According to 
Lawrence the tribes were intensely suspicious of foreign interference and 'the landing of a 
considerable foreign force ... would undoubtedly alarm them and might well result 
in the 
return of many tribesmen to their tents, in which case we shall have contributed to the very 
result which we wish to avoid. ' The report also pointed out what had not been understood 
before: specifically that the towns of the Hijaz did not support the Sharif since, whereas they 
consisted of 'agglomerations of foreign settlers, ' his movement was purely Arab. The report 
ended with: 'I do not think that anyone who has examined the Hejaz lately will contest that the 
Sherif's strengths lies only amongst the tribes: and it follows that when the tribes go over to 
the Turks there is no more "Sherif's movement". ' 117 
Very quickly such notions became common currency amongst the British Middle Eastern 
political intelligence community. Towards the end of 1916, George Lloyd MP, on service with ZI) 
the Arab Bureau, reported that 'the Hejaz revolt is essentially a tribal movement and the 
Shereef a tribal chief who has thrown in his lot quite definitively with the tribesmen. With 
them he stands or falls. ' Consequently, Lloyd was against direct military intervention unless it 
was judged likely to produce a decisively positive effect on tribal morale. He drew the 
unfortunate conclusion that 'this leaves us very powerless to take any very satisfactory part in 
the fortunes of the campaign and leaves us in a situation in which as spectators of many a lost 
opportunity, many a strategical mistake and many a tactical timidity, we may feel irritation 
and impatience considering all the material help which we are rendering to the Arab cause. ' 118 
Perhaps the most telling episode of the Revolt, in which the lack of co-ordination between 
India and Cairo resulted in the embarrassment of all parties concerned, was the 'Qunfidhah 
incident. ' The coastal town of Qunfidhah lay at the southernmost limit of the territory within 
which the inhabitants' allegiance was claimed by the Sharif, while at the same time the town 
bore a similar relationship to al-ldrisi of 'Asir. It also happened that 'Asir, along with Yemen 
117 FO 882 Vol. V, HRG 16/66, Precis of a report by T. E. Lawrence on the Arab Revolt, 17 November 1916. 
118 FO 882 Vol. VI, HRG 18/85, Report by George Lloyd MP on 'Questions concerning the Hedjaz Revolt, ' 22 
December 1916. 
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had remained the responsibility of the Government of India, much as liaison with the Sharif 
was undertaken from Cairo. In late June, the Red Sea patrol operated by India decided to 
bombard Qunfidhah in order to help remove the Turks. Unfortunately for the Sharif, the patrol 
then facilitated al-ldrisi's capture of the town by landing his tribesmen there, where, much to 
the consternation of both the Sharif and the Arab Bureau, 'British officers accompanied them, 
presiding over the raising of the 'Asiri banner over the Turkish fort. ' To make matters worse, 
when Husayn looked like mounting an attack, the British naval force 'threatened to intervene 
on the Idrisi's behalf. ' The issue was only resolved (after a fashion) on 7 August when al- 
Idrisi was given three days to evacuate in favour of the Sharif's occupation. 119 
Apart from reflecting the obvious lack of coordination between India, London and the Arab 
Bureau, which had evidently not been resolved by the formation of the latter, this incident 
(according to them) had permanently soured the relations between the Sharif and al-ldrisi. 120 
In more general terms, however, the fiasco at Qunfidhah illustrated the Sharif's marked 
incapacity for extending allegiances within the Arabian peninsular. In the words of Bruce 
Westrate, 'dangerous foundations had been laid in this reckless emphasis on marshaling as 
much tribal force as possible for use against the Turks, without regard to the compatibility of 
Britain's Arabian allies. ' 121 In particular Husayn never managed to gain the support of Ibn 
Sa'ud and the tribes under him. No doubt this was not helped by India's aid to the latter. This, 
it may be pointed out, need not have happened at all, had the British in Cairo been able to 
support the Sharif more directly. Consequently, it is argued once again, in accordance with 
one of the main tenets of this thesis, that the immediate cause of the failure of Britain's 
Sharifian schcme was its central and abiding contradiction. Specifically, that the principle 
reason for Britain's not being able to bolster Husayn against his Arabian opponents had been 
the very reason for their supporting him in the first place. However, as the Arab Bureau 
belatedly discovered, the Sharif's supposed standing throughout Islam counted for little within 
the tribal milieu which proved to be the only real source of his power available to him. 
119 Wcstrate, 1992, pp. 96-7. 
120 PRO Arab Bureau Papers, FO 882 HRG 16/65, 'Summary of Historical Documents from outbreak of War 
between Great Britain and Turkey 1914 to the outbreak of the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916, ' Arab 
Bureau, Cairo, 29 November 1916. 
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7.5 The Turning Point: Husayn's Proclamation of Kingship 
It has already been stated that although, according to 'official' British policy, the future of the 
caliphate was a matter for Muslims alone to decide, those in Cairo and Khartoum most closely 
associated with its implementation were rather. less disinterested than this would suggest. They 
considered Sharif Husayn's claim merely to have been deferred, it was hoped, only until he 
was better placed to exercise his eligibility. However, notwithstanding the early failings of the 
Revolt, or, conceivably, because of them, in late October 1916 Husayn decided to declare 
himself 'King of the Arabs. ' It was this occasion, more than the early setbacks experienced by 
the Sharif's rebellion, which, due to the immediate international ramifications, induced an 
even more acute re-examination of British attitudes towards Husayn's claim to the caliphate. 
Furthermore, since this scrutiny of policy now involved the formal recognition of a new 
sovereign leader, it took place, not only within the community of local enthusiasts but at the 
highest levels of government and, therefore, came to be of greater consequence for Middle 
Eastern policy as a whole. 
The first indication that Husayn still intended to proclaim himself king in anticipation of his 
assumption of the caliphate came within a month of the opening of the Revolt 122 though, 
significantly, this would only happen after he had secured a suitable foundation from which to 
make such a leap. There were even rumours reported to the Foreign Office emanating from 
Egyptian and Turkish exiles in Berne that the Sharif was about to proclaim himself caliph at 
the forthcoming Bairam festival though these were not treated seriously. 123 Either eventuality 
would have tested the sincerity of Britain's official 'hands-off' policy. However, an Arab 
Bureau report drafted in mid-September concluded that the Sharif was disinclined to change 
his title to 'King of the Arabs. ' According to the report the fact that he continued to treat Ibn 
Rashid as an independent chief showed that he realised the futility of such a scheme at 
121 Westrate, 1992, p. 95. 
122 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/31, Cornwallis to the Director of the Arab Bureau, 8 July 1916. 
123 FO 371/2778 Political Tukey (War) files 91530-151566 1916 147987, Secret Report from Berne, 24 July 
1916, B. 00812. 
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present. 124 Certainly, there had been no suggestion that such a move on Husayn's part was 
imminent. 
One of Husayn's earliest proclamations in which he defended his rebellion was addressed to 
4all our brother Moslems' and was, as might have been expected, couched in religious 
terminology. This document was judiciously ambiguous since it legitimised the Revolt in 
terms of the need to save the caliphate from the ruinous influence of the CUP. The ambiguity 
lay in the concern expressed over the CUP's curtailment of the Sultan's powers in so far as 
this 'prevented him from looking after the interests of Islam' and signified 'the destruction of 
the Khalifate conditions which all Muslims dernand. ' This could have signaled either that the 
Sharif wished to restore the institution of the caliphate proper to the Sultan, or that he intended 
to remove it from him personally. This indeterminacy was sustained throughout the 
proclamation which declared: 'The only aim intended is to cause victory for the religion of 
Islam and to exalt the Moslem's state based on the principles of the Mohammedan law to 
which we shall now return. ' The only hint of impending kingship which might have been 
implied by, and reasonably inferred from, the proclamation, came in the statement that, 'The 
Country [Hijaz] is actually independent and is entirely separated from the country which is 
still under the suzerainty of the enemy (The Union and Progress Committee) it is an absolute 
independence and nothing cannot be interfered with by any foreign country or power. ' 125 
However, since the proclamation combined Islamic and Arab-nationalist language and used 
the former to justify Husayn's assertion of independence 126 it might also have been read as a 
challenge to the Ottoman caliphate itself rather than simply as an appeal for reform. 
News that both the public and 'ulama of the Hijaz had declared Husayn 'the king of the Arab 
nation' was received with dismay in Cairo and London. The message, which had been sent by 
the Sharif's son, 'Abdullah, in his capacity as 'Minister of Foreign Affairs, ' announced that 
Husayn 'will be recognised as the religious head until the Moslems are of one opinion 
concerning the Islamic Caliphate. ' While passing on the news from Jiddah, Wilson asked 
124 FO 882 Vol. 8, IS 16n, Arbur, The Residency, II September 1916. 
125 FO 882 Vol. IV, HRG 16/30, Appendix 111, Translation of a document headed 'This is a Copy of Our 
Proclamation to all our Brother Moslems, ' signed by the Sharif of Mecca, '25 Shabaan 1334' [26 June 1916]. 126 Tauber, 1993, p. 82. 
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Wingate to establish whether 'H. M. Govt. [would] recognise this somewhat premature regal 
dignity. ' 127 McMahon, who received the message simultaneously, immediately informed India 
and the Foreign Office. 128 
During the days which followed, Cairo would receive several explanations from 'Abdullah for 
the apparent suddenness of the Sharif's action. In the first, a 'telephone message' delivered to 
Wilson in Jiddah on I November, 'Abdullah argued that his father's declaration was necessary 
in order to display to the Muslim world the independence of the Hijaz, not only from Turkey 
but above all from Britain. The first reason given by 'Abdullah was that because Britain feared 
Muslims would suspect her of occupying the Holy Places, she had felt unable to aid the Arab 
cause by military means thus implying that once the Hijaz had declared its independence 
without first consulting Britain such aid might now be forthcoming. Another reason given was 
that, 'because the pulpits of Mecca and Hejaz have the supremacy over all pulpits of the 
world, i. e. when they mention anyone as the Caliph all the people must recognise him. ' 129 
Again, the argument was not explicit, though there was the clear implication that Husayn's 
kingship was a precursor to him being proclaimed caliph. It may deduced from what followed 
that the Sharif felt confident in this regard, since his agent in Cairo reported that 'Abdullah 
had already informed 'all Foreign Ministers of Allies & neutral Powers' of Husayn's 
declaration of independence, and had told them that, 'as to the Caliphate, there will follow 
whatever decision Moslems agree upon. ' 130 
127 SAD WP 141/2/180, Telegram no. 436 from Wilson, Jeddah, to the Sirdar, 29 October 1916, attaching a 
telegram from Abdullah. Husayn's declaration of kingship did not occur on either of the Bairam festivals as 
might have been expected (see Note 123, above, with reference to the rumoured proclamation of a new caliphate) 
but on I Muharram, new years day AH 1335. It may have been significant that this was the least 'spiritual' of the 
important dates in the Islamic calendar, being Hijra, the day which commemorates the Prophet's departure from 
Mecca for Medina. Alternatively, it may simply have been the next important date to follow '1(1-al-Adha, AH 
1334. 
128 SAD WP 143/1/23, Telegram no. 953 from McMahon, Cairo to the Sirdar, Khartoum, I November 1916; and, 
FO 141 587 545/15, p. 122, Extract from telegram No. 743 from the High Commissioner to the Foreign Office, 
forwarding telegram sent by Abdullah to the Sharirs agent in Cairo with regard to his proclamation of kingship, 0 I November 1916. 
129 FO 882 Vol. V, HRG 16/59, Telephone message from Emir Abdullah relayed to Cairo by Wilson, Jeddah, I 
November 1916; and copied to Wingate. SAD WP 143/1/36, Copy of telegram W465, Wilson, Jeddah to Sirdar, 
Khartoum, I November 1916. 
130 SAD WP 143/l/23, Copy of telegram No 953, from McMahon, Cairo, to Sirdar, Khartoum, I November 1916. 
The gist of the latter was confirmed by receipt of a translation of a copy of Abdullah's message to Colo. 
Bremond, head of the French mission in the Hijaz. SAD WP 143/1/62, Copy of telegram no. 960, McMahon, 
Cairo to Sirdar, Khartoum, 2 November 1916, including a translation of telegram received by Bremond, dated 
'2nd Moharram' [AH 13351130 October, 19161. 
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In a further message relayed to Cairo by Wilson, on 3 November, 'Abdullah offered additional 
explanations for his father's actions. There was, however, a degree of ambiguity (no doubt 
intended) regarding the caliphate. Apparently, while the 'ulama of Mecca had already 'decided 
not to accept the Turkish Caliphate, ' the Sharif was only 'King of the Arabs and a religious 
leader until the Islam will be of one opinion as to the caliphate. ' 13 1 Furthermore, 'Abdullah 
claimed that the local independence of Ibn Sa'ud, al-ldrisi and the tribes of Arabia was 
compatible with Husayn's newfound status and that a majority of the shaykhs of these tribes 
had been present at the declaration itself. To 'Abdullah's justifications were added the 
'unofficial reasons' of his deputy, Fu'ad al-Khitab. Though more subtle, these have the 
appearance of ad hominem post-rationalisations intended to appeal to the British. These 
included the technicality that Husayn's previous title of Amir denoted personal subservience 
to the Ottoman Sultan. In the same way, allegiance to the Sultan had been implied by the 
assumption of loyalty to the Sharif as Amir on the part of the Varna and ashraf. 132 
In a message from the Sharif himself, however, he insisted that 'he had denied the caliphate 
entirely' and indicated his willingness to publish a book by a well-known Wahhabi proving 
that there was no caliphate. Perhaps by design, the Sharif's professed attitude mirrored 
Britain'sfonnal disinterest in the future of he caliphate. He maintained that he was 'officially 
leaving it to the opinion of those who know all about its regulations until all Moslems choose 
one to be their Calipha. ' [emphasis added) At the same time Husayn was evidently desperate 
to obtain British approval of his kingship since he wished the High Commissioner to know 
that he would 'resign from this business' 133 if any misunderstanding with Britain were 
sustained. 
While consulting with the Allies over recognition, the Foreign Office decided immediately to 
congratulate the Sharif on behalf of His Majesty's Government for which he duly returned his 
thanks. However, in doing so Husayn took the opportunity to refer to H. M. G. as having 'once 
13 1 FO 882 Vol. V, HRG 16/59, Further message from Abdullah in which he replied to certain question posed by 
an unnamed correspondent, 3 November 1916. 
132 FO 882 Vol V, HRG 16/63, Document headed 'Reasons for assuming the title, ' undated. 
133 Ibid. Transcript of a telephone message from the Sharif, 3 November 1916. 
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addressed him as Caliph' which the Foreign Office quickly denied, though without taking the 
matter up with the new king. A week later McMahon telegraphed the Foreign Office, India 
and the Sudan confirming that there was no record of the Sharif have ever having been 
addressed as caliph by H. M. G. or anyone else. 134 
Although Cairo and the Foreign Office expressed surprise at Husayn's declaration of kingship, 
it transpired that an account of a meeting between Storrs and 'Abdullah which had taken place 
on 17 October, only twelve days before the Sharif's assumption of kingship, had, in fact, 
indicated that some formal enhancement of the Sharif's status was imminent. The report 
recorded that 'Abdullah had suggested that his father might declare himself Amir al-Mu'minin 
(commander of the faithful), and that this be publicly recognised by Britain. Storrs took this as 
a veiled attempt to ascertain Britain's current attitude to Husayn's assumption of the caliphate. 
He responded by disabusing 'Abdullah of any notion that H. M. G. could conceivably 'proclaim 
as Khalif our ally the Sherif before he had been accepted as such by any section of Islam - 
before even, so far as we had heard, by the people of his own Hejaz. ' In particular, Storrs 
anticipated hostility from Ibn Sa'ud, al-ldrisi and the Imam. From this report the Foreign 
Office drew the conclusion that the Sharif had inferred from the fact that 'Abdullah had 'been 
furnished with funds to win over Arab notables to the Sherif's cause ... that H. M. G. 's repeated 
public announcements regarding the Caliphate were not to be taken too seriously. ' [emphasis 
added] 135 It has been concluded in earlier chapters of this thesis that Britain's 'official' policy 
was simply that. Storrs' indignation, therefore, was as inexcusable as the Sharif's cynicism 
was justified. Nevertheless, Storrs' attitude, which was typical of his contemporaries, is 
indicative of a fundamental change of approach towards the caliphate - an actualisation of the 
'official' policy - consequential to the early failings of the Arab Revolt. 
During the six weeks following the proclamation a series of lengthy and involved discussions 1-1 
took place among British officials and statesmen about the precise nature and extent of the 
recognition which should be accorded Husayn's kingship. Although Clayton was of the view 
that the coronation was 'a great nuisance' he was the most sympathetic insofar as he purported 
134 SAD WP 143/2/27, Copy of telegram no. 984 from McMahon, Cairo, to Sirdar, Foreign Office, and India, 8 
November 1916. 
135 Ibid. FO no. 880,3 November 1916. 
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to mind not for 'our sake' but because it was likely to injure the Sharif's cause beyond the 
Hijaz. All that remained to be done, Clayton wrote, was 'to try to check him from any stupid 
nonsense in regard to the Khalifate. ' 136 The general concern as expressed by Hogarth in the 
Arab Bulletin was not with Husayn's kingship per se but with the fact that he was 'very far 
from being in a position to substantiate his pretension. ' 137 It was such views which informed 
the ensuing deliberations concerning the caliphate. 
7.6 The Caliphate Idea Brought under Further Scrutiny 
Although the underlying concem was with a premature bid on the part of the Sharif of Mecca 
for what was assumed to be the most revered office within Islam, the discussions over 
Husayn's kingship did not for the most part refer explicitly to the matter of the caliphate. 
However, there was concern over the implications for the caliphate to the extent that these 
were believed to impinge on British interests in the region and throughout the Muslim world. 
Significantly for this thesis these discussions illustrate the true nature of British intentions and 
lay open their hopes of creating an essentially insubstantial or 'spiritual' caliphate which 
would not encroach upon the local sovereign claims of other Arabian chiefs nor impair British 
external control over this area. The option of multilateral, or more accurately multi-bi lateral, 
collaboration must have seemed ever more attractive in the light of the failure of the Arab 
Revolt. 
Initially, in proposing the form of a Foreign Office reply to Wilson, who had requested advice 
on responding to Husayn's proclamation, the Egyptian High Commissioner suggested that 
publication of his kingship should be restricted to the Hijaz. Specifically, McMahon wished to 
restrict recognition of Husayn to his capacity as 'ruler of the Hejaz and champion of the Arab 
people against Turkish oppression. ' It is worthy of note that while the first half of this 
136 SAD CP 693/lon5-6, Letter from Clayton to Wilson, 9 November 1916. 
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designation is restrictive in relation to territory, the second is limited in relation to time and 
function, since the revolt against the Turks would, presumably, be finite in duration. The 
reason given by McMahon for such a circumscription was that publication of Husayn's 
kingship outside the Hijaz might 'render [even] the assistance now given to the Sherif for the 
purpose of securing Arab independence open to the charge of violation of their guarantee not 
to interfere with Moslem religious affairs. " 38 Nevertheless, although McMahon felt that since 
Husayn had not consulted Britain before declaring himself king they would be justified in 
withholding recognition, it was considered already too late to check publication of his 
proclamation. 139 Wingate agreed, as he was keen not to withhold formal recognition of afait 
accompli but preferred the title 'King of Arabs in Hejaz' on the grounds that 'King of the Arab 
Nation' would violate the independence of other chiefs. 140 The Sirdar's preference was in turn 
rejected by McMahon for fear that it would be shortened to 'King of Arabs. ' 141 
Any satisfaction which might have been felt within the British camp that the affair had been 
successfully managed was abruptly halted by the alarming news that the French foreign 
ministry had advocated the appellation 'King of the Holy Places. ' They had done so, 
apparently, for the agreeable reason that such a designation 'while likely to satisfy Sherif and 
increase his prestige, [would] not open up future claims to extended territorial or national 
sovereignty, and [would] not offend other chiefs of Arabian Peninsula. ' 142 The Arab Bureau's 
reply to the Foreign Office concerning this suggestion is an illustration of the differential 
thresholds of discomfiture affecting Britain and France, respectively. Given the relative lack of 
interest shown in the caliphate by the Muslim inhabitants of France's colonies she was 
correspondingly less concerned by the religious implications of any of Husayn's possible 
titles. While concurring with French reasoning the Bureau deprecated their suggestion since 
'the Title may nevertheless be open to objection on the ground that a religious as distinct from 
137 Fromkin, 1991, p. 222, quoting from Arab Bulletin, issue No. 29,8 November 1916. 
138 FO 882, Vol. V, HRG 16/64, Document headed 'Attitude of Great Britain and France to the Sherif-s 
proclamation of the assumption of the title "Malik cl Bilad el Arabia", ' covering a series of telegrams dated 31 
October to 13 December 1916, and, Telegram No. 947, from High Commissioner to Foreign Office and Sirdar, 
31 October 1916. 
139 Ibid. Telegram No. 961, from High Commissioner to Sirdar, 2 November 1916. 
140 Ibid. Telegram No. 629, from Sirdar to High Commissioner, 2 November 1916. 
141 Ibid. Telegram No. 963, from High Commissioner to Foreign Office and Sirdar, 3 November 1916. 
142 Ibid. Telegram No. 108, from Sirdar to Arbur, 2 December 1916, with reference to (French) despatch no. 
240161, M. Paul Cambon to Lord Grey of Falloden, 27 November 1916. 
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a territorial significance could be given to it' and thought 'King of Arabs in Hejaz' much 
'safer. ' 143 On being told of such reservations concerning his assumption of the title 'King of 
the Arabs, ' Husayn declared to al-Faruqi, now his agent in Cairo, somewhat prophetically, that 
the attitude of his imperial allies would result in the ultimate failure of his and their combined 
efforts. 144 
The Indian Government, as might be expected, also found fault with the French preference but 
were more explicit in their reasoning 'strongly deprecat[ing] the French proposal of "Malek el 
Haramein" as connoting a definite claim to the caliphate. ' India made their own suggestion of 
'King of the Arabs in the Hejaz and its dependencies. ' This was supported by the argument 
that, by avoiding 'specific territorial assurances, ' 145 it did not preclude future territorial 
aggrandisement on the part of the Sharif. 
Eventually, High Commissioner McMahon prevailed with his 'King of Hejaz' and the Foreign 
Office quickly secured the agreement of France and Russia on this basis. On 10 December 
1916 both Britain and France formally recognised Sharif Husayn as 'King of Hejaz. ' It had 
been decided to inform him also of their view that the title he had already assumed was 'not 
territorial but national' and would be a contradiction of his previous undertaking to 
acknowledge the rule of Ibn Sa'ud and al-ldrisi in their respective countries. Though the 
despatch communicating the recognition emphasised that the Allies regarded Husayn as 
'titular head of the Arab peoples in their revolt against Turkish misrule' the Allies could not 
accept 'any sovereign title which might provoke disunion among the Arabs at the present 
moment. ' Though the wording was subtle, the occasion of this formal recognition was taken as 
an opportunity to urge a definite deferral of any claim to the caliphate which Husayn might 
make. The High Commissioner wrote on behalf of His Majesty's Government: 
[His Majesty's Government] note[s] that Your Highness has made no claim to the Khalifate 
and that it is to be kept absolutely for the Mohammedan world to decide at a later date who is to 
fill this exalted position. 
143 Ibid. Draft of Arab Bureau reply to Foreign Office via the High Commissioner concerning Telegram No. 108 
(Note 142, above). 
144 Ibid. Extract of cipher message no. 57 from Fuad el Khatib to Faruki, conveying the Sharit's views regarding 
the attitude of the British and French, 22 November 1916. 
145 Ibid. Telegram No. 9825 from Foreign Office, Delhi to Secretary of State for India, 8 December 1916. 
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HMG entirely agree with the wisdom of this course, as it is undoubtedly in Your Highness' 
own interests that this important question should be left open till the end of the war. 146 
In this way Britain's official policy was for the first time explicitly reiterated and, in essence, 
violated in the same sentence. The hypocrisy and self-contradiction on Britain's part lies in 
the foisting of her policy towards Islam upon a Muslim, it being a rank absurdity for a 
Christian power to insist that a Muslim pretender to the caliphate leave the matter to Muslims 
alone! This proclamation, then, marks a decisive point in the history of the relationship 
between Britain and the restoration of an Arab caliphate and constitutes a fulmination of the 
central contradiction of Britain's Sharifian policy and the 'Cairo scheme. ' This aporia, 147 
besides precluding Britain from providing substantial and effective military backing for their 
ally, would, ironically, contribute towards preventing the Sharif from securing the caliphate, 
his outstanding eligibility for which was the very reason for their supporting him in the first 
instance. Any advantage that Sharif Husayn might have gleaned from his collaboration with a 
Christian imperial power, was, ipsofacto, nullified. The final irony of this entire episode was 
that on receiving the qualified, and somewhat circumscribed, recognition of his new title, the 
result of lengthy deliberation across three continents, Husayn declared to the British and 
French missions in the Hijaz that 'he attached no importance to titles. ' 148 
146 Ibid. Remainder of Arab Bureau document reproducing the above correspondence. Note that reference to the 
caliphate was included after it had been suggested by Wilson who feared that Abdullah 'may, in an evil moment 
persuade the Sherif to declare himself Caliph of Islam. ' FO 371/2490 242002, Covering letter no. 328 from 
McMahon, The Residency, Cairo to Grey, 21 November 1916, enclosing dispatch no. 14 from Wilson, Jeddah to 
Lord Chelmsford [Viceroy of India from April 19161,5 November 1916. 
147 A critical term from deconstructive literary theory denoting 'a final impasse or paradox: a point at which a 
text's self-contradictory meanings can no longer be resolved, or at which the text undermines its own most 
fundamental presuppositions. ' Baldick, 1990, pp. 14-15. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has dealt with what, in retrospect, may be seen as the most crucial period in 
British engagement with the idea of a revived Arab caliphate. This originally nebulous notion 
which by the end of 1915 had coalesced into Britain's Sharifian policy continued to depend on 
the caliphate idea for its internal coherence. Ni neteen-six teen was the year when theory was 
put into practice. This was made all the more urgent by the abandonment of the 'forward 
option. ' After Gallipoli and Kut, the Easter Rising in Ireland and a standstill on the Western 
Front, there was, undoubtedly, a loss of confidence at the highest reaches of the imperial 
government. Regardless of the precise reasons for the 'final' rejection of a landing at 
Alexandretta the need for a way forward in the Middle East, which was vicarious in execution, 
and whose underpinning was 'ideological' rather than military, became ever more acute. 
There were, however, certain preliminaries. One of these was a degree of institutional and 
departmental co-ordination on the British side which would both reflect the quality of unity 
sought in Arabia, and engender the harmony of purpose, and direction of collaborative 
endeavour, required to achieve that end. The creation of the Arab Bureau may well have had 
the effect of prolonging the autonomy of the caliphate idea in British thinking to the extent 
that its currency as an idea outlived any serious possibility of its being realised. Certainly, the 
success of the 'Cairo scheme' (in its more grandiose versions) became the raison Xetre of the 
Bureau according to which its performance tended to be measured. However, as the main part 
of the conclusion to this chapter indicates, this effect should not be overstated. 
It had long been understood in Cairo and London that another prerequisite for the 
commencement of the Sharif's revolt as the practical kernel of the scheme as it had evolved in 
theory, was an understanding with Britain's main wartime and imperial ally, France. 
Notwithstanding the eventual disposition of the Middle East after the 1914-18 war, it has been 
shown conclusively that for those directly engaged in its negotiation on the British side, the 
Sykes-Picot agreement was ancillary to the understanding reached between McMahon and 
148 FO 882, Vol. V, HRG 16/64. See Note 138, above. 
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Husayn during 1915. Alternatively, the Sharifian policy was the cornerstone of an overall 
policy in relation to which Sykes-Picot was an embellishment. The latter did not, as is 
frequently supposed, emerge as a counter-proposal. 
The remainder of this chapter was concerned with the preparation for, and conduct of, the 
Arab Revolt in its early stages, and the effect this had on Britain's attitude to the issue of the 
caliphate. In assessing the reappraisal which took place (with greater purpose following the 
proclamation of Sharif Husayn as 'King of the Arabs') it is necessary to return to what have 
been described here as the positive and negative sources of Britain's engagement with the idea 
of a revived Arab caliphate. These were, respectively, the idea of Britain's ruling over a 
nominally united and independent Arabia under an Arab caliph, and the fear of political pan- 
Islam and the prospect of an anti-British jihad inspired by an opposing imperial power. In 
brief, the early failure of the Arab Revolt disclosed the fact that in practice the second of these 
rendered the first impossible. In other words, Britain's trepidation concerning the imagined 
sanctions of political pan-Islam made it impossible to aid the Sharif in a manner likely to 
enhance his prestige and, consequently, his claim to the caliphate. Moreover, the fine balance 
between dependence and capacity required of a collaborative partner was absent in this 
particular relationship with the consequence that interest in the Revolt was rapidly reduced to 
the issue of British standing among Arabs and British prestige in the Muslim world. 
Furthermore, the negative motivation for Britain's accord with Sharif Husayn, in respect of 
which his capacity as the Sharif of Mecca had been the critical factor, was almost completely 
negated in the early stages of the Revolt. Simply stated, there had been neither a German- 
Turkish inspired jihad against the Sharif's rebellion nor a spontaneous uprising in support of 
it, it being pertinent that the proclamation issued by Husayn at the inception of the Revolt 
declared it to be for the good of Islam. With respect to a question raised earlier, 149 the absence 
of a jihad was less to do with the failure of the Turks to retain the Holy Places than with its 
being a concomitant of Arabian tribal socio-economics. Neither can it be supposed that the 
Sharif's caution in not explicitly rejecting the Ottoman caliphate was the determining factor in 
this. In this regard, Bruce Westrate concludes: 
149 See Notes 10,61 & 106, above. 
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The mere fact of the revolt itself did much to discredit the notion that the influence of the 
present caliph was as ubiquitous and commanding as heretofore assumed. Not only had his call 
to jihad been for the most part ignored by substantial segments of the Arab community, but 
now the most sacred region of Islam was in open rebellion. Even though London had always 
taken the line that the caliphate was a matter for Muslims to settle, subsequent events rendered 
the question academic. 150 
In other words, through the experience of the Revolt, political pan-Islam was shown to be 
rather less of a 'bogey' than had once been supposed. It will be recalled that before and during 
the early months of the war, British imperialists had viewed Islam as a potential material force 
capable of threatening the integrity of the Empire. Although they had set out, with a good 
measure of misdirected finesse, to nullify or subvert this force, the experience of the Arab 
rebellion would make Britain less timid in her dealings with Islam thereafter. Nevertheless, the 
reappraisal was tentative and Britain was not sufficiently emboldened to disregard the Islamic 
factor altogether, since the sanctity of the Holy Places continued to be of genuille religious and 
political concern throughout the more socially developed parts of the Muslim world. 
Finally, reports concerning the conduct of the Revolt in its early stages revealed the 
underlying reason for the disappointing response of the people of the Hijaz and elsewhere to 
the Sharif's proclamation of a revolt. The factor which emerged as the determinant one in 
securing the active allegiance of local tribes in the rebellion against the Turks was a 
straightforwardly material one: that of cash! The modus o1mrandi of tribal Arabia undermined 
both the positive and negative reasons for Britain's collaboration with Sharif Husayn. 
Ironically, Britain had, in part, been attracted to the more 'backward' sections of the Arab 
polity due to the absence of mass politics. However, it was the lack of politics, as such, which 
helped ensure the early frustration of the Revolt. It soon became evident that the tribes of the 
Hijaz were no more stirred by the idea of an anti-imperial jihad than they were compelled to 
rally in support of Husayn's bid to rule Arabia on account of his supposed standing within 
Islam. 
150 Westrate, 1992, p. 145. 
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CHAPTER 8: The End of the War, the Peace Process, and 
the Abolition of the Caliphate 
8.0 Introduction 
It has been established in Chapter 7 that by the end of 1916 the precise conduct of the Arab 
Revolt, the inherent lim=its of its social -structural context, and the internal contradictions of the 
British conception of Arabia nominally unified under an Arab caliph, had set in motion a 
comprehensive reappraisal of British, Middle Eastem political strategy. This reappraisal 
continued throughout the remaining two years of the war and thereafter. Within six years of 
the final armistice the Ottoman Caliphate, along with the Ottoman Empire, was finally 
abolished - and is yet to replaced by anything comparable within the 'Muslim world. ' 
However, at no precise point did the British make a clear or absolutely irrevocable decision 
not to endorse, openly or clandestinely, an alternative Arab caliphate. Although the central 
arguments of this thesis have already been made, and the necessary explanations provided in 
the terms set out in the Introduction, Britain's attitude towards King Husayn's belated 
pretensions to the caliphate confirm the conclusions of the preceding chapter regarding the 
underlying reasons for Britain's abandonment of him. Of greater significance however, is 
Britain's conduct towards Turkey in the diplomatic field during the post-war peace process in 
which it is revealed that the sine qua non of Britain's policy towards Islam (the subject of 
Chapter 4) was still operative. 
That the final historiographical chapter of this thesis should begin at the end of 1916 is in no 
way a matter of calendrical convenience since December 1916 saw both a reversal (in military 
terms at least) of British misfortune in the Middle East, ' and a change of government at home. 
1 For example, General Maude began the Tigris offensive in December, 1916, Kut was retaken in February, 1918 
to be followed by Baghdad in March. Similarly the Palestine campaign was begun in December 1916. Although 
Beersheba, Gaza, Jaffa and Jerusalem were not taken until the final quarter of 1917, and the remainder of 
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Conventionally, it has frequently been argued that the latter resulted in a finidamental 
transformation from a 'Pro-Arab' to a 'pro-Jewish' disposition towards the region on account 
of the personal proclivities of the incumbents of the new administration. The presumption of 
these mutually exclusive categories is not conducive to answering the questions set out in the 
Introduction, since they are properly the explanandian rather than the explanalls of the 
investigation at hand. Rather, it will be maintained here that the change of government was the 
occasion for an intensification of the reappraisal which was already under way, now pursued 
by imperial servants with less of a personal investment in the original vision. In any case, 
where there was a good deal of continuity, as in the case of Sir Mark Sykes, it has already 
been emphasised that his attitude to all potential subjects of empire, including Arabs and Jews, 
2 
was governed by the consistent, necessary and enduring logic of imperial collaboration. On 
the other hand, a previously steadfast Sharifian visionary such as Wingate, now operating 
much closer to the centre of responsibility, simply chose to toe the 'new line. ' 
8.1 The Last Two Years of the War 
8.11 The Caliphate Issue: Towards a New Consensus 
Lloyd George who became Prime Minister on 7 December 1916 created a new War Cabinet in 
which he relied heavily on the services and imperialist vision of Viscount Milner, minister 
without portfolio. Milner in turn relied on three men in whom he had particular confidence, 
two of these, his parliamentary secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, and Sir Mark Sykes, each 
with special responsibilities for the Middle East, he had had placed within the cabinet 
secretariat under Maurice Hankey. Although Ormsby-Gore's imperial background had been in 
India he was appointed to work closely with the Arab Bureau. 3 One of his earliest 
Palestine and the Syria hinterland were not occupied until late 1918, there were no major setbacks in the Middle 
East for Britain after December, 1916. 
2 This is not at odds with the fact that the War Cabinet was 'converted' to Zionism in the spring of 1917. 
3 Fromkin, 1991, pp, 234-5. 
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contributions was a lengthy report on the caliphate in which the author set out to correct 
certain 'errors' of thought. 
Though not the first to do so, Ormsby-Gore's 'note on the Khalifate' identified the origin of 
the current European view of the Islamic caliphate. The defining passage read as follows: 
It is was not until the last century that the Khalifate assumed the political significance which it 
is now necessary to discuss; As the political power of Abdul Hamid declined in the face of 
external pressure from foreign countries and internal pressure from those clamouring for 
reform, he sought to restore his prestige and authority by the astute use of the doctrine of the 
Khalifate. He sought to make the Khalifate the basis of a religious and political claim to the 
spiritual and political allegiance of, not only his own subjects, but all Moslems. This claim; 
neither historical nor orthodox was based upon a Christian analogy. He encouraged the idea 
that he representedfor Moslems what the Pope represents to Roman Catholics of Ultramarine 
views, viz; that he was possessed of a spiritual sovereignty over and above political 
sovereignty. [emphasis added] 
4 
The report went on to say that 'the Khalifate has meant different things at different times , and 
that its origin is not religious, i. e., 'due to the Prophet or the Koran' and that it was 'not an 
essential part of the Islamic faith. ' However, the closing remark would prove the most 
prophctic, the import of which would determine the ultimate demise of the institution itself: 
'That its revival in a new form is the creation of "interested parties" whose aims are political 
rather than religious. ' 5 In spite of its perspicacity, what gives the report an air of naYve 
arrivisme is that it omits to point out what would have turned it into a devastating auto- 
critique: this being that it was precisely the facility of 'a spiritual sovereignty over and above 
political sovereignty' which was the foundation of Britain's original Arab caliphate and 
Sharifian policies. This irony, however, was not noted. 
Given that the former British policy on the caliphate had been based not so much on a 
misconception but on a conscious innovation regarding the institution, the significance of 
Ormsby-Gore's 'revelation' is that it signaled a rejection of the former policy. As the absence 
of irony suggests, this process in itself involved a certain amount of self-deception. The 
4 This is precisely the point made in the introduction to this thesis, i. e. that any proposition concerning the 
essential 'nature' of the caliphate would be an entirely contingent one, and, that no Islamic doctrine of the 
caliphate will suffice for historical purposes. See Section 1.04. 
5 FO 882, Vol 111, HM/16/2, 'Note on the Khalifate', by Capt. Gore. [The report is undated though an archivist or 
clerk has written "? Dec '16 T' in the margin. ] 
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relevant correspondence reveals a collective amnesia regarding former attitudes. Although it is 
not certain who read the report nor what direct influence it had, there can be no doubt that its 
import corresponded closely with the apparently more objective and distanced perspective 
which prevailed from 1917 onwards. This development was, however, far from even. 
It is not uncommon for officers of imperialism routinely engaged in liaison activities to inflate 
the prestige and standing of their opposite number in aid of their own promotion and self- 
advancement. Colonel C. E. Wilson, British Agent in Jiddah and British Representative to the 
Sharifian Government, proved to be no exception. Increasingly, at a time when other erstwhile 
enthusiasts were becoming less ebullient about King Husayn's caliphate ambitions, Wilson 
took up the cause with greater purpose. In this sense he replaced Wingate who, now in the 
position of High Commissioner in Egypt, had, to all appearances, become a confirmed sceptic. 
In anticipation of a post-war peace settlement Wilson hoped for Husayn's involvement in the 
disposition of Syria since, 
The settlement of the Arab territories is of first importance to the British Empire for many 
reasons and by no means the least is that the future position of the Sherif is intimately bound tip 
in any settlement made. The spiritual power of the Sherif, which now is great, will undoubtedly 
become greater still and it is by no means impossible that he will realize what I think is his 
chief ambition, viz the establishment of an Arab Caliphat. 6 
In the context of the framework of analysis adopted here, his concern would seem to be an 
inverted form of everyone else's. Whereas, most British orientalists had hoped to promote 
Husayn's supposed spiritual powers in order to minimise his real political sovereignty, Wilson 
was now advocating an extension of his temporal domain in order to underpin his spiritual 
ascendancy. Others, like Clayton, were in broad agreement over the future of Syria but 
preferred that it be taken by one of the King's sons on the grounds that Husayn's government 
would be too 'reactionary and non-progressive' 7 for Syrian political tastes. 
Perhaps because of his enthusiasm Wilson had overlooked the limits set by the social and 
political milieu which conditioned Husayn's outlook as well as his immediate and long term 
prospects. However, he had certainly been aware of these, it was simply that he had not 
FO 882 Vol. 12, KH 17/8, Wilson to Clayton, 21 March 1917. 
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grasped their implications for his own vision of a Sharifian caliphate. For example he 
simultaneously requested, via the Arab Bureau, an eighty percent increase in the Sharif's 
subsidy, which he believed was necessary to enable Husayn and his sons to 'bribe' and pay 
subsidies to the shaykhs and tribes who were joining or might join the Sharif's arMy. 8 What he 
did not appreciate was the disparity between Husayns' supposed suitability as political leader 
of the Arabs and the facts which he now cited. Specifically, that without such subsidies the 
King of the Hijaz attracted no popular support or charismatic allegiance based on the supposed 
spiritual powers of which Wilson had spoken to Clayton only ten days before. Lawrence, on 
the other hand, linked Sharifian ambitions with the need to incorporate settled territory in 
Arabia. A settled peasantry, Lawrence understood, had been the basis of recent Wahhabite 
expansion and, historically, of the spread of Islam itself. 9 Lawrence's diagnosis would prove 
to be the correct one. 
Days later Wilson wrote to Wingate enclosing a lengthy note by a political officer with the 
Indian Army which advocated a wholehearted support for both King Husayn and his son 
Faysal whose command of allegiance in Arabia and Syria he exaggerated out of all proportion. 
The author, a Captain Bray of the Bengal Lancers, now assisting Wilson in gathering 
intelligence in Arabia, 10 feared, above all, an Islamic resurgence in Afghanistan. He argued: 'It 
is ... essential that the country to whom Mohammedans 
look should not be Afghanistan. We 
should therefore create a State more convenient for ourselves, to whom the attention of Islam 
should be turned. We have an opportunity in Arabia. ' He also saw in present circumstances an 
opportunity to divide Islam. Undoubtedly what had inspired both Wilson's and Bray's sudden 
enthusiasm was the recent reversal of British misfortune in the region" and the mounting 
expectation that Turkey and its caliphate would fall. Assuming that, like the papacy, the 
institution of the caliphate must continue, it was now thought inevitable that the Muslim world 
would quickly find a replacement. However, what motivated Bray was a fear that only 
Afghanistan and Arabia could realistically produce a caliph, the former being obviously 
unacceptable to British India. Whereas Afghanistan was a fully constituted state and virtually 
7 FO 882 Vol. 12, KH 17/12, Clayton to Wilson, 18 April 1917. 
8 FO 882 Vol. 12, KH 17/9, Wilson to the Director of the Arab Bureau, Cairo, 29 March 1917. 
9 FO 882, Vol. VII, HRG 17/29, Report by T. E. Lawrence, 16 April 1917. 
10 Westrate, 1992, p. 69. 
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independent, Arabia was weak and not even nominallY united: hence the pressing need to 
promote Husayn as suzerain of, an as-yet-to-be-united, Arabia. 12 
A further reappraisal took place, this time in the form of a re-examination of the undertakings 
in relation to the caliphate that had been communicated to Husayn by McMahon on 30 August 
1915. An article penned by Hogarth entitled, 'The Next Caliphate' published in issue No. 49 
of the Arab Bulletin, now under the editorship of Major Cornwallis, referred to the High 
Commissioner's letter as 'a message sent through the Emir of Mecca to the Arab people. ' 
This, Hogarth maintained, had 'committed' Britain to "'approve" an Arab Caliphate, 
whenever established by Arabs in common. ' 
Apart from the obvious recasting of the message in nationalist terms as one addressed 
indirectly to the Arab people without any reference whatsoever to the approval of Muslims in 
general, the report represented a new departure in self-criticism. The report noted that when 
the original 'message was framed, it was, perhaps, not realized that diplomatic, or any official, 
"approval" of a Caliph as such by a Christian Power would be a novelty. ' The turn of events in 
Arabia brought the end of the war into. view, and a new focus on the future of the caliphate 
along with it. As Hogarth saw it the problem in India would be that of having to approve a 
new caliphate while continuing to allow Indian Muslims to pray for the Ottoman one. 
Conversely, the current situation according to which the Indian Government did not interfere 
with religious practice, had only been tolerable on the basis of 'our official pretence that the 
Caliphate is only a spiritual headship, no longer implying temporal dominion over Moslems in 
general. ' Later Hogarth declared succinctly: 'A pretence indeed it is -a sturdy, conscious 
fiction. It does not alter facts, but only our imperial relation to thern. ' It was precisely this 
'official pretence' which, according to Hogarth, lay behind Kitchener's letters of 1914 and 
those of McMahon which followed in 1915. He concluded that any Western state which 
admitted the authority of a caliph over its Muslim subjects was 'in simple ignorance ... 
feeding political programmes., " In future, therefore, Britain should ensure that any caliph had 
11 See Note 1, above. 
12 FO 882, Vol. 15, PNI 17/2, Wilson to Wingate, 29 March 1917, enclosing 'a note on the Mohammedan 
Suestion' by Capt. Bray 18 th KGO Lancers, Indian Army, under a covering note to Wilson dated, 27 March 1917. 
1 FO 882, Vol. 25, Arab Bulletin, 49,30 April 1917, pp. 191-3, section headed, 'Arabia. ' 
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only spiritual influence, in the narrowest sense, beyond his own realm. In fact, as has been 
adumbrated in earlier chapters, this problem had already been apprehended in broad outline. 
What Hogarth seemed to be saying was that political efficacy should not be obtained by a 
future caliph under the guise of the inviolability of 'religious' practice. 
It is of further significance that Hogarth refers to a 'sturdy conscious fiction, ' [emphasis 
added]. Although Elie Kedourie acknowledges this point elsewhere, with regard to a 
memorandum sent by Husayn to Wingate on 10 April 1917, he insists that, 
the Arab caliphate of which the British were said to have "repeatedly and plainly" desired the 
restoration was, in Husayn's view, no mere "spiritual" caliphate, but a political power which 
would replace that exercised by the Ottomans. And for the first tinle in these Sharifian 
negotiations, someone in Cairo realized that Husayn meant one thing by the caliphate, while the 
British who had so insouciantly dangled it before his eyes meant quite another. [emphasis 
added] 14 
This is plainly absurd in the light of Hogarth's reference to a conscious fiction as the basis of 
Britain's negotiating position since the earliest days of the war. Furthermore, it would make 
nonsense of the idea which has been substantiated throughout this thesis: that Britain sought to 
introduce Husayn into the post-war arrangements as part of a faqade in which nominal 
4 spiritual' suzerainty would displace effective temporal sovereignty and independence. Britain 
had understood for a long time that historically the caliphate had encompassed both religious 
and ternporal powers and had long believed that even an effective 'spiritual' caliphate must 
rest on a sound temporal base - even, it was supposed, one provided by an external imperial 
power! 
In retrospect a contemporaneous memorandum by Cornwallis, acting director of the Bureau 
following Hogarth's absence in late 1916, may be regarded, in certain respects, as representing 
an end-point in the development of Britain's attitude which endured until the abolition and 
ultimate demise of the caliphate between 1922 and 1926. In this document Cornwallis, 
possibly influenced by Hogarth's article which he would have been responsible for editing, 
expressed the hope of multiple caliphs once the Sultan had fallen. Regarding the institution in 
14 Kedourie, 1976, p. 149. Hogarth's 'sturdy conscious fiction' is referred to in an altogether different context in: 
Kedourie, 1956, p. 53. 
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general he opined that 'our obvious line is to steer clear of it and to let the thing develop by 
itself, merely watching the situation closely, and putting in our influence Own and wherever 
wefind it advantageous to the Empire to do so. ' [emphasis added] 15 
The import of Hogarth's apparently clarifying statement is not self-evident. Some would 
insist, no doubt, that since the Arab Bulletin was, in practice, far from confidential it is 
unlikely that the admission of such an error would be made there. Nevertheless the 
documentary record is unambiguous' 6 and one can only assume that it was now judged politic 
to declare an end to the pretence and to be more straightforward about the kind of caliphate 
that Britain could contemplate. For example, it was known that copies of the Arab Bulletin 
had been regularly obtained by French diplomats. This could, however, be construed as 
advantageous. Although it cannot be firmly substantiated, the 'leaking' of such material might 
have been expected to lessen French suspicion of Britain's involvement with Husayn while 
simultaneously leaking Britain's firm intentions to the world at large. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the documentary record supported here must lead one to conclude that the 
suggestion of belated realisation on the part of Cornwallis in his note to Symes (which forms 
the basis of Kedourie's view) must be judged insincere. Cornwallis wrote: 
In the subsequent negotiations with the Sherif, H. M. G. merely agreed to approve 17 of an Arab 
Caliphate vice the Ottoman Caliphate, should the Arabs succeed in establishing one 
satisfactorily. But it should be noted that to the Sherif, both temporal and spiritual power are 
included in the word "Caliphate" and a much wider meaning has therefore has been given by 
him to the extracts quoted above than was intended by H. M. G. 
15 FO 882, Vol. 12, KH 17/16, Cornwallis to Symes, 28 April 1917. 
16 One need go no further back than 24 April 1916 for an explicit indication that Wingate understood that 
Husayn's caliphate ambitions were both spiritual and temporal. See Chapter 7, Note 60; though there is an 
equally explicit indication from Clayton on 24 July 1915. See Chapter 6, Note 25. However, numerous other 
references may be taken to imply that it was generally understood that Husayn's ambitions in that area were 
ultimately temporal. See Chapter 4, Notes 16 and 18; Chapter 5, Note 27; Section 5.6. Also, SAD WP 136/l/. 35- 
7, Clayton to Wingate, 6 January 1916. Chapter 4, Note 16, refers to the influential and foresightful 'Symes 
Report' of 15 February 1915. 
17 On reading Arab Bulletin No. 49, Hirtzel recorded a minute in which he objected to the idea that Britain had 
'approved' a caliphate of any sort but blamed McMahon for using the term in his letter of 30 August 1915. 
Hirtzel insisted that Kitchener had been far less precise. LR&S1I 1/119, P. 782,1917 Register No. 195 1, Minute 
by Hirtzel, 31 May 1917. 
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Rather, this paragraph is an indication that another 'conscious fiction' was in the making - 
specifically, that there had been no original intention to mislead Husayn and the Arabs over 
the nature of the caliphate then envisaged. 
8.12 The Persistence of the Caliphate Issue 
References to tribal politics in the intelligence reports emanating from Arabia continued 
unabated throughout the war; their effect has been established and need not be re-emphasised 
here. Suffice it to say that during the remainder of the war relations between King Husayn and 
Ibn Sa'ud gradually worsened to the extent that speculation that Ibn Sa'ud might submit to 
Sharifian suzerainty was discontinued - in Cairo at least. 
18 It is an indication of how far 
Sharifian-Sa'udi relations had deteriorated that 'Abdullah felt sufficiently aggrieved that in 
December 1917 he should refer to Ibn Sa'ud as 'a son of a dog. '19 Issues such as these formed 
the background and not the substance of British policy discussions concerning the future of the 
caliphate. During the ensuing eighteen months, that is between May 1917 and October 1918, 
more enduring themes dominated the debate. One was the desire to downplay, even to deny, 
Britain's original offer to endorse an Arab caliphate; another was the need for Britain to find 
some alternative faqade from behind which to rule Arabia. 
In conjunction these themes continued to exhibit two of the underlying contradictions at the 
heart of British policy. Firstly, there was the imperial imperative of controlling Arabia (loosely 
defined) to the effective exclusion of other powers, while allowing a semblance of 
independence and unity. Secondly, was the need to satisfy the supposed Muslim desire for a 
strong caliphate while simultaneously avoiding any accusations of interference in Islamic 
affairs, or of taking action detrimental to Islam. It may be pointed out that in the long run the 
first contradiction was irresolvable in as much as imperialism is invariably resisted at the point 
18 Although Sir Percy Cox became increasingly bold in supporting Ibn Sa'ud against Husayn, he later maintained 
that Husayn's caliphate would be acceptable to Ibn Sa'ud and the 'Mesopotamians' once the Turks were 
eliminated. FO 882, Vol 111, AP 18/1, 'Very Secret, ' Arab Bureau Supplementary Papers, I April, 1918, No. 3- 
The Future ofArabia, Report of meeting held at the Residency, Cairo, 23 March 1918. See Note 32, below. 
19 FO 882, Vol. 8, IS 17/25, Memo by Cornwallis regarding a meeting with Emir Abdullah on the subject of Ibn 
Saud, 9 December 1917. 
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of contact. The second problem would turn out to be illusory since, ultimately, secular 
nationalism both precluded the possibility of, and obviated the need for, a pre-eminent ruler in 
Islam. In the meantime, however, in spite of British functionaries taking refuge in the 
sanctuary of official indifference, the caliphate issue would not go away. 
The two predominant themes noted above were the subject of a report submitted by Wingate 
to the Foreign Secretary in June 1917. In the course of outlining the aims of Britain's Arabian 
policy as he saw it, Wingate appeared to concur with the necessity of 'stand[ing] apart' on the 
issue of the caliphate, but warned against 'underrating its final bearing on all future political 
arrangements. ' Although he did not explicitly connect an Arab caliphate with the notion of a 
faqade, he did explain the need 'to create and preserve ... the faqade of an independent Arab 
Empire and [to] grant its titular ruler the appanage of an Imperial state' in terms of the need to 
'assuage Moslem pride 720 after the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, with 
reference to the 1916 agreement with France, though without mentioning the caliphate, Sykes 
recommended 'that both Great Britain and France should encourage all Arab parties in areas A 
and B to look to [Sharif Husayn] and his successors resident at Mecca as titular suzerains. 21 
The idea of a temporally circumscribed caliphate with extensive 'spiritual' reach had been 
displaced by the concept of nominal, or in this instance 'titular, ' suzerainty, pure and simple. 
In spite of the increasing anticipation of a post-war peace conference the discussions in this 
regard were as abstract as they ever had been - however there were the first signs of a purely 
'Sharifian policy, ' that is, without a caliphate, according to which Husayn's sons would be 
'hereditary Prince[s]' in each of the 'independent' states within the French and British spheres 
of influence. 
Elsewhere the issue of the caliphate was still current. In consequence of the discussion in the 
cabinet surrounding Wingate's memorandum, Sykes, who always strove to synthesise 
contradictory points of view, informed Lord Curzon that 'temporal power [was] not a 
necessary appanage of the Caliphate, ' since the Abbasids had been confined to Baghdad or 
20 FO 882, Vol. III, AP 17/11, Letter from Sir R. Wingate, The Residency, Ramich, to A. J. Balfour, II June 
1917, presented at Cabinet. CAB 27/22, MAC 3 July, 1917, under Item 3- Policy in Arabia. 21 Sledniere Papers, DDSY (2)/4 143, 'Observations on Arabian Policy as a result of visit to Red Sea ports, 
Jeddah, Yembo, Kamaran, and Aden' by Mark Sykes, 17 May 1917. 
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Cairo for 250 years when 'their political authority [had] barely extended over their palaces. ' 22 
The upshot being that the secular authority of the Sharif's caliphate could easily be confined to 
the Hijaz without risking offence to Islam. Concern was later expressed by the Director of 
Military Intelligence that if Mecca should prove unsuitable as the seat of the caliphate, as 
Wingate had suggested, then Baghdad should be selected against Damascus. The former was 
preferred because the decision had alread been taken 'to give Baghdad an Arab faqade. ' In y0 
the face of Britain's official "hands-off' policy, Wingate reiterated what had, in fact, been the 
basis of British policy since the beginning of the war. He stated simply that, 'in considering 
this question the desirability of retaining the Caliphate under British auspices should be a sine 
quA non. ' 23 
In view of the ongoing discussions to which Sharif Husayn had not been party, it seems 
extraordinarily coincidental that he should suddenly declare, quite emphatically and at some 
length, that he was in no way interested in the caliphate. It may have been simply that he had 
arrived at the (correct) conclusion that the caliphate as understood by the British had become 
an encumbrance to his secular ambitions. According to a report submitted by Wilson to the 
Arab Bureau at the end of July 1917, Husayn was now opposed to the caliphate on principle, 
preferring to become Amir al-Mu'minin, 24 in part because 'it will apparently be acceptable to 
the Sheikhs of urban Syria. ' Furthermore, according to T. E. Lawrence, Husayn had recently 
declared that the caliphate had been the source of many problems for Turkey, and that in any 
case 'in view of his own policy of friendship with Great Britain, he could neither acknowledge 
another's Khalifate, assume one himself, or admit the existence of a theory. ' Certainly, these 
observations suggest that Husayn had been advised by an informant who had already 
assimilated the gist of Hogarth's contribution to Arab Bulletin No. 49 and wished to appear in 
step with his imperial sponsors. In this context Husayn's reference to the notion that 'the idea 
22 Sledmere Papers, DDSY /(2) 4 148, Note from Mark Sykes at the Offices of the War Cabinet, Whitehall, to 
Lord Curzon, 2 July 1917. 
23 CAB 27/22, MAC July 1917, Arabian Policy - 'Observations by Director of Military Intelligence on Sir R 
Wingate's despatch No. 127 of June I I'h, ' War Office, 6 July 1917. 
24 Usually translated as 'Commander of the Faithful. ' 
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of a Muslim Khalifate was suggested to Abdul Hamid by the British, and exploited by him as 
a stick to beat [them] with 925 seems particularly remarkable. 
These pronouncements, it may be supposed, should have signified an end to the issue of the 
caliphate in connection with the Sharif of Mecca's secular ambitions. And so it did until six 
months later when 'Abdullah announced to Cornwallis that he wished to meet Wingate in 
order 'to discuss the question of proclaiming King Hussein as Caliph. ' He argued on the basis 
of nationalist priorities by reiterating the necessary connection between the return of the 
caliphate to Mecca and the independence of the Arabs. It should be pointed out that the 
distinction between caliph and Amir al-Mu'minin, which had comforted Wilson and 
Lawrence, was wasted on Wingate. For example, Husayn's disavowal had in no way 
precluded Wingate from standing in the way of the Sharif's being represented when it came to 
disposing of the holy sites of Jerusalem on the occasion of Allenby's formal entry into the 
'Old City' on II December 1917. Ironically, Wingate now felt it necessary to exclude an 
agent of Husayn from being granted custody of the Hararn area on the grounds that 
'representation of the King might be construed as British recognition of his title to the 
Caliphate. 26 
Cornwallis's reply to 'Abdullah is instructive in that it refers to Britain's 'traditional policy' of 
non-interference in religious matters while in the same sentence declaring that 'HMG could 
not remain unconcerned and hoped he would take no action without HMG's approval. ' The 
hypocrisy here was twofold: besides the blatant contradiction between non-interference and an 
insistence on such approval, was the talk of 'approval' after Hogarth's complete denigration of 
the idea in Arab Bulletin no. 49. Cornwallis went on to discourage in the strongest terms any 
such bid for the caliphate pointing out, without acknowledging the irony of his argument, that 
25 FO 892, Vol. 12, KH 17/18, Wilson to Cornwallis, 31 July 1917, attaching a report by T. E. Lawrence on a 
meeting between Hussein, and Wilson and Lawrence on 28 July 1917. Wingate sent copies of Lawrence's report 
to Balfour and the Viceroy. FO 141/825 1198/820, Wingate, The Residency, Ramleh, to Balfour, despatch no. 
179,16 August 1917; and, Covering letter by Wingate to Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India, Simla, despatch no. 
199M, enclosing a copy of the latter, 16 August 1917. Lawrence's report was reproduced in Arab Bulletin No. 
59, issued on 12 August 1917. 
26 Tibawi, 1978, pp. 1934. 
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'a caliph who would be ... entirely dependent on a 
Christian power for support, would find 
little sympathy with Moslems generally. ' 27 
Moreover, Wingate later told Balfour that he favoured the meeting proposed by 'Abdullah 'in 
order to have the opportunity ... of checking premature or 
ill-considered action by him. 128 The 
view was later expressed in the Arab Bulletin that it was only 'Abdullah who wanted his father 
to become caliph . 
29 However, 'Abdullah's nationalist reasoning was echoed by the Sharif 
himself. In a letter to Bassett, Wilson's assistant in Jiddah, Husayn politely reminded his 
correspondents that the Arab movement had been founded on Britain's expression of support 
for the re-establishment of the Arab caliphate. Husayn went on to say that, although this had 
not been in the name of the Sharif or his sons, Great Britain had 'thought it better that [he] 
should be the preliminary means of starting this blessed revolt. ' It therefore, 'became 
incumbent upon [him] to serve her [Great Britain's] good aspirations and the welfare of the 
Arabs religiously as well as nationally. 930 In the event, such was British confidence at this 
stage that they were satisfied by 'Abdullah's assurances that little could be done without a 
clear expression of sympathy by Britain. 'Abdullah spoke of waiting two or three pilgrimages 
before acting. 31 This episode above all others marks the point in time by which the original 
'Grand plan' which had rested upon Husayn's eventual attainment of the caliphate had been 
stood on its head: from now on support for the Sharif would depended on him not being 
declared caliph. 
27 FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 18/2, Cornwallis to Wingate, 3 January 1918, enclosing a translation of a letter from 
Abdullah which ended, rather desperately, with a passing reference to gold deposits in the Hijaz. 
28 CAB 27/23, p. 127-8, Secret MEC 78. War Cabinet, Item: 'The Proclamation of King Hussein as Caliph, ' 
including discussion of despatch No. 2 from Sir R. Wingate, The Residency, Cairo, to Balfour, 6 January 1918, 
enclosing Cornwallis to Wingate, 3 January 1918. 
29 FO 882, Vol. 25, Arab Bulletin No. 76,13 January 1918. 
30 FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 18/5, Bassett to Cornwallis, 24 January 1918, enclosing a translation of a letter from 
Hussein to Bassett. 
31 Ljp&S/10/1 I 11, p. 1510 1924, [E2298 / 1752 / 441, 'Memorandum on British Commitments to King Hussein, ' 
12 March 1924. 
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8.13 The Derogation of King Husayn: A Sharifian Policy without a Caliphate 
The remainder of 1918 saw further moves towards a purely 'Sharifian' policy, i. e. one 
divested of its Islamic underpinning according to which the Sharif's sons would be made 
titular monarchs in the various Arab countries to be ruled by Britain. In spite of this process, 
which resulted in the complete extirpation of the former caliphate policy, the requirement that 
no future caliphate should be in a position to threaten Britain was maintained. Nevertheless, 
'Abdullah's attempt to broach the subject of his father's candidature for the caliphate was 
something of a watershed. Thereafter the caliphate became quite incidental, almost a minor 
irritation in the context of British dealings with Sharif Husayn - though not, as will be seen 
later, in relation to the negotiation of peace with Turkey. The demise of the caliphate which 
followed, and which was hastened by the very terms of this peace, will be examined only to 
the extent that it related to British interest in the matter. 
In March 1918 an important meeting took place at the Cairo residency which included 
Wingate, Cox, Hogarth, Cornwallis, Clayton, and Wilson. They met in order to discuss 
'Future Policy in Arabia, ' their deliberations and conclusions being submitted for further 
discussion at a cabinet meeting in April. This meeting delivered a consensus over the future of 
Sharif Husayn according to which his chances of succeeding in the field of secular politics 
were utterly discounted. For example it was understood that while his success would depend 
on his being well received in Syria, the Syrians did not desire his involvement. Cox insisted 
that the principle of 'primus inter pares' be allowed for religious supremacy only and later 
argued against the political involvement of the Sharif, either as the nominal head of an Arab 
confederacy or of Mesopotamia. Cox believed that Husayn could never crush Ibn Sa'ud 
though he thought that both the latter and the people of Mesopotamia might, under certain 
circumstances, accept Husayn as caliph. It was agreed that if such an eventuality were 
presented to the British as a fait accompli then Britain should adopt 'a non-committal 
attitude. ' 32 The implication being that it was now understood that this was an outcome which 
should be avoided if at all possible. 
32 UP&S/l 1/135, P 2142, account of a meeting held at the Residency, Cairo, 23 March 1918, and submitted to 
War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, EC 180. 
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A subsequent War Cabinet meeting dealt summarily with the potentially delicate issue of 
President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' which, among other things, provided for the self- 
determination of all nationalities presently within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was feared 
that the universal application of the underlying principle might form the basis of similar claims 
elsewhere, for example in the areas 'liberated' from Turkey. However, Balfour announced 
that, 
President Wilson did not seriously mean to apply his formula outside Europe. He meant that no 
"civilised" communities should remain under the heel of other "civilised" communities; as to 
politically inarticulate peoples, he would probably not say more than that their true interests 
should prevail as against exploitation by conquerors. If so, an Arab State under British 
protection would satisfy him, ... if it were shown the 
Arabs could not stand alone. 33 
In other words, as John Fisher points out, there was thought to be no inconsistency between 
President Wilson's declaration of January 19 18 and the idea of an Arab faqade. 34 Remarkably, 
Clayton would later use 'the principles of freedom and self-determination of peoples, ' which 
was expected to govern the post-war peace conference, against Husayn. It was on this basis 
that in September 1918 he insisted that the King must 'follow the advice of H. M. G. on all 
matters of external policy and in dealing with other independent Arab rulers and States. ' 
35 
It would appear that in the confident atmosphere engendered by recent military advances in 
the Middle East, many British imperialists, 'in the field' so to speak, had overlooked, or 
simply forgotten about, the previously assumed dangers of pan-Islam. 
36 This was certainly 
33 CAB 27/24, EC 5'h Meeting, Minutes of War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, 24 April 1918, 'Future of 
Mesopotamia. ' It may be remarked that Balfour's conclusion, and indeed Wilson's intention, were quite 
consistent with the principles of liberty as espoused by John Stuart Mill, since according to the latter: 'The early 
difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, and there is seldom any choice of means for 
overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of expedients that will 
attain an end, perhaps otherwise unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with 
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. ' Mill, 
in, Robson (ed. ), 1966, p. 14. 
34 Fisher, 1999, p. 130. 
35 FO 882, Vol. 111, AP 1815, Memo by Clayton to The Residency, Ramich, 8 September 1918. 
36 This was evidently not the case in the Sudan where a policy was still in force, that had been introduced by 
Wingate, of maintaining an 'Islam-free' buffer in the southern portion of the country which abutted East Africa 
('a non-Mohamedan belt along the southern frontier'). For example Sudanese Muslim officials were not 
employed in the area while Christian missionaries were permitted free access. FO 882, Vol 15, PNI 18/6, 
Despatch from Governor General's Office, Khartoum, Sudan to High Commissioner Wingate, Egypt, 7 February 
1918. 
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Captain Wilson's view. In a despatch to Wingate in May he tried to persuade his superior that 
the 'non-caliphate' policy now being pursued may be construed as an attempt by Britain to 
effect the 'disintegration of Islam. ' He continued to see Husayn's spiritual and temporal 
ambitions as intimately connected and still thought it unwise to disregard either. 
37 
Notwithstanding Wilson's entreaties, the general tendency was now strongly in the opposite 
direction. In June 1918 Wingate wrote a letter to Husayn which in practical effect, though not 
in words, amounted to a retraction of support for the King's ambitions, political and religious, 
beyond the Hijaz. The key passage read: 
Your Highness cannot fail to realise how sincerely His Majesty's Government will welcome 
any practical evidences of Arab Unity, which it is in their policy to promote. At the same time 
they believe that such unity to be real and permanent in its effect can best be achieved by the 
common consent of the Arabs and should not be imposed upon them. 
38 
At the same time Wingate's assistant, Symes, still appeared to support the Sharif as caliph. He 
drafted a policy proposal which attempted to square three ostensibly disparate policies - 
'Zionist, Syrian and Sherifial' - on the assumption that the Sykes-Picot agreement was 
'virtually defunct. ' Remarkably the Zionist and Shariflan policies were easily reconciled. In 
fact they were construed as mutually reinforcing since the Zionists, it was envisaged, would 
compensate the Sharif financially thereby obviating the need for Christian support. 
Furthermore, this 'might also provide the means by which King Husayn could establish his 
position as primus inter pares, or his complete ascendancy, over the other Chiefs of the 
Arabian Peninsula, thus creating a better territorial background for his claims to the Caliphate 
of the Moslems. ' 39 The well-establ i shed Syrian objections to Husayn's involvement could just 
as easily be dealt with by offering the Syrian emirate to Faysal. Apart from its exhibiting the 
kernel of the Sharifian policy which ultimately came about, Symes' note represents something 
of a return to the abstract verbal conjuring of earlier days; as such it bore little fruit. Apart 
from Wilson and Symes, only the somewhat marginal figure of Gertrude Bell continued to 
37 FO 882, Vol. 111, AP 18/2, secret note from Wilson to Wingate, I May 1918. The view expressed here was 
reiterated a month later. FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 18/9, Wilson to High Commissioner, 5 June 1918, regarding an 
interview of King Hussein undertaken by Mark Sykes. 
38 FO 882, Vol. VII, AB 1915, 'High Commissioner to King of Hejaz, ' June 19 19. This gist of this message was 
repeated by Wilson in a meeting with Husayn on 18 July. FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 18/6, Wilson to Wingate, 23 July 
1918. 
39 SAD WP 148/10/3746, Secret note by G. S. Symes, 13 June 19 18. 
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advocate the suzerainty of the Sharif as caliph with his political sovereignty restricted to the 
Hijaz. 40 
It is important to point out at this stage, in further substantiation of the arguments presented in 
earlier chapters, that whereas Zionist aspirations are here imagined to be compatible with a 
Sharifian policy based on Husayn's caliphate '41 albeit 
deferred, agreement with the French is 
now considered to be at odds with a version of the Sharifian policy according to which the 
secular rule of Faysal replaces Husayn's nominal suzerainty based on his supposed religious 
credentials. Conversely, it may be argued that the private rejection of Sykes-Picot by Lloyd 
George's government 42 made the former caliphate policy dispensable, paving the way for a 
more directly political faqade - specifically a secular Sharifian policy in the context of a 
fragmented Arabia. Although his description of this policy is indistinguishable from the Cairo 
caliphate policy as developed during 1915, even to the point of describing Husayn's future 
empire as a 'faqade, ' Symes now treats it as something quite alien. Likewise, in an almost 
identical account written for Balfour, Wingate describes the very same policy as 'the King's 
programme. 943 However, within days of Symes' report being issued an unsigned Arab Bureau 
memorandum asserted that, 'as for the Arab Kingship there is probably non-one who sees 
through the "faqade" so clearly as Husayn himself though I don't suppose he realises the 
depths of perfidy to which British Policy can sink! '44 
40 CAB 27/3, Papers submitted for EC 1217. A paper by Gertrude Bell written for the Arab Bureau (information 
only) submitted to Cabinet under a covering letter to Lord Hardinge, 25 May 1918. Bell had earlier expressed the 
view that the Sharif s religious position was an asset as it could not 'be converted into political supremacy. ' FO 
882, Vol. III, AP 17/14, Memo by Miss Bell, June 1917. Evidently her views had changed little and continued to 
accord with the original 'Grand Plan. ' 
41 It is relevant to this argument that the incompatibility between Zionism and the Arab policy only came about 
when (a) the latter had become the secular Sharifian policy, and (b) the true extent and nature of Zionist 
aspirations had been appreciated. William Ormsby-Gore, an ardent Zionist himself, was one of the first to do so. 
In August 1918 he declared: 'I can't agree that we should, or can, shape, our private policy (whatever we say in 
public) on an assumption that "Zionists seek no political domination etc., " What Sokolov says, what Weizmann if 
pressed admits (he has so admitted to me not a month ago), and the logic of facts all forbid! There will be no 
effective force behind Zionism unless the Jewish Home in Palestine means Palestine for the Jews as a Nation 
politically dominant there under whatever protection be eventually imposed. This will & can only come about by 
pressure on the existing population, not by its free, or even peaceable, consent. ' PRO FO 371 146256, 
Memorandum by William Ormsby Gore, 20 August 1918. 
42 Hughes, 1999, p. 108. 
43 FO 371/3381, Political Turkey, 123868, Secret No. 129, Wingate, the Residency, Ramleh, to Balfour, 25 June 
1918. However, on the same day Wingate wired an outline policy to Sykes which included 'the assumption of the 
caliphate by Hussein, ' [though he did so on the mistaken assumption that this was the Arab Bureau's position]. 
Westrate, 1992, p. 165. 
44 FO 882, Vol. 8, IR 18/9, unsigned handwritten note dated, II July 1918. 
266 
It would seem that by the second half of 1918 practically the entire British establishment 
having any connection with Middle Eastern policy had managed to disassociate thernselves 
from the former 'Grand plan. ' In this field of human endeavor it is perhaps unremarkable that 
they did so without acknowledging the fact. That Balfour was probably not fully cognisant of 
the earlier caliphate policy, though undoubtedly familiar with the 'official' version, can only 
have aided the process. However, such was the extent of the transformation that certain agents 
of the Indian Government now thought that things had gone too far. The comparatively vague 
concept of 'suzerainty' which had been preferred to the more definite 'sovereignty' was, 
according to the Resident and Assistant Resident at Aden, now thought to be too 'elast ic. , 45 
On the basis of the experience of India, direct control or complete non-involvement was 
preferred for fear that Arabia might descend into chaos and anarchy under an arrangement 
which would preclude their effective intervention. 
By July 19 18 even Wilson had been reduced to expressing a preference for a 'Suzerain' policy 
without referring directly to the caliphate. 46 Wingate, however, in September 1918 appears to 
have become convinced once again, this time by Husayn himself, by the idea of an eventual 
'smooth transition of Sunnite opinion from a temporal to a spiritual [elsewhere termed 
Tontific'] conception of the Caliphate. ' 47 On the other hand comfort was taken, as it had been 
before, by the fact that Husayn was 'doubtful of his capacity unaided to realize his aims. ' 
Within a month Wingate felt able to draft a comprehensive set of recommendations entitled, 
'Note On Arab Policy - Arab Aggregation On A Racial Basis, ' in which he omitted to refer to 
45 FO 371/3381, Political Turkey, 149524, Covering letter No. 177 from Wingate, the Residency, Ramleh, to 
Balfour, 13 August 1918, enclosing 'Note by Major B. R. Reilly (Assistant Resident Aden)' on a Memorandum 
by Wilson, I May 1918, and 'Comment on Major Reilly's Note made by Major-General J. M. Stewart C. B., 
Resident at Aden. ' These notes were later presented to the War Cabinet. CAB 27/32, War Cabinet - Eastern 
Committee - Memoranda EC 1401 - EC 1600, Volume VIII, pp. 118-122. For EC 1479, September 1918. 46 FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 18/6, Secret, Wilson, Red Sea, 23 July 1918. It should be born in mind, however, that this 
document, among others, was selected for presentation at discussions convened in preparation for a post-warjoint 
Anglo-French declaration 'defining the attitude of Britain and France " towards the Arab territories liberated 
from Turkish rule. "' Fisher, 1999, p. 230. It is perhaps natural that the British would wish to play-down the 
matter of the caliphate at this juncture. 
47 FO 371/3384, Political Turkey, 171983, Secret No. 129, Wingate, The Residency, Ranileh, to Balfour, 21 
September 1918. Wingate had been temporarily convinced by Husayn's reference to the fact that the latter's 
declared purpose in commencing his revolt had been 'to preserve the political state of Islarn. ' 
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the caliphate even once, merely suggesting recognition of the King's religious significance 
throughout the region with the preservation of the Hijaz 'as an archaic enclave. ' 48 
It was of perhaps greater moment that Sykes, who had direct and frequent access to the 
cabinet, completely distanced himself from the idea of an Arabian caliphate during the later 
months of 1918. He now objected to Faysal's becoming an Amir in Syria as this would imply 
that he was the Amir 'of a caliph ... deriving authority 
from a religious source, ' and went even 
further in suggesting that some title be found for Husayn 'which did not carry with it any 
claim to temporal or spiritual authority. ' [emphasis added]49 
Notwithstanding the almost complete abandonment of the Sharifian caliphate policy within the 
British establishment, the French were justified in being suspicious when General Allenby 
50 
visited Damascus on 3 October shortly after it had been taken by the British. Commandant 
Larcher remarked, 'E lui restait [Allenby] ý installer Fdmir Faisal ý Damas ... il commencait 
d'autre part h poursuivre 1'ex6cution du plan impdrialiste anglais conqu: la reconstitution du 
kalifat des Abbasides. '51 The same events induced Sykes to remark: 'I believe that King 
Hussein will go to Damascus and be declared Commander of the Faithful and appoint 
Abdullah Sherif of Mecca. If he does it will not matter. I am sure that the Khalifate is no 
concern of ours. We ought to tell him we back his movement as a national one. ' 52 
48 SAD WP 150/3/84, Private and Secret Note by Wingate, The Rcsidency, Ramleh, 21 October 1918. C, 49 FO 371/338 1, Political Turkey, 123868, Various memoranda by Sykes, probably June and July 1918. 
50 Strictly speaking Damascus was all but taken by the Australian cavalry and entered triumphantly by Faysal and 
Lawrence the following day. Fromkin, 199 1, p. 336. 
51 Hughes, 1999, p. 106. 
52 FO 371/3384, Political Turkey, 171983, Minute by Sykes, 14 October 1918. 
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8.2 The Post-War Settlement and the Issue of the Caliphate 
8.21 Further Moves Towards the irrevocable Exclusion of the Sharif of Mecca 
With the final occupation of Greater Syria by British and Arab forces, 53 and of Mesopotamia 
by Britain alone, between September and November 1918,54 the war in the Middle East 
officially ended. No doubt the impending peace conference concentrated the minds of the 
proposers and arbiters of British Middle Eastern policy and in November and December 1918 
a number of definitive documents and decisions were produced. On the same day that the 
armistice was signed in the Forest of Compi6gne, Hogarth issued a memorandum, which, 
although not the sole determinant of policy, adumbrated with unusual clarity what was to 
become the final version of the British caliphate policy. Hogarth's opening remarks suggested 
nothing new. He recommended that, 'The King of Hedjaz ought never to be allowed more 
than most nominal suzerainty over any other Arab area, since his rule must necessarily be 
theocratic, ' adding that Britain might well recognise 'a vague general title such as "Malik el- 
Arban" or "Malik el-Hashimi" ... and we might well encourage, 
by every discreet and 
unobvious means in our power, the practice of praying for him in the Khutba as "Emir ern- 
Muminin" not only in the general Arab area but also in India. ' 
The essentials of what Hogarth was to outline next presaged both Britain's conduct in the 
negotiations relating to the final disposition of the Middle East, and what ultimately befell the 
caliphate, these two factors being closely connected. The origins and reworking of the crucial 
notion at the heart of Hogarth's message will be outlined in the following section. In asserting 
that, 'in the full recognition of him [Husayn] or anyone else as Caliph we ought to take no 
hand whatever, ' Hogarth was merely repeating the mantra of 'official' policy. However, this 
was now underwritten by new facts, or at least old facts re-discovered, whose import was now 
deemed relevant to the British imperial cause. The memo continued: 
53 This was essentially true in the first instance since even Beirut was only properly annexed by France after it 
had been handed over by Britain once they had taken down the Arab flag. Fromkin, 199 1, p. 340. 
'" Mosul was not taken until 4 days after the Mudros Armistice. This was done to keep it from the French as 
much as it was to remove it from the Turks. Venn, 1986, pp. 39-43. 
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since that title necessarily implies sovereignty over our own subjects, ... we ought 
in no way to 
follow the bad Italian precedent in Tripolitania, where rights of religio-political interference 
were conceded to the Ottoman Caliph. We should never, as I think, in any diplomatic document 
or in any other way, acknowledge the existence of a Caliph, and no hope of conciliating Indian 
Moslems ought to modify this rule. The more Caliphs there are actually recognised by the 
Moslem world at one time, the better for us. 55 
More importantly, within days of the end of the war, the cabinet rushed to formulate Britain's 
definitive position on the Middle East with which to 'arm' herself at the forthcoming peace 
conference. At a meeting of the Eastern Committee, the Chairman, Lord Curzon, reminded 
those attending that there had already been 'a definite decision ... in the early part of the 
summer of 1918' to establish an 'Arab faqade' in Mesopotamia. Curzon's interjection was in 
response to the Foreign Office who, now feeling somewhat bereft of diplomatic cover in the 
absence of the former caliphate policy, had hastily proposed extending Husayn's title to 'King 
of the Arabs. ' 56 The India Office were still concerned that even though a 'self-sterilized' 
caliph may emerge in the Hijaz this would not, of itself, preclude the interference of other 
powers. Taken to its logical conclusion, the potential effects of this could only be eluded by 
keeping the British sphere from the influence of Husayn himself . 
57 This was the first 
indication of the secular Sharifian policy minus Husayn, which did ultimately prevail. 
At a meeting in mid-December, Curzon reiterated what had, by this time, become both the 
'official' and 'actual' policy: 
One thing we must not do, and this is a commonplace of our policy, we must not touch with the 
end of a barge-pole the question of the Khalifate. That is a matter exclusively for the Moslem 
world; whether they choose to elect King Hussein or anybody else does not seem to me to 
concern us. Of course it would concern us in this sense, that it is a very material thing in India 
and the countries we influence to know to whom they look as Khalif, and it might be in our 
interest, if King Hussein succeeds in establishing his power, that he should be Khalif. All I 
mean is, that at the moment we should take no active steps to influence the decision. We should 
accept it whatever form it takes, hoping, now that the Sultan of Turkey has disappeared from 
the stage, that it may take the form of being offered to the Sherif of Mecca. 
58 
55 SAD WP 150/6/53-56, Memorandum by Hogarth, II November 19 18. Copied to Clayton, Cornwallis and The 
Residency. This memorandum was reprinted and submitted for discussion at a cabinet meeting. CAB 27/36, p. 
142, for EC 2302, 'Memorandum on Certain Conditions of Settlement of Western Asia, ' signed by D. G. 
Hogarth, General Staff, War Office, 15 November 1915. 
56 UP&S/10/807, War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, Minutes of the Meeting of Thursday, 21 November 1918. 
57 CAB 27/37, War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, Memoranda for EC 2584, November or December 1918. 
58 CAB 27/24, Minutes - War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, 16 
becember 1918. 
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Reference to the idea that the Sultanate would soon be dissolved, and that his caliphate would 
thereby be rendered harmless, here serves as a reminder to the historian that a Sharifian 
caliphate was, for the British, never an end in itself. It should be emphasised, however, that the 
declaration of utter disinterest in the matter of the caliphate can only novt, be taken as sincere 
in the context of that contingency, i. e. in anticipation of the dissolution of the Turkish 
caliphate. Nevertheless, on the basis of this assumption a subsequent meeting agreed a ten- 
point resolution which included, as well as a repetition of the official caliphate policy, the 
stipulation that regardless of any title Husayn might adopt in the future, his suzerainty should 
on no account be recognised outside the Hijaz . 
59 For the reasons noted above, British 
'disinterest' in the caliphate was itself a thoroughly contingent affair. 
Husayn and any influence he might have had was now the least of Britain's worries. There 
could only have been comfort gained from the view, expressed by Wilson in Jeddah, that the 
king would now accept more or less anything offered him. 60 However, there was still dissent 
within the Government on certain matters. The Foreign Office, apparently still operating 
according to some of the old assumptions, was still concerned with avoiding any offence to 
Islam and therefore continued to see value in doing what was possible to enhance Husayn's 
standing in the Muslim world. Although no longer advocating a Sharifian caliphate, they 
wished to see created 'a spiritual centre for the Moslem world which may satisfy Moslem 
aspirations without fostering chauvinism or encouraging the disastrous ideal of a political pan- 
Islamic movement. ' 61 
Furthermore, when Curzon argued for the expulsion of Turkey from Europe, i. e. 
Constantinople, in order to settle, once and for all, the question of the caliphate, Montagu 
objected on behalf of the India Office. To his own rhetorical question: 'How has the Ottoman 
Sultan been able through all these centuries to hold the position of Khalif, ' Curzon answered 
that 'if he [the Sultan] loses Constantinople I imagine that there can be very little doubt that 
the Mahommedan world will not accept as a Khalif a sovereign who has been dispossessed of 
59 CAB 27/24, EC 44 th Minutes, War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, 19 December 19 19. 
60 FO 882, Vol. 13, KH 19/48, Wilson to Wingate, 23 December 1919. 
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Constantinople, Mecca, and Medina, and who has been driven back into the highlands of 
Asia. ' 62 In response to which, Montagu insisted on adherence to the official abstention policy 
to the letter! With one or two exceptional and trivial episodes, from this point on Britain's 
main concern over the caliphate was in connection with the Sultanate rather than the future of 
King Husayn. In this regard India's interest in the issue would be sustained more zealously 
than that of the metropolis. 
8.22 The Resort to Academic Sources: Assimilating the 'Italian Lesson' 
A move towards a more critical-historical view of the caliphate on the part of the British 
authorities has already been alluded to in the context of William Ormsby-Gore's memorandum 
of December 1916.63 In this he identified a conscious policy on the part of the Turks to subvert 
the encroaching European empires through the extra-territorial religious influence of the 
Sultan as caliph. In April 1917 Hogarth had contributed an article for Arab Bulletin No. 49, 
which acknowledged the work of a Dutch academic by the name of Snouck Hurgronje. In this 
it was argued that if the caliph of Islam was afforded even the slightest spiritual authority 
there would be a distinct danger of this being used to feed the political programmes of pan- 
Islam. Hurgronje's influence is discernable in Hogarth's memorandum of II November 1918. 
It is conceivable that Ormsby-Gore's memorandum, tentatively dated December 1916, was 
also based on the work of the Dutch orientalist. 64 It was not however, until the middle of 1918 
when another foreign academic source was introduced to the Middle Eastern political 
intelligence community that the precise significance of Hurgronje's critical history, for the 
impending peace conference was realised. What follows is a brief account of the publications 
and derivative memoranda produced from mid-1918 onwards and their impact on Britain's 
attitude towards the caliphate after the war. 
61 FO 371/3385 Political -Turkey File 747 (P. P. 184895-201091) 1918,191229, 'Confidential [printed document] 
memorandum on French and Arab Claims in the Middle East in relation to British Interests. ' FO 19 December 
1918. 
62 CAB 27/24, EC 46 1h Minutes, War Cabinet, Eastern Committee, 23 December 1918. 
63 See Note 5, above. 
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In July 1918, the British Embassy in Rome despatched to the Residency in Cairo several 
copies of a translation of a booklet written by a C. A. Nallino, Professor of History and Islamic 
Institutions at the University of Rome. The booklet had been published sometime in 1917, 
before being discovered by the embassy and translated by Lieutenant F. R. Rodd of General 
Staff, Intelligence. 65 On receipt of a copy, Hogarth, perhaps a little irritated that he had yet 
again, and at such a late stage, been furnished with superior material not from his own 
provenance, declared, correctly in relation to Nallino's use of Hergronje, that 'its main 
contribution [was] not new. ' He conceded, however, that Nallino's 'criticism of the Treaty of 
Lausanne is new and very interesting in this office. ' 66 Rodd's translation was reproduced in its 
entirety in four issues of the Arab Bulletin during August and September 1918.67 
The point which had so interested Hogarth was that Italy's 1912 treaty with Turkey had 
established, among other things, that the Ottoman caliph's name was to be used in the Friday 
khutba throughout Libya, and that the caliph would be entitled to appoint and dismiss the 
. 
68 
s, qadis of that country in spite of its not otherwise being considered Ottoman territory Thi. 
according to Nallino, made Italy at best a kind of vice-Sultanate in Libya, and at worst an 
illegal occupier. The implications of this for the negotiation of a post-war peace with Turkey 
were clear: if the extra-territorial authority of the caliphate was not to be exploited with the 
cooperation of the Sharif of Mecca, then its effects must be canceled in the case of the Sultan 
of Turkey. Consequently these 'new' facts, considered from a purely British perspective, 
became the lynchpin of a series of preparatory and advisory reference documents produced to 
64 See Notes, 5,13 & 55, above. Hurgronje, 1917. This book consists of articles published in tile second half of 
1916. 
65 Francis Rennell Rodd was the son of the British Ambassador to Rome, the Rodds being long-term friends of 
Ronald Storrs. Storrs, 1943, pp. 15 & 282-3. 
66 FO 141/587/545/33 & 33, Covering slip from Cornwallis, Director, Arab Bureau, The Residency, Ramleh, 13 
August 1918, attached to a covering note from the British Embassy, Rome, 4 July 1918, and a handwritten note 
by Hogarth, dated, 21 July 1918 [This date looks like 1917 but cannot be since tile note refers to Rodd's 
translation of Nallinol; as well as an original copy of Nallino's booklet entitled, Appunti sulla Naturtz del 
"Califato " in Genere el sul Presento "Califato Ottoinano ". 
67 FO 882, Vol. 27, Arab Bulletin, No. 's 10 1- 104,27 August, and 3,10 & 24, September 1918. 
68 According to the penuitimate page of Rodd's translation, Nallino wrote: 'As Snouck Hergronje has repeatedly 
written, the Sultan receives recognition of his aspirations through the ignorance of European Powers, in a manner 
different from that which they intended, yet more consonant with the historical and legal principles of the 
Mohammedan religion. ' Interestingly, Nallino makes the point that it was only the unilateral Italian agreements, 
and neither the bilateral agreements, nor the Turkish unilateral agreements which referred to the Sultan of Turkey 
as caliph, adding that, 'in a solemn treaty the Turks could not make sta(ements which were absurd from the 
Moslem point of view. ' 
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support and guide those negotiating a settlement with the former Ottoman Empire. The first of 
these was a note by Dr. T. W. Arnold entitled, The Supposed Spiritual Authority of the Caliph, 
which freely acknowledged the authority of both Snouck Hurgronje and Nallino. A note by 
Hirtzel was appended which drew attention to the 'mistakes made by the Austrians, Italians, 
Bulgarians and Greeks, as described by Dr. Arnold. ' Hirtzel emphatically suggested that the 
Sultan renounce all rights as 'Sheikh ul-Islam' over any and all territories ceded, and that the 
words "'religious"' and "'spiritual... be avoided in any treaty concluded. 69 
There followed a series of Foreign Office handbooks, published in January 1919 in 
preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. This included one on, The Pan-Islainic Moi, entent, 
and another entitled, The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate. 70 Although the series was published 
anonymously the latter was almost certainly the work of Arnold .71 The caliphate booklet also 
relied heavily on Nallino and Hurgronje and reproduced the points made in Arnold's note, 
referred to above. Of greater significance, is the fact that Dr. Arnold was a key adviser at the 
Peace Conference and continued in that capacity up to the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923. There is an obvious irony in the fact that the 'errors' committed at 
Lausanne in 1912 were finally expunged there eleven years later. Ultimately it was the Indian 
Office and the Government of India who would put Nallino's advice into service, though 
events would render their rather arcane confabulations superfluous. 
Although the British negotiating team may have been fully apprised of the new 'truth' 
concerning the caliphate, one commentator at least was aware that knowledge of the 'facts' 
does not automatically translate into a universal dissolution of the former state of 'ignorance. ' 
69 FO 608/96/660, 'The Supposed Spiritual Authority of the Caliph, ' December, 1918. This was reproduced as 
Appendix B to Arnold's book, The Caliphate, which he had published in 1924 once his undertaking to the 
Government was complete. 
70 FO 373/5 5/6, Handbooks prepared under the direction of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office, no. 96a 
& b. 'The Pan-Islamic Movement' and 'The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate, ' January 1919. 
71 There exists a handwritten list by Elie Kedourie who was able to establish the authorship of the entire series 
which the archival record does not reveal. A Mr. David Chilton of Taikoo Books, Boothani, York, dealer in, and 
collector of, Middle Eastern historical material has in his possession a photocopy of Kedourie's list which, 
unfortunately, he was unable to locate at the time of writing. Mr. Chilton is unaware of the whereabouts of either 
the original, or of other copies of Kedourie's list but does recall from memory that the handbook on the caliphate 
was the work of Dr. Arnold. 
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Mr. Ryan of the British High Commission in Constantinople, apparently unaware of both Dr. 
Arnold's note and the FO handbook, later wrote with reference to Nallino's booklet: 
It is none the less true that, however unsound the theory, and whatever the means used to 
promote it, a new conception of the Caliphate has come into existence for better or worse. This 
has been grafted on the old conception with sufficient success and has found sufficient 
acceptance to make the new caliphate a not less real factor than the old. 
More pertinently in relation to the future relations between an imperial power and Islam, Ryan 
added: 'The root idea of this conception is that Islam, divided up politically, is or should be an 
undivided whole religiously, and that the Caliph has a real though undefined position as 
religious head. M Though his point was a valid one, due to tendencies which might not have 
been readily anticipated, Ryan's warnings were eventually proved redundant. 
Though the lesson provided by Nallino and later disseminated by Arnold and the Foreign 
Office undoubtedly aided British negotiators after the war, it should not be supposed that they 
were, in themselves, a crucial determinant of the British policy towards he caliphate. Rather it 
was the lessons learned in Arabia during the course of the Arab Revolt which had set them on 
their present course. As ever, the newly discovered authorities on Islam, were selected 
retrospectively, precisely because they supported the pre-adopted position. The British might 
just as easily have turned the 'caliphate error' to their advantage, or simply disregarded 
Nallino and Hurgronje entirely, and though Arnold may have been commissioned by the 
Foreign Office he would have found himself writing an entirely different note on the caliphate. 
As it was, Sharif Husayn was barely mentioned, never mind advocated as a future caliph, by 
either Nallino or Arnold. This must be taken as an indication that his candidacy, as far as the 
British were concerned, was by now a dead letter. This was, in fact, the view expressed in the 
Foreign Office handbook. The final paragraph read: 'It may become clear that the caliphate as 
an institution is really as dead as the Holy Roman Empire-vox et praeterea nillil., 73 
72 FO 608/117/17229, Memorandum by Mr. Ryan, British High Commission, Constantinople, 19 July 1919. 
73 FO 373/5 5/6, 'The Rise of Islam and The Caliphate, ' January, 1919, p. 46. 
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8.23 'A Voice and Nothing More' : The Development of a Secular Sharifian Policy, Sans 
Sharif! 
Between March and May 1919, any discussions regarding the future of Arabia (this term, 
though still ambiguous, came increasingly to apply to the peninsula only) in which King 
Husayn figured at all, were purely in respect of his nominal or 'titular' suzerainty. 74 Over this 
there was general agreement, there being hardly any mention of the caliphate in this 
connection. Only Lt. Col. Jacob, the Government of India representative at the Arab Bureau, 
raised the faintest demurral, considering it wise 'to recognise the Caliphate of a moribund 
Turkey-' 75 
However, there remained a fundamental practical contradiction at the heart of the 'nominal 
suzerainty' policy, not so different from that at the heart of Britain's Sharifian caliphate 
policy, specifically that it required a single dominant prince. Unfortunately for Husayn, Britain 
had effectively confined his sovereignty to the Hijaz, in addition to which, due to reasons 
already discussed at length, they were unable to support, or even publicly endorse, the 
extension of his power. These and other points were made with some cogency in a 
memorandum by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson which he sent to the new Acting High 
Commissioner in Egypt. Wilson quoted the British orientalist G. Wyman Bury in a manner 
suggestive of a rudimentary theory of structural capacity and of the collaborative mode of 
imperialism: 'One of the first principles of state craft in dealing with Orientals is never to back 
one ruler in preference to others unless he is by personal qualities, position and resources, 
fitted to wield permanent power. ' The implications for Britain's relationship with King 
Husayn are further clarified by Wilson's comparison of the most prominent Arabian 
chieftains: 
He [King Husayn] has to subsidise the tribes and these tribes have to be subsidised until they 
can be induced to form permanent settlement and give up their nomad life. Nomad Arabs pay 
no taxes and have to be bribed. They have nothing in the way of tillages and cultivation to lose. 
74 FO 882/20 Vol 1, AP 19/1, Foreign Office Telegram No. 338, to High Commissioner, 14 March 1919; AP 
19/2; AP 19/3-, AP 19/4; AP 19/5; AP 19/6; AP 19/8, & AP 19/10. 
75 FO 882/20 Vol I, AP 19/1, Memorandum by Lt. Col. Jacob, 19 May 1919. 
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Sedentary Arabs have and can be forced to pay taxes and obey laws. This is where Ibn Rashid 76 has been successful viz in settling his people and to some extent Ibn Saud. 
In some ways Wilson was out of step with his colleagues in Cairo who, by September 1919, 
had completely discounted King Husayn's chances of becoming the caliph of Islam. 77 At the 
same time that he emphasised Husayn's incapacity, Wilson concluded that, as with tile 
caliphate, Husayn would have to show that he could gain the support of the various states over 
which he was to become suzerain. Increasingly, the view in the Arab Bureau was that, whether 
or not Husayn aspired to the caliphate, and whether or not he could gain some support in 
Arabia, it seemed likely that several caliphs might reign concurrently - any one of them as 
ineffectually as any other as far as Britain was concerned. 
It has already been pointed out that by the autumn of 1919 any notion of Britain's actively 
supporting an Arab candidate for the caliphate, even clandestinely, had been rej)1aced by a 
policy based upon the appointment of members of the Sharifian family to positions of secular 
office in the territories to be ruled by Britain. One may say 'replaced' since, although the 
solution had changed, the underlying motivation and function of the policy remained the same. 
The two policies were in essence analogous since Britain still intended to govern these 
territories 'behind a veil, ' that is through 'placemen' who would be sufficiently dependent 
upon Britain for subsidies etc. though at the same time appropriately located within their 
social milieu to ensure their effectiveness. As this development did not, by and large, involve 
the issue of the caliphate it need only be described, for the sake of completeness, in the most 
cursory way. 
A 'Shereeflan system 978 was explicitly referred to by Churchill, as Colonial Secretary, at the 
so-called Cairo Conference, its chief merit, from his point of view, being its relatively low cost 
in terms of administrative and defence expenditure. The Middle East Conference which had 
been convened in Cairo and Jerusalem during March, 1921 decided, among other things that: 
(a) King Husayn's son 'Abdullah should become the ruler of Transjordan, i. e. that portion of 
76 FO 882/20 Vol 1, HM 19/1, 'Memorandum appreciating the situation in the Hedjaz, ' by Lieutenant Colonel 
Wilson, British Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Milne Cheetham, Acting High Commissioner, Ramleh, 30 September 1919. 
77 FO 141 587 545 (2) 545/46 p. 216, Letter from Garland, the Arab Bureau, to the Residency, Ranfleh, 7 
September 1919. 
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the 'Palestine Mandate' from which Britain wished to exclude Zionist settlement, (b) Faysal 
should be similarly appointed in Mesopotamia, and (c) Ibn Sa'ud and King Hussein should be 
treated on an equal footing. 79 In fact, to a considerable extent, things had already been moving 
in this direction for a least two years. 
Faysal had been installed in Syria by the British in September 1918, though his position would 
become precarious once it was decided to hand it over to the French a year later. 80 Although 
he had been declared king in tandem with a French High Commissioner in March 1920, tile 
new ruling power deposed and expelled him four months later, thereby releasing him for 
alternative imperial service in Mesopotamia where he was made king in July-August 1921. 
Similarly, in the November of that year, 'Abdullah was appointed Amir of Transjordan where 
he ruled in accordance with the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement from 1923 onwards. 
In the meantime, the Arab Bureau, once the institutional champion of the Anglo-Sharifian 
cause, had already by March 1919 been 'shorn of most of its illustrious members'81 and was 
finally disbanded in July 1920. Significantly, according to Bruce Westrate, it was largely due 
to the pressure of the Indian Government and the India Office that the Bureau was closed. 
After the War Indian officials, now preoccupied with the militancy of the 'Khilafat, 
movement82 which held Britain responsible for the demise of the Turkish caliphate, 'shrank 
from aggrandizing an Arab Bureau that preferred to deal with Islamic peoples as an aggregate 
community rather than as a "discordant mosaic". ' 83 It is perhaps an indication of a changing 
78 CAB 23/38, p. 268, Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers, II April 1921. 
79 FO 371/6343, Report on Middle East Conference held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12-30,1921. Report 
printed for Colonial Office, June 192 1. 
0 The British took the decision to withdraw on the 5-6 September 1919 as a result of pressure from the French 
who were by then in a position to assert their imperial will in the Middle East once the Treaty of Versailles had 
been signed at the end of June. Furthermore, once President Wilson had become seriously ill in September 1919 
it became apparent that the United States was not about to share the 'imperial, burden. ' Hughes, 1999, pp. 150- 1. 
This outcome should not be taken as evidence of the triumph of Sykes-Picot over Husayn-McMahon, since both 
had been superseded by this time, albeit informally. 
81 Westrate, 1992, p. 192. 
82 An Indian Muslim anti-imperialist movement which emerged in response to the treatment of the Ottoman 
sultanate-caliphate after (he war. The movement remained active until the abolition of the caliphate in 1924. 83 Westrate, 1992, p. 200. It should be pointed out, however, that British policy had been moving towards a more 
fragmentary approach for some time. 
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atmosphere within British circles appertaining to the Middle East that The Times saw fit to 
declare the Arab Bureau's outlook obsolete on more than one occasion. 84 
Moreover, King Husayn had become quite superfluous to this system of colonial rule. 
Whereas the British had restrained Ibn Sa'ud's incursions into Sharifian territory at Turabah in 
May 1919, they did not oppose his annexation of 'Asir in August 1921. However it was not 
until August 1924 that Ibn Sa'ud felt confident enough to invade the Hijaz. As a result of Ibn 
Sa'ud's success, in October that year the notables of Mecca persuaded Husayn to abdicate in 
favour of his son, 'Ali, only to see Mecca taken within ten days. 'Ali, in turn, was forced to 
surrender to Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jiddah at the end of 1925. Finally, in January 1926 
'Abd al-'Aziz II (Ibn Sa'ud) was proclaimed 'King of Hijaz. ' 
8.24 The Caliphate Issue at S6vres 85 and Lausanne 
The issue of the caliphate, Arab or otherwise, did not figure in Faysal's representations at 
Paris on behalf of the Hijaz delegation which had been cast in an overtly secular nationalist 
idiom. 86 When it came to the treaties concerning Turkey, and the Middle East in general, it 
was Britain who would ensure that the disposition of the caliphate be dealt with once and for 
all. Although the idea of a specifically Arab caliphate was defunct by the autumn of 1919, in 
spite of the official attitude of disinterest, it did not follow that Britain was entirely 
unconcerned with the issue of the caliphate itself. The uncharacteristically definitive advice, 
considering the subject matter, which the Foreign Office now dispensed is evidence that they 
had assimilated the lessons derived from the Italian experience: 
The question of the Caliphate should not be touched upon in any treaty made (1) with Turkey 
(2) with any of the nations which previously belonged to the Turkish Empire and which will 
now be placed under a Mandatory power. In this way the High Contracting Powers would not 
render themselves open to the charge of meddling in matters which are solely a concern of the 
84 The Arab Bureau was criticised specifically for its former caliphate policy - on 20 September 1920, Fronikin, 
199 1, p. 426; and on 27 December 192 1, Westrate, 1992, pp. 143-4. 
85 Whereas the Treaty of Lausanne was negotiated at Lausanne, the Treaty of Sývres was, in fact, negotiated in 
London and San Remo. Anderson, 1966, p. 367. 
86 Hurewitz, 1956, Vol. 11, pp. 38-9, Amir Faysal's Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris Peace 
Conference, I January 1919; and, Antonius, 1938, pp. 286-7. 
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Mohammedan religion and which should therefore be decided by the Moslem world. In their 
recognition of the King of the Hedjaz the High Contracting Powers should emphasize his 
responsibilities and privileges as keeper of the Holy Cities but should ignore any claims which 
he may wish to make to the Caliphate. 87 
It was, however, the India Office and the Government of India who would ensure that the 
lessons of Nallino were positively implemented. 88 Their motivation was undoubtedly 
engendered by the creation of the 'All-India Khilafat Committee' and compounded by their 
own response at the infamous massacre at Amritsar in November 1919.89 The delay and 
ultimate failure of the Treaty of S6vres 90 and the five months spent negotiating the Treaty of 
Lausanne gave them ample opportunity to indulge their obsessive desire to eliminate any 
residual extra-territorial 'spiritual' powers which the Turkish caliphate might seek to retain 
after the war. In fact the discussions with India barely touched on anything else. The details 
are of only slight interest here: that is in so far as the rather esoteric and involuted 
deliberations reflect the same fears that comprised the negative 91 component of the motivation 
underpinning the original caliphate policy. What follows gives only a flavour of the 
discussions which took place. 
Except to reach a basic understanding over the question of the caliphate the Foreign Office 
barely consulted India in preparation for the Treaty of Rvres. As Curzon and Montagu saw it, 
the problem was that Islam required that the caliph be an independent temporal sovereign. 
However, according to the proposed treaty, Turkey was to be placed tinder a mandate and lose 
its sovereignty, whereas, the same treaty was about to recognise the sovereignty of the King of 
the Hijaz. It would appear to Muslims therefore that Britain was exercising a preference over 
the future of the caliphate in contradiction of her publicly stated policy. There followed brief 
discussions over whether the extra-territorial authority of the Shaykh al-Islam should be 
87 FO 141 587 545 (2) 545/45, Foreign Office despatch no. 8120 in response to queries from the High 
Commissioner, Constantinople, I September 1919. 
88 The centrality Dr. Arnold's advice was acknowledged from the outset. UP&S/10/851 P 4320/19, Montagu to 
Hirtzel, 19 August 1919. 
89 Hardy, 1972, p. 189. 
90 Busch, 1976, p. 247. 
91 As distinct from the positive component, that is, the use of an Arab caliphate as the principal of unity and 
organisation of a future British Arabia. 
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explicitly abrogated, nullified indirectly via some euphemism, or simply ignored altogether. 92 
The final draft of the treaty was evidently unsatisfactory from an Islamic point of view since it 
attempted, rather crudely, to sever the connection between Turkey and Muslims elsewhere. 
93 
Consequently, during the period leading up to its drafting, and in the year or so after its 
conclusive non-ratification in August 1920, the Prime Minister received numerous 
representations and deputations from Muslims who objected to Britain's derogation of the 
caliph of Islam. 94 in response the orientally ingenuous Lloyd George issued an impromptu 
pledge which the Indian Government would later regret. 95 
In March 1922 the Foreign Office instigated a process of consultation in which the views of 
the Government of India were sought with specific reference to the insertion of an article into 
the revised Treaty of S6vres. The object of this article was to nullify the authority of the 
Turkish Sultan-caliph in all of the ceded territories without attracting the hostility of Islam as 
Article 139 of the original treaty had done. There was however the additional obstacle of the 
'Prime Minister's pledge' not to interfere in the spiritual authority of the caliph which, 
according to Hirtzel, ran counter to the advice of Dr. Arnold. Ironically, the delegation of 
Indian Muslims which had visited the Prime Minister the previous March had cited the 1912 
treaty between Italy and Turkey in order to illustrate the caliphal privileges which they now 
96 insisted be maintained . 
The discussions between the Government of India and the India Office over the wording of 
what was to become the Treaty of Lausanne continued for another twelve months. In no way 
did these deliberations contemplate the creation of an alternative caliphate, let alone an Arab 
92 LIP&S/10/851 P. 5273/1919, Secret letter from J. A. C. Tilley, Acting Under Secretary, Foreign Office, No. 
I 19147/G. 44. to Under Secretary of State, India Office, 30 August 1919; Extracts from Minutes of War Cabinet, 
619,20 August 1919; and, Private letter from Montagu, India Office, to Curzon, 28 August 1919. UP&S/10/576 
P. 4744 Pt. 2 1919 5011, draft of letter by Holderness to the Foreign Office, 14 October 1919. 
93 Hurewitz, 1956, Vol 11, p. 8 1, 'Political Clauses of the Treaty of SLIvres 10 August 1920. ' 
94 umsnonW P. 1972 1920, covering representations and memorials for 1919 and 1920; and, UP&S/10/853, 
'Deputation to the Prime Minister, at the House of Commons. On Thursday, 24 th March, 192 L' 
95 L/P&S/10/853 P. 3090, 'The Prime Minister's "pledge"' addressed to the Indian Moslem Delegation, 24 
March 1921; and, UP&S/10/853 P. 1696 1922, Letter from Hirtzel to Dr. Arnold, 27 April 1922. 
96 L/P&S/10/853, P. 4995 79, Department minute signed by the secretaries of the Government of India 
Department and the C&R Department, 31 March 1922, and, handwritten minutes initialed AH [Arthur Hirtzell, 
7 April 1922. The Prime Minister received further objections to Article 139 from the Indian Khilafat Committee. 
P. 1419 1922, Chotani, President, Khilafat, Bombay, to the Rt. Hon. Lloyd George, 31 March 1922. 
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one; rather the main object was to confine the authority of the Turkish caliph, temporal, 
spiritual, religious or secular to Turkey itself - in a sense to 'nationalise' or 'domesticate' the 
caliphate. However, there were considerable differences of opinion. The Viceroy began by 
suggesting the formal recognition of the Sultan-caliph's religious suzerainty over the Holy 
Places - the very opposite of the original caliphate policy. He was also sensitive to the use of 
the word 'temporal' in the treaty, which in his view amounted to 'the recognition of the non- 
removal of a spiritual authority' which could only be cancelled by a consensus of Muslims 
themselves. 97 Hirtzel, on the other hand, was against using either of the words 'spiritual' or 
'temporal' since it was necessary to assume that Turkey would have no rights which were not 
temporal. He later told the Government of India that 'there is a fundamental objection to 
attempt to distinguish between temporal & spiritual functions, since such distinction does not 
really exist & attempt to foster belief in it was and is one of main planks in pan Islamic 
platform. ' He went on to say, three months later, that the distinction had been the invention of 
'Abdulhamid and was a trap best avoided, and that it was at variance with what "'competent 
European scholars... had told them was 'the very essence of the calipliatc. '98 Hirtzel even 
objected to referring to the Sultan as caliph since this constituted 'a pronouncement on the 
caliphate by non-Muslims. '99 
In an almost comic understatement, Wakely, the Secretary of the Political Department of the 
India Office, described the discussions over the treaty as having become 'rather involved. ' 
When he asked, rhetorically, how the treaty might be amended to give effect to the PM's 
pledge regarding the caliphate he implied, unhelpfully, that it had already been 'agreed that no 
positive or detailed provisions on the subject can be included in the Treaty. '100 This apparent 
impasse led to an argument over euphemisms. The phrase 'any spiritual privileges assigned to 
the caliph by tenets of the Moslem religion' was bandied about, though Arnold thought this 
unacceptable since the caliph had never exercised such authority. A jihad, for example, was a 
political, not a spiritual, act. However, the Viceroy deprecated the term 'spiritual privileges' as 
97 L/P&S/10/853 P. 1696 1922, Telegram 498. S from Viceroy, Foreign and Political Department, Simla, to 
Secretary of State for India, 22 April 1922. 
98 L/P&S/10/853 P. 2390, Minute by Hirtzel, 6 July 1922. 
99 UP&S/10/853 P. 1696 1922, Hirtzel to Dr. Arnold, 27 April 1922, and Hirtzel to Government of India, Foreign 
Department. 
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the PM had undertaken not to interfere with them; and 'tenets' he thought inadequate as it did 
not cover practices which were a matter of custom and tradition. 101 
Finally, a compromise was reached which in effect accorded with Dr. Arnold's preferred 
solution. All conceivable extra-territorial powers of the caliph were de: rillitil, ely and 
comprehensively canceled while at the same time giving the general appearance of standing 
by the particulars of the Prime Minister's pledge. The relevant articles of the Treaty of 
Lausanne read as follows: 
Art. 22. Without prejudice to the general stipulations of Article 27, Turkey hereby recognises 
the definite abolition of all rights and privileges whatsoever which she enjoyed in Libya under 
the Treaty of Lausanne of the 18th October, 1912, and the instruments connected therewith. 
Art. 27. ... It 
is understood that the spiritual attributions of the Moslem religious authorities are 
in no way infringed. 102 
Although the resolution of the caliphate issue in the treaty appears adroit, it must remain a 
matter of speculation how these contradictory clauses might have fared had there been both 
the capacity and the will among Muslims to perpetuate the institution of the Islamic caliphate 
in a militantly anti-imperialist, or merely chauvinistically anti-European, way. In the event, 
within nine months of the treaty being signed the Turkish caliphate was abolished. 
8.3 The Demise of the Caliphate 
8.31 The Abolition of the Turkish Caliphate 
The actions of Britain and her Allies in Turkey after the War provide an outstanding historical 
example of 'La Fontaine's Fable, ' 103 since, with regard to the matter of the caliphate, their 
100 UP&S/10/853 P. 1953, Let(er from L. D. Wakely, Secretary, Political Department, India Office, to the 
Secretary of State, India Office, 17 May 1922. 
'01 UP&S/10/853 P. 2390, Minute by Hirtzel, 6 July 1922, and, P. 3090, Telegram 967-S, Viceroy, Foreign & 
Political Department to Secretary of State for India, 24 July 1922. 
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actions produced for them a satisfactory outcome in a way totally opposite to the one intended. 
The extremity of the Allies designs, later reflected in the diplomatic assault at Rvres, merely 
strengthened Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Nationalists who were forced to regroup in 
Ankara where they could remain unmolested by the British and French navies. The attitude of 
the Allies even induced the parliament at Constantinople to join the Kernalists in signing the 
'National Pact' in January 1920. In a vain attempt to regain the upper hand the Allies then 
occupied Constantinople and in April forced the Shaykh al-Islam to publicly denounce 
Kemal. 104This in turn threw the Ankara Grand National Assembly even more strongly behind 
Kemal and against the collaborator government which reported to a British High 
Commissioner. The Allies' actions ultimately ensured the failure of S6vres. 105 
The Kernalists agenda was one of secular, national, reform and political and economic 
reconstruction. Their strictly national programme meant that they had no imperialist 
pretensions and therefore eschewed all supra-riational religious responsibilities. As such they 
posed no long-term threat to Britain. However, Kemal's first public denunciation of pan-Islam 
was not until late 1921106 and there was no clear indication that he might move against the 
Sultan-caliph until September 1922. British commentators had hitherto assumed that the 
Kernalists would abide by the fourth article of the National Pact which had declared in favour 
of retaining the caliphate. ' 07 In fact it was the Sultanate which was abolished on I November; 
the caliphate was to remain with the House of Osman but under the authority of the National 
Assembly. 108 As A. L. Macfie explains: 
The actual occasion, selected (according to his own account) by Mustafa Kemal, for the 
abolition of the sultanate ... was the receipt in October 
1922 of an invitation from tile Allies to 
102 Hurewitz, Volume 11,1956, p. 121. The treaty was signed on 24 July 1923. 
103 According to this fable a peasant labourer induced his sons to toil furiously by telling them that there was 
treasure buried in their fields. They did not discover any treasure but their digging so enriched the soil that they 
did indeed become wealthy. Elster, 1985, pp. 22-3. 
104 Note that the British had absolutely no qualms about interfering in 'spiritual' matters or opposing established 
religious authorities within a national, as opposed to global, context. 
'05 Anderson, 1966, pp. 366-7. 
106 Landau, 1990, p. 180; and, FO 371/6537 13622/143/44, Despatch No. 1112, Sir H. Rumbold, British High 
Commission, Constantinople, to the Marquess Curzon of Keddleston, 6 December 1921. 
107 UP&S/10/895, P 3909 1922, Secret Report - 'The Kernalists and the Caliphate, ' 21 September 1922. 109 L/P&S/10/895, P 4448 1922, Telegram No. 644 from Sir H. Rumbold, Constantinople, 3 November 1922. 
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both the Istanbul and Ankara governments to send delegations to the peace conference shortly 
to be convened in Lausanne. 109 
Once again the actions of the allies both enabled and forced Kemal to strengthen his position 
vis-a-vis the old government. Jacob Landau adds that the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne 
enabled the Kernalists to disregard the support of Muslims outside Turkey. ' 10 It thus becomes 
apparent that from the Turkish republican point of view, the Treaty of Lausanne was not so 
much an imposition, but an advancement of their agenda. 
On 24 November a new Turkish caliph was invested while the ex-Sultan, soon to be become 
ex-Caliph had already been removed to exile in Malta, courtesy of the British navy. 
"' With 
the exception of Transjordan and the Hijaz the new caliph received general, though frequently 
unenthusiastic, recognition throughout the Muslim world. 
' 12 Ironically, although the 
Government of India 'endorsed' the change, Indian Muslims were reported to be 
'unconcerned. ' 113 Interestingly, in a manner which Mr. Wyman Bury' 14 might have 
appreciated, Ronald Storrs observed that attachment to the caliphate was strongest in Muslim 
countries which had lost their independence, adding that this 'varie[d] in inverse proportion 
with the good relations between protector and protected. 
" 15 
The electoral victory of Kemal's People's Party' 16 and the proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic in October 1923 were quickly followed by rumours of the imminent abolition of the 
caliphate, 117 only to be succeeded by the abolition itself on 3 March 1924.118 When news of 
109 Macfie, 1998, p. 197. 
110 Landau, 1990, p. 18 1. 
111 LIP&S/10/895, Printed Document E 13645/12891/44, including Henderson to Curzon, 28 November 1922, 
and, Busch, 1976, p. 363. The British Consul in Damascus opined that a new caliph could not be nominated as 
long as the old one was still alive and had not abdicated. L/P&S/10/895, P 89 1923, C. E. S. Palmer, British 
Consul, Damascus, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 4 December 1922. 
112 UP&S/10/895, P 3459, P3468, &P 3762, relating to July-August 1923. 
113 LJP&S/ 10/895, P 3408, Humphrys to Curzon, 14 August 1923. 
114 See the quotation from this rather perceptive imperialist at the front of this thesis. 
"5 LJP&S/10/895, P 3762 1923, Paraphrase of telegram No. 288 of 28 August 1923, from the Officer 
administrating the Government of Palestine, to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, incorporating a 
memorandum by Mr. Storrs, District Governor of the Jerusalem-Jaffa District, 27 August 1923. 
116 Macfie, 1998, p. 207. 
117 L/P&S/10/895, P 4448 1923, Henderson, British High Commission, Constantinople, to Curzon, 4 November 
1923; P 4496 1923, Henderson to Curzon, 13 November 1923; P 4567 1923, Henderson No. 523,23 Novenitwr 
1923; P 4766 1923, Henderson, No. 775,27 November 1923; UP&S/10/1 I 11, P 1015 1924, Mr. Lindsay. HM 
Representative, Constantinople, No. 33,25 February 1924. 
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the abolition was received in the British parliament Ormsby-Gore asked the first Labour Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, J. Ramsay MacDonald, whether the Treaty of Lausanne, in 
any way, 'implie[d] recognition of the existing [sic] Turkish Caliphate by powers other than 
Turkey. " 19 The inconsequentiality of this query is best illustrated by the Dail), Mail's report of 
the ultimate fate of the caliph of Islam. The headline ran: 'Ex-Caliph Almost Penniless - 
Unable to Afford Servant - Timid Wives in One Room. ' As if further evidence of the caliph's 
almost tragicomic demise were needed, the report went on to say that, now in exile in 
Switzerland, for reasons of economy and timidity the ex-Imperial wives all slept in one 
'dormitory. ' 120 
8.32 The Caliphate of Husayn, King of the Hijaz 
For once Kedourie may be quoted with unqualified approval: 
The Caliphate question became acute in 1924. In March, the Turks abolished the Ottoman 
Caliphate and sent the last Caliph into exile. Thereupon, the king of the Hijaz hastened to have 
himself proclaimed Caliph, basing himself-so he claimed-on the suffrages of tile faithful in 
Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Transjordan. But Husain's presumed election settled nothing; it was 
patently farcical, and had no relation to the realities of the Islamic world. 121 
The acuteness of the issue was, in the first instance, a predominantly Muslim affair. Husayn's 
bid neither shocked, gratified, nor dismayed the British authorities. There had been rumours of 
such a proclamation on at least three occasions during the five years since the War. In January 
1919 news had been received that King Husayn had been proclaimed caliph at a ceremony at 
the Mosque of 'Umar in Jerusalem. This turned out to have been a mere propaganda ploy, the 
response to which had not been encouraging for Husayn. 122 After the abolition of the Turkish 
sultanate in November 1922, the possibility of a declaration by Husayn was mooted by the 
British but discounted as unlikely by the Foreign Office on the grounds that he was so 
118 Up&S/10/1 I 11, p 1135 1924, Mr. Lindsay, telegrams 4&5 March 1924. 
119 L/P&S/10/1 I 11, P 1148 1924, 'House of Commons - Parliamentary Notice - Question by Mr. Ornisby-Gore, 
Weds 5" March, 1924. ' 
120 L/p&S/10/1 I 11, P 2456 1924, Press cuttings - Daily Mail, April 19,1924. 12 1 Kedourie, 1963, p. 214. 
122 FO 882 Vol. 25, Arab Bulletin, No. 108, January 1919; and, Arab Bulletin No. 109,6 February 1919. 
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obviously under British influence. 123 However, a message sent by the Dail), Mail's Jerusalem 
correspondent in January 1923 which indicated the likelihood of a Sharifian caliphate, induced 
the Indian Viceroy to declare nonchalantly: 'This fulfils the original British scheme for the 
removal of the Khalifat to Mecca. ' 124 Although the matter was discussed only briefly at 
Lausanne, the delegation seemed to gain comfort from the view that a Sharifian caliphate at 
the present juncture would simply split the Muslim world in two. ' 25 There was, however, some 
consternation in India when it was suggested that the allegiance of the Muslim world might be 
divided amongst three caliphs - the third being the Amir of Afghanistan. 
126 In the summer of 
1923 further rumours arrived in London from Mecca, in turn via the Grand Qadi there, the 
'ulama of Java, the Dutch Consul in Jiddah, and, finally, through the offices of his British 
counterpart, Bullard. 127 The assessment of an Indian Nawab on this occasion proved most 
accurate and is worth quoting at length: 
The Sharif cannot control the situation without outside help, there is no doubt about it. In the 
first place he has not got enough funds with which to maintain the dignity of the Holy Places 
and in the second place he must find something for the poor turbulent Beduins to live upon. 
The country being totally unproductive these Beduins must live on the poor Hajis, if they are 
not to be subsidised by outsiders. The case becomes worse when the British help is stopped and 
the Egyptian allowances are withdrawn. Somebody must come to the Sharif's assistance and 
save the situation and if British help is likely to prove more injurious than beneficial to the 
Sharif, the only alternative left is either to revert to the old status of Turkish sovereignty over 
the Hedjaz or to place the country under the control and management of the United States of 
Islam. The latter will be impossible under the present disunited condition of the Muslim 
brotherhood all over the world. 128 
The only indications of European imperial interest in the issue after the abolition concerned 
rumours that King Fu'ad of Egypt was being promoted as a possible candidate. The issue was 
compounded by the French who, apparently, considered offering asylum to 'Abdulmecid (the 
last caliph) and vesting the caliphate in the Sultanate of Morocco. To this eventuality was 
123 UP&S/10/895, P 4749 1922, Hardinge to Curzon, no. 2732,22 November 1922. 
124 LIP&S/10/895, P 299 1923, Telegram 73 S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 18 January 
1923. 
125 LJP&S/10/895, Graffety-Smith Esq., Foreign Office, No. 23 to Acting British Agent, Jeddah, 8 February 
1923. 
126 UP&S/10/895, Viceroy, telegram No. 207 S, to Secretary of State for India, 23 February 1923. 
127 FO 141 587 545 (2) 545/101, Report from Consul Bullard, Jeddah, to Curzon, Foreign Oft-ice, 14 August 
1923. 
128 UP&S/10/895, P 4013 1923, from the Chief Commissioner of the North West Frontier province to the 
Secretary of the Government of India Foreign and Political department, 26 September 1923, enclosing a report 
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counterposed the idea of the British giving asylum to the ex-Sultan-caliph, Mehmet V, in 
Egypt, and encouraging him to re-establish the caliphate there. 129 There is, however, no 
indication that such ideas were pursued with any constancy or seriousness. It will be shown 
later how the intimately related factors referred to above, namely political fragmentation in the 
Muslim world, and imperial rivalry among the occupying powers (Britain, France, Italy, and, 
to a lesser extent, Holland), ensured that the caliphate would not be revived. 
On 7 March 1924 Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner for Palestine, informed the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies that he had been told by Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan that his 
father had been widely hailed as caliph and had therefore accepted the office., 30 The British 
Representative in Constantinople immediately alerted his superiors in London to the 
likelihood that Husayn's candidature would be exploited against Britain. 13 1 This proved to be 
the case - the Viceroy reported on the same day that the Indian Khilafat Committee had 
already warned Indian Muslims of British intrigue. In support of their argument the 
Committee identified Mr. Ryan in Constantinople along with 'Abdullah in Trans-Jordania, 
Samuel in Palestine, Feisal in Baghdad and the Sherif himself in holy Mecca'132 as the agents 
of the British conspiracy against Islam. 
Throughout the remaining seven months of Husayn's kingship in Mecca a range of responses 
to his caliphate were reported by British agents in the region. Opinion in Palestine, Iraq and 
Transjordan was reputedly favourable, while India, Afghanistan, Egypt and Libya responded 
negatively. Ibn Sa'ud declared his solidarity with the Indian Khilafat Committee. Turkey and 
the Dutch East Indies appeared indifferent and the 'ulama of the Sudan were divided. 133 These 
responses were to a large degree predictable. The most interesting reaction of all, however, 
was in the French mandated territories of Lebanon and Syria. It has already been stated that 
dated 8 September 1923 by the 'Nawab Sir Abdul Qayyum' based on an interview with the 'King of Hijaz, ' 
conducted eighteen months previously. 
129 FO 141587 545 (3) 545/127a, Note on the Caliphate, author not stated, 7 March 1924. 
130 Up&S/10/1 I 11, p 1193 1924, Telegram from the High Commissioner, Palestine to the Sec. of State for the 
Colonies, 7 March 1924. Bullard in Jeddah had anticipated Husayn's acceptance four days earlier. P 1511 1924, 
Despatch No. 22, Bullard, British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, 3 March 1924. 
13 1 L/P&S/10/1 I 11, P 1208 1924, Telegram No. 49 from Lindsay, Constantinople, 8 March 1924. 
132 LIP&S/10/1 I 11, Telegram No. 517 S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, 8 March 1924. 
133 The archival references are too numerous to list. The relevant material may be found at: UP&S/10/1 I 11, for 
March, April, June and August 1924; and, FO 141587 545 (4) & (5), for March 1924. 
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the French feared, with some justification, that Britain might attempt to subvert their 
occupation of Syria by superimposing (according to the metaphors previously employed here) 
the spiritual or religious suzerainty of a Sharifian caliphate over their rule. Evidently Husayn's 
declaration rekindled their suspicions. 
The initial responses to Husayn's caliphate were reputedly positive in the cities of Beirut, 
Damascus and Aleppo, though it was also said that they had been muted in anticipation of the 
French response. During the second half of March 1924, the French authorities adopted a 
threefold strategy of pressure, propaganda and repression against anyone who overtly 
supported Hussein as caliph. In the three cities mentioned the district governors were required 
to order their respective local mufti's and Varna to curtail, at once, all declarations for 
Husayn in the mosques within their jurisdiction. Secondly, the French colonial administration 
forced the local press to insert articles stating, either directly as 'fact, ' or in the guise of a 
rumour, that Husayn's election to the caliphate and the subsequent support for him in Syria 
and Lebanon had been induced by British funding. Finally, reports were received by British 
representatives in Beirut that a number of recalcitrant supporters of the Sharifian caliphate had 
been arrested and deported. 134 In May there were further rumours in a Cairo newspaper that 
the French were about to entice the ex-caliph, 'Abdulmecid, to Damascus and promote him as 
a rival to Husayn. 135 It was even reported in October that year, after King Husayn had 
abdicated but before his son 'Ali had been displaced by Ibn Sa'ud as King of Hijaz, that the 
French might encourage the latter to make a bid for the caliphate. 136 
In the end Husayn's caliphate failed, not as a result of specifically religious factors but 
because of his incapacity in respect of the social and economic resources at his disposal l4s-el- 
vis his main rival, Ibn Sa'ud. It is one of the main tenets of this thesis that the internal 
contradictions of the earlier British, Sharifian caliphate policy were largely a consequence of 
this more fundamental incapacity. In other words Husayn's failure was a foregone conclusion, 
the outcome having been determined by the same factors which limited the progress of 
34 Again, numerous archival references are to be found at: UP&S/10/1 I 11, for March 1924. 35 L/p&S/10/1 I 11, P 2462 1924, Despatch No. 87 from W. A. Smart, British Consulate, Damascus. Syria, to tile 
Principle Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 May 1924. 
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Husayn's Arab Revolt. In the context of the Kernalist's abolition of the caliphate, and the later 
collapse of the Cairo Caliphate Conference without reaching a consensus, Husayn's fugacious 
tenure looks like an inconsequential aberration. 
8.33 The Caliphate Conferences of 1926 
There had been proposals for an Islamic conference to detennine the future of the caliphate as 
early as 1921. Such initiatives proliferated after the abolition of the Turkish caliphate in March 
1924. The first to occur had been that convened by King Husayn in Mecca in the July of that 
year in the hope of garnering a more comprehensive endorsement for his pretensions. He 
failed, but the so-called 'Pilgrimage Congress' was to meet annually thereafter - only the 
advance of Ibn Sa'ud's Ikhwan prevented this from ever happening. 137 The main impetus for a 
conference, however, came from Egypt, ' 38 which was arguably the strongest contender being 
formally independent, 139 populous and predominantly Muslim. Afghanistan, being equally 
Muslim, perhaps more independent, though rather less populous, framed a counter proposal. 140 
The Amir argued that the conference should be held in a 'purely Islamic country which is free 
from both external intrigues and from foreign influences. ' His assessment of the situation 
would prove more accurate than that of any imperialist. According to the British representative 
in Kabul the Amir had said that, 
the spirit of nationalism, had taken a strong grip on all the countries of the world, and national 
"churches" of Islam would probably be the result of the action of the Turks in abolishing the 
Caliph's office. 141 
136 L/P&S/l 0/1111, P 4270 1924, Telegram No. 9 from the Acting British Consul, Damascus, to the Foreign 
Office, 21 October 1924. 
137 Kramer, 1986, p. 80. After he abdicated in October 1924, Husayn fled to 'Aqaba where lie lived for (en 
months until Ibn Sa'ud threatened to attack him there too. He was quickly removed to Cyprus by the British. 
remaining there until he became seriously ill in 1930. He was then allowed to go to Ainnian where he died six 
months later on 4 June 1931 at the age of 78. Wilson, 1990, pp. 87-9. 
IM FO 141 587 545 (3) 545/127, Handwritten minute, unsigned but stamped by the HC, Egypt, 8 March, 1924, 
FO 141 587 545 (5) 545/201 a, 'Memorandum on the Khalifate Committees, ' unsigned but stamped by the High 
Commissioner, 3 June 1924, and, 55/203, Memorandum initialed D. G. E. D., stamped by the High Commissioner, 
E ypt, 18 June 1924. 
Since February 1922. 
140 FO 141587 545 (5) 545/202, Memorandum, 3 November 1924. 
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After two years of planning and organisation the 'General Islamic Congress for the Cal iphate' 
was eventually convened in May 1926 142 to be adjourned indefinitely on 19 May after only 
four sessions. 143 According to Albert Hourani's account, 
the congress reaffirmed the traditional view of the caliphate: it was legitimate, indeed it was 
necessary, since many legal obligations depended on it. But to be real it must have both 
spiritual and temporal power. When such power did not exist the caliphate could not really 
exist, and this was the situation at the present time. 144 
The following month a counter-conference, 'The Congress of the Islamic World, ' was 
instigated by Ibn Sa'ud in Mecca. According to Martin Kramer this also ended in a shambles 
with many delegates being unprepared and representing no one. 145 The details of these 
conferences need not be gone into here; suffice it to say that their collapse was due to the 
factors already referred to: national rivalry and suspicion of, and between, the various imperial 
interests. From the Eastern Crisis of 1878-80, if not at the drafting of the Treaty of Kuquk 
Kaynarci in 1774, the fate of the Caliphate of Islam had been intimately connected with the 
effects of imperial domination. Although by 1926 the imperial powers had already ceased to 
be preoccupied by the institution of the caliphate itself, Islamist political resistance to 
imperialist penetration and influence would continue for many years to come, as would 
imperialist attempts to subvert, redirect or extinguish such threats. The relationship between 
Britain and the caliphate in the era of the Great War represents only the first instance of such a 
development. 
141 UP&S/10/11 11, Despatch No. 54, from F. H. Humphrys, Kabul, to RHJ. Ramsay MacDonald, 21 April 1924. 
142 Kramer, 1986, p. 96. 
143 FO 141 587 545 (5) 545/248, Letter from Lloyd, High Commissioner, Egypt to The Governor, Straits 
Settlement, Government House, Singapore, 28 May 1926. 
144 Hourani, 1983, p. 184. 
145 Kramer, 1986, pp. 106 & 109-12. 
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8.4 Historical Footnote 
In a certain sense the story of Britain's interest in the caliphate of Islam begins and ends, 
courtesy of the 'Italian Lesson, ' with the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci, although it took nearly a 
century and half for Britain's 'oriental experts' to attempt a reversal of its effects. The issue of 
the Islamic Caliphate has been of little, other than purely academic, interest among non- 
Muslims throughout the intervening three-quarters of a century. However, in relation to the 
latest manifestation of reaction against Western domination articulated through the ideology 
and language of Islam, 146 The Guardian reported in the autumn of 2001 that, 
in his 1996 fatwa, Bin Laden declared: "There is no more important duty than pushing the 
American enemy out of the holy land. " This was not a goal in itself, but a necessary step 
towards overthrowing corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and replacing them with a new 
caliphate that would unite all Muslims. [emphasis added] 147 
The significance of the events of September It, 2001 were that, for the first time on a 
momentous scale, resistance to Western imperialism articulated through the language of Islam 
was conducted at the heart of the metropolis. While it remains to be seen whether trans- 
national Islamic insurgency will succeed in undermining US imperialism in the Middle East, it 
seems unlikely that the world's remaining superpower will resort to promoting, even 
clandestinely, the restoration of an alternative caliphate sympathetic to western interests. It 
may safely be assumed, however, that should Ibn Ladin's purported aim of restoring the 
caliphate be advanced in the slightest, the western powers would quickly conspire to efface 
such a development. 
146 This may be characteriscd in a number of ways depending on whether one wishes to take Islamic rhetoric at 
face value or explain the underlying grievances in more secular, universalist terms. The incident referred to being 
the attack on the World Trade Center, New York on II September 2001 which is presumed to have been 
perpetrated by members of the 'al-Qa'ida Network' under the direction of Usama bin Ladin, a former citizen of 
Sa'udi Arabia. 
147 Whitaker, 2001. The 'holy land' to which Ibn Ladin is refcrring is, of course, the very same kingdom which C, had absorbed King Husayn's Hijaz three-quarters of a century earlier. 
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CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 
Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ' 
Francis Bacon's niaxiniz contains an important truth if one accepts that, in an alienated 
world. i. e. one divided by nationality, race and, most importantly, by class, certain 
categories of other people may present themselves as external facts to be contended with, 
just as 'nature' appear-, to 'nian' in Bacon's aphorism. The relevance of Bacon's insight is 
that if there were a single lesson to be drawn from this thesis it would be this: that for the 
imperialist, as for the would-be collaborator, the success of any collaborative endeavour 
will depend upon the nature of the contending social structures obtaining under the 
circumstances. Such a conclusion has the benefit of responding to the second and third 
objective,, of this thesis regarding the bilateral nature of the enterprise undertaken, and the C_ 
failure of Britain's Arab caliphate project as a result of the inherent structural incapacity of 
ZI . Importantly, these conclusions emerge 
from an application of the tile collaborating party 
theoretical framework set out in Chapter I to the 'raw' material selected from official 
archival sources. This framework consisted of a theory of imperial collaboration enhanced 
by a theory of structural capacities set within a certain understanding of the context of 
illiperialisni. Tile first objective of the thesis, i. e. to establish the centrality of the caliphate 
i%sue in British Middle Ea%tern policy during the first half of Great War, has been met, 
firstly, b*v showing how the removal of the caliphate from enemy hands became the sine 
q'I'l non of 'British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia, ' and secondly, by indicating how this 
fact explains tile presumption of compatibility between the accords reached with Sharif 
liusayn and France, respectively. Such was the strength of this presumption amongst 
British policy makers that the issue was the subject of relatively little discussion between 
NIC-Malion's first letter to Husayn of August 1915, and the onset of the Arab Revolt in June 
1916. after which the caliphate 'plan' began to unravel. 
'I-'ran,: i,. lia,: on., v(, %Ij, 1620, quoted in, Tripp, 1976, p. 616. 2 nw dialeoi,: ai t, orce of Ba,: on's aphorism is expressed in Lucio Colletti's gloss'. 'to make the object conforin to u, it i, inditvnahie that \4e conform ourselves to it. ' Colletti, 1974, p. 68. 
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9. oi 'rtic Back ground to Britkh Involvement in the Matter of the Caliphate 
Chapter 2 did riot only pro%-ide the historical background to Britain's eventual engagement 
with que-, tion% concerning the future of the caliphate of Islam, but inadvertently suggested 
sonie ans%%ers to tile question of continuity (biographical and textual) in the matter of 
certain iniperial techniques and ideologies. Before summarising these it is important to 
note that the%. 11.1%. e important implications for certain epistemological questions regarding 
the nature of 'imperial knowledge. ' However, as these lie beyond the main scope of this 
thesis they will be addressed only cursorily in a subsidiary section of this conclusion. The 
significance of the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci in relation to the ob ectives of this thesis is 
that it illustrate-, how the institution of the caliphate was reinvented to conform with 
European pre-conceptions. This 'papalisation' of the caliphate was undertaken in order to 
increase tile *spiritUal' reach supposedly attached to the office in order to compensate for 
tile territorial losses suffered by the Ottoman Empire in favour of encroaching Christian 
European powers. Significantly, the extra-territoriality which came to be associated with 
the authority of the caliphate, and which remains the salient feature of political pan-Islam, 
enierged thalectit -i MY. That is, it was neither imposed upon Islam, adopted out of 
veneration of Eurorvan ways, nor forinulated as an anti-European hoax. 
For the British, the so-called 'Indian I'Autiny' of 1857, although neither essentially, nor 
predominantly, I-ilamic in nature, produced the peculiarly British paranoia disparagingly 
known as the 'Islainic bogey' by highlighting the potential dangers of pan-Islam directed 
again-, I a Eurorvan empire. The most important result of Chapter 2, however, was that it 
established the conjuncture of the 'Hijaz Crisis' of 1879-80 with the Second Afghan War, 
as an historical paradigni for an alliance between Britain and one of the supposed high 
office-, of The objective, from a British point of view, being to forestall the 
Possibility of an anti-British jihad aided and abetted by a rival imperial power. An 
inllxmant feature of this relationship was that, like the Anglo-Sharifian alliance of the 
Great War, it depended very inuch on the Sharif of Mecca's perspicacity regarding inter- 
inifvrial affair,. and on the subordinate party taking the initiative to exploit this 
knowledge. 
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It was during this episode that the notion first arose among certain members of the British 
imperial class that the Sharif of Mecca was 'head of the faith' - his position being 
analogous to that of the Pope - and that it would be advantageous for Britain to obtain a 
protectorate over the Hijaz in order to control Islam. This was also the first occasion on 
which British imperialists conjoined, no matter how vaguely, the supposed spiritual pre- 
eminence of the Sharif of Mecca with the idea of Arab separation from the Turks. 
Furthermore, in a manner that would be repeated some thirty-odd years later, it was 
understood that the success of such an enterprise would very much depend on maintaining 
a semblance of non-involvement in the affairs of Islam. 
As war approached, the very real possibility that the Ottoman Empire would collapse 
leaving those parts of the empire inhabited by Arabs open to Western imperial 
encroachment figured prominently in the strategic considerations of European powers - in 
particular those of Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia. It is Linder precisely such 
conditions that the notion of 'prophylactic acquisition' comes into force. Although this is a 
negative impulse in itself it, such a dynamic necessitates a more creative approach to 
imperial extension in the areas anticipated to become available. In the case of Britain this 
resulted in the emergence of a more positive vision of a British Middle East aniong. -st 
certain, critically placed, individuals. Unusually, in this instance, the prophylactic motive 
came to be applied to the realm of ideas and institutions, since Turkey, the Power whose 
secular ruler occupied the position of caliph, had become an enemy of Britain. This novel 
circumstance created the opportunity for Germany, the imperial archenemy, to conspire 
with Turkey in directing a jihad against Britain. In this regard Britain was uniquely 
vulnerable in having dominion over hundreds of millions of Muslim subjects in India and 
Egypt. 
It is apparent that, in general, the ubiquitous logic of collaboration conjoined with an 
instance of purely prophylactic imperialism would tend to produce arrangements which 
preserve, rather than revolutionise, existing social relations. Under certain circumstances 
an imperial power might be inclined to revive traditional structures or even prolong the 
efficacy of moribund institutions, in order to forestall the emergence of more troublesome 
'modem' political organisation and ideologies. Objectively, it may be inferred from the 
foregoing that the imperialists' preference would be for collaborative arrangements 
involving tribal structures or religious notables, both of which tend to encourage vertical 
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allegiance. A combination of the two would, on the face of it, appear to be ideal. Overtly 
national leaders, on the other hand, are less attractive since they might ultimately seek to 
occupy precisely the same political space that the imperial power would wish to 
commandeer. With specific regard to nomadic-pastoral tribal societies in general, their 
inherent tendency towards external collaboration has already been noted. 3 From an 
imperial point of view, then, the tribes of Arabia were pre-eminently co-optable. 
The problem for the British at the end of 1914, however, was their general state of 
ignorance regarding the politics of greater Arabia amongst those assigned tile task of 
solving Britain's Middle Eastern dilemma. Apart from what might have been gleamed 
from the writings of such intrepid romantics and adventurers as Burton and Doughty, 4 tile 
knowledge of those with any practical experience was limited to Egypt and the Sudan. 
There were, however, the anecdotal impressions of dilettantes like Sykes, and tile 
testimony of pseudo-experts such as Hogarth and Lawrence, each of which over-exploited 
the relative exclusivity of their experience. Importantly, in Britain before the Great War 
there was no academic foundation dedicated to the study of contemporar), Middle Eastern 
societies, and consequently no comprehensive knowledge concerning the social and 
political conditions of the Arab Middle East. It is an indication of the depth and 
intractability of this state of ignorance that as late as April 1917 - some ten months after 
the start of the Arab Revolt, by which time British forces had occupied a substantial 
portion of Greater Syria - the Arab Bulletin could report that 'there was no book in any 
European language that provided a survey of the social and political conditions of the 
area. '5 
The relevance of British ignorance for the collaborative engagement which followed, was 
that there was an effective carte-blanche upon which a grandiose imperial vision could be 
depicted. This was as much a precondition of the over indulgence of the British imperial 
imagination as it was an opportunity for local informants to exercise their influence in 
pursuit of their own interests. Accordingly, they provided their imperial correspondents 
with a version of Islamic history specifically constructed to reinforce British 
preconceptions about what was feasible in terms of the future of the caliphate. Moreover. 
3 Chapter 1, Note 83. 
4 Nasir, 1979, Ch. 4. 
5 Fromkin, 199 1, p. 86. 
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this future was one in which they hoped to enhance their own positions within the 
anticipated political structures. Notably, as the example of Wingate shows, where tile 
testimony of local informants diverged from the imperial vision it was conveniently 
suppressed. 
9.02 The Formation and Currency of the Arab Caliphate Idea in British Thinkin 
By the end of 1914, both 'the idea, ' and an indefinite collaborative arrangement with the 
Sharif of Mecca, came to be inextricably linked in the minds of certain British imperialists. 
The abstract generalisations associated with imperial collaboration had already attached 
themselves to the particular person of Sharif Husayn on account of his purported eligibility 
for the caliphate. A number of contextual factors have already been iterated. The need to 
subvert, subsume or preclude popular secular politics was partly what attracted the Cairo 
British to Husayn in the first instance. The same factor was later brought into play when 
espousing the alliance to their peers and superiors as military intelligence became 
convinced that the secular Arab movement was a force in its own right. Secondly, the fear 
that a rival imperial power would combine with the forces of pan-Islam became actite after 
October 1914. Interestingly, these are both manifestations of trans-national, and potentially 
anti-imperial, ideologies, and as such were the motive for urgent prophylactic action by 
Britain. 
The main difference between the crisis of 1879-80 and the initiative of 1913-14 was that, 
prior to the onset of the Great War, Britain's disposition towards Islam was exclusively 
negative having been motivated by a fear of political pan-Islarn. By the end of 1914, 
however, in addition to these essentially negative motivations, a new imperial vision had 
emerged among those surrounding the pre-eminent imperial figure of Lord Kitchener. The 
'avenger of Gordon' and hero of the British Empire they hoped would, one day, become 
viceroy of a British Middle East, centred on Cairo and encompassing greater Arabia, Egypt 
and the Sudan. Most of the enthusiasts for the 'Cairo scheme' - otherwise referred to as 
'Western Arabians, ' in contradistinction to the representatives of the Government of India 
whose experience was limited to southern Mesopotamia, the Gulf and the south Arabian 
coast - had developed their own careers in imperial administration in the wake of 
Kitchener 
in Khartoum and Cairo. Undoubtedly, the political intelligence community in Cairo 
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developed an institutional attachment to this vision along with the collaborative 
arrangements which were pursued in its name, which manifested itself as a consistent 
preference for certain policy proposals, and later coalesced into the ideological raison 
d'&re of the Arab Bureau. 
Such grandiosity of vision was a function, both of British ignorance regarding the political 
conditions in greater Arabia and of the fact that there was, in any case, no evidence of an 
Arabia-wide ruling class capable of either serving, or indeed challenging, the British claim. 
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of Islam and the Arabic language, greater Arabia was in fact 
a vast area of considerable social and political disarticulation .6 It soon became apparent, 
therefore, that the realisation of a Middle Eastern viceroyalty required an overarching idea 
or unifying principle which could create a single identity out of what was, for the British at 
least, an unknown quantity. The idea of an Arab caliphate based in Mecca, long associated 
with the project of Arab separatism, appeared to the British in Cairo as a 'universal 
solvent' readily adaptable to their needs. 
With regard to the specific connection between such rarefied considerations and the place 
of Sharif Husayn in British thinking, it is self-evident that merely nominal unity could have 
no practical effect without a figurehead to act as its visible human expression. The idea of 
'practical effect, ' however, should not be taken too seriously since the nominal unity 
required by Britain was consistent with, and would become the precondition of, 11clual 
partition. If one were to take a purely negative view, the collaborative options available to 
Britain in 1914-15 were limited. Britain had no real contacts with any notables or political 
movements in Greater Syria for example, before the arrival of Muhammad a1-Faruqi in 
Cairo in September 1915. Besides Sharif Husayn in the Hijaz, in the relatively accessible 
Western Arabian littoral, there was only al-ldrisi in 'Asir and Imam Yahya in Yemen. 
Although each of these held ambitions beyond the confines of their traditional homelands, 
and were, unlike Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid, readily accessible from the west, only tile 
Sharif of Mecca had his own good reasons for opposing the Turks and showed any signs of 
doing so. 
6 This is not to disparage any projects for Arab unification; the comment refers to the %late of affairs ar the 
time. 
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More important than any of the above considerations, however, was the presumption that 
his being a member of the Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet gave him absolute pre- 
eminence in any future competition over the caliphate. This notion, coupled with the idea 
that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent restoration of an Arab 
caliphate were inevitable, besides impelling Britain to intervene, made the Sharif of Mecca 
the most obvious collaborative partner. It is worth recalling, at this point, that the essential 
and most critical issue of any collaborative enterprise, is that the chosen party must be 
sufficiently empowered within the local social structure while, at the saine titne, being 
sufficiently dependent upon imperial sponsorship to ensure that imperial objectives will be 
served. It also worth reiterating the manner in which it was conceived in Cairo that the 
Sharif's impeccable credentials for the caliphate would ensure that both horris of the 
collaborative dilemma would be avoided. 
While it was taken for granted that within Islam, politics and religion were closely related, 
it was also believed that there was a functional separation between so-called 'spiritual' and 
'temporal' powers within the office of sultan as caliph. This belief had been suggested by 
the terms of the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci and reinforced during the reign of 'Abdulhanlid 
II for reasons already stated, and was now being projected onto the future office of tile 
Sharif of Mecca as caliph. It was intended that the functional division between the Sharif's 
supposed extensive spiritual reach, and his secular domain confined to the Hijaz, would 
leave a political space into which Britain could surreptitiously insert her rule. The area 
around Mecca had the dubious advantage of being out of bounds for Christians-, this, it was 
thought, would preclude the interference of Britain's European rivals while allowing 
political access to Britain through her exclusive alliance with the Sharif. Under these rather 
imaginative arrangements the new caliph's spiritual ambit would correspond with tile 
extent of his nominal sovereignty throughout the nominally independent Arab kingdom. 
On the other hand, his secular authority would be confined to the Hijaz, being 
circumscribed and qualified by a variety of alternative, and yet to he determined, 
nominally subordinate secular arrangements in other areas under his official suzerainty. In 
other words the discrepancy between the spiritual and temporal power-, of the caliphate 
found in the Ottoman Sultan after the Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci were to be greatly 
amplified in the case of Sharif Husayn. It was also hoped that, on a global scale, the 
extraterritoriality of pan-Islam which lay behind the Islamic 'bogey' would finally be 
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turned, prophylactically, in Britain's favour, and, more creatively, enable Britain to rule, as 
it were 'behind the veil of Islam. ' 
It is one thing to explain the origin, tout court, of an idea, however, such explanations 
amount to little, unless they also account for its further reproduction and currency. The 
inherent salience of the idea of a British sponsored Arab caliphate is, to a certain degree, 
readily apparent from the benefits which were expected to accrue to Britain, contingent 
upon its realisation. However, a number of other features may be brought to attention. 
Firstly, the idea, or more appropriately, the scheme, outlined above had a certain abstract 
coherence, that is, it consisted of a set of interrelated suppositions, which, regardless of 
their ultimate feasibility, were mutually supporting and therefore gave the appearance of 
being substantially corroborated .7 Secondly, 
from the British point of view, this abstract 
internal coherence enabled Middle Eastern policy makers and advisers to contemplate a 
whole series of alliances and collaborative arrangements which appeared to them to be 
mutually compatible. Thirdly, the idea of a British backed caliphate had a certain kind of 
objectivity during the early years of the war in so far as a number of disparate parties 
seemed to accept its viability. Although the Government of India was less than 
wholehearted about it, they could not deny that it answered to their fears of political pan- 
Islamism. 
More significantly, both France and Germany came to take seriously the possibility that 
Britain was engaged in a plot to capture the caliphate, and Egyptian nationalists believed 
that Britain was intending to back the Khedive as caliph. None of the latter thought the 
idea ridiculous in any way and seemed to be genuinely threatened by the prospect. There 
were other, more immediate, factors at play. While the instance of the 'Alexandretta 
option' usefully illustrated the conceptual integrity of Britain's approach to the Arab 
Middle East, the importance of its abandonment was that greater Arabia would not be 
severed, all at once and in one piece, from the Turkish Empire. This resulted in a greater 
emphasis on the idea of an Arab caliphate to provide a semblance of unity to the Arabic 
7 Explaining the currency of an idea in terms of its internal coherence should not be construed as all 
endorsement of 'coherence theory' (Callinicos, 1995, p. 94) which holds that belief's gain currency and 
sustain justification from their compatibility with a set of related ideas, none of which is considered more 
fundamental than any other. Since, the nub of this thesis is that, in spite of such coherence, in the final 
analysis, certain 'facts' proved to be more fundamental than others. 
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speaking areas, as well as a form of vicarious political control, which the British could 
eventually utilise. 
It has already been stated that, in the course of assembling the 'grand scheme, ' the 
intelligence gatherers in Cairo and Khartoum were forced to rely on a small number of 
informants with interests of their own. Invariably, these people furnished their 
correspondents with sel f-rational i sing historical collateral. This included the notion that the 
Turks were usurpers of the caliphate which rightly belonged to an Arab of Qurayshite 
descent, and the idea that possession of the Holy Cities was an established prerequisite of 
retaining the caliphate. They also stressed the importance of Islam being led from an 
independent state. Although the British convinced themselves that 'orientals' were easily 
deceived by outward show, i. e. nominal independence and the trappings of sovereignty, as 
their informants gained confidence they gradually introduced the idea that even for a 
'spiritual' caliphate to succeed it must be supported by a sound political and economic 
base. For a brief period, policy advisers in Cairo were torn between advocating a strong 
Arab empire, and exploiting the fact by insisting on a more or less beleaguered Arab 
caliphate, since a friendly Arab caliphate, once established, would obviate the need for 
genuine independence. 
It may be concluded that the British caliphate idea was the result of imperial necessity and 
not the blind inheritance, and unilateral imposition of orientalist preconceptions. This is 
not to say that preconceptions were not at play, or that orientalist elements were not 
brought to bear on the situation. Rather, these resulted from the specific engagement with 
'orientals' who tended to confirm such notions for their own ends. What such engagements 
illustrate, the encounter with al-Faruqi being an outstanding example, is that power and 
knowledge are not equipollent. While conceding that a weaker party may well feign to 
conform to the dominant power's view of the world with to some effect, 8 there are 
fundamental limits, both to the extent to which the underlying social reality may be 
transformed as a result, and, consequently, to the ultimate success of any project based 
upon such (self-) deception. In other words, an imperial enterprise based upon such 
dialogue may fail on account of factors which exist independently of it. Remarkably. 
certain political intelligence officers were able to historicise the institution of the caliphate 
8 This is the theme of much post-colonialist writing on India, for example. 
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at an early stage which opened up possibilities for its future. Unfortunately for the British, 
however, these were without obvious limit. Their misapprehension, therefore, was over 
social contextual prerequisites of successful collaboration and not over the nature of the 
caliphate itself. 
9.03 ExDlaininLy the Failure of the Arab Calinhate Idea 
It is evident from the foregoing reconstruction that, even in its pristine abstractness, a 
closer examination of the British vision reveals deep structural flaws and potentially fatal 
contradictions. Firstly, the functional separation of 'spiritual' from 'temporal' authority, 
which was less of a problem for an already established power like the Ottoman sultan- 
caliph, would become a stumbling block for Sharif Husayn. The mistake was to 
misconstrue 'functional separation' as 'total disarticulation. ' Whereas the British had 
chosen the Sharif on the assumption that his extensive 'spiritual authority' would be 
exercised from a restricted 'temporal' base, in practice his religious standing counted for 
little as long as he effected no real political and military power. The British made the 
mistake of thinking that because the established caliphate had been reduced to a condition 
of nominal authority, an alternative caliphate possessing only nominal status could be 
created exnihilo. Secondly, the denial of Christian access to the vicinity of the Holy Cities 
was the most trivial aspect of what turned out to be a more intractable problem: that the 
Sharif of Mecca's standing within Islam - the precise reason for Britain seeking an alliance 
with him in the first place - meant that he could receive no direct, or visible aid from a 
Christian power. 
It soon became apparent during the course of the Arab Revolt of 1916 that under his own 
resources Sharif Husayn could attract no reliable following amongst either the tribes- 
people of the Peninsula or amongst the city-dwellers further afield. In terms of the logic of 
imperial collaboration, it has been shown how, as a consequence of their own ignorance 
and the lack of a viable alternative, the political intelligence establishment in Cairo failed 
to locate the precise balance of dependence/independence required in a successful 
collaborative relationship. 
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Unfortunately for him, Husayn's lack of religious standing among the tribes, or rather its 
irrelevance, would not exempt him from the charge of collaborating with infidels, in the 
wider Muslim world. Four months into the Revolt T. E. Lawrence wrote: 
I do not think there is really much religious antipathy to Christians landing in the Hejaz. On 
the Turkish side the religious cry would be used as a stick with which to heat the Sherif .... 
and on the Arab side it is used as an excuse to hide the really political objections to our 
coming. 9 
In fact what Lawrence was describing were various manifestations of anti-imperialism 
rationalised and legitimised through the language of Islam. What many of Lawrence's 
recondite intelligence reports indicated, was that the nature of tribal politics meant that 
allegiance could only be secured by 'gifts' of gold and cash. When the flow of cash 
stopped so did the allegiance. In spite of the necessarily clandestine and low-key nature of 
British support, this made Lawrence's guerrilla war an unusually expensive business. 
In the final reckoning, Sharif Husayn's supposed religious credentials, coupled with his 
dependence on Britain, put him at a disadvantage vis-t)-vis his Arabian rivals. A brief 
comparison with 'Abd al-'Aziz bin Sa'ud is apposite. The Sharif of Mecca, unlike other 
tribal chieftains, did not rely primarily on income from trade or on the exploitation of the 
tribal political system, but on income derived from the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The 
latter was limited in quantity, duration and obviously confined to a certain area. Neither did 
Sharif Husayn's secular ambitions find resonance in the cosmopolitan milieu of Mecca 
where most of the citizens were not Arab. Quite simply, Sharif Husayn's location within 
the social and economic structure of Arabia was not conducive to state building, and, ipso 
facto, not properly suited to collaboration from an imperial point of view. Ibn Sa'Lid, on the 
other hand, was more effectively integrated into the tribal political, and economic, system. 
More importantly, however, he had the foresight to embark on a programme of agricultural 
settlement which would provide a stable tax base as well as the recruiting ground for a 
standing army, in other words, the foundations of a state. Unlike Sharif Husayn, Ibn Sa'Lid 
was able to transform his own structural capacities, and in a very objective sense, enhance 
his suitability for imperial collaboration. This would seem to be a more satisfactory form 
of explanation than one elucidated in terms of the success of one department's romantic 
FO 882 Vol. V, HRG 16/57, Report by T. E. Lawrence, 27 October 1916. 
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proclivities over another: specifically, those of the Government of India over those of 
Cairo and the Foreign Office. 
There remains the question of the precise relationship between the central contradiction of 
the original caliphate scheme, essentially a logical one, and the practical limitations 
inherent in Sharif Husayn's social structural location. One is forced to speculate what 
might have been the outcome had Britain been able to aid Husayn openly and directly. Tile 
likely result is that the caliphate project would have failed for the same reasons that it did 
anyway. Although it is conceivable that unlimited amounts of gold and cash may have 
secured widespread tribal allegiance, this would have been self-defeating since the salience 
of the British caliphate idea was that it provided a cheap, arms-length solution to the 
problem of British intervention in the Middle East. In this sense the logical contradiction, 
although operative in the sense that it precluded Britain from certain actions, was 
ultimately superfluous and not a critical factor in explaining the demise of the Sharifian 
caliphate idea. However, the problems connected with an important Islamic dignitary being 
closely associated with a Christian power undoubtedly contributed to Husayn's eventual 
exclusion from the Sharifain Arab 'faqade. ' 
The conclusion that the British, Sharifian caliphate project failed on account of Sharif 
Husayn's structural incapacity should not be seen a-, deriving solely from retrospective 
historical inquiry, since it is evidenced by numerous intelligence reports, mostly those of T. 
E. Lawrence and C. E. Wilson, drafted during the early months of the Arab Revolt. In 
other words, the abandonment of the Britain's Arab caliphate aspirations, or at least the 
gradual appreciation that they were unrealisable in the terms in which they had originally 
been constructed, coincided with the assimilation of information gathered in attempting to 
implement the Cairo 'Grand plan. ' It was precisely at the point of their attempting to give 
concrete expression to what had been an entirely abstract scheme that theory failed in the 
face of practice, and from whence matters of departmental and romantic preference 
followed. 
By the summer of 1916 Britain began to play down Husayn's caliphate ambitions having 
become increasingly embarrassed by their vanity since they were clearly incommensurate 
with his actual capacity for self-aggrandisement. Although the preference for an Arab 
caliphate was not abandoned entirely, by the end of 1916 the objective had been deferred 
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indefinitely, and the 'official' policy of non-interference was now zealously endorsed - 
hypocritically so when used in attempts to stall Sharif Husayn's belated bid for the 
caliphate. Although the British eventually came to understand the implications of the 
Treaty of Kuquk Kaynarci for European, Christian empires some one hundred and forty 
four years later courtesy of the Italian and Dutch academe, the idea of an Arab caliphate 
was already a dead letter. This lesson, once leamt, was applied whilst negotiating the 
Treaty of Lausanne in ensuring that the juridical device of a caliphate with extra-territorial 
authority (first created by the Turks in 1774) which the British had failed to bring into their 
own service, was finally abrogated. When Sharif Husayn, as 'King of the Hijaz, ' finally 
made his rather bungled claim to the caliphate, the viability of the endeavour was treated 
with virtual disdain. 
Whether Husayn ever experienced feelings of malicious satisfaction as Britain encountered 
the kind of trouble in Palestine and Iraq which the caliphate scheme had been conceived to 
forestall, is not recorded. In any case the British had already moved on to the policy of an 
'Arab faqade, '10 more accurately, a Sharifian Arab faqade, though, ironically, one which 
excluded the Sharif of Mecca. It was soon realised that the need for a 'principle of unity' 
which Britain's backing of an Arab caliphate was designed to satisfy, was no longer 
required, since there was no corresponding political class which existed throughout Arabia 
which could challenge British hegemony in all its guises. As regards the 'Islamic bogey, ' it 
was realised, also during the early months of the Revolt, that there had been no 'general 
rising of Islam' on account of the economic diversity of the Muslim world and the 
divisions to which it had been subjected by imperial powers. 
" It was for precisely such 
reasons that the caliphate conferences of 1926 were unable to choose a successor to the 
Ottoman caliphate and that the institution lapsed indefinitely. It was in this way, and not 
through British intrigue, that the sine qua non of de Bunsen was eventually satisfied. 
Ultimately, the facts of the Arabian social structure in conjunction with the effects of local 
nationalism and global imperialism, had rendered the Sharifian caliphate project both 
inoperable, and unnecessary. 
10 LJP&S/10/807, War Cabinet Eastern Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Thursday, Nov. 21,19 18. 
" This conclusion, too, was gleaned from a continental source, this time a German one. See Chapter 7, Note 
96. 
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9.04 Matters for Further Research 
This thesis might well have been subtitled: 'A Case Study in the Production of Knowledge 
under Conditions of Imperialism. ' The comparison made in Chapters 2 and 3 between 
Britain's part in the Hijaz crises of 1879-80 and 1913-14 resulted in the conclusion that 
since there had been no textual or biographical continuity between the two episodes, the 
first could not be construed as a prototype for the second. Rather, the first Hijaz crisis was 
described as an historical paradigm, discernible only by retrospective objective analysis 
and not to those taking part. Consequently, the formal similarities underlying the 
correspondence of interests between Britain and the Sharif of Mecca in each instance has 
been explained in terms of the re-emergence of necessity, and the rediscovery of 
objectively available techniques, rather than a continuous legacy of area 'expertise. ' Where 
historical example has been brought into play by imperialists, it has been selected 
according to its usefulness in terms of pre-set objectives arising from imperial compulsion. 
This gives the appearance that such 'knowledge' reproduces itself autonomously (Said's 
'intertextuality'), whereas the components of such knowledge (the phenomena of Said's 
orientalism 12 ) are constantly, and consciously, re-selected. 
The question that arises from this recapitulation, and which lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis, is an epistemological one regarding the nature of what, provisionally, may be 
termed 'imperial knowledge. ' It would have been tempting to conclude that the political 
intelligence community could, and should, have learnt the lessons of history. However, it is 
suggested here that the exigencies of imperial competition require prompt action, and that, 
in any case, there is no such thing as once-and-for-all success in such matters since 
imperialism always produces victims, and victims always produce resistance. This fact is 
inherent in the logic of imperial collaboration. Empires are, by their very nature, 
vulnerable, transient and subject to paranoia, and, paradoxically, always in a state of 
loosing even when they are winning. It is precisely when an empire attains its greatest 
extent that strength is turned into its opposite: weakness and vulnerability. In so far as 
empires are deemed to be successful in their own terms, this is invariably the result of 
military and economic compulsion and not because political solutions have been found to 
the problems of compelling other peoples and other economies to yield to the imperial will. 
12 Aziz al-Azmeh has referred to Edward Said's Orientalism as a 'phenomenology of Orientalism. ' at- 
Azmeh, 198 1, p. 390. 
306 
It is suggested here that the perpetual necessity of intervention and re-intervention in order 
to control actual resources immediately, or potential resources prophylactically, ensures 
that the lessons of history cannot be leamt since they are only likely to indicate that 
'successful' collaboration is virtually impossible. Furthermore, as this study has shown, 
dependence on informants with interests of their own is unavoidable. To the extent that 
imperial incursions may be deemed successful, such success is achieved in spite of, and 
conceivably, because of, the ignorance of the imperialist. Besides which, there is always 
the need to rationalise, and, moreover, self-rationalise, each new imperial intervention and 
each continuing imperial presence. With self-rationalisation comes self-deception. This is 
not to say that the imperialist has no requirement for objective knowledge. However, such 
knowledge tends to be assimilated at a very instrumental level, that is, in relation to very 
specific tasks subsumed under the 'head project' of a given imperial intervention 
The recent controversy surrounding the gathering and use of military and political 
intelligence in preparation for the war against Iraq would make an equally pertinent case 
study in relation to the same question of epistemology. Many of the problems encountered 
by the 'Allies' since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 are associated with a reliance on a single 
source of information who, like al-Faruqi, had an interest in a certain outcome which only 
outside (in this instance US) intervention could bring about. Just as the British had hoped 
to rule Arabia 'behind the veil of Islam, ' the 'Allies' hoped to 'decapitate' the Ba'thist 
regime and insert a coterie headed by Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress, itself 
a US sponsored organisation, through which the US would assert its interests. Once the 
policy of 'decapitation' failed in practice it became necessary to destroy the country and 
the very structures upon which the 'Allies' had intended to rely. Naturally, Chalabi told the 
US government exactly what it wanted to hear and he became their 'authentic' source in 
the same way that al-Faruqi, among others, had served the British in 1915. In neither 
instance did the question of deception arise since 'intelligence' was gathered in the service 
of policies which had already been determined. The contrast between science and Stich 
'intelligence' (i. e. 'imperial knowledge') may be illustrated by imagining the consequence 
if science were to serve engineering design in exactly the same way. Except by pure 
chance, there would not be a bridge capable of supporting traffic, nor a dwelling fit to live 
in. Of relevance here, however, is that engineering know-how could not develop 
accumulatively, since each new structural whim would require a unique post- 
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rational i sation. Furthermore it is no coincidence that the present intelligence services, like 
the Arab Bureau before it, are responsible for information gathering and the dissemination 
of propaganda. For the reasons just described the products of these ostensibly separate 
functions may, under certain circumstances, become virtually indistinguishable. 
What the present case study confirms is that 'imperial knowledge' is perpetually re- 
assembled episodically and, unlike scientific knowledge, does not accumulate. This would 
now seem to be the view of Edward Said, when, in relation to the whole history of imperial 
intervention in the Middle East, he affirms that, 'Each of these phases and eras produces its 
own distorted knowledge of the other, each its own reductive images, its own disputatious 
polemics. ' [emphases added] 13 Furthermore, to the imperialist, 'facts' do not always 
present themselves as quanta of knowledge, but frequently as the bullets and bombs of 
resistance. Such 'facts' must be explained away. To grasp the whole picture would be to 
undermine the entire project of empire. The active imperialist, therefore, must be in a 
constant 'state of denial. ' When the dialectician cries: 'Always totalise' the imperialist 
must reply: 'Never! ' 
13 Said, 2003. This formulation stands in contrast to the continuous, autonomous, and, ultimately, paralogical 
discourse implied by the mechanism of intertextuality. 
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